

CHRISTIAN RAKOVSKI (1873–1941)

A Political Biography

FRANCIS CONTE

Translated from the French by A. P. M. Bradley

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER
DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK

1989

DK 268 .R34 C6513 1989

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, NO. CCLVI

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ISBN 0-88033-153-4

Library of Congress Card Catalog Number 88-72220

Printed in the United States of America

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Preface to the American Edition

An American edition of this study appears at a time when the very idea of having the book published in the Soviet Union is no longer utopian. The lively discussions that take place currently among Soviet historians and even within the Soviet Communist Party itself open many new doors.

The willingness of the present Soviet leaders to consider the fundamental issues facing the Soviet Union has led them, inevitably, to look at the past and, particularly, at the actions of the founders of the system, at those members of the Leninist team who almost all were the victims of the show trials of the years 1936–1938. Among those one finds Christian Rakovski. The reader will be able to look at his life, that of a revolutionary and “citizen of the world” who has contributed extensively to the organization of the social–democratic movement in the Balkans before tying his fate to that of the young Soviet state immediately after the Revolution of 1917.

Since the purges, Rakovski belongs to those major leaders of the October Revolution who became non–persons, whose names have been forgotten not only, naturally, in the West but also, and especially, in the Soviet Union even though their role was capital in the establishment of the communist system.

In 1927, at the time of his expulsion from the Party as a member of the Trotskyite opposition, Rakovski was still able to publish his autobiography in the *Encyclopédie Granat*. Three years later, following his relocation in Astrakhan and, then, in Siberia, the *Malaja Sovetskaja Entsiklopedia* included in its columns an honest and accurate biography of the man. On the other hand, the *Sovetskaia Istoricheskaia Entsiklopedia*, of more recent vintage, failed to mention his name. Nor does it mention the names of other victims of Stalin who were not rehabilitated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress.

Does Mikhail Gorbachev intend to expedite the reassessment of the twenty years—1917–1937—which have largely shaped the Soviet Union of today? Since his advent to power Gorbachev has abandoned the traditional orthodoxy so characteristic of the Brezhnev period in favor of a newer and more realistic understanding of issues and problems. Many of his views and positions are similar to those of the Russian revolutionaries of the beginning of the century who questioned

and argued over the validity of all certitudes be they political, economic, or social. However, the Gorbachev team has chosen to ignore the fact that the instruments of totalitarianism were in place under Lenin and stress instead the relative democracy which prevailed in the early years of the Bolshevik Party even after the elimination of all possible factionalism in 1921. It is also true that during the NEP there arose possibilities of diversification identified particularly with Trotsky and Bukharin. But all this ended with the elimination of these two leaders and the advent of Stalin and Stalinism.

Destalinization only began in 1956 since the Stalinist generation was entrenched. Alternatives to Stalinism could only be condemned. With the current reassessment of Stalin and Stalinism those leaders who offered alternatives, such as Bukharin and Rykov can be rehabilitated, and even Trotsky is becoming less Manichaean.

Gorbachev now believes that the people who made the revolution should no longer be "pushed into the shade." On the eve of the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution he went so far as to say that "there should be no forgotten names and blank pages in Soviet history and literature." In his search for "socialist pluralism" Gorbachev finds common ground with certain revolutionaries who were anti-Stalinist, most notably with Christian Rakovski. Was it not Rakovski who fought for the internal democratization of the Party, against bureaucratization and all-encompassing authoritarianism? Did he not show in April 1930, in what may be regarded as his political testament, that one of the greatest dangers facing the system was the recreation of a ruling class totally isolated from the people, from the working masses that had no rights? Herein lies the current significance of Rakovski who was rehabilitated legally at the beginning of January 1988 and who in the Summer of the same year was rehabilitated politically and reintegrated into the ranks of the Party.

Since that time, the director of the Soviet publishing house "Relations Internationales" has approached the author with a view to publication, in Moscow, of Rakovski's biography (for the period 1917-1941) while a bibliography of Rakovski's Bulgarian works is being put together in Sofia. It will be a collaborative work of this author and historians of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and will be a companion volume to the Romanian publication *Scrieri social-politice (1900-1916)*, București, Editura Politică.

Thus, book by book, stone, by stone, the historic truth is being reestablished.

Chapter 1

Bulgarian Origins and Family Traditions (1873-1890)

I

Christian Georgevich Rakovski was born on 1 August 1873 at Kotel, a small town in the mountains of central Bulgaria. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Kotel was already an important administrative and economic center, and his family belonged to the well-to-do stratum of society.¹

On his father's side, Christian did not inherit anything to influence him in his revolutionary career. His father, Georgi Rakovski, was one of the Bulgarian middle class, who accepted the political and economic domination of his country by the Ottoman Empire together with the Greek hegemony in the cultural and spiritual sphere. There is a consensus among historians that Bulgaria, until about 1850, had lagged behind other Balkan peoples in their struggle for independence from the Turks. Like all the educated elite in Bulgaria, Christian's father had learned Greek at school, very few books being printed in Bulgarian at that time.² However, all his life, Christian's father was interested in literature; the books that he collected for his library were going to help Christian in his education. Although he did not attend Roberts College in Constantinople,³ like other scions of rich Bulgarian families, Christian's father spent several months every year in the Ottoman capital on business. Being a liberal, and influenced by Voltaire in the same way as many Balkan people in the 1880s, he was a member of the Bulgarian Democratic party and, as such, was repeatedly elected as councilor of Mangalia, the nearest town of his landholdings.⁴ Upon his death, he left a sizeable fortune to Christian, which enabled him, in his early life, to travel and study all over Europe and, later, to help out financially many of his socialist friends and several Bulgarian, Romanian or Russian publications.

On his mother's side, Rakovski inherited very different traditions and more "subversive" leanings. His mother came from a family that had distinguished itself in the cultural and political revival of the independent state of Bulgaria. While his father's family looked to Turkey for their business transactions, on his mother's side they turned to Russia to help Bulgaria free herself from the Turkish yoke.

In this context, it may be interesting to examine the relations between Rakovski's family and Russia, in the light of the bonds Christian would later have in that country. Under George Hutza's influence, Bulgarian separatists regarded Russia's interest in the Balkan countries not as showing any wish to enlarge her empire, but simply to help them attain freedom.⁵ This is why a relation of his mother, Captain Georgi Mamarchev Buyukli, had enlisted as an officer in the Russian army under General Dibich-Zabalkanski during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829. Mamarchev was born in Kotel, and, from 1810, was member of *Zemskoe-Bolgarskoe Voisko*; in 1829, when Russian troops stormed Silistra, a town occupied by the Turks, the patrol he was leading showed much fighting spirit, and Mamarchev was commended for it.⁶ However, when the war ended with the Treaty of Adrianople, which gave no advantage to Bulgaria, he decided to act without the Russians, even in spite of them. Thus, Mamarchev set up a training center at Sliven, whence Bulgarian nationalists had taken weapons from a Turkish barracks. To avoid Russia being blamed for the revolt, General Dibich-Zabalkanski sent 200 Cossacks to arrest Mamarchev. Despite loud protests by his fellow countrymen, the Russian general would not allow the Bulgarian captain to act independently. Instead, he chose a diplomatic way out of his dilemma, appointing him as mayor of Silistra, the last Bulgarian city held by the Russians under the Treaty of Adrianople. Mamarchev could be kept under close watch and be rewarded for his bravery in the war, especially in capturing the city.

This did not put an end to Mamarchev's rebelliousness: in 1834, he got in touch with some of his fellow patriots, mostly tradesmen and craftsmen, who dreamt of their country's liberation. Trnovo, the old capital, was chosen to become the base of their movement, and the conspirators met secretly in the Plakovo Monastery, whose abbot shared their enthusiasm. Mamarchev and his friends hoped the uprising would bring about a Russian intervention and eventually Bulgaria's freedom. The Bulgarian army of liberation would consist of the 2,000 workers rounded up by the Turks to repair the fortress of Varna. Unfortunately the plotters were betrayed by a rich peasant from Elena. Immediate retaliation followed; several conspirators were hanged; the abbot was jailed, only to die later under torture. As for Mamarchev, he was not executed because he was regarded as a Russian; he was imprisoned in Asia Minor and later on the island of Samos, where ironically he suffered cruel treatment at the hands of a fellow Bulgarian who had been appointed governor of the island for services rendered. Two years later, in 1896, Mamarchev was to die from the harsh treatment meted out by his renegade brother.⁷

Mamarchev was first cousin to the mother of a revolutionary leader called Georgi Sava Rakovski, another outstanding member of this family of big merchants, who became famous for strong patriotic feelings and hatred of oppressors.⁸ A poet, revolutionary, and ideological founding father of the national liberation movement, Georgi Sava Rakovski was a leading figure in the political and cultural history of Bulgaria for over twenty-five years, from 1840 to 1867.⁹ Because of his ceaseless activity and colorful personality, historians rightly call him the "Patriarch" of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement.

He was born in Kotel in 1821, a town protected by his maternal ancestors from raids by *kurdjali*, famous mountain bandits of the eighteenth century. Educated at first in the Greek-Bulgarian school of Rayno Popovich, he subsequently attended the Greek School at Constantinople, and later Athens University, which had just been opened.¹⁰ Influenced by Greek culture, which at the time was much more sophisticated than the Bulgarian, it nonetheless confirmed him in his faith of a Bulgarian cultural renaissance. In addition, these newly established Greek schools and universities were imbued with the spirit of nationalism and liberal ideas spread recently through Europe by the French Revolution. He became acquainted with young Greek revolutionaries, who were busy organizing nationalist uprisings in Crete and Thessaly. Imitating his Greek acquaintances, he and his friend Ilarion decided to found a secret society, The Macedonian Organization. While Sava Rakovski's revolutionary activity cannot be examined in detail, the similarity with his nephew's is striking.

Both had boundless faith in revolution: without a doubt, this faith became the mainspring of their lives, thoughts, and actions. Its strength derived, in both cases, from an exceptional intellectual ability and energy. Sava Rakovski was the embodiment of the Bulgarian renaissance. His interests ranged from problems of education and agriculture to those of the autonomous Bulgarian church and the leadership of the revolutionary movement. He was also concerned with leading the revolutionary movement, and earned his people's respect for his efforts in the struggle for freedom. Nevertheless, because of his illegal activities, Sava Rakovski was to be hunted by police forces and European governments like his nephew later on. With Turkish, Bulgarian, Romanian, Austrian, and Greek authorities looking for him, Sava Rakovski sought sanctuary in France for a while, choosing Marseilles to live in exile; forty years later, his nephew, expelled from all Bulgarian schools for revolutionary activities, would also leave for France to take up medical studies at Montpellier University.

To a certain extent, one can say that the revolutionary tactics advocated by Sava Rakovski were similar to those contained in Bol-

shevik doctrine. He helped to change the Bulgarian revolutionary movement from spontaneous peasant risings to organized revolutionary struggle. He changed the objectives of groups of rebels hiding out in the mountains—*hajdutsi*—from personal revenge to national liberation. As a military leader he broke new ground by creating *cheti*, strictly disciplined detachments based abroad; their aim was to intervene, at the right moment, in backing up a popular rebellion. As early as 1841, he set up one of these units in Romania to invade Bulgaria. Twenty years later, in 1861, while the Prince of Serbia was making plans to free his country from Turkish domination, Sava Rakovski was allowed to organize the first Bulgarian Legion on Serbian territory in order to start an uprising in Bulgaria timed to coincide with the Serbian uprising. However, when the dispute between Turkey and Serbia was settled by diplomatic means with the support of the Great Powers, Sava Rakovski became an embarrassment and, once again, had to go into hiding. Once before, when he had been amnestied and allowed to go back to Kotel, his political enemies decided to ruin him, mostly because he and his father had exposed them for misappropriation of public funds. For being public-spirited, they were sentenced to seven years in jail, which brought the whole family to financial ruin; to save her father and husband, Sava Rakovski's wife was forced to "buy them back" from the authorities. Christian Rakovski himself recorded in his autobiography all the troubles and unpleasantness facing his family in their fight for justice:

Their political opponents took revenge on my family and they were left defenseless, excommunicated; all contact with neighbors was forbidden to such an extent that, in days when matches were in short supply and people used to go to neighbors for a light, they had to put up with being cold and hungry to pay for the political sins of father and brothers. My mother was still a little girl at the time, and Sava Rakovski had long been dead when I was born, but memories were still fresh enough in my mother's and grandmother's minds to feed my imagination.¹¹

From an early age, Christian Rakovski grew up in the atmosphere of his uncle's revolutionary activities and could reflect on their significance. Both men were intellectuals who were to play a part as actors and spectators on the revolutionary stage. Indeed, Sava Rakovski was also a poet, well-known for his poem entitled *Gorski putnik* (*The Traveler in the Wilds*), in which he draws a romantic picture of amorous brigands and separatists, who took to the mountains to carry on the fight against the Turks. He was also a successful

publicist who founded several newspapers during his peregrinations: notably *Dunavski lebed* (*Danube Swan*) published in Belgrade in 1860, *Buduchnost* (*The Future*) and *Branitel* (*Protector*), which came out in 1864 when Sava Rakovski had to go into exile in Romania. He was also a considerable theoretical writer, and his "Plan for Liberating Bulgaria," written in 1861, gave a detailed account of all the military and psychological, rather than political, preparation necessary for the men who were to become *cheti*.¹²

Early in the twentieth century, Christian Rakovski recalled two basic ideas in his uncle's analysis: first, the small Balkan nations had to form a confederation in order to gain independence; second, a Russian intervention in the Balkans could bring about, in a short space of time, the liberation of Bulgaria.¹³ Christian took it up again in 1918: tsarist Russia which he had vehemently condemned for its policy of expansion had just collapsed;¹⁴ he put all his hope for a revolution in the Balkan area on the impetus of the Bolshevik revolution centered on Moscow.¹⁵

In his autobiography Rakovski emphasized the attraction he felt for Russia as a child. The family traditions became a reality when he saw for himself the 1877-1878 war between Russia and Turkey. This is how he recalled it:

I was only five years old, but I have in my mind a confused picture of Russian soldiers going through the Balkans. Our house was one of the best in town, and this is why it was chosen to quarter top-ranking officers. I met General Totleben, who organized the siege of Plevna. I lived with Prince Vyazemski, major general of the Bulgarian militia, who recovered in our house for forty days after being wounded. Some officers were connected with the underground movement, and the family annals recorded their saying: "We are giving you freedom, but who will free us?"¹⁶

Yet the life of Rakovski's family was upset by the war, mostly by the Berlin Conference altering the Treaty of San Stefano in favor of Romania, and causing Bulgaria to be dismembered. In 1880, they had to move to Gherence, a small village near Constanța in the Romanian Dobrudja where most of their property was.

II

Like his forefathers, Christian started his education in Kotel, and his mother went on teaching him when they arrived in Dobrudja. Later his parents took him back to Bulgaria to finish his first year of primary school and then start at the *gymnasium* in Varna. These years between 1880 and 1890 happened to be a time when, in Romania and

Bulgaria, "even the youngest children were interested in politics" particularly in social problems.¹⁷ From his earliest childhood, Christian was fascinated by "existential problems," but clearly preferred to act them out in his own life. As he subsequently showed, he felt morally compelled to translate his reflection into action: his sense of human solidarity urged him to take practical steps and sharpened his will to act. Thus, when he was fourteen, he was expelled from all Bulgarian schools for participating in an "important revolt" that started with him and other pupils from a mixture of political resentment and dislike of the teachers.¹⁸ The revolt became so widespread that the school authorities had to call in the army to calm the excited school-boys. Christian happened to be one of the arrested "ringleaders," and thus spent the year 1888 studying at home, in a house the family owned on the shore of the Black Sea of Mangalia.

In the autumn of 1888, he was allowed to resume his schooling in a Bulgarian school, and decided to enter the Gabrovo gymnasium. The next two years were most important for his intellectual development; his political ideas took shape at this stage of his life. From being a follower of Rousseau and his social ideas he changed, under the influence of his teacher, Evtim Dabev, a veteran of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, into a Marxist.

To start with, Christian was undoubtedly influenced by the Christian religion, but only in an emotional way and by the vague concept of "Christian communism." Thus, at the age of sixteen, he walked back to Kotel, where his ancestors had staged many a revolt against the Turks and mountain bandits. He went straight into the church, where from the pulpit he delivered a sermon on the early Christian church founded by Saint James.¹⁹ In fact, this was his first revolutionary peroration, and many followed—inspired by the same emotions though not the same ethical concepts. His new faith was shaped by the reading of Rousseau, who became his prophet. In the *Contrat Social*, Christian discovered Rousseau's hatred of private property and made it his own. He equally accepted his "prophet's" love of individual freedom, equality between men, and the vindication of the right to revolt if the social contract was infringed upon. Rousseau's fundamental assertion that "though man was born free, he nonetheless lives in chains" appealed to him strongly. It was complemented by another of Rousseau's ideas on social inequality: "You will be lost, if you forget that the fruit of the earth belongs to every one and the earth belongs to no one." Young Christian was amazed by these ideas and saw in them a challenge to the social and political order of his country, which was still medieval. He hailed the new power for the people instead of the old tyranny, the natural piety man was born

with in place of the established church with its antiquated institutions and dogmas. Finally, he admired the way Rousseau made education more humane. He had to share all his discoveries with the other students and set to convert them without delay. Together with Sava Balabanov, he published a duplicated underground journal, *Zerkalo* (*Mirror*), which undoubtedly reflected their readings and thoughts; one could find in it "Rousseau's ideas on education, the struggle of the poor, examples of teachers' injustice, etc."²⁰ As usual, Rakovski put his ideas into practice: he started his career as a publicist, giving vein to the optimistic ideas that would be his throughout his life: man was born with a good nature, but society was evil and had to be drastically changed.

Rakovski already felt dissatisfied with mere verbal protests; he had to act. With a few friends he started "a little propaganda among the peasants" circulating underground publications from Geneva that had been translated into Bulgarian. But, as he himself commented later with good humor, "their influence did not spread beyond the college walls." Through lengthy discussions with friends—an exercise he always enjoyed—his political views soon crystallized during the last year he spent in the Gabrovo *gymnasium*.

At the time, the giant strides taken by the European intelligentsia in the fields of scientific, social, and philosophical research were becoming known among Balkan students. Recalling the intellectual climate of the 1880-1890 decade, Cantacuzino, the famous Romanian doctor, wrote of "the overwhelming storm of ideas and feelings" that was raging in the Balkans:²¹ it came from the organized struggle of the Western proletariat against industrial capitalism, the theory of evolution in biology, Hegel's pantheism and Marx's violent social criticism, Beethoven's or Wagner's angry cries.²² Soon, under Evtim Dabev's guidance, Rakovski started studying Marx and Engels; he became in Trotsky's opinion, a sound theoretician.

In 1890, Dabev asked Rakovski to help him with the publication of "The Development of Scientific Socialism" by Engels.²³ Vera Zasluch's introduction had to be amended to adapt it to conditions in Bulgaria (it had been written for the Russian edition).²⁴ When this fact came to be known by the authorities, Rakovski was banned from all Bulgarian schools, this time forever.

The young man (he was seventeen then) was not unduly disturbed by this sentence: being expelled for "subversive" activities was going to become so commonplace in his life that, in the end, he regarded it as a suitable means of drawing public attention to "the barbarity and reactionary corruption" of a government that banned him. He only saw in it the need to move on to a country that would

make revolutionary action possible for him. In 1890, he set out first for Geneva as a student, then for Berlin, Montpellier, and all over Europe.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, university cities in France, Switzerland, and even England, became sanctuaries for a new Eastern European generation eager to learn about culture, independence, and the latest social theories. They wanted an education in philosophy, and were keen to find out about the idea of freedom made famous by the French Revolution.

As early as 1840, Romanian students, for example, had turned to France to acquire or complete an education. In that country, they found both the atmosphere congenial and sympathetic ears for their dream of independence. Liberal and university circles made them welcome. Historians such as Michelet and Edgar Quinet had rallied to their cause; Paris had become the headquarters of young men who absorbed its culture and would be faithful to it even after returning to their birthplace.²⁵

Around 1895, Montpellier University had a large colony of foreign students, the largest after Paris. This was partly due to the old reputation of the medical school, attended by Rabelais, and to the fact that, in the eighteenth century, Montpellier was a winter resort known all over Europe. Moreover, paradoxically, it was thought in Russian *gymnasia* for both girls and boys that the French language there was the best spoken.²⁶ According to a witness, foreign students living then in Montpellier came from all over Eastern Europe: Greeks, Armenians, Turks, Bulgarians, and Russians; they studied, argued, and played cards all night, making an international political center, a powerhouse of revolutionary thought. There they dreamt up plans and systems for the day they would introduce a new order in their countries.²⁷

There was a similar atmosphere in Switzerland, mainly in Zurich and Geneva, where foreign students were the mainspring of the socialist movement at the university. In Geneva, for example, the *Cercle des étudiants socialistes* had only three Swiss members, while Russians, Bulgarians, and Armenians were numerous and formed the majority of the student population. Let us examine the Bulgarians who are the most interesting to us.²⁸

In the 1890s, Bulgarian students who had fled the regime of the dictator Stambulov, numbered 150. Whether right-wing or left-wing, they were all politically minded and well organized, forming three groups according to their political ideas. First came the socialist students called "chauvinists" or "careerists," who were bursars of the Bulgarian education ministry; they met in the club house of the so-

ciety they had founded, Bratsvo (Fraternity). Second, there was a group whose political beliefs were similar to those of most of the Russian students staying in Switzerland: they were populists, revolutionaries, anarchists—followers of Lavrov, Bakunin, or Kropotkin.²⁹ These students were strongly opposed to Plekhanov's ideas (he was the founding father of Russian Marxism); they thought not enough attention had been paid by Plekhanov to the political and social conditions affecting each country's peasant classes.³⁰ Last, there was a group of about thirty-five social democrat students, keen supporters of Plekhanov and Jules Guesde; they met regularly at the *Société des étudiants bulgares sociaux-démocrates* where there were facilities such as a reading room and library of socialist writings.

This society was very active, and had monthly meetings organized around lectures and discussions on wide-ranging topics from sociology to natural sciences and ethnography; great emphasis was given to the problems of workers' movements and socialism. The most popular speakers were, according to a reliable witness, Christian Rakovski and two of his friends, Sava Balabanov and Georgi Bakalov, who were the organizers.³¹ These student gatherings played a large part in the development of socialism at the time, and the rise of revolutionary movements in many Eastern European countries would be their mark in the future. In fact, in countries where large-scale industry was just beginning, socialism was nearly always imported from abroad. Thus, students working in Western countries did much to spread socialist ideas when they returned home.

After being expelled from the Gabrovo *gymnasium* in October 1890, Christian Rakovski decided to enroll at the medical school in Geneva. His reasons for choosing medical studies were almost entirely idealistic: he thought "it would give him an opportunity to get in touch with ordinary people."³² Since this wish could not be carried out while he was only a student, Christian soon lost interest, but, nevertheless, he passed his exams during the three years he spent in Geneva (1890-1893). What really interested him was to become acquainted with Russian political émigrés, particularly members of social democratic groups.

A few months after arriving in Geneva, he met Axelrod, Plekhanov, and Vera Zasulich, who would tell Trotsky around 1903 and 1904 of "the warm sympathy we all felt for young Rakovski;" she added that she appreciated, above all, his gift for polemics, for "he was implacable in discussions where vital principles were concerned, and showed remarkable personal and political courage."³³

It should be observed that this testimony came from a person who had dared to shoot at General Trepov, commanding officer of the St.

Petersburg police forces, when he had ordered a jailed student to be flogged.³⁴ On the other hand, Vera Zasulich was one of the founding members of the Russian Marxist school, and very soon came to value young Rakovski's ideological staunchness. On his part, he had long been fascinated by this revolutionary whose preface to a book written by Engels he had translated into Bulgarian. He admired her vast knowledge of history and philosophy, as well as her independent spirit: after a lifetime of exchanges with Marx, she had rejected any doubt the master might entertain as to the possibility of a revolutionary by the proletariat in Russia.³⁵

Rakovski also became friendly in those days with Plekhanov, who was to have a strong influence on the development of his political ideas and keep him away from Lenin's influence until the 1917 October Revolution.³⁶ Later, Plekhanov and Rakovski met often; it is well known that the founder of Russian Marxism liked to have lengthy conversations with the promising young Marxists he happened to meet. Lunacharski, who called on him in 1893 when Rakovski was still in Geneva, gives us a vivid account in his memoirs.³⁷ He relates how Plekhanov liked to invite young people to cross swords with him on political and philosophical subjects: "Sometimes he [Plekhanov] would play with me like a large dog playing with a small one, unexpectedly throwing me backwards with his big paw, at times he would become angry or expound his ideas in the most earnest manner."³⁸

III

During the three years he spent in Geneva, Rakovski became acquainted with the leaders of Russian Marxism, one of whom was Axelrod. He also worked with other socialist students: with his fellow Bulgarians studying in Geneva, Lausanne, and Montpellier, he made up his mind to help organize the "young socialist ideologues" who were beginning to appear on the European stage. They had to arrange meetings, organize lectures, and share in political fighting. About this time, he became a close friend of Rosa Luxemburg, who was a brilliant student at the University of Zurich and often came to Geneva; they worked together as militants, chairing groups of Marxist studies.³⁹ One of the points they often debated was the following: How do young socialists see themselves in relation to the proletariat, and who can help them define their role?

We have already commented on the interest shown by Russian political émigrés in the new generation of Marxists; they shared this interest with French socialists such as Guesde and Jaurès and German socialists ranging from Engels to W. Liebknecht. However, they were all wary of seeing an intellectual aristocracy rise from socialist

ranks: Engels thought they had to impress on students the need for an intellectual proletariat to emerge and play a major part in the revolution alongside their brothers, the manual workers.⁴⁰

Although Engels wanted students and workers to stand side by side in the approaching struggle, Plekhanov preferred to stress this point: intellectuals, mostly students, are nothing without a proletariat to give them strength and guidance. He also warned them quite sharply against fruitless separatism, which would only push them back toward the bourgeois society into which they had been born. Here is one of his pronouncements:

If it came to be isolated from the workers' movement, a socialist student movement would be no more than child's talk. You cannot mean this. Because you are proletarians, you will not cut yourselves off from the proletariat; on the contrary, you regard yourselves as belonging to it, you intend to spread its views in an area of society where bourgeois theories used to be dominant up to now. . . .⁴¹

Guesde's thinking was similar to Plekhanov's on this subject: he once proclaimed in front of students at a meeting in Toulouse that it would be increasingly difficult for them to belong to a real intellectual proletariat.⁴² Jaurès, on the other hand, viewed the situation of intellectuals in a more sympathetic, humane way; in his opinion, feeling was essential, being one of the noblest characteristics of mankind. He declared, distinguishing between the social background of students and proletariat:

What is remarkable is that young socialists are not inspired by a feeling of rebellion fuelled by self-interest, class interest. In my opinion, this is remarkable because they are undoubtedly Marxists, but they respect the idea of justice and generosity of conscience There is no question of putting forward personal claims, but adopting an attitude of renunciation, warm solidarity and self-denial.⁴³

The students wanted to give workers the scientific knowledge they had acquired. When they studied these statements, Marxist students such as Rakovski no doubt felt closer to Plekhanov and Guesde than to Jaurès. This was shown in the minutes of the Second International Congress, which took place in Geneva in December 1893.

The First International Congress of Socialist Students had taken place in Brussels in the winter of 1891-1892. Rakovski had been unable to attend, but closely followed the correspondence published in the *Etudiant Socialiste*, the mouthpiece of the International Secretariat based in Brussels at the time. Besides, he had corresponded

with the organizers for a long time, which would help him when, in the autumn of 1893, he was given the task of organizing the Second International Congress of Socialist Students, carrying out all "preliminary work."⁴⁴ Here, we must give a short analysis of this congress because it is a landmark both in the student socialist movement and in Rakovski's career.

Some historians called this congress a "minicongress," which may have been the case given the small number of participants, but it certainly had great significance for those present.⁴⁵

They met from 22 to 25 December 1893 in Geneva, where twenty-four socialist societies sent twenty-six of their members, representing nine nations: Germany, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Switzerland. Thanks to the contacts made by the organizers, especially Rakovski, in international socialist circles, this general meeting had an impact that should not be underestimated. The letter sent by Jaurès to the congress set the general tone: the socialist leader begged the students to be conscious of their responsibilities in the task of building the new socialist order. He stressed the need for "letting the young help us, for the old world of poverty, oppression and crime is ready to put up the most short-sighted and dangerous show of resistance."⁴⁶

The main objective for the congress was to draw up a program that could be common to all trends among socialist students. On the theoretical level, it ended with a resolution requiring students to study the principles of scientific socialism thoroughly, and to emphasize the unity of intelligentsia and workers in the struggle against the capitalist system.⁴⁷ The congress also analyzed some of the general problems facing society; one of them was to deal with "criminology from a social point of view," a subject of great interest to the new socialist generation. Four years later, Rakovski was to write a thesis at the end of his medical studies under the title of *Etiologie du crime et de la dégénérescence*, and the Italian socialist leader, Filippo Turati, chose a similar subject for his thesis: *Crime and Social Questions*.⁴⁸

Several journalists took the congress seriously enough to report on its conclusions: a leading provincial newspaper, *Dépêche de Toulouse*, made unfavorable comments on the final resolution, which was passed on 23 December, condemning state socialism. This condemnation was the result of the students trying to define the contents of real scientific socialism. These were the words:

The congress, while insisting on the need for an intervention on the part of existing public authorities—the intermediaries between proletariat and capitalists—declares that there is no common ground between state socialism and scientific

socialism: it is not in the worker's interest to have the police state back up by a bourgeois state both of which must be destroyed, not supported.⁴⁹

Rakovski was in full agreement with this resolution, which he had helped to draft. He had also proved an efficient organizer; Plekhanov had pledged himself to advise the young man whenever he encountered a difficulty.⁵⁰ Together with leading personalities of European socialism, Engels, Lafargue, Lavrov, and Jaurès, Plekhanov had sent his best wishes to the student congress, while apologizing for not attending in person. The spokesman of the congress, de Brucker, thanked the organizing committee and its chairman, Rakovski, "for the selfless generosity they showed in carrying out their difficult tasks."⁵¹

IV

As would be the case throughout his life, Rakovski could not be content with organizing meetings, directing Marxist study groups, or theoretical discussions; he wanted a wider audience, and he started to write. In fact he had embarked on a career as a translator, publicist, and writer while still in Geneva. He translated Gabriel Deville's book *Évolution du capital*, adding a lengthy introduction in which he analyzed economic conditions in Bulgaria.⁵² When the first Marxist journal, *Den (Day)*, was published in Bulgaria, together with the first social democrat weekly, *Rabotnik (Worker)*, and the daily, *Drugar*, he became one of their permanent correspondents, especially of the last. Sometimes half the edition was written by him, and he used several pseudonyms.⁵³

After a while, he published in Geneva a periodical in Bulgarian that resembled the one published abroad in Russian, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, not only because of its title but also because of its size and cover.⁵⁴ This shows how involved Rakovski was in the work of the founder of Russian Marxism. Plekhanov helped Rakovski at the start of the review, allowing him to translate several of his manuscript articles, to publish them in the Bulgarian *Sotsial-Demokrat*.⁵⁵ Rakovski edited the review for two years in Geneva (1892-1893) with the help of his friend, Sava Balabanov. Manuscripts were sent to Bulgaria where they were secretly printed in the village of Sevliyevo (near Gabrovo), thanks to the help of one Sava Musatov, who acted as technical advisor and proofreader.⁵⁶ Rakovski prepared each issue with his usual energy and, in the words of G. Bakalov:

Rakovski's brilliant talent showed in the pages of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. He was by then a convinced Marxist, worked

hard, kept a close watch on the proletarian movement throughout the world, and, in his articles full of revolutionary fire, he depicted the "beautiful scene of class struggle!"⁵⁷

In Geneva as well as Bulgaria, *Sotsial-Demokrat* soon acquired a reputation for the strict socialist lines it adopted. It was a focal point for members of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Union, who held views roughly similar to those of the Russian "economists": they were against the creation of a Social Democratic party in Bulgaria, since the times did not seem ripe for it yet. From their base in Geneva, Rakovski and his associates of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Society defended the policy of the union against the people who, under Dimitar Blagoev, had created the Bulgarian Social Democratic party in 1891.⁵⁸

During the summer of 1892, Rakovski back in his country for the holidays, once again advised against setting up an official socialist party there, for two basic reasons: Bulgaria was still economically underdeveloped, with no proletariat to speak of, and rural masses were, as yet, unprepared for coordinated social action. Besides, the dictatorial regime of Stambulov would inevitably suppress such an initiative. No one took any notice of this sound advice: the following year, the Bulgarian government took harsh measures against the socialist movement, which was no longer underground, so that it was soon wiped out; it only just survived because of Rakovski's and his friends' propaganda material sent from Geneva.⁵⁹

V

In 1893, Rakovski started on a "career" as a socialist representative to international congresses, a role he would play until the war in 1914. He was only twenty years old when he was chosen by Bulgarian social democrats to represent their country and express their opinion at the annual conference of the International Congress, which took place in Zurich in 1893. He was lucky enough then, as he said himself, to see and hear Friedrich Engels, to whom he had written occasionally, particularly at the time of the Second International Congress of Socialist Students.⁶⁰ The correspondence had started in 1892;⁶¹ Rakovski had then suggested to a member of the editorial board of the *Sotsial-Demokrat*—Stoyan Novok—sending to Engels, who was then living in London, a copy of the second issue of the review. Engels was kind enough to answer the questions they asked.⁶² In his third letter to Bulgarian students, he wrote "in other circumstances he would have been happy to write a special article for the Bulgarians, the youngest members of socialism."⁶³ Rakovski kept in touch with Engels, and when he had to turn to him, he did so through Vera Zasulich, who

was Engels' close friend.⁶⁴

At the congress in Zurich, Rakovski met Plekhanov again; he also met Jules Guesde and Rosa Luxemburg, who won his admiration by her "Joan of Arc" attitude throughout the conference.

As J. P. Nettl pointed out, it is a pity that we do not have records of the political friendship that sprang up between Rakovski and Rosa Luxemburg, since "they met regularly and enjoyed doing so on the occasion of each international congress of European socialist parties, up to 1914." Their political ideas were obviously quite close, above all on the question of nationalities. Rosa Luxemburg undoubtedly fell under the charm of the young man with his warm and enthusiastic personality, and she also must have admired his political courage. One has to admit, nevertheless, that Rakovski, who would become Trotsky's closest friend, would not be able to bring the latter and her together.⁶⁵

VI

After three years of ceaseless activity from his base in Geneva, Rakovski left for Berlin where he stayed for six months. In the autumn of 1893, he registered with the medical faculty, but he only wanted to know more about Germany and "to get closer to the workers' movement in Germany."⁶⁶ It did not take him long to make contact with German associations of socialist students, which were still illegal. This was probably the time he was introduced to Karl Liebknecht, one of those who founded the International Youth Movement. Christian kept up his work as a journalist and became the Balkan correspondent for the socialist newspaper *Vorwärts*, which had started two years earlier. This famous socialist leader, W. Liebknecht, who had founded the newspaper, became a friend of the young Bulgarian; he was very interested in the Balkans and socialist movements in Russia, Poland, and Romania, countries that were well-known to the latter.⁶⁷ Consequently, Rakovski met him once every fortnight and through him was introduced to other leaders of the German Social Democratic party.⁶⁸ Rakovski was very much influenced by the political ideas of the *starik* (the "old man," as he used to call W. Liebknecht), and kept up a steady correspondence and personal relations with him until 1900, when the elderly German leader died.⁶⁹

It may be appropriate to add that Rakovski's political life in Berlin was not confined to German socialist circles. He mixed mostly within the Russian colony, in keeping with his steadfast interest in the socialist movement of a country that would become his own. As he related in his autobiography, these were the days when Russian Marxism grew rapidly after being made legal.⁷⁰ The Russian colony

was engrossed in tumultuous debates on populism, Marxism, the subjectivist school, and dialectal materialism. Rakovski was laying the foundations for his thorough knowledge of the many interpretations of Marxism; from time to time, he also took part in discussions, especially to intervene against Zionism.⁷¹

Because of his close relations with the émigré Russian revolutionaries, Rakovski's presence in Prussia was undesirable to the local police and he was soon expelled. To carry on with his studies, as well as to remain in touch with the European socialist movement, he turned again to France.

VII

Before leaving for France, Rakovski spent the summer term in 1894 in Zurich where he attended lectures at the faculty of medicine. Since he was in Zurich, he had an opportunity to meet one of the most distinguished members of Russian Marxism, Pavel Axelrod.⁷² They were never as close as he had been with Plekhanov, but Rakovski was keen to exchange ideas with another founding member of the group called Workers' Emancipation; he continued his study of the growth of the workers' movement in Russia and of the influence Marxism had on it. Besides, Axelrod and his family were known among students for their warm hospitality; however, after a few months, Rakovski decided to leave Switzerland, where he had spent nearly four years.⁷³

French revolutionary traditions had long drawn the young man to the country, and he was going to make his home there for several years, until Russia replaced France for him after the October Revolution. He chose Nancy as his first stop, and spent the winter of 1894-1895 there. As usual with him, changing countries did not mean that he felt uprooted, since he made an overriding interest in the evolution of socialism the central theme of his life. In Nancy, he kept in touch with the Bulgarian movement, as well as regularly writing to Plekhanov and Vera Zasulich, then living in London. The French socialist movement was already familiar to him. He had already met Jules Guesde in Paris in 1892, while still a student in Geneva. Plekhanov had given him a letter of introduction for the famous French Marxist who, at their first meeting, enabled him to realize his lifelong dream: a visit to the French National Assembly. Guesde gave Rakovski a letter of introduction for the one Guesdist member to be in the Assembly.⁷⁴ Christian rushed to the National Assembly where he witnessed a memorable debate with heated exchanges on the subject of the miners' strike that was taking place at Carmaux.⁷⁵

As we shall see later in detail, Rakovski was strongly influenced

by Guesde until World War I. He admired the man for his selflessness and staunch loyalty to the cause. He only diverged from Guesde's position on the subject of "social patriotism" in 1914, but when the break did occur, it was final.

Christian spent his last two years as a roving student at the University of Montpellier, from the autumn of 1895 to the end of the summer of 1897. As we saw earlier, he probably chose Montpellier for its famous medical school, but even more for its large colony of students of Eastern European extraction. As for Geneva, we should now examine the social climate in which Rakovski lived in those days. Among the foreign students, Bulgarians were the most numerous at Montpellier, followed by the Russians, amounting to about a hundred. Women formed a majority among the Russians, most of them coming from southern Russia. They belonged to all strata of society, rich or poor, and many of them were Jewish. The wealthy ones received allowances from their families; the others had a grant given to them by the town they came from or the regional council by which it was administered. Nearly all of them assiduously attended lectures at the Faculty of Medicine. According to an eyewitness, a few of them were passionately interested in politics and even more in social problems. Rather extreme in their views, they mixed freely with men students and sometimes lived with them.⁷⁶

About that time, Rakovski became concerned with the Ukraine and its problems for the first time. There were quite a few Ukrainian students, distinct from the Russians, in Montpellier; they demanded not only the right to speak and write their language, but also political autonomy for their nation.⁷⁷ With his experience in the Balkans, Rakovski was well equipped to understand how important the idea of independence was; it may have weighted on his conscience when he became responsible for the sovietization of the Ukraine, from 1919 to 1921.

Rakovski understood that the Ukrainians insisted on preserving their language for the very reason the tsarist government was bent on destroying it. He realized that, through speaking its own language, a nation develops its consciousness of itself, language being the last bulwark to protect the independence of oppressed nations or of those that do not feel in control of their own affairs.

We should now examine how his fellow students saw Rakovski and what his activities as a socialist were. One eye witness, Jules Véran, gives an accurate description.⁷⁸ Christian was at the time twenty-two years old, and his portrait, both psychological and physical, fits a typical left-wing intellectual:

Rather thin and sickly looking, he had a pale face framed

by a dark beard, lit by dark eyes with an unusually sad and melancholy look, which could become hard in a debate. In fact, when faced with an opponent, Rakovski showed a passionate temperament, kept under control at first, only to burst out a little later.⁷⁹

Working long hours, he slept very little, and spent the time he was not at the faculty, learning foreign languages, writing letters to leading European socialists, and writing articles for *Vorwärts* and the Bulgarian periodicals, *Den*, *Rabotnik*, and *Drugar*.

His activities did not stop there: having been educated in Marxism by the most distinguished leaders:

He soon became a leader of socialist students, whether foreign or French, and tirelessly guided them. His views were always extreme in debates: he expounded them with the fervor of a convert and was intransigent in upholding them, which he did in French, incidentally, since his Russian was poor in those days. It was clear that, among French Socialists, he only respected Jules Guesde, the advocate of scientific socialism, class struggle, a materialist concept of history, and revolutionary action. He did not think much of Jaurès; he was amused by his romantic policies and idealism, which seemed hopeless to him.

However, he once happened to spend several hours with him, in Montpellier—it was in June or July 1896. Jaurès, who was staying in the town for a day or two, agreed to go on an excursion with a party of socialist students.⁸⁰ On the way back by train, Jaurès only talked to Rakovski, whose conversation he seemed to find most stimulating. His articles on the following days in *Petite république and Dépêche de Toulouse* reflected this conversation, which had covered the Balkan question and Eastern Europe. Other students resented Rakovski having monopolized their hero.⁸¹

From then on, Rakovski kept in touch with the great French socialist and became the Balkan correspondent for *Humanité* when Jaurès started the famous newspaper in 1904. From these days as a student in Montpellier, he contributed to the Marxist journal *Jeunesse Socialiste*, which was published in Toulouse with Lagardelle as editor, as well as to the socialist daily *Petite République*, when Jules Guesde became editor in 1897.⁸² As a follower of Guesde, Rakovski condemned Jaurès' reformist ideas outright. Yet, the two men found common ground in the area of social humanism, as we shall see later, when (until 1917) Rakovski violently opposed Lenin, whether in mat-

ters of revolutionary tactics or from certain moral principles, it was often due to his humanistic philosophy.⁸³ Though he was, in Trotsky's words, "a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist," he was much too interested in the complexities of life and its variety to see merely its political aspect.⁸⁴ Some thirty years after he met Jaurès, Rakovski told Trotsky how he had been impressed with his ideas on art and socialism: Jaurès thought that only socialism could really lead to art. He hoped for a new impetus in the arts and life in all its aspects through the influence of socialism, in fact a new birth for mankind. He wrote:

Socialism will lead all men, whatever their background, to art and beauty. For the first time, we shall see a human art, since so far we have seen only glimpses of humanity, we have only had glimpses of a humanistic kind of art A wonderful renaissance in the arts will come from this renewal of society. For the first time, mankind as such will stand opposite nature. In the contemplation of nature, in questioning her, each man will come into contact with the essence of man. For the first time, the whole of mankind will be free from the yoke of nature and dominate her from such a height that self-confidence will make it possible to gaze trustingly at her.⁸⁵

Jaurès and Rakovski were always happy to come together when they met at conferences of the Second International, in which they were both active members.⁸⁶ Even if their political relations were sometimes strained, on a personal level, they were always good.⁸⁷ Rakovski was fascinated by Jaurès' imagery, which, in Trotsky's words, was rich with "national traditions, high moral principles, love for the dispossessed, and was magnified by poetry."⁸⁸

VIII

While still a student in Montpellier, Rakovski represented the Bulgarian Social Democratic party for the second time at an international socialist congress, one that took place in London from 26 July to 2 August 1896. Again he met Rosa Luxemburg, and made closer contact with the Polish Socialist party (PPS) founded in 1892, a year after the Bulgarian party. He would write articles against the tsarist regime for the publications of PPS.⁸⁹ But he was not satisfied with only that. These were the days of rebellions in Armenia and Crete. Earlier, in a series of brilliant articles, Rakovski had tried to impress on the French Socialists the need to intervene on behalf of Armenia and the peoples of Crete and Macedonia.⁹⁰ He also dwelt on these problems in his conversations with W. Liebknecht and Jean Jaurès, because he was convinced that "lack of awareness and understanding

of the Eastern questions was one of the weaknesses of the international socialist movement.”⁹¹ This is why he decided to address the London congress on this subject. The paper that he read in French could not be printed in time to be distributed, but it was well received. It would soon be translated into German and published in Kautski’s periodical in Stuttgart, *Die Neue Zeit*.⁹²

IX

At the end of his medical studies, Rakovski defended a doctoral thesis on the causes of criminality and degeneracy. His approach was very clear: he wanted to study the problems from a Marxist point of view. Rakovski wrote in his autobiography that “the dissertation caused a stir at the university and found an echo in the local press and specialized publications,” which was no more than the truth.⁹³ Later on, when Rakovski became the Soviet diplomatic representative in London, and then in Paris, political experts studied his doctoral dissertation in order to understand the diplomat.⁹⁴ The study is of historical interest not only because it shows Rakovski’s erudition, but also because it contains the basic principles of one of the Russian revolutionaries who would apply them to the new Soviet society.⁹⁵ This was the conclusion that commentators arrived at in the 1920s, and we shall now assess the validity of their conclusions.

As was seen before, Rakovski became interested in the connection between crime and society four years before he defended his thesis. The subject was discussed at great length by the socialist students at their Geneva conference in 1893. Rakovski was so taken up by the idea that, instead of applying for a subject to his professorial supervisor, he submitted his own proposal. He also broke another rule in approaching the subject from a sociological point of view rather than a purely medical one. Let us now see how he wrote his thesis.

First he hired a commissioner and his cart to fetch the books he needed. He was perhaps showing a certain theatrical sense, or mere common sense.⁹⁶ He borrowed some forty books from the library of the Faculty of Medicine and about the same number from the city library and, walking behind the cart, took his material home.⁹⁷ Three weeks later, after finishing his work, he took the books back in the same way. He had thus broken a third rule: in those days, as Jules V éran points out, medical students made scant use of the wealth of information available to them at the faculty library. So the cartload of books that Rakovski had borrowed created a sensation. He, on the contrary, complained of the lack of resources in local libraries, and mentioned it in his preface.⁹⁸

He defended his thesis on 31 July 1897; eye witnesses were unani-

mous in praising him. The examinee's friends, students of both sexes, filled the room to watch the proceedings. The exchange was tense, even heated, but, in the end, the student was granted a doctorate with congratulations from all members of the jury. Even though they might not have been fully convinced by his reasoning, they could only be impressed by the erudition and rigor Rakovski had shown, as was the case with all his theoretical writings. He also had proved remarkably experienced in his use of abstract ideas, supporting them with precise examples that he had drawn from his extensive reading. Summing up the general impression, one wrote this comment:

Everything of note in philosophy, sociology, economics, pre-history, etc. . . . written in French in the last three centuries, in Italian, English, German, Russian, from Pascal and Hobbes to articles published recently by Foinitski in *Severnyi vestnik*, has all been thoroughly absorbed and digested The work of this Bulgarian is methodically organized in the French and Mediterranean way.⁹⁹

One of the most visible influences behind Rakovski's thesis is Rousseau's: we can trace in it the marks left on his intellectual development by the books he read as a youth. One of the key statements is this:

Crime is the consequence of progress. It appeared for the first time, when men set up a social grouping, when rules were established, which if broken, gave rise to crime. Primitive man was virtuous, the criminal born together with society.¹⁰⁰

But Marx soon corrected Rousseau, as did Marxist theoreticians such as Engels, Bebel, and Plekhanov. Crime is in no way hereditary; it arises, according to Rakovski, from the injustice of capitalist society and the vicious circle it brings about: poverty, unemployment, liquidation, bankruptcy, suicide. Thus, it seemed to the student that all factors involved in criminality are social, foremost among them, by far, the economic factor: crime is one of the most serious ills of capitalist society. Rakovski goes on to give a detailed analysis of what Fourier called "*crises pléthoriques*," that is to say, bursts of criminality following economic crises. These frequent crises caused by chronic deficiencies in the capitalist system were seen by Rakovski as leading to degeneracy, therefore he drew the conclusion that a new society was needed.

There was a strong political bent in all this, but Rakovski was no vulgar proselyte. The contributor to *Mercure de France*, who could not be suspected of Marxist sympathies, concluded his article

with a portrait of Rakovski as “a party man, but a learned one and a philosopher.”¹⁰¹ His work clearly revealed a wide-ranging mind, able to assimilate and make his own other people’s theories, which Rakovski was to do throughout his life. This, combined with a keen intellectual curiosity and boundless energy, would have a large impact, allowing Rakovski to be, in turn, one of the main leaders of the socialist movement in the Balkans, the head of the Soviet Ukrainian republic after the October Revolution, and finally one of the chief Soviet diplomats in the 1920s.¹⁰² After negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations between the new Russia and first England and then France, Rakovski became one of the leading theoreticians of the Trotsky opposition, before falling a prey to the Stalinist purge.

Chapter 2

Leader of the Socialist Movement in the Balkans (1900-1914)

At that time, Rakovski's life became rather complicated. Drawing its course on a map would be impossible without looking into the secret police's archives of most European countries. These early years fulfilled his strong urge to acquire knowledge and new experiences and start a life of action.

Trotsky, *Notes on Rakovski*

Rakovski wrote in his autobiography that, at the end of his university years, he had to solve the same problem as all other young men: what direction should his life take? The socialist activist was standing in the way of the medical doctor, and an urgent question had to be answered: *Kuda dal'she?* What next?¹

Rakovski was primarily interested in his work as a party member, doing propaganda work and organizing meetings and discussions; he had no intention of setting up as a general practitioner somewhere in France or the Balkans. In fact, he already acted and felt as European or even international revolutionary. He had worked mostly for the Bulgarian Socialist party, both in his country of birth and at international socialist congresses; yet he was a citizen of Romania. On the other hand, although he was very interested in socialism in the Balkans, his greatest wish in 1897 and 1898 was to work in Russia.

He had objective reasons for this: as we have seen, although he was concerned with socialism in Armenia and the growing workers' movement in Poland, he had kept in touch with Russian socialists living in exile in Geneva and Berlin. These circles had helped in his Marxist education, and Rakovski now wanted to find out for himself how socialism had developed in Russia. Moreover, personal reasons were involved in his decision to go to his teachers' homeland.

Rakovski had just married a young Russian woman, E. P. Ryabova, who had finished her medical studies with him. She was born in Moscow and had come to Montpellier for her degree, but like Rakovski, she was as much interested in politics as medicine. She

was a close friend of Plekhanov and Zasulich, and a revolutionary Marxist, actively taking part in the political meetings organized by Rakovski's student societies.² She was the only person invited to the meal they had at 10 rue St. Louis in Montpellier. The landlady had cooked a good dinner shared with the other two lodgers. Three days earlier, E. P. Ryabova had also defended her medical thesis.³

In spite of the attraction Russia exercised over him, and although his new wife had just gone back to St. Petersburg, Rakovski was unable to join her right away. As soon as he graduated, the Romanian authorities summoned him to Bucharest for his military service. He was mobilized on 15 September 1898 as an army doctor to the Ninth Cavalry Regiment garrisoned at Constanța.⁴ He served in the Romanian army for a year and a half, before being discharged on 1 January 1900. However, his military service did not affect his writing, which kept him busier than ever.

He wrote two pamphlets at that time, which reflect his manifold interests, ranging from the general problems facing mankind to the drama of the day that was tearing French families apart. He published, in quick succession, a book in Bulgarian entitled *The Significance of the Dreyfus Affair*, a pamphlet directed against spiritualists, *Science and Miracle*, in which he made use of his medical knowledge.⁵ The pamphlet writer soon gave way to historian; Rakovski published within the space of two years two large volumes. The first dealt with tsarist Russia, especially its foreign policy;⁶ the second gave a full picture of modern France,⁷ expanding the social survey begun by Rakovski in his booklet on the Dreyfus Affair. Here is proof that, when his interest was aroused, he could withdraw from his daily routine and immerse himself in a staggering bout of work, at the end of which he would have found his own answer to the problem in hand, keeping to the deadline he had set himself. In this respect, he had the independence and intellectual rigor of an intelligent person who also has strong willpower. Trotsky, who became one of his closest friends, wrote on this subject: "The need to think out a problem, and to draw all necessary deductions from it, has always been a prerequisite in my life."⁸

Both of Rakovski's books, while very thorough and accurate, are nevertheless perfectly readable. The quality of the historical research and analysis are impressive. In the book he published under the title *Russia in the East*, Rakovski gave his first historical treatment of international affairs and diplomacy. About twenty years later, he would face diplomacy as a "Professional" and prove himself to be a skillful statesman, able to conduct the most difficult negotiations.

The book is of great interest mainly because it is the first at-

tempt at writing a history of Russian diplomacy from a Marxist point of view.⁹ Moreover, the whole picture is seen in the light of Plekhanov's advice to Western socialists, "Russia has to be isolated in the field of international relations."¹⁰ The sources used range from classical works such as S. Solovev,¹¹ Tatishchev,¹² Leontev,¹³ and Tikhomirov,¹⁴ to publications of French Socialists such as Louis Blanc,¹⁵ as well as the most important Marxist books dealing with international relations.¹⁶ Rakovski shows his erudition by using a number of articles that had appeared in Russian, French, Bulgarian or German periodicals, which fully justifies the subtitle of his work, *An Historical Investigation*.

The "imperialism" of tsarist diplomacy is vehemently attacked, whether directed at Poland in the West, or the Balkan countries in the South. To make his demonstration more convincing, Rakovski started his enquiry with Old Russia and Tatar influence, until he arrived at Peter the Great's reforms and Catherine the Great; there followed several chapters reviewing the Byzantine hegemony that had prevailed in the early days and the dangers of the Slavophile movement. Rakovski also gave a detailed analysis of the significance and importance of the Russian and Turkish empires colliding in the Balkans. Obviously he had a clear aim in giving his historical account and did not hide his sympathies. This is why the book was to have a large audience: "For years it would provide arguments not only for the Bulgarian socialist party, but also for all the anti-Russian elements in Bulgarian society and in the Balkan countries."¹⁷ So Rakovski was attacked as a pamphleteer, not as an historian, by all the journalists of the so-called "bourgeois" press in Bulgaria, which was extremely Russophile and would never forgive him for his "blasphemies."

The second book that Rakovski wrote at the time was much less biased; it was a history of the French Third Republic commissioned by the St. Petersburg publishers, *Znanie*, who turned to him for his thorough insight into French political life.¹⁸ According to a critic (none other than Anatole de Monzie) this book shows his great admiration for the Third Republic, as well as a first-class scholarly mind.¹⁹

Rakovski became concerned, in turn, with France, Russia, and Bulgaria, having been an activist among socialists in all three countries, and having published in their newspapers. He happened to be in Romania then, but he had not, so far, made much contact with the Romanian socialist movement. In 1899, he did not think that he had more than formal relations with the movement he was going to lead firmly a few years later. It was only in January 1900, after finishing his military service, that Rakovski openly contributed to the Roma-

nian socialist press and took part in workers' meetings in Bucharest. But, as he pointed out in his autobiography, "it was only to find out that the Romanian working-class movement had completely disintegrated, as a result of the leaders' desertion, since almost all of them had gone over to Bratianu's Liberal party."²⁰ We shall later examine in more detail the crisis the Romanian socialist movement went through until 1905, when Rakovski reactivated it. Between 1900 and 1905, Rakovski moved much closer to the Bulgarian Socialist party, which was quite powerful and well organized.

Throughout his military service, Rakovski had contributed to Bulgarian socialist newspapers. *Den*, the mouthpiece of the party had been replaced by *Novo vreme* (*New Times*), issued every month with Blagoev as its head. Yet, relations between Rakovski and the Bulgarian leader were not easy. We must not forget that in 1892 through 1893 Rakovski had clashed with him when the Bulgarian Social Democratic party had been created, since Rakovski regarded the move as premature politically and even dangerous for the future of social democracy in Bulgaria.

Two years later, in 1895, while still a student at Montpellier, Rakovski entered into a sharp conflict with Blagoev through *Sotsialist*, the official newspaper of the Bulgarian party. He found the leader's attitude to the peasants negative, and favored a more accommodating approach. He did not think that including some of their wishes in the party program would amount to betraying proletarian principles.²¹ However, in spite of these differences, Rakovski was valuable to Bulgarian Socialists; they asked him to visit the country in 1898, just before he started his military service, to give a course of lectures on topical questions in several towns and cities. One year later, he helped Blagoev to counter Russian Populists who had moved to Bulgaria and were attacking Marxism.²² He intended to pursue the controversy in Russia, where he moved as soon as his military service ended.

As soon as Rakovski arrived in the Russian capital, he threw himself into the thick of political debate. A violent quarrel was raging in St. Petersburg at the time between two "progressive" political groups which were diametrically opposed in their ideas of revolutionary tactics—the Populists and the Marxists. The Marxists wanted to accelerate the development of capitalism in Russia, so that conditions they regarded as necessary for a socialist revolution would obtain as soon as possible. The Populists, on the contrary, considered these tactics as helping the capitalists and slowing the growth of a revolutionary situation. Their main objective was to prevent village communes, *mirs*, being destroyed as well as communes of craftsmen, *artels*, by

slowing down the progress of the capitalist system fast developing in Russia. The *mir* and the *artel* would then become the instruments of socialist government.²³ Populists made themselves open to Marxist attacks therefore and were accused of helping bureaucracy; the latter regarded *mir*s and *artels* as traditional institutions having nothing to do with revolution.

In February 1899, Rakovski argued along these lines at a meeting organized by one of the branches of the Free Economic Society in St. Petersburg. He happened to be in the capital then, because the military authorities had granted him a visitor's permit for a fortnight to see his wife. Since he used his name openly, and his fiery speech branded him as a "dangerous revolutionary," the police were soon after him. When they discovered his address, he was already on his way back to Romania.

While still serving in the Romanian army, Rakovski went on corresponding frequently with the Russian Marxist leaders he had known in Geneva. He was very useful to Plekhanov and Zasulich, whose letters to St. Petersburg Marxists passed as letters to his wife. Later, Zasulich herself came to Romania, where Christian provided her with a passport in the name of Kirova; this gave her free entry into Russia where he followed her a few months later.²⁴

Back in St. Petersburg early in 1900, Rakovski was happy to move among his wife's friends and acquaintances, who shared his political views and objectives. His private life was cloudless, "he breathed in fully the winter air, dreaming about all the things that needed doing in Russia," and he expected to settle there forever. In those days, he started drafting his book, *Modern France*, and immersed himself in the activities of the capital's Marxist circles. His wife's apartment was a regular meeting place for left-wing leaders—Mikhailovski, Karpov, Annenski, not to mention Marxists such as Tugan-Baranovski, Veresaev, and Bogucharski. A closer circle was made up of Rakovski and his wife, A. N. Kamykov and Peter Struve's wife, N. A. Struve. The latter were involved in direct action among the masses and made plans to educate the young and the workers. On a purely theoretical level, the quarrel between Marxists and Populists was further complicated by a conflict between the Marxists and the "economists."²⁵

Outside Russia, Plekhanov championed the fight against the "economist" doctrine, which he strongly attacked in a booklet entitled *More Socialism and Political Struggle*. In the same year, the "economists" had a pamphlet published, which was to become famous under the title of *Credo*. E. D. Kuskova wrote, in defense of their tactics, of concentrating efforts on the workers' economic and

social struggle. The political struggle against the tsar had to be left to middle-class liberals; it was only of marginal concern for the proletariat. From abroad, Plekhanov retorted with his *Vademecum*, while Axelrod wrote a "Letter to my Comrades." In Russia itself, the three main Marxist leaders in exile, Lenin, Potresov, and Dan, answered the "economists" in the same vein.²⁶

This double quarrel was compounded by a polarization becoming more and more apparent between the "orthodox" and "legal" Marxists. The latter, such as Peter Struve, and Tugan-Baranovski had won the right for Marxism to exist legally, by sacrificing any idea of a political struggle against the tsarist regime. They drew their inspiration from the ideas of the German "revisionist" leader, Eduard Bernstein; as regards economic theories, they agreed with Marxists, but their political views were close to those of the liberals.

At the time of Rakovski's first visit to Russia, in February 1899, he had published an article on Bulgarian political parties, in the first periodical of the legal Marxists, *Nashe slovo*.²⁷ A year later, when he returned to Russia, he could only notice that Struve had taken another turn to the right, and broke all personal relations with him. A radical change had occurred in the autumn of 1899; in the phrase of Alexandra Kollontai, "the honeymoon between legal and underground Marxists had come to an end."²⁸

In those days, Peter Struve was very popular among progressive Russians. Together with such brilliant thinkers as N. A. Berdyaev, S. N. Bulgakov, or Tugan-Baranovski, he was the epitome of the part of the intelligentsia that had joined the Marxist ranks in the 1880s. In the field of esthetics, they had moved closer to Marx's early way of thinking, so distorted later. At the time, Marxist theorists considered that culture was intrinsically good, apart from its utilitarian value. Paradoxically, Marxists were the first to appreciate art at its face value, without any thought of its application, and saw in it the product of a certain civilization and the psychological expression of a social stratum.²⁹ From the political point of view, this generation contrasted with the previous one and its utopian views on revolution: the intelligentsia had become more practical and moved closer to a genuine Marxism that took into account the real world instead of rejecting it. Yet, deep down, they had embraced Marxism only on an intellectual level, without drawing from it revolutionary conclusions that they would use in everyday politics. When they joined Bernstein's revisionists, late in 1899, orthodox Marxists had them expelled from the ranks of Russian social democrats. As the leader of legal Marxists, Struve refused, from then on, to compromise with them. According to Rakovski, Struve bitterly resented Zaslulich's re-

turn to Russia, since she risked, in the event of her being caught by the police, endangering her "friends." She was deeply hurt, for she was fond of Struve.³⁰ Plekhanov was also upset because someone he had always regarded as a "personal friend" was now letting him down. Nonetheless, he wrote to Rakovski that "they had to close ranks against Struve, if necessary with Mikhailovski."³¹

In so doing, Plekhanov was resorting to a dangerous tactic: trying to ally himself with yesterday's enemy to help him fight yesterday's friend. N. K. Mikhailovski (1842-1904) was an old hand of the Populist movement, one of its most remarkable theorists.³² A few years earlier (1894), he had led an all-out ideological crusade against Marxism in a series of forceful articles. Plekhanov had replied with a long treatise published in 1895, *On the Question of the Development of a Monistic View of History*, which was a powerful attack against Populism. Lenin had also opposed Mikhailovski in his booklet *Who Are the "Friends of the People?" and How They Fight Social Democrats* (1894). In it he condemned the Russian peasant brand of socialism, which had been revolutionary at first, but "had now completely disintegrated to give way to a vulgar philistine liberalism." Some aspects of this economy looked "progressive" to the peasants, but they forgot that this progress coincided with massive expropriations and was a consequence of it.³³

The subtitle of Lenin's book was the following: *A Reply to Articles Published in Russkoe Bogatsvo Against Marxism*.³⁴ As it happened, Plekhanov intended to publish his articles against Struve in this review. He wrote to Rakovski early in 1900, asking him to offer to *Russkoe Bogatsvo* to write for them under the pseudonym of Beltov, as soon as ne arrived in St. Petersburg.³⁵ After consulting several members of the Marxist group, Rakovski decided that Plekhanov's plan was "unrealistic;" the pseudonym, in any case, was the one Plekhanov had used five years earlier to sign a book in which he attacked the very same Mikhailovski. Both thought it more "sensible" for the founding father of Russian Marxism to contribute to the review that represented legal Marxism, *Zhizn*, published by Posse and Gorki.³⁶

Rakovski's second visit to Russia was not going to last much longer than the first. Thanks to the numerous *agents provocateurs* who had infiltrated Marxist circles in the capital, the police were soon on his trail, and he was informed that within forty-eight hours he had to be out of the county. This was a setback for Christian, who now had to face another dilemma. As he wrote in his autobiography, "My expulsion destroyed all the plans I had made. I had no wish to return to the Balkans, for I became increasingly less concerned with

them as I drew closer to the Russian revolutionary movement.”³⁷ At the time, it is clear that Rakovski already regarded himself first and foremost bound to Russia and the Russian revolutionary movement. This is why he tried at all cost, in 1901, to return there and be allowed to stay, whether legally or not. When he was expelled, Rakovski took it calmly. He was escorted to Reval, with his wife, by the police. There, while waiting for the earliest ship to take him to France, he finished the book commissioned by a St. Petersburg publisher, *Contemporary France*.³⁸ While in Paris, where he lived for almost a year, Rakovski led a busy life, conducting negotiations and studying. As he did not expect to be allowed into Russia for some time, he enrolled at the law faculty in Paris and started working. In the meantime, his friends and acquaintances in Russia were trying to intervene on his behalf; among them N. I. Gurovich, who visited him in Paris in the summer of 1900, assuring him that his connections at the Russian court would not remain inactive. He promised to approach either a brother or a son-in-law of Baron Frederix, then a minister of the crown. Rakovski thought he could trust Gurovich, who published the review *Nachalo*, one of the first Marxist publications. Gurovich became more and more a confidant; soon the whole thing could be summed up in this way: “Money was needed to bribe Baron Frederix’s relations.” Rakovski confessed that he had no hesitation in the matter. After this “offering,” all was resolved rapidly, and he could return to Russia.³⁹

In fact, Gurovich had easily obtained another visa for Rakovski not so much because he was close to the court establishment, but rather because of his relations with the police. He was one of the many *agents provocateurs* who had infiltrated Marxist circles, among whom the most famous was, no doubt, Roman Malinovski.⁴⁰ Gurovich had been appointed to keep under close scrutiny the Marxist journal, *Nachalo*, which he largely financed. His task was to find the names of all Marxist writers working under a pseudonym and, early on, he had informed the police that Plekhanov, Zaslulich, Martov, Potresov, and Ulyanov were secret contributors to that journal.⁴¹

Back in St. Petersburg in the second half of 1901, Rakovski “found a vacuum.” After the student unrest in the spring of 1901, many writers had been exiled, among them a number of Marxists. underground milieu, where Lenin’s soft-cover book, *What’s to be done?* soon became a topic for discussion.

Lenin had chosen for his first serious work, published in 1902, the title of a famous novel by Chernyshevski, which had influenced him greatly. Rakovski was fascinated by his analysis, seeing in it a

new approach to revolutionary tactics. For the first time, Lenin had put forward his ideas on the part played by "professional revolutionaries" and the relations between party intellectuals and workers. He thought the working class could be protected from bourgeois influence only through the action of revolutionary intellectuals who would lead them to socialism. In his words:

The history of every country shows that, if it is isolated, the working class cannot hope for anything more than such awareness of their condition as will bring about trade unions, that is to say the idea that they have to fight against bosses to wrench from the government laws that will benefit workers. The socialist doctrine, on the other hand, has evolved from philosophical, historical, and economic theories that were developed by members of the well-to-do classes, the intellectuals.

In their social origins, Marx and Engels, the founders of contemporary scientific socialism, belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. Likewise, in Russia, theoretical principles of social democracy appeared quite independently of the unconscious efforts that might have been made by the toiling masses. These principles are the natural and inevitable result of the growth of ideas among revolutionary socialist intellectuals.⁴²

Although Rakovski found these ideas interesting, he knew that they were not really Lenin's. They had been advocated, at least in part, by Peter Tkachev (1844-1885), a theoretician who first thought, in the 1870s, that the advent of revolution meant primarily a dynamic minority seizing power, the people being only an instrument to be used.⁴³ Moreover, Tkachev wanted the revolutionary socialist party to be a ruling party. In a country such as Russia, the fact that there was hardly any bourgeois element was, to his mind, an advantage and not a shortcoming in the process of historical development. These lines announced the increasingly divergent positions that Lenin and Plekhanov would adopt in the future. In the name of orthodoxy, the latter had rejected Tkachev's principles in a book entitled *Nasche raznoglasie*. Whether in his political theories or revolutionary practice, Rakovski aligned himself on Plekhanov's views rather than Lenin's, until October 1917. We shall later analyze their opposition, its origins, and significance.

As usual, Rakovski was forging ahead with his writing. In those days (1901-1902), he regularly contributed to the "voluminous" Russian periodicals, which he continued doing, but less actively until 1904, under the names of Insarov and Grigoriev. His writing took

many forms and complemented his political work; thus, he published simultaneously children's stories and articles on socialism, while taking part in the launching of *Iskra*, the mouthpiece of the Russian Social Democratic party.

However, due to external circumstances, Rakovski had to leave Russia again, not returning until December 1917, when he helped set up the first socialist republic.

Two main reasons caused Rakovski to leave Russia: first a personal misfortune that affected him deeply—his wife died. Second, it was becoming increasingly difficult to be a political activist in Russia because of the repressive measures taken by the police, which had decimated the socialist movement. Since he could not be content with purely literary work, Rakovski chose to leave for France, arriving late in 1902.

Since he thought he had left Russia forever, he decided to start a new life in a country that had always made him welcome, and where he felt at home emotionally and intellectually. He applied for naturalization; he enrolled once again at the Faculty of Law and graduated. He also renewed old acquaintances, especially with young leaders of the socialist and cooperative movement—Emile Buré, Lagardelle, and Sarraute—and young radicals who would lead the country twenty years later, at the time that he became Soviet ambassador to London and, later, Paris. Anatole de Monzie was one of them; he was a lawyer who had just finished his training to become a magistrate. He tried to persuade the French authorities to grant Rakovski French citizenship.⁴³ They refused because of Rakovski's revolutionary beliefs; his "subversive" activities had attracted police attention in the days when he was a medical student in Nancy and later in Montpellier. Also, the articles he published in periodicals such as *Revue socialiste* and *Mouvement socialiste* did nothing to help the French government change its mind.

In order to make a living and, most of all, to lead a more balanced life, Rakovski decided to become a general practitioner. For six months, he stood in for a friend of Russian origin, Dr. Chiripakin, whom he had known in Montpellier as a student.⁴⁴ In the village of Beaulieu sur Loire Rakovski busied himself with contacts of a medical nature but also mixed with the local peasants. He greatly enjoyed expounding his political views at an official banquet, and needless to say, his speech sent the local members of the Assembly and the Senate who were attending the function into paroxysms of anger, especially because he announced his wish to become a representative himself.

Yet, just when he thought he would become a permanent French resident, and it had been suggested that he stay in Beaulieu, Rakovski's

life had to change course again. His father's death, in the summer of 1903, made him go back to Romania. He then resumed his life as a member of the Balkan socialist party and devoted all his energy to it until the Bolshevik revolution broke out in October 1917.

II

It is obvious that, up to 1905, Rakovski was closer to the Bulgarian socialist movement than to the Romanian one. In Romania, the socialist daily had disappeared when the party leaders had defected. True enough the same thing had occurred in the Bulgarian socialist movement, where a schism between the *tesnyaki* ("narrows") and the *shiroski* ("broads") had taken place in 1903. Rakovski immediately joined the *tesnyaki* and led a campaign against the "renegades of the Bulgarian Socialist party."⁴⁶

In 1904, for the third time he was chosen by the Bulgarian socialists as their representative at the International Socialist Congress, which took place in Amsterdam that August. The fact that he was also representing the Serbian Social Democratic party proves that he was highly thought of everywhere. He appeared as a man of the future in the Balkan socialist movement, and they all knew how influential he was in the highest Western European socialist circles.

In the history of socialism, the Amsterdam Congress is important in so far as it solved the dilemma facing the International at the time: Would it be reformist or orthodox Marxists? Rakovski, having had experience of the fight against reformism since his early Bulgarian years, was chosen as a member of the "Commission on Tactics," and took an active part in its work. As Trotsky related in the notes he took of the proceedings, Rakovski played an important part at the congress, "he helped defeat the 'opportunist' motion put forward by Adler and Vandervelde."⁴⁷ He supported the opposite resolution, which was approved by "a huge majority of delegates from various countries." However, Jaurès violently opposed this.⁴⁸ Rakovski then made a final speech, which won him a round of applause, and ended with these words:

The task for Socialists must be to reveal to the working class the contradictions between their own interest and that of the bourgeoisie. They must also bring the class struggle to its logical conclusion; that is to say, total victory for the proletariat over the bourgeois society.⁴⁹

When he went back to Romania at the end of the summer of 1904, Rakovski was faced with the defection of a large majority of socialist leaders in favor of Bratianu's Liberal party; such a "betrayal"

meant the collapse of the socialist movement in the country. Socialism had been slow in establishing a foothold in Romania because of adverse circumstances and the barrier of indifference and ignorance it encountered. Pavel Axelrod, who lived there in 1880, was convinced that the low level of intellectual attainments was a consequence of the country's economic underdevelopment. "Even the wildest optimist could hardly hope to see modern socialist notions take root in a soil seemingly sterile."⁵⁰

To have a better understanding of the part Rakovski would play in the Romanian socialist movement, we have to go back to the beginning and describe the intellectual climate of the time. From 1879 onwards, several small ideological circles were set up to maintain a certain intellectual ferment, but they were short-lived and uncoordinated. They called themselves "socialist" but were, in fact, opposition movements predominantly influenced by anarchists. These early circles were gatherings of students and politically minded young intellectuals, who were disappointed by the Liberal party; the latter had just won power after a prolonged fight against the conservatives, and they had every intention of staying in power. In fact, the growth of socialist circles was a result of the repressive measures taken by the liberals after 1881. The Socialists had then started their own organization and established a program that was discussed in the pages of their periodical *Contemporanul*.⁵¹

From the point of view of this study, we must remember that, in the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the Russian revolutionary movement influenced, or rather started a similar movement in Romania.⁵² The experience made by the Russian intelligentsia between 1860 and 1870 was passed on by those who had fled the country; on the run from the police, many of them chose to settle in Romania. They became the backbone of the Romanian socialist movement.⁵³ Thus, *Contemporanul*, published in Iași (the intellectual center in Romania at the time), was a replica of the Russian periodical *Sovremennik* (*Contemporary*). Its editorial board was made up of young members of one intellectual family, who gave rise to a strong current of ideas filling the intellectual and political vacuum so far prevalent in Romania.

The years 1884 to 1885 marked a definite turn toward Marxism, which soon became dominant. To publicize Marx's theories in economics, politics, and history, the Iași Socialists founded a new publication, *Revista socialista*. *Contemporanul* changed its emphasis then from philosophy to literature and from Darwinist theories to fine arts. It became a mouthpiece for young socialist poets and literary critics like Dobroyeanu-Gherea. The latter became a leading person-

ality in the Romanian socialist movement and soon was at its head. He was to be Rakovski's first influence in that country.

Gherea was a Russian revolutionary who had settled in Romania on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War, after being forced to flee his country. At first, he made a strong impression on Romanian intellectuals, later on progressive workers. Trotsky, who met him in 1912 and 1913, gave an accurate description of his impression: "Literary criticism, based on a social approach, was the principal means employed by Gherea to fashion the awareness of the avant-garde among Romanian intellectuals." From the arts and personal morality, he led them on the path to scientific socialism. Most Romanian politicians, whatever their party, went through a spell of Marxism in their youth.⁵⁴ Like Dabev and Blagoev before him in Bulgaria, Gherea introduced Romanian intellectuals to the leading Marxist theorists of the day; this is what roused Rakovski's interest, and he soon praised him as "the greatest Marxist theorist in the Balkans" because he could combine political analysis with literary insight.

Gherea managed to free literary criticism from generalizations and guide it toward scientific research.⁵⁵ He forcefully stated his stand and the end of literature he wished for, messianic, *engagé*, in contrast to art for art's sake which he despised. Soon, Gherea would be locked in a furious battle with the disciples of the "deceptionist" school of thought whose head was Titu Maiorescu. According to Gherea, the deceptionist movement could only be harmful, since it "poisoned the soul of the intelligentsia by praising the charms of decadent apathy." He regarded Maiorescu and his followers as mere byproducts, the vulgar champions of bourgeois society, and contrasted them with "the optimists who are usually the children of modern society, representatives of the future socialist society." He wrote:

Strongly supported by those young and vigorous elements of society which alone are capable of bringing lies and social oppression to an end . . . Socialists have high hopes and look confidently to the future; they have a splendid vision of the future.⁵⁶

Rakovski also threw himself into the fight, which was both political and moral. Being naturally optimistic, he supported this feeling with cool reasoning that drew strength and purpose from his deep faith in the social structures he wanted to establish everywhere.

While Rakovski shared in Gherea's basic optimism, and his faith in the notion that man is capable of transforming nature and society, he also took his political teaching seriously and was influenced by it until 1905. He never ceased to respect Gherea, seeing him as the first

theoretician of the Romanian Socialist party, the man who went on fighting even after the first Romanian Socialists turned their backs on their youthful ideals and proclaimed the party's dissolution in 1899. When the movement was revived after a few years, Gherea was still very active, but the new party developed mainly through Rakovski's efforts. From 1905, Rakovski had a single aim in mind: to transfer the basis of the socialist movement from the intelligentsia to the workers.⁵⁷ To have a better understanding of Rakovski's personal share in the growth of the socialist movement in Romania, let us analyze, in turn, three specific events in which he was closely involved: the repercussions of the 1905 Russian revolution in Romania, the story of the battleship *Potemkin* and the *Sarya*, and the revolt of the Romanian peasants in 1907.

When Rakovski went back to Romania after the Amsterdam congress, he was determined to rekindle the flame of socialism in the country; his task was made easier by the impact of the 1905 Russian revolution on workers and peasants. As we know, on Sunday, 9 January, Russian troops opened fire on a worker's delegation led by Father Gapon that was making its way to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar. "Bloody Sunday" roused intense feelings of sympathy in the Romanian population, and, as Rakovski wrote in his autobiography, "the events of 9 January were the signal for the reawakening of the Romanian working class."⁵⁸

Three months later, in March 1905, Rakovski and his close political associates started a new social democrat weekly, *România muncitoare* (*Workers' Romania*) and founded a political organization under the same name. Unlike previous leaders of the movement, they devoted most of their energy to "the organization of trade unions so as to give the Social Democratic party a purely proletarian base."⁵⁹ In fact, the first socialist movement had been made up of intellectuals, for the most part, and included comparatively few workers. Priority was now given to the task of drawing the working class to socialism. The times seemed ripe, and workers were not long in answering the call made to them by Rakovski through *România muncitoare*.

The three years of 1905 through 1907 were marked by bitter class struggle. The whole country was affected by strikes. They even became so widespread that, as Rakovski reported, policemen themselves asked the Socialists to organize a strike for them.⁶⁰ The Socialists suggested a solution that was immediately accepted: new trade unions had to be set up. The liberal government had no option but strategic withdrawal at this juncture; since they had been taken unawares by the coordinated action of popular forces they were unused to, they yielded ground to regroup and counterattack. This is how Rakovski

took it anyway.

The government, thereafter, tried to weaken the organization that had caused the trouble with public opinion. To do so, they decided to fight Rakovski since he was the new leader of the Socialist party. He was to write: "The Romanian press as a whole pointed me out as the instigator of the movement; the campaign was centered around my foreign extraction, which they hoped would also compromise the workers' movement."⁶¹ In fact, the liberals tried to discredit Rakovski in person, blaming him not only for being born a Bulgarian, but also for acting like an outsider, a restless element making trouble in a foreign country. Rakovski straight away replied in *România muncitoare* that he "acknowledged no country, except the common land of the international proletariat."⁶² Likewise, in the first public speech he delivered in Romania on May 1905, he asked the audience to make allowances for the mistakes he might make, and referred to "the international language of social democrats." When the liberal press accused him once more of lacking in patriotism, he answered that "if patriotism meant racial prejudices, international civil war, political tyranny, and plutocratic domination" then indeed he was not a patriot.⁶³

In the next two years, several important factors were going to confirm the Romanian government in its firm opposition to the socialist movement and its recognized leader. One of them was the part Rakovski played in the episode of the battleship *Potemkin* in June 1905.

In a long article published in *Izvestiya* in June 1925, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the sailors' mutiny, Rakovski pointed out its significance:

No one was in any doubt that the tsarist regime was disintegrating. Yet, there had so far not been any conclusive sign in the army, the main prop of the landed gentry and the Romanov dynasty, of refusing to serve them and even turning against them. This was [changed] by the mutiny on board the *Potemkin*.⁶⁴

Indeed, while strikes were spreading all over Russia because of growing social unrest and a spate of defeats inflicted on the government by the Japanese, the army as a whole remained loyal to the throne. But the morale of the Black Sea sailors was deteriorating fast; they could not take part in the naval operations in the Far East, but they were subjected to the strict discipline and shortages of wartime. Many of them started listening to agitators belonging to various left-wing parties, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and anarchists.

In June, the crew of the *Potemkin* mutinied near the port of Odessa, where a general strike had just broken out.⁶⁵ After resisting for eleven days the urgings by those on other ships in the fleet asking them to surrender, the *Potemkin* twice took refuge in the Romanian port of Constanța. The mutineers then asked the authorities to grant them political asylum.

When Rakovski learned of these events, two days after the mutiny started, he made for Constanța, where the ship had docked for the first time. When he arrived, the battleship had just steamed off: the Romanian government had rejected their appeal and the mutineers had decided to go to Fyodosia in the Crimea, where they refueled and took on supplies. There they learned that, following a diplomatic move by St. Petersburg, the Turkish government had just refused to grant them the right to land at Constantinople.⁶⁶ Their only recourse was to go back to Constanța where Rakovski was waiting, after obtaining visas for them.⁶⁷

His first impulse was to get in touch with the sailors, above all with the Mensheviks and anarchists who were in a majority among the politically minded crew members. In spite of a sudden storm and the fact that it was impossible to come right on board because of government troops guarding the port, Rakovski managed to get on board. He was disappointed by what he saw: he had to face the fact that the crew was in no position to carry on fighting. The mutineers had coal, water, and food now, but they were physically and morally exhausted. In the eleven days of the struggle, a small group of about fifty sailors (out of 730 crew members) had taken all the strain of the fighting; almost all of them were enginemen and they had to carry out their routine work, as well as combat the growing disaffection of the other men who had no political views. After the initial burst of enthusiasm, these sailors, most of them peasants from the Volga, lost their nerve on learning that all the Black Sea countries had hardened their attitudes toward them.⁶⁸ They also had to take into account the hostility of their officers (still on board) and of the sailors who respected law and order.

Rakovski first tried to persuade the mutineers to leave Constanța and make for the Russian port of Batumi. Only two or three days after the *Potemkin* arrived in Constanța, Rakovski received a telegram from Geneva sent by the editorial board of *Iskra*.⁶⁹ In it were details of the general situation in the Caucasus where an uprising was taking place; a dockers' strike had just started in Batumi, and many peasant insurrections were occurring inland. Rakovski tried to explain to the mutineers that if the battleship turned up in the Caucasus, that together with combined land and sea operations, a revolution-

ary situation might be created. From this base, the revolt might spread to the whole country. Such arguments might have impressed the sailors a few days earlier, but it was now too late; weariness and demoralization prevailed. But the most politically minded members of the "Revolutionary Committee"—those who had published and distributed a manifesto against tsarism, those who had proclaimed that the battleship *Potemkin* was the first territory to be free from the oppressors' yoke—these men fully realized what an immense loss the surrender of the vessel to the Romanian authorities represented.

To prevent the Romanian authorities delivering up the sailors as deserters to the Russian government, Rakovski, early on, had waged a press campaign in the mutineers' favor. On 16 June 1905, he had appealed to his country's government, when the battleship was in Constanța harbor for the first time:

The Russian sailors . . . have resumed their bellicose stance on board the battleship; they could only reject the Romanian government's offer of regarding them as deserters. Our patriotic feelings make us denounce this attitude of the conservative government as hypocritical and barbarous; our politicians have twisted the meaning of the word 'nation' into 'shame.'⁷⁰

In the same issue of his *România muncitoare*, Rakovski praised the courage of the revolutionary sailors; he particularly stressed the significance of their example that should inspire proletarian solidarity:

For the first time in history, the red flag of the proletariat and the international Socialist party has been hoisted on a warship . . . Hail our Russian comrades! The proletariat is proud of our brave and generous Russian socialists, who proved how strong their convictions are and how determined they feel. Their courage will be of immense value to the proletarian cause and to peoples' freedom.⁷¹

It was not long before Rakovski and his followers at the workers' organization of *România muncitoare* set up a mutual aid committee to support the Russian sailors—there were two branches, one in Bucharest, the other in Constanța; and a manifesto was published in the newspaper. It said:

The debt of the Romanian society, after warmly welcoming the *Potemkin* has not been fully discharged. We have to help the sailors, either in finding for them employment similar to their previous ones, or in making it possible for them to set out for other countries where they can be taken care of by their friends.⁷²

As Rakovski was to relate in his autobiography, the Romanian government saw in his wish to help the sailors an attempt "to use them to start a revolution in Romania and, in so doing, help the Russian revolution." What the Socialists had in mind was apparently more "modest" but came to the same in the end; they worked on the "sailors' political education,"⁷³ and their preliminary efforts would soon prove successful.⁷⁴

Rakovski's prompt action and energetic campaign in favor of the *Potemkin's* mutineers clearly showed his interest in the Russian revolutionary movement and in any social struggles for freedom. His primary objective was to set an example of proletarian international cooperation. The close relations he already had with revolutionary Russia repeatedly came to the fore at various international congresses.

In August 1904, at the Amsterdam congress, the Russian delegation asked Rakovski to make a speech at a workers' meeting on Plehve's (the Russian minister of the interior) assassination, its causes and consequences. Two years later, at the socialist congress meeting in Stuttgart, he was publicly thanked by members of the Russian delegation "for services rendered to the cause of the Russian revolution and the proletariat's struggle against tsarism."⁷⁵ Among the signatories were Plekhanov, Martov, and Trotsky. The latter wrote, in 1915, that Rakovski had to be regarded in reality as one of the first Russian social democrats:

At the time of the revolution [1905], he devoted all his energy to spreading the influence of the movement; he tirelessly helped emigrants, he led a campaign for the *Potemkin's* sailors when they landed in Romania, while regularly contributing to many Russian social democratic publications and giving financial support to the *Golos sotsial-democrata*, *Pravda*, and the legal labor press.⁷⁶

As an example of Rakovski's aid to Russian social democrats, let us recall a story that is not so well known as the *Potemkin's* rescue: the incident of the *Sarya*. After "Bloody Sunday" in January 1905 and the failure of open rebellions such as the *Potemkin* sailors', Russian revolutionaries became convinced that the people could overthrow autocracy only through force of arms. The tsarist government was powerful enough, being able to rely on its army and police, not to allow street demonstrations to get out of hand. In January 1906, Lenin was to declare: "We should have looked more closely at the question of weapons; we should have been more determined and explained to the people that it was impossible to rely on peaceful strikes, that an armed strike was needed to alter the situation." To make such

a strike possible, Litvinov, who was to be people's commissar for foreign affairs and a colleague of Rakovski in the 1920s, was sent by the Party to buy arms in Europe. In Paris, Copenhagen, and Berlin, Litvinov selected the best weapons (mainly Mausers and machine guns), which had to be first sent to the Balkans.⁷⁷ He visited Bulgaria for this purpose, explaining to the government that the arms were intended for the Macedonian revolutionaries to help them in their fight against Turkey. The Bulgarians, who remembered recent Turkish domination, consented to turn a blind eye and allow a shipment of arms to be sent from the port of Varna to Caucasus.

When he wrote his memoirs, Litvinov recalled the beach at Varna: he was looking out at the yacht *Sarya* making for Batumi with a cargo of 50,000 guns and he was hoping that "his revolutionary mission that had taken ten months would end up a success."⁷⁸ Three days later, while in Sofia, he learned that the ship had just foundered on the Romanian coast, perhaps because of a storm, according to his informers, or because of the captain's cowardice and lack of experience.

As soon as Rakovski heard that a ship laden with arms intended for Russian revolutionaries was stranded on a Romanian beach and that it had been seized by the authorities, he went in search of the crew, a member of which was a Bolshevik emissary named Kamo. From the latter's declarations, Rakovski understood that the captain had betrayed them intentionally, causing the vessel to head for the coast.⁷⁹ Kamo and Rakovski both regretted the loss of the 50,000 weapons which had been seized by the Romanian government. Financially, as well as from a purely tactical point of view, it was a real disaster. Besides, the Romanian government took advantage of this incident of "arms trafficking" involving Rakovski to try and discredit him, as well as his movement, in the public opinion. The government press claimed that the weapons, captured *in extremis* by the authorities were intended, in fact, to organize an uprising in Dobrudja. In this particular case, their guess was wrong; but, before the year was out, a serious development was going to tie Rakovski's name forever to a wave of popular demands in Romania: the 1907 large-scale peasant rebellion.

Early in the twentieth century, frequent and widespread peasant uprisings were the most serious problem the Romanian government had to face.⁸⁰ In an agrarian country, a solution to this question had to be found urgently, because the relations between serfs and large landowners was becoming more and more violent. In February 1907, a peasant revolt more virulent than ever before broke out in Romania, undoubtedly under the influence of similar movements in Russia.⁸¹

As Rakovski related in his memoirs, this rebellion had both racial

and social characteristics; or, rather, racial hatred led to social unrest. What started it was a protest against Jewish farmers in southern Moldavia, fanned by anti-Semitic attacks made by Romanian liberals and nationalists. After ransacking Jewish farms, peasants attacked Romanian ones, then those belonging to large landowners. The situation soon became critical; the whole country was ablaze with social strife. Serfs took to systematically burning down estates and cutting the throats of those landowners who happened to be in the country.⁸²

The liberal government, under the impulse of its theoretician, V. I. Bratianu, was not long in realizing that the main danger in the situation was "not only fire spreading fast, but also the excitement that was getting hold of the cities, especially the capital."⁸³

An interesting aspect of the rebellion, at least from an academic point of view, was that the revolt had spread from the country to cities, not the other way around, as would be in keeping with traditional Marxist theories. It was obvious that the proletariat's *leaders*, that is to say, politically active workers, were not in practice the only ones capable of starting a rebellion in the countryside, and sustaining it.

At the time, the newspaper published by Rakovski was read by all workers' socialist groups; the aim was to keep up political agitation, paying special attention to agrarian policies. Yet, as Rakovski remarked, they had neither time nor strength to devote to the preparation or the evolution of this revolt, which, starting in Moldavia, had soon spread to the whole of Wallachia. To stop the movement gaining ground in the cities and prevent an alliance between the peasantry and the working class (which also had many common grievances), the liberal government decided to squash it at the source; soldiers were ordered to fire on peasants, and artillery had to destroy rebellious villages. Concurrently, drastic measures were taken against Socialists in towns: house searches, raids on socialist press, banning trade unions and similar organizations as well as arrests of leaders of the workers' movement.⁸⁴

The measures taken by the liberal government were a direct attack on the Socialists who, at the instigation of Rakovski and his comrades, wanted to slow down, if not stop altogether, the repression that was increasingly applied against peasants. Through *România muncitoare*, Rakovski appealed to soldiers in an attempt to rouse their class feeling and encourage them to mutiny. He wrote: "Denounce the real enemy everywhere, and, where necessary and if possible, join the rebels."⁸⁵ As a last resort, he asked them to "fire in the air, not at peasants."⁸⁶

Yet, Rakovski soon realized that this appeal to soldiers and Ro-

manian public opinion could not succeed. He turned, therefore, to international public opinion, since he was familiar with its various manifestations, thanks to his extensive travels as a student. In mid-June of 1907, he wrote in *România muncitoare*:

With the support of the daily socialist press of every country in Europe and America, and of our Romanian comrades, we are going to wage a relentless campaign to enlighten European public opinion on what the Liberal party and government do in their own country, although they pretend to be democrats.⁸⁷

In this way, Rakovski thought he could draw the attention of European socialist circles to the tragic events that were taking place in Romania, just as he had kept the congress of the 1896 London Socialist International informed of the repressive measures taken against the movements for national liberation in Macedonia, Crete, and Armenia. As a correspondent for *Humanité*, he wrote several articles on the abrupt deterioration of the Romanian social climate and its consequences. In a long article on "Agrarian Revolution in Romania," he examined the economic "objective" reasons behind the rebellion. His conclusion was that:

The day has come at last for peasants to rise against their oppressors. Whatever the initial cause— increase in poverty among peasants, the Russian experience of revolutionary propaganda—the day has come when the cup is full to overflowing. This is why, from every village, cries of rebellion can be heard.⁸⁸

The international press campaign started by Rakovski was growing rapidly: on 15 July 1907 he proudly listed in all his newspapers the numerous articles that had been published in the socialist press all over Europe: *Arbeiter Zeitung* in Vienna,⁸⁹ *Vorwärts*, and *Népszava* in Budapest, and *Le peuple* in Brussels, had all attempted to draw their readers' attention to the revolutionary events in Romania and to the brutal repression carried out by the liberal government. At the time, a lengthy study of the theory of revolution appeared in Paris in *Temps nouveaux*. It had been written in the light of the Romanian peasant insurrection and it stressed the above-mentioned facts. Contrary to the ideas of most leaders of the Second International as to the "conservative" and "reactionary" character of peasants, and the "harmful" consequences of peasant revolts, it claimed that the peasant masses offer priceless potential, and that their struggle "ushers in social advances."⁹¹ Another socialist analyst came to the conclusion, a few days later, that these uprisings were a "real revolutionary

training ground.”⁹²

Rakovski could see that one of the best ways of influencing European public opinion was to refer the Romanian case to the International Socialist Congress, which was to meet in Stuttgart in August. He declared: “Through the International Socialist Bureau we shall rouse democratic and enlightened circles in European society, and they will condemn the Romanian government’s policy.”

His idea was discussed and adopted during the conference of Romanian trade unions which took place in Galați on 29 and 30 June and July 1907; the Romanian delegation to the Stuttgart Congress was elected and asked to prepare an overall report on the revival of the Romanian socialist movement and the latest social disturbances.⁹³ Rakovski, who had attended the 1904 Amsterdam Congress as a delegate of the Bulgarian Socialist party, was now going to head the Romanian delegation together with Alecu Constantinescu: the former as member of the Central Committee of the *România muncitoare* circles, the latter as secretary to the General Commission of Romanian Unions. Together they drafted the report of the Romanian political and union organizations.⁹⁴ Commenting on the socialist revival in Romania since the party was dissolved in 1899, and grateful for international cooperation, the editor of *Viitorul social*, (*Socialist Future*,) the social-democratic review, summed up the situation in these words:

The socialist press in all countries has provided information for the Workers International Association on our struggle and the harassment to which the Romanian socialist movement is subjected. Our duty was to show ourselves worthy of their concern, not only by playing an active part in the work of the congress, but also in making contact with socialist organizations in other countries, and endeavoring to make our movement better known abroad.⁹⁵

In *România muncitoare*, Rakovski emphasized the aims of the Romanian delegation to the congress:

Our organizations are provided with a unique opportunity: they can protest against the wrongdoings of our government in front of an assembly of the world’s proletariat. Our delegation will reveal how so-called liberal and democratic politicians solved the peasant question by means of massacres and then proceeded to harass our organizations, in defiance of constitutional rights and also fundamental human rights.⁹⁶

Two days after the official opening of the congress, and after the

Romanian delegation had given to the International Socialist Bureau full information on the situation, a special commission was set up from the ranks of the Romanian and Austrian delegations to draft a resolution "against persecutions in Romania." This resolution was presented to and unanimously approved by the congress on 24 August 1907. Among other things, the following was included:

In view of the fact that, after wiping out thousands of peasants who had been forced to take the unhappy course of rebellion under conditions of excessive oppression and exploitation, and how it [the Romanian government] attacks the workers' socialist and union organizations that have been declared illegal.

The resolution protested against systematic persecution and expulsion of foreign workers, denouncing these actions as "contrary to human rights." At the same time, the congress wished every success and encouragement to the politically conscious Romanian proletariat in its struggle to gain its rights, rising indignantly against "the shameful policy of the Romanian government."⁹⁷ One can imagine that Rakovski was far from satisfied with the word "unhappy," which we have put in italics on purpose. This adjective contradicted all the recent initiatives he had taken, and his articles in *România muncitoare* and *Humanité*. As for Lenin, he crossed out the word, criticizing it in a footnote that he wrote in his German copy.⁹⁸ Instead of regretting what had happened, Rakovski, as well as Lenin, always stressed the real significance of the Romanian peasant uprisings. This is an idea they shared after the October Revolution; it also partly explains why Lenin chose Rakovski as head of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, and set up the famous *kombedy* ("committees of poor peasants"), the aim of which was to stir up a revolution in the countryside. Before parting, the Stuttgart Congress asked those of its members in various European parliaments "to demand from the Romanian government" that it fulfill its obligations to all sections of the population, "since they are covered by international treaties."⁹⁹ Nothing could have made that government more angry with the Socialists than these repeated appeals to European public opinion and international laws. An excuse had to be found for repressions, and the authorities declared once again (as happened two years before at the time of the *Potemkin* mutiny) that peasant riots had been triggered by foreigners. An official proclamation claimed that it had been discovered that popular uprisings were "the result of secret propaganda aimed at peasants by a group of revolutionaries, among whom teachers, priests, and the Russian sailors of the battleship *Potemkin* had taken an active share."

Rakovski was first on the list of revolutionary troublemakers; and, when the articles he had written in *Humanité* arrived in Bucharest, he was singled out, with 880 others "undesirable foreigners," as liable for expulsion.

III

The expulsion order was issued while Rakovski was at the Stuttgart Congress. He immediately opposed it strongly, on the grounds that it was "by all counts unlawful." He thought he could accuse the government of acting illegally to expel its own citizens. So, to keep antigovernment agitation going, he decided to make use of his personal misfortune. For five years, the staunch internationalist made every effort to prove that he was indeed a Romanian citizen. Only much later, when he was Soviet ambassador in Paris, did he declare humorously: "Of old, seven cities claimed to have seen Homer's birth. I belong to five countries at least: Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, the Ukraine, and France . . ." ¹⁰⁰

In 1907, he had to demonstrate that he was Romanian, and the matter of his return was, for five years, going to be one of the practical problems "round which the class struggle was carried out by Romanian workers." ¹⁰¹

Rakovski pointed out that his father had resided in the Dobrudja from 11 April 1877 and had acquired Romanian nationality after the treaty of Berlin had altered the Bulgarian border in favor of Romania. The Romanian government, on the other hand, "feverishly sought" in Rakovski's past a loophole to make it possible to send him into exile. The High Court pronounced his father to be not a Romanian citizen, since he had permanently moved to the Dobrudja only in 1880 and since Christian himself had twice used a Bulgarian passport to enter Romania. Moreover, the court learned that he had passed himself off as a Bulgarian when he had enrolled at the Berlin Faculty of Medicine in 1893. Rakovski replied with two irrefutable facts: he was Romanian, indeed, since he had been called up by the Romanian military authorities and had served for almost two years as a lieutenant in the Ninth Cavalry Regiment; also, he was a member of the Constanța zemstvo, and a large landowner in the Dobrudja, where his father had repeatedly been elected to the council of the town of Mangalia. ¹⁰² Both parties remained locked in this dispute until 1912.

Since he was banned and deprived of his political rights, Rakovski came once again to Western Europe, and decided to stay in France. However, he continued to help in running the Romanian workers' movement and contributing to *Viitorul social*, the social democratic periodical. He also undertook to write three books: the first, in

Romanian, was *The Rule of the Arbitrary and of Cowardice*, and was intended for the workers he had just left behind; the other two were *Political Persecutions in Romania* and *Romania of the Boyars: A Scandalous Expulsion* were to inform Western European socialist parties.¹⁰³ All three gave detailed descriptions of the "persecutions" of the Romanian people, and were drawn from Rakovski's personal experience, representing him as a martyr to the cause.

Until April 1912, when a special court sentence and a governmental decree were to restore his political rights in Romania, Rakovski lived in Paris most of the time, finding ample scope for his energy. Dmitri Sverchkov, Trotsky's close friend, who was to turn into a Stalinist after being a Menshevik, gives us an account of Rakovski's life. The portrait is interesting because it shows how widespread his political activities were:

From Paris, Rakovski always kept in close touch with the Romanian Socialist party; tirelessly, he wrote for periodicals and newspapers, constantly receiving from Romania invitations to represent the socialist and trade unions party at congresses and conferences that delegates from all over the world would attend.

Sverchkov shows Rakovski as a passionate fighter, whose strong convictions inspired his speeches:

I attended [these congresses] as a guest, and saw for myself the subtlety and fire Rakovski could command to defend his revolutionary point of view. I could also see how wounded he was by such political opponents as Jouhaux [France], Leigrin [Germany], and Samuel Gompers, a delegate of the American Federation Workers. The latter especially lost all restraint after a speech made by Rakovski, going so far as to say in his reply that Romania, being such a small country, precluded anyone paying much attention to what her representatives could say.¹⁰⁴

Yet, our witness adds that "it was not easy to ignore Rakovski nor to keep him silent;" he was "moved by an inflexible revolutionary spirit," which, of course, could only clash with the usual attitude of American union representatives who wanted conciliation. Although, while in Paris, Rakovski remained the exiled leader of the Romanian socialist movement, and represented it with some panache at various international meetings, he found himself very close to the French Socialist party, especially to the followers of Jules Guesde.

Rakovski was fascinated by Guesde and the French socialism, and took part in all the events of the movement in France during

those years, without ever feeling that he was "abroad." In spite of feeling that he was uprooted in his exile, by temperament he enjoyed traveling and meeting new faces, as well as having new experiences. Thus, in 1909, he suggested to Sverchkov that he accompany him to India, a country he had longed to know since his childhood. Because a Russian publisher had asked him to bring his *History of France* up to date (the first volume had been published in 1900), he invited his friend to go over and look "for a quiet place in which to work." He would write his book in French and Sverchkov would translate it into Russian.¹⁰⁵

This anecdote brings out something fundamental in Rakovski's disposition: his ability to take adverse circumstances philosophically. We shall have more examples of his calm and serene character when we come to his long exile following Trotsky's downfall in 1927. It was also typical of him, having briefly thought of withdrawing from the turmoil, to throw himself into the fray almost at once again. He had one clear aim in mind: giving a new impetus to the Romanian revolutionary movement by using his own misfortune. He nearly lost his life in the attempt.

In March and again in April, the liberal government of Bratianu, instituted two lawsuits against him, taking advantage of his being away. They went so far as forging documents in Rakovski's own words to back its accusations—but to no avail.¹⁰⁶ Rakovski himself had one single objective in mind, which explains his repeated attempts, between the spring of 1908 and the autumn of the following year, to enter Romania and have proceedings taken against him.¹⁰⁷ He wanted to turn the courtroom into a political platform, using his right to answer the accusations made by the authorities by accusing them himself. A lawsuit against him could thus become "an instrument for fighting the government and bourgeois society."¹⁰⁸

Whenever Rakovski tried to enter Romania, his expulsion order would be confirmed by the Bratianu government, in spite of violent protests in Parliament and street demonstrations by workers. The obvious support he enjoyed with a large part of public opinion encourage him further in his action; he succeeded in entering Romania in October 1909, but was soon betrayed and arrested by the police and then immediately jailed.¹⁰⁹ The Romanian government was at a loss with how to deal with such an "eccentric." It was afraid of starting proceedings against him, which could spark an outburst of public discontent, fueled by members of the socialist movement. It decided to expel Rakovski again, but he refused to be intimidated. He reacted like Trotsky, in 1927 in Moscow, when the attempt was made to push him bodily into a train bound for Central Asia; he resisted

physical violence, using force to counter force.

Rakovski also caused a stir when he tried to fight his expulsion by physical means; the police had to take him forcibly onto a train leaving for Austria-Hungary and keep him under lock and key. When he arrived on the other side of the border, the Hungarian authorities refused to let him in. As he was to write in his memoirs, he was then sent "like a parcel" from one country to another, until, after diplomatic exchanges between the Romanian government and the Austro-Hungarian government, the latter finally consented to accept him. It looked as if Rakovski's efforts were ending in failure; but the next installment of the story of "Romanian adventure" would prove that it had not been in vain. The authority Rakovski had acquired over the socialist movement in "his" country and Romanian society as a whole became quite apparent, as would be seen in several articles published in European newspapers.¹¹⁰ What followed next could only strengthen his will to fight for the triumph of socialist ideas in a social climate increasingly strained. He wrote later:

The news of my arrest had been kept secret: it nevertheless leaked to the press. The Romanian government issued a firm denial, but the working class, knowing from experience that the government was capable of any infringement of the law, regarded the attempt to keep my arrest as well as my deportation into Hungarian territory from public knowledge as a further proof of evil intentions toward me. On 19 October 1909, after public indignation had been whipped up by a communiqué published in the official press announcing the government's decision to do away with me rather than allowing me to stay freely in Romania, Bucharest workers started a demonstration that ended in a bloody clash with the police. Besides dozens of wounded people, some thirty workers were arrested, among whom were leaders of unions and political movements who were massacred that very night in Bucharest police dungeons. These revolting actions were followed by more protests, not only in large and small industrial centers, and in the Romanian democratic bourgeois press, but also outside Romania. The struggle between workers and government was taking a new turn. There was an attempt on Bratianu's life, which failed, although it seems the police themselves were partly responsible for it. It was the signal for the start of fresh police harassment and partial martial law to stifle the right to strike and right of assembly. Bratianu's government had to disappear, and did so, cursed by the workers replaced by a conservative government under

Carp.¹¹¹

Rakovski and the Romanian Socialists regarded this change in government as beneficial, since it could only exacerbate social unrest and lead, in due course, to popular uprisings that would topple the regime.

Thus, late in 1909, Rakovski went back to Western Europe after a short stay in Hungary. He tried to maintain contact with the comrades he had left behind and was successful. This is why he was chosen as their delegate for the Romanian Socialist party at the International Socialist Congress that took place in August 1910 in Copenhagen.

One of the main topics for discussion at the congress, as we know, was the unity of the Russian social democratic movement. Rakovski insisted that it was necessary to keep the various tendencies within the same movement, and wholeheartedly supported Trotsky who had led a campaign in the German press. Trotsky sent a letter to *Vorwärts* which "caused a stir at the congress." He denounced "the conspiracy led by the émigré [Bolshevik] clique¹¹² against the [Russian] Social Democratic party," adding menacingly that "the circle around Lenin, putting itself the party, could soon find itself outside it."¹¹³ He concluded with words to the effect that none of the émigré leaders was representative of the real Russian movement. It may be appropriate to point out that Stalin, in the articles he wrote at the time in *Bakinski proletarii* expressed the same opinion. Stalin blamed the Russian leaders who lived in exile (Lenin no less than Martov)¹¹⁴ for having lost touch with real Russian life.¹¹⁵ But the future "peoples' father" was careful to treat Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike, refusing to take sides. On the contrary, Trotsky insisted on the fact that Russian Socialists who lived in very difficult circumstances in Russia, the Caucasus or Siberia, suffered from these everlasting disputes, caused by too many philosophical discussions among salon theoreticians, or so it seemed to them.¹¹⁶ This controversy raised general indignation among the Russian social democrat delegates taking part in the congress, obviously since most of them qualified as émigrés and chatterboxes. The "founding father" of Russian Marxism, Plekhanov, supported by Lenin, asked for disciplinary action to be taken against Trotsky, when the Russian delegation met to give a ruling on the matter, and pass sentence on the "blasphemer." But three highly thought of delegates rose up in his defense: Rakovski, Lunacharski, who would later become commissar for education, and Ryazanov, later a distinguished director of the Marx-Engels Institute; Trotsky was not punished.¹¹⁷

In February 1911, Rakovski came back to Romania. He managed to reach the capital and right away got in touch with the Socialists

to decide on the tactics they would use in their struggle with the bourgeois society in Romania. They settled on a plan similar to the one Rakovski had devised two years earlier. They would try to bring a lawsuit that would be used for political ends by the socialist movement. To be arrested, Rakovski would go as far as declaring his "trust" in the impartiality of Romanian justice, giving himself up to its mercy.

When one remembers the massacres in October 1909, when a large number of socialist and union leaders had been wiped out in the cells of the Bucharest police, it is clear that Rakovski was taking a great risk, inspired by revolutionary enthusiasm and not lacking in physical courage. Next he sent a letter to the public prosecutor, claiming with some irony:

I can assure you, and this will be confirmed by my friends and political comrades, who respect law and order as much as I do, that my only desire is for my case to be examined in accordance with the laws of the country, in a dispassionate and orderly fashion.¹¹⁸

He then put himself at the disposal of the authorities. But the conservative government was wary, seeing in this gesture, as sudden as seemingly absurd, another device and poisoned gift. Like his predecessor, Carp refused to keep Rakovski in jail and had him forcibly taken to the border. The only problem was, which border?

Because the road to Austria-Hungary was now closed, they tried to deport him to Bulgaria, but Bulgarian border guards refused to let Rakovski in. As he was to remark later, our hero was too well known among European police officials, and "only the way to Russia remained open, together with the high seas."¹¹⁹ Therefore, he was taken aboard a ship for Constantinople, having been provided with a Romanian passport. A few days after landing, he was arrested by the "Young Turk" authorities at the request of the Romanian police. When he was set free, thanks to the intervention of Turkish socialist deputies, Rakovski traveled to Sofia, more determined than ever to resume the fight, but perhaps in a different way.

In the spring of 1911, Rakovski had thus been expelled from a European country for the sixth time because of his political beliefs. He was *persona non grata* in Romania, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and even lately Turkey. As Anatole de Monzie wrote later, when examining the past of Ambassador Rakovski and his character: "Curiously, the striking feature of this remarkable diplomat was his easy manner, having been expelled from so many countries, he had made a habit of feeling at home everywhere."¹²⁰ Once he was

in Bulgaria, Rakovski made improvements in the running of the review entitled *Napred (Forward)*, which had replaced *Viitorul social* of which he had to give up the editorship in Romania. He chose two main objectives for this periodical: the reunification of the Bulgarian social democratic movement, and "the fight against a violent kind of nationalism that had developed in Bulgaria and was paving the way for the Balkan war."¹²¹ In this respect, Rakovski could make a useful contribution to the theoretical approach of major social problems, presenting them from the Marxist point of view.

His first objective was to try and unite both wings of the Bulgarian socialist movement in the interest of the common struggle. The *shiroki* were close to the Russian "economists" in some respects, thus straying from orthodox Marxists; while the left-wing, the *tesnyaki* proved increasingly intolerant on points of principle. The secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, Camille Huysmans, specifically asked Rakovski to accomplish this difficult task. The policy was vigorously advocated by Trotsky at the Copenhagen Congress, but Rakovski failed there too. However, all his discussions on Marxist theory and its practical application and all the debates on doctrinal points he had to take part in could only help shape Rakovski's political personality and they also showed his innate ability to negotiate. As Karl Radek remarked about another gifted diplomat: "The endless negotiations we had to conduct with the Mensheviks made us familiar with the techniques of diplomacy; comrade Chicherin, through these years of doctrinal struggle, learned how to draft a diplomatic note."¹²² Yet, when his principles were involved, Rakovski could be just as unbending as the most rigid Marxist. His friend Trotsky described him as "a Marxist to the marrow of his bones."¹²³ When he realized that the numerous articles he had published in *Napred* (between June 1911 and January 1912) had not changed anything, Rakovski had to admit his defeat.¹²⁴ He knew that it would harm the Bulgarian socialist movement to include within its members such moderates and "softies" who seemed mere "opportunists" to him.¹²⁵

In fact, from the days of the split in the Bulgarian socialist movement in 1903, and the schism within Russian social democracy, Rakovski had sided with the *tesnyaki* under Blagoev's leadership. He had only become less close to them insofar as he was more involved with the Romanian movement. In 1905, he had waged an energetic campaign against "renegade" Bulgarian socialists, especially against the *shiroki* leader, Tanko Sakazov, in the review entitled *Tsirk Bolgaria*.¹²⁶ The polemics on the way to socialism, with or without support from the bourgeois class, started again after the failure of his reconciliation attempt.¹²⁷ To justify his position and throw some

light on the contradictory aspects of left-wing movements in Bulgaria, Rakovski had to publish several articles in Kautski's *Die Neue Zeit*, a periodical providing information for all Western European socialists.

Another important theme, which Rakovski developed in *Napred*, dealt with relations between nationalists and socialists: his aim was to find practical solutions to make Bulgarian nationalism less rabid than it had appeared for a long time. He thought that the only antidote to war, the only means of achieving a degree of coexistence among peoples which were political rivals, as well as economic competitors and religious fanatics, would be the setting up of a democratic federation of the Balkan peoples, on the line of Swiss or U. S. federated states.¹²⁸ He defended the idea since 1908, but it was not his entirely: it had been debated and adopted by all Balkan Socialist as far back as the eighteenth century. As early as the years 1869-1870, the revolutionary theoretician Lyuben Karavelov, famous for his slogan: "Freedom is not granted, it must be won," had become the apostle of a federation of Balkan peoples, which would gain independence through economic power.¹²⁹ Within such a federation, Karavelov gave a dominant role to Bulgaria and Serbia, which could hardly appeal to other nationalities, especially the Romanians. The idea of a federation was taken up again in 1885 by Dimitar Blagoev in the first article he had published in a Bulgarian review (*Makedonski glas*). He thought a Balkan federation would solve the perennial "dilemma between struggle and cooperation." This federation would free Macedonia from Turkish tutelage, while saving it from being incorporated into Bulgaria. Blagoev based his study on the authority of the great "preachers" of the Bulgarian socialist movement, Karavelov, Levsky, and Botev, demonstrating that such a federation would protect the small Balkan states by keeping great powers away. The inhabitants would enjoy "a large measure of autonomy and more equitable distribution of material and spiritual resources." Macedonia could then choose a language, religion, and nationality, Blagoev went on, so that neither Serbia, nor Greece, nor Bulgaria would be able to take advantage of an internal strife between two Slavic nations on the question of Macedonia. "People of the Balkan peninsula, unite before time runs out," our revolutionary concluded.¹³⁰

Rakovski started from the same assumptions as Blagoev, but gave them a stronger Marxist character. For more than thirty years, until he lost the right to speak in public in his Soviet exile in 1928, he tirelessly proclaimed the same message, as we can see from this article written in 1925: "Before such a federation can be brought about, there must exist relations of mutual solidarity between workers and peasants through the whole peninsula."¹³¹

In November 1911, he started on a journey to Macedonia, both to spread these ideas and to make the nightmare of an approaching war recede by expounding the gospel of working-class internationalism. Each of the speeches he made aroused great enthusiasm, for example, in Salonika, where the audience numbered some 8,000 people in the course of a demonstration organized by local socialists.¹³²

In the spring of 1912, Rakovski was allowed, at last, to enter Romania legally; the conservative government had just issued a decree on exile, and a special court ruling had restored his political rights.¹³³ The reasons for this change of attitude in the conservative government are rather difficult to ascertain. According to Rakovski himself, the cause of this unexpected gesture lay in internal problems that stemmed from the merciless fight that was going on between the Conservative and the Liberal parties in Romania. The new conservative strategy was to conciliate the Socialists to help combat Bratianu's party. Rakovski described this phenomenon accurately in his autobiography.

The worst enemy of our movement was the Liberal party, which included not only large farmers and landowners, but also industrialists. After a few concessions to the peasants, which restored a measure of peace in the countryside, the conservatives felt safe for a while from peasant uprisings, and sought an alliance with the workers' movement to help them fight the liberals. Anyhow . . . the conservatives undertook to allow my case to be reviewed.¹³⁴

The term used by Rakovski, "Anyhow"—(*tak ili inache*, in Russian), is interesting. We know that ambiguous deals take place between conservatives and liberals in any country; in Russia, the story of "legal" Marxism is well known.¹³⁵ So, Peter, Struve, N. Berdyaev, Tugan-Baranovski, and S. Bulgakov had been able to put forward their ideas in Russian newspapers without interference from the tsarist police. They were, admittedly, in total opposition to the Populists, believing, in step with the strictest Marxist orthodoxy, that it was necessary to go through the capitalist bourgeois stage to make a proletarian revolution possible—much later.¹³⁶ These "legal" Marxists were also opposed to Revolutionary Socialists, since the latter advocated violence against the most influential members of the Russian ruling class. The former were thus helping the tsarist government unwittingly, and were being used in the fight against more "active" revolutionaries. This was the kind of relationship that could take place between Marxists and conservatives.

For several years, Lenin himself sided with those Marxists who

were fighting moderate Socialists, liberals, or union leaders of all complexion, who, it seemed to him, were deceiving the working class, lulling it out of the struggle to try to gain social advantages within the framework of bourgeois society.¹³⁷ But, from 1902, he turned against them to break the "pact" made by some Russian Marxists and conservatives, attacking it violently. In Romania, Rakovski had established with the conservatives a common front against the liberals, thinking that both groups would benefit from their disappearance, obviously for different reasons; it was but a temporary "alliance" that could only serve the interests of Romanian socialists.

Rakovski's enemies suggested there were other reasons for the improvement in relations, and that it helped him to have his case reviewed. These were nationalists, who resented the international revolutionary and extremist and represented many nationalities. Before returning to Romania, Christian had become, as he said, "a target for attacks by all Bulgarian nationalists."¹³⁸ He was, as a matter of fact, opposed to their empire building, especially their wish to annex Macedonia.¹³⁹ On the other hand, we know that Romanian nationalists had tried to discredit him after the peasant revolt in 1907, accusing him of being Bulgarian rather than Romanian, whether from personal feelings or family connections. Rakovski had answered this accusation in *România muncitoare*, declaring that he recognized "no single country but the common land of the international proletariat."¹⁴⁰ Let us remember that in the first public speech he delivered in Romania in 1905 (on 1 May, Workers' Day) he had begged the audience to forgive him the mistakes he might make in their language, calling on them to bear in mind "the international language of social democracy." When the Romanian liberal press accused him later of not being a patriot, he did not mince his words and declared that if it meant patriotism in the sense of "racial prejudice, international civil war, political tyranny and plutocratic domination, then I am not a patriot."¹⁴¹ Likewise, the faith in internationalism he displayed during World War I was to arouse lasting resentment among French nationalists, for example in François Coty, the press baron and perfumemaker. In his book, *Contre le communisme*, in 1927, he stated surprisingly: "Rakovski was always considered as a German agent. He remains, to this day, the most useful collaborator of Germany in our country."¹⁴² As we shall see, when we examine Rakovski's life from 1914 to 1917, his relations with the German authorities were far from simple, just as was the case with Lenin and many other Bolsheviks at the time. In his book, Coty went as far as to say that:

In 1912, mysterious accomplices opened the [Romanian] border and even rescinded the expulsion decree. Obviously, a

great power was keen on keeping the Bulgarian agitator in Romania, since he was well disposed toward Germany and influenced by Marxist pan-Germanism.¹⁴³

These assertions remain without substance. As we have no documents to back them, we can only rely on guesswork and we shall come back to the subject later. However, it is established that Romanian conservatives (Bulgarians also) were enthusiastic Germanophiles, in large numbers, and were accused of taking directives and money straight from Berlin. As for Rakovski, we know already that he was wealthy and could support several Romanian, Bulgarian, and even Russian socialist publications, having offered to Lenin to help in launching *Iskra* in 1900¹⁴⁴ and giving financial aid to *Pravda* in 1908 when it was published by Trotsky in Vienna,¹⁴⁵ and also to *Nashe slovo* in Paris in 1915.¹⁴⁶

In 1912, Rakovski and Trotsky met again, when the latter was sent by a newspaper, *Kievskaya mysl* (*Kievan Thought*) to Romania at the start of the First Balkan War, which aimed at expelling the Turks from the Balkan Peninsula for good. Both men had become acquainted in Paris in 1903, and met again at several of the socialist congresses mentioned above, always being politically close to each other. Their friendship would last for nearly thirty-five years, outliving war, revolution, victory and defeat, exile and the Stalinist purges. As Isaac Deutscher wrote: "This was perhaps the only lasting and close friendship that Trotsky experienced in all his life."¹⁴⁷ The numerous manuscript notes (and unpublished scribblings in Trotsky's hand) that we have been able to consult, give us valuable information on the subject. Each page, each sentence, shows the genuine admiration that Trotsky, a difficult and complicated man, felt for Rakovski. In 1923, when he was in Russia at the height of his power, Trotsky wrote a dedication to him in his famous book, *Literature and Revolution*, expressing his respect with three simple words: "to the fighter, the man, the friend."¹⁴⁸ When we remember Trotsky's character—hard and unpredictable—such a long friendship that even Rakovski's "treason" at the time of his trial in 1938, did not sever, was remarkable.¹⁴⁹

Trotsky was often described as a man who "looked down on everybody and everything." Angelika Balabanova, who wrote these words, knew him well because she had been secretary of the Zimmerwald movement,¹⁵⁰ and she added: "His arrogance was the reason he was never popular among his revolutionary comrades, even before the start of political differences. He erected a glass wall around himself, although at times he might try to be pleasant."¹⁵¹ Of course, it may be that Balabanova was less than impartial toward a man she did not

like. But her opinion is confirmed by a man who often stood up for Trotsky against Lenin himself before 1917, A. V. Lunacharski. The latter sternly remarked on the famous commissar: "His monstrous arrogance and inability, perhaps unwillingness, to show himself in a warm or humane light, or to take much notice of anybody, his total lack of the kind of charm always shown by Lenin, inevitably isolated Trotsky."¹⁵² Even with political allies who were close to him, such as A. A. Ioffe, Trotsky could not help being condescending.¹⁵³ By contrast, he always regarded Rakovski as his equal in the revolutionary movement. This was so in 1912, for example, when Rakovski was the most famous leader of the socialist movement in the Balkans, while Trotsky was mainly known for his brilliant past, having distinguished himself as president of the Petrograd Soviet at the time of the 1905 revolution. He had become a professional journalist, and admired Rakovski as a man "who, from his village in the Bulgarian backwaters, had risen through revolutionary fervor to a position where the whole world was in his thoughts, and he wielded vast influence."¹⁵⁴

Time and again, in his various descriptions of his friend's unusual character, Trotsky stressed the essential connection between Rakovski as a man and as a fighter: "He has a genial attitude toward people, open and kind, which reveals his generous intelligence and noble disposition. The indefatigable fighter, in whom political courage merges with personal daring, is completely ignorant of the ways of intrigue." Further, "Rakovski was a man of high moral principles; this showed in all his thoughts, all his actions . . . Rakovski, sweet, gentle, delicate through and through, was one of the most unbending revolutionaries ever seen in the course of history."¹⁵⁵

We can see that some of the expressions used by Trotsky to describe his friend's personality are exactly the opposite of those used by Balabanova or Lunacharski when writing about him. The attraction of two sharply contrasting characters is obvious. It is significant that Trotsky criticized his comrade-in-arms only once; that was in 1919, when Rakovski had been appointed by Lenin as head of the Soviet Ukrainian Provisional Government. The Red Army had just been routed, and Rakovski was hard put to deal with the desperate situation; Trotsky accused him then of being "soft."¹⁵⁶

It is true that Rakovski did not show his mettle like Trotsky. This may have been due to his qualities as a man, to the character of his revolutionary beliefs which were never tainted by cruelty or fanaticism. Thus, although Trotsky valued his comrade's "ingrained sense of humor," he immediately qualified it with "he was too kind to people to allow it often to change into sarcasm."¹⁵⁷ Among his intimates, Christian liked "an attitude both sentimental and detached,"

and had many friends in every European country, because, "while trying to reform the world and mankind, he took them as they were, always."¹⁵⁸

They became close friends in 1912, when Trotsky came to Romania to report on the First Balkan War. His "doctor friend" acted as his guide, directing him, among other things, to a campside for *skoptsy* in Dobrudja. The latter were members of a strange sect (the "holy eunuchs") some of whom Trotsky had met in 1904, in his Siberian exile. Their houses and their orchards, Trotsky observed, were well-kept, but here was "something dull, joyless . . . life was lacking; there were no children. Faces were puffy, and in spite of their honest gaze, unpleasant." And, being in agreement with him, Trotsky jotted down what Rakovski had remarked: "When you consider how the *skoptsy* live, you become more and more convinced of the importance of sex as a social force, the source of altruism and of every noble aspect in man."¹⁵⁹ The friends did not limit their conversations to Sigmund Freud; during their travels, politics soon came to the fore again, and the sight of the atrocities of the war left its mark on both of them. Rakovski gave Trotsky a survey of the history of the Balkans, astonishing him with his thorough knowledge and remarkable understanding of the socialist movement in Western and Eastern Europe.¹⁶⁰ He also gave a detailed account of the federation plans that would "unite within one state all Balkan nationalities, on a democratic and socialist basis, which alone could restore peace in the area and create conditions necessary for economic expansion."¹⁶¹ They also had a long conversation on the problem of Bessarabia. The position adopted by Rakovski in 1912 is interesting because it is different from his stand after the Russian revolution in October 1917, and even contradicts it, on the surface.

When Rakovski came back to Romania in April 1912, his first political gesture was to take part, on 16 March of the following year, in the ceremony to commemorate the centenary of the annexation by Russia of a province that had always belonged to Romania.¹⁶² On this occasion, he protested against Russian domination in the area, and made use of this case to stress that a federation would make it possible for the small nations of Southern Europe to resist foreign aggression. We shall see later how, after October 1917, Rakovski became the champion of Russian hegemony not only in Bessarabia, but also in the whole Balkan peninsula. Is there really a contradiction between the two attitudes? One has to realize, while all the conquests of tsarist Russia seemed wrong to Rakovski, the wars waged by the first socialist state could only be, on the contrary, wars of liberation. Through the two Balkan wars, Rakovski led an energetic campaign for

peace. At first, he blamed all the countries involved in the war, but he singled out Romania for annexing Bulgarian territory.¹⁶³ When he was criticized for it by the Romanian government, he boldly retorted in the pages of *România mucitoare*, using the same argument:

If it came to the defense of the national territory against any aggression whatsoever, we Socialists would be the first to support war. In fact, we are willing to assert that, had there been a Socialist party in Romania in 1879, it would not have remained idle, as were the parties in power at the time; even if it had been unable to prevent the crime through its efforts and protests, at least it would have raised the spirit of all Romanian inhabitants in Bessarabia.¹⁶⁴

We can see how confused Rakovski was on this subject. He shared this bewilderment with other Socialists in every European country, a phenomenon that would be increasingly felt up to the start of World War I, when after much soulsearching, the final break would occur between the “patriots” and the “defeatists” in the Socialist party. In the lines we have just quoted, Rakovski definitely sided with the patriots, supporting a “defensive” war; he only attacked “aggressive” wars, which are very often difficult to distinguish from the former.

Rakovski was above all a “pacifist” and revolutionary. He thought (together with Lenin) that there should be no wars between nations, only between social classes. What was needed was to educate soldiers and raw recruits politically, so as to divert the wars entered into for the benefit of the bourgeois class into a general war that would destroy it. To this end he issued, in October 1912, an appeal to young recruits, saying as in 1907, when the Romanian authorities had ordered troops to fire at rebellious peasants:

You are given guns to kill men. Take these guns away: they were paid for by your sweat, they often pointed at our hearts. Each soldier must understand that he is compelled to support a treacherous country; he must understand that his task is to protect the class to which he belongs through his work, since it is being mocked and deprived of its rights. But one day, it will turn against the workers' worst enemies, the well-to-do, and those in power. For this war only, must we make all necessary preparations, and learn every possible stategem.¹⁶⁵

This appeal was meant to herald the future, which it did. A few years later, in 1917, Russian troops, en masse, weary of fighting and under the influence of revolutionary propagandists, would turn against the propertied classes, oust their rulers, and try to enact a

revolution that would cover the whole world. But, before the storm could break out, they had to undergo four years of untold suffering; those years that all European peoples had to live through during World War I.

Chapter 3

Rakovski and World War I (1914-1917)

Until the declaration of war, on 2 August 1914, all European Socialist parties had been opposed to militarism on principle. The leaders of the Second International had expressed the general opinion of militants in all countries, when they declared that the only way to stop the war was to try to stop it happening. Thus, they were at a loss when war broke out, as if a cataclysm had occurred, the beginning of which had escaped notice and its laws could no longer be explained. Martov wrote to Axelrod on 19 August 1914, "Gradually we learn to live in an atmosphere of universal doom, but, during the first days, I completely lost my bearings"¹

A few months later, Lunacharski expressed the same dismay in a letter to Jules Guesde: "I am utterly convinced, comrade, that Russian democrats are completely lost."² Many Socialists thought they were reaping the fruit "not only of the work done by opportunists, but also of their own lack of concern for military questions and lukewarm support of their principles." Before the war, their action was nothing more than "making solemn resolutions," which no one, not even the revolutionaries themselves, ever thought of putting into practice.³ They were bitter now, realizing that their efforts had failed when war had been declared and it had become apparent how the various groups that made up the International had remained attached to their respective countries in spite of their devotion to working-class internationalism, which was proved to be a mere theory in comparison. Kautsky summed up what this tragic event meant for the socialist movement, when he said that "the International was not meant for war."⁴ Socialist leaders were able, at the time, to gauge the full extent of the collapse; the present situation had forestalled them, confronting them with their failure "to force bourgeois society to choose between the two saving options: peace or social revolution."⁵

Such was the origin of the feeling of helplessness that took hold of all the European movements of the left at the start of the war. Rakovski, having shared all the hopes of the International, was deeply affected by it. As a Socialist and a member of the left wing of the workers movement, he stood against wars of aggression, but believed

that some "defensive" wars could be justified. One has to admit that his attitude was not entirely without contradictions, as a result not so much of an opportunism that was never a feature of his political makeup, as of his conviction that "only a fool never changes his mind."⁶ A convinced internationalist and pacifist, Rakovski asserted in January 1912, on the eve of the First Balkan War: "We are against all wars, since even wars of liberation are wars of conquest."⁷ This posture was academic, but explains his ambivalent attitude when the Balkan peoples pushed the Turks out of the peninsula. It also justifies the violence of his attacks against those who wanted to appropriate the spoils. Uppermost in Rakovski's mind were the call to social revolution, hatred for all forms of oppression, therefore of war, and the belief that class struggle is the only way to achieve the downfall of the old social order. He wrote in 1917:

We, social democrats, were against war not only because it is a means of exterminating the proletariat, but also because it brings only poverty and slavery. We emphasized that only the proletariat's class struggle and a revolution could bring about social liberation for the people.⁸

Rakovski was the first to admit and to regret the fact that "the socialist tactics as regards to war remained so hazy." Reviewing the achievements of the various congresses under the Second International, he pointed out one outstanding element: "Although the resolutions of the Stuttgart and Basel (1912) Congresses had stressed the need of 'waging war against war,' the means for such an endeavor were never sufficiently developed."⁹

When World War I began, European social democracy was split into two camps, totally opposed: the "patriotic" Socialists, on one side, and the "defeatists" or "pacifists" on the other. The former, who were a large majority, emphasized the right for Socialists to defend the motherland, asserting that it had been recognized at the Stuttgart Congress. Grumbach, the Alsatian Socialist, in support of his argument, made use of the Vandervelde report, saying:

The existence of the International is based on the existence of autonomous nationalities. Our federation is not an amorphous mass of individuals; it is a free federation of living nationalities . . . We must deduce from these principles that nations, no less than individuals, have a right to protect themselves against invasions and attacks that could threaten their independence.¹⁰

The main question that perplexed the European Socialists and divided them after August 1914 hinged on this famous "borderline"

between "offensive" wars to be condemned and "defensive" ones that were just. Lenin himself, in 1915, leaning on W. Liebknecht's moral authority, distinguished between the two, as an introduction to his reflections on the war. He wrote, for example, in a letter dated 4 August 1915, to Alexandra Kollontai:¹¹

Not to separate the various types of war is to my mind, wrong on a theoretical level and harmful in practice. We cannot protest against wars of national liberation. You quoted the example of Serbia; but if only the Serbs fought against Austria, should we not support them.¹²

In the first months of the war, Rakovski tried to suspend judgment, "to find his bearings" as to what was happening in the West.¹³ He could quite understand that "the main object of the various governments involved in the war was to prove that they were using their right of self-defense, and that the enemy was the aggressor." In the circumstances, it was difficult to decide who was the attacker and who was the victim. While Lenin refused to distinguish (since, in his opinion, this war was nothing but imperialistic), Rakovski, on the contrary, tried to weigh the pros and the cons from the first. As he explained in 1917:

Austria was complaining of the Serbian paramilitary organizations, helped by the Serbian government—itsself under the influence of Russia—preparing insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which insurrections were announced by the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne and his wife. Germany judged that she had to defend herself against Russia, since Austria's defeat could lead to Germany's. France regarded herself as forced to enter the war, while Germany declared that she had only attacked France to prevent an attack by France, who was committed to support Russia. England thought that, if Germany established her hegemony on the continent, she would soon lose not only her influence in all European affairs, but even perhaps the domination of the seas. Consequently, she declared that the violation of Belgian neutrality was a challenge to her own independence, and entered the war, in self-defense also.¹⁴

Rakovski had to admit that, because he felt confused at the start of the war, he had to justify the efforts made by both the French and German Socialist parties to help their country in the crisis.¹⁵ The Germans were of the opinion that "nowadays, social progress [was dependent on] the defense of the motherland,"¹⁶ and Rakovski was not deaf to the comments made by Plekhanov and Jules Guesde on

this point.¹⁷

His vacillation is surprising when one remembers that, as early as 1904 and 1905, Rakovski had argued against these very persons on the question of the Marxist attitude to war. As we saw earlier, in the winter of 1903–1904, Christian was in Paris when the Russo–Japanese War broke out. He recalled in his autobiography that he was asked to deliver a speech at a “monster” meeting attended by representatives from all revolutionary parties. His “defeatist” intervention was criticized by Plekhanov, who chaired the meeting; he went on:

I remember that, on the following day, Plekhanov, who had dinner with Jules Guesde and myself, blamed me for being defeatist. I have not forgotten Guesde’s solemn answer, “Social democracy will never be antipatriotic.” Plekhanov quoted this phrase to me many times later.¹⁸

Rakovski who was counted among Guesde’s partisans in those days, had no qualms about contradicting someone he deeply respected and distancing himself from Plekhanov who had enormously helped him also in the development of his political thinking.¹⁹ When Lenin, who knew how close were their personal relations, in 1922, asked Rakovski to write an obituary on Jules Guesde, the latter made a point of explaining all the implications of the French Marxist’s ideas on war.²⁰ “To his way of thinking,” Rakovski wrote, “war in itself could not be considered as absolutely evil or absolutely good. All depended on the consequences war would have on the working class and the part workers could play in the war.” Besides, “the idea of war held no terror for Guesde.” He thought, at least before 1914, that it should inspire fear only among capitalists. His followers hoped that a “new order,” a “future political system,” would come from a revolutionary upheaval, and they had to work assiduously to “accelerate the beginning of the end of the most pitiless of political regimes.” Guesde even quoted with equanimity these lines:

Coule, coule, sang de soldat,
Soldat du tsar ou de la reine,
Coule en ruisseau, coule en fontaine.²¹

He usually added the following: “let international socialism, especially the 18 March French movement, actively work for the grand, final confrontation.” His objective was primarily to prepare the power takeover of the Socialist party.²² Yet, it was often remarked that Guesde was more revolutionary in word than in deed. Lenin, on the contrary, used World War I to usher “the dictatorship of the proletariat” into the old tsarist empire. As for Guesde, he could not accept the idea of using the war for his own ends, because he thought that

socialism could not be "antipatriotic." In 1870, he had supported the *Gouvernement de la défense nationale*; in 1914, he joined the *Gouvernement d'union sacrée* as a minister without portfolio, together with Marcel Sembat. When Lenin accused him of betraying the Socialists, Guesde replied that it showed the Bolshevik leader's "lack of intelligence or his bad faith." He declared:

In peacetime, cooperation between classes in politics or government is the worst possible deception, since it means the conservation of the capitalist society, whose destruction is necessary for the liberation of labor and ordinary people; in the case of an attack, and as far as national defense is concerned, it is just the opposite: cooperation is a duty for Socialists, because it preserves the nation, which is also a necessary framework of action for today's workers and a prerequisite for tomorrow's international rule.²³

These reasons explain why Guesde changed from socialism to patriotism, since the transition was essential for a return to socialism in the future, or so it seemed to him. This idea clearly appears in an article he wrote in September 1914 on the future of Europe. He regarded France's victory as "the creation of a German Republic, a Bohemian Republic, an Austrian Republic, and a Hungarian Republic." It meant "a world safe from the nightmare of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs . . . the end of European militarism . . . peace restored everywhere;" it meant all roads would be open to social progress.²⁴

Lenin found nothing more exasperating than this kind of reasoning. So when Shklovsky, a Socialist, tried to use the same arguments in front of him, on the grounds that, if Germany won, French democracy would be destroyed, Lenin answered:

Well, let it be destroyed. France is nothing but a backward republic of usurers and people of independent means who grow fat on their pile of gold. If Germany, after depriving her of her industry beats her, there will be no harm in that. To us, revolutionary Marxists, it makes no difference who loses or who wins. Our job is to try and turn the imperialist war into universal civil war.²⁵

Lenin's ideas on the subject of war are more complex than it seems at first sight, and he developed them clearly in his brochure published in July-August 1915 in *Socialism and the War*. He recalled how "Socialists have always condemned war between nations for being barbarous and brutal," but Marxists regard all wars as being wrong on principle. Lenin, on the one hand, was opposed to those he calls

“pacifist bourgeois,” and, on the other, equally opposed to anarchists. He thought a Marxist has “to study each case separately” before passing judgment on a war. Placing himself deliberately at a height affording a wide historical perspective, he saw the class struggle as “the engine” of the march of history, and could “observe the inevitable connection between wars and class struggle within a country.” He thought that wars would be abolished only when classes no longer existed and socialism was instituted. The logical conclusion of this will appear to bourgeois pacifists as unacceptable as his premises: civil wars, that is wars waged by the oppressed classes against the ruling class, become “legitimate, progressive and necessary.”²⁶ So, Lenin fully approved of wars of national liberation, while Rakovski’s attitude changed after 1904 from defeatism to temporary acceptance of patriotic wars.

In 1915, however, Rakovski succeeded in sifting through his ideas under the influence of his friend, Trotsky. In an article published in October 1915, in *Nashe slovo*, which Trotsky edited in Paris, Christian reiterated his belief in internationalism and pacifism, but refused to distinguish any longer between an offensive and a defensive war, in view of recent events

We have also used this terminology in Romania, defensive war and war of aggression; but the events of our recent history prove this distinction to be purely academic. If, for example, Bulgaria were to declare war on Romania to regain the province she lost in 1913, would it be on her part aggression or self-defense? On the other hand, if we call it a war of conquest, we have to accept the fact that these annexations, which were at the time iniquitous and totally arbitrary, become lawful when they are confirmed by diplomatic treaties. In other words, we recognize that international diplomatic conferences are really the seal to a nation’s right to exit. Does it make sense from the socialist point of view?²⁷

This article helped Rakovski make up his mind, and he definitely rejected the attempts made by Guesdist members, who had been aware of his hesitation, to win him over to social patriotism. Their tactics were to turn the “strict and sincere neutrality” he claimed to have adopted, into pan-Germanism, on the principle that, “when the very fate of mankind is in the balance,” neutrality “can only refer itself to the example of Pontius Pilate in history”²⁸

Thus, on 17 March 1915, *Humanité* published an interview in which Rakovski supported the cause of neutralism “based on socialist principles” for the Balkan socialists. On the other hand, he recognized

that the responsibility for war was not "shared evenly" because, in his opinion, the German people remained "deep down filled with a religious respect for force."²⁹ Rakovski seemed to be trying to deal with counterattacks of "being Germanophile" when he wrote to Jules Guesde's chef de cabinet:

The fact that Germany is a country run in feudal and military fashion to the present day and that the wishes of ordinary people do not influence the government of the country leads us to assume, *a priori*, that the German government can declare war much more easily than a republican government, or even a parliamentary monarchy. I do not contest the fact that the duty German Socialists had, and still have, is much heavier than the duty of French Socialists. Since Germany officially declared war, German Socialists had to set an example of courage by adopting a policy of civil resistance.³⁰

Rakovski was the first to acknowledge that he had not succeeded in 1914—the problem was too complex—in deciding which form socialist opposition should take. But he could not help reminding the Guesdists that, in 1912, at the time of the First Balkan War, the Balkan Socialists had been true to their socialist duty, insofar as they never, for a single moment, ceased to condemn the fight into which their governments had entered—even though it was a war of national liberation, which was supported in principle by many Marxists, first of all Lenin. If Rakovski had denounced this national war at the time, it was for the reason he shared with Rosa Luxemburg: "the principle of nationalities" could not be included in a socialist program, since its application was "impossible within the framework of today's national state."³¹ The solution to the problem lay, in his opinion, in the creation of a socialist federation of the Balkan countries. He said that in the East, in this "Balkan zoo,"³² where races are so mixed, with borders that do not fit, the principle of nationality only covers a policy of territorial conquest."³³

In 1915, it was difficult for a Socialist who belonged to a "neutral" country to preach morality to men who fought for their homelands. We know that, when Rakovski had been criticized by the Romanian government three years earlier for defeatism, he had supported the principle of a patriotic war. Now, with the Guesdists, he chose to steer a middle course, reminding them that socialist propaganda had for a long time prepared the proletariat to use the following tactics in the event of war: "*standing against war*, but also against sabotage of the national defense."³⁴ Rakovski believed it to be of paramount impor-

tance not to hinder the defense of the motherland, which did not mean that they had to accept what *Humanité* called "a truce in the class struggle" and German Socialists called "civil peace." Rakovski was against anything smacking of "officialdom" (*ministérielisme*), that is a coalition between Socialist parties and bourgeois governments that would bring about a coalition government. He defended his stance with faultless logic in these words to the followers of Guesde:

Today, as is the case when there is a second ballot, and the socialist candidate, having received less votes, will stand down in favor of the candidate of the most progressive bourgeois party, the French Socialist party has stood down in favor of French imperialism in its struggle against German imperialism. This is the truth of the matter.³⁵

Yet, unlike Lenin, Rakovski could not accuse his old comrades of treachery, even if he condemned their new attitude. Being "against sabotage of the national defense," he recognized that he had not seen, in the early days of the war, any "radical breach of the old socialist tactics" in the fact that French and German Socialists had agreed by a large majority to vote for war credits. He implicitly admitted that he would have done the same. This is just what the Romanian government had understood, and the reason why, as Rakovski remembered later, it showed him "the utmost regard." This sudden turnabout on the part of the authorities stemmed from their fear that a man, who had always exerted much influence with Romanian workers and peasants, might join the "extreme pacifists" and sway the men, who in wartime, would make up the country's armed forces, toward rebellion. So, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed him at once of the telegram it had received confirming that the German Social Democrats had voted for war credits on 4 August 1914.³⁶

Although Rakovski did not think that the Socialist party should undermine national defense, nevertheless he strongly attacked the idea of cooperation with the ruling government. Yet, he was willing to understand how Socialists in France, Germany, or Great Britain had come to adopt their new attitude. In his opinion, it was mainly due to the ambiguous resolutions taken by the Second International. He could not forget that the International Socialist Congress, meeting in Paris in September 1900, had approved a statement, drafted by Kautski, permitting Socialists "in exceptional circumstances" to enter a bourgeois ministry. As Kautski himself explained four years later, at the Amsterdam Congress, by exceptional circumstances he meant "the hypothesis of a war following invasion."³⁷ The only thing was that, whether in 1900 or 1904, Guesde and Vaillant had been among

the first to refuse the resolution.

They represented, at the time, what Rakovski called "the revolutionary socialist will" against Jaurès who, "by his personal prestige and the eloquence of his fiery words, made the International lay down its arms, without totally convincing it."³⁸ Besides, as Rakovski remarked in a letter to Jules Guesde's chef de cabinet in May 1915, Jaurès, who did not wish participation in the bourgeois government to be limited to defense, later humorously emphasized the "nationalistic bias" of Kautski's resolution.

When I heard Kautski, Jaurès told the Amsterdam Congress, repeat that he recognized the need for Socialists to join a central government in a national crisis, I wondered whether an appetite for ministerial jobs became orthodox, once it was mixed with nationalism, and whether it would be legitimate for a proletarian to give up the class struggle, in order to contribute to the defense of his country, which is governed and, above all, exploited by bourgeois society. I wondered whether political freedom, individual freedom, the freedom to promote proletarian struggle, was not just as vital as the motherland. I am convinced that, in some circumstances, I could not fully follow the nationalistic ideas of our comrade.³⁹

Rakovski always rejected this nationalistic trend because he refused what he called: the Socialists' *class defeatism*. He remained faithful to his stance at the Stuttgart and Copenhagen congresses when he supported the resolution bidding Socialists involved in the war "not to relinquish what was left of their freedom of thought and action, while doing their duty as soldiers."⁴⁰ In his opinion, it was impossible to cooperate, even for a time, with bourgeois society because it had, while in power, set in motion "this formidable machine called mobilization and war" to safeguard its property. When the question of the socialist attitude in time of war had been raised at various congresses between 1900 and 1912, resolutions were unanimously adopted and strongly supported by Jaurès, demanding of members not to give up the social struggle. "They must not become passive but, on the contrary, keep working for socialism now more than ever." Rakovski acted accordingly at the time of the Balkan wars, and advised the Socialists whose country was involved in World War I to do the same.

When Trotsky heard about the open letter sent to Guesde's followers by Rakovski, he was delighted. He found it "courteous in its expression, but unequivocal in substance." Some time later, he was glad to acknowledge the part it had played in discussions among

French Socialists. One of the fundamental points made by Rakovski in the letter had a special appeal for Trotsky; he (Rakovski) had made "no difference in principle between the tactics officially used by the French Socialist party and the German one."⁴¹ Yet, paradoxically, the very thing that was drawing them apart, and made them rush at each other in the wake of the opposing armies, brought them together: that is to say, the patriotic instinct or, rather, "reflex action."⁴²

If Rakovski, in the spring of 1915, had finally moved closer to the position summed up in 1914 by Trotsky in the phrase "peace without war reparations [or] annexation, peace where neither side wins or loses," Lenin had already moved on to the idea of civil war, and he was no longer thinking of peace.⁴³ This is what made him blame both Trotsky and Rakovski for being satisfied with sterile analyses instead of looking forward. It seemed useless, even harmful, to try and unravel the reasons that had pushed European Socialists to cooperate with their respective governments, since, in any case, it could only make the fight between brothers last longer. Lenin thought the time had come to use the large-scale involvement of the proletariat in the war and incite them to turn against the autocratic and bourgeois governments that had sent them to be massacred in the service of their own interests. In this way, brother could stop killing brother to join in the real class struggle—general civil war. Here undoubtedly, Lenin's imagination raced far ahead of anything Rakovski or Trotsky might have conceived; he was discarding the most ingenious analyses "to make use of the chain of events as a tool for revolution."⁴⁴ At this point, we can understand the real meaning of his words to Alexandra Kollontai in a letter dated 4 August 1915:

Roland-Host, just like Rakovski [have you read his brochure in French?], and Trotsky are, *all of them*, it seems to me, sinister 'kautskists' in the sense that they, one way or the other, are in favor of working with opportunists They all put forward [each in his own way] the possibility of choice instead of sticking to revolutionary Marxism.⁴⁵

It is worth recalling that Rakovski also, in a letter to Charles Dumas, accused the "opportunists" of every sin and declared that "all the harm comes from opportunism among Socialists." Yet, we know full well that this term, equivalent to excommunication, is always used in political circles to indicate "others," those who no longer belong (or never belonged) to the line followed by the accuser. But unlike Lenin, who always gave the names of his enemies of the day, Rakovski only sought to trace the origins of the deviation. Thus, trying to explain the end of the Second International, which could not prevent war

breaking out or the rise of nationalist feelings that he had denounced when he was in the Balkans, Rakovski wrote dispassionately:

The collapse of the International, our party's moral ruin, is not the consequence of temporary aberration, or a mere parliamentary incident. *It sprang from a profound corruption of the European socialist consciousness*, because it had been poisoned by revisionism and socialist opportunism.⁴⁶

This approach, and "explanations," could hardly appeal to Lenin, who, as we know, was already fighting another battle. This is the reason why he wrote to Karl Radek, on 4 August 1915, to warn him against what he called later the charms of Rakovski's "French rhetorics." As for him, he could easily ward off the danger by the use of his favorite device: blurring the issues. He openly accused Rakovski of being a social patriot, with the words: "Rakovski [see his brochure] stands for defending the motherland. In my opinion, we must keep those people at arm's length."⁴⁷ This is, of course, a typical example of political simplification, and illustrated Lenin's words to Maxim Gorky: "Who is not for us is against us."⁴⁸ Yet, Lenin and Rakovski already both felt a deep distrust of Russian chauvinism. Lenin called on his followers to fight sophistry such as this: "In Russia, chauvinistic attitudes are concealed in phrases like 'beautiful France, unhappy Belgium, and death to the Kaiser and German militarism.'" He regarded it an "absolute duty" to fight this mentality, adding an argument that Engels had partly expounded:

From the point of view of the interest of the working class, there is little doubt that the defeat of tsarism is a catastrophe of lesser importance, for tsarism is a thousand times more dangerous than German militarism.⁴⁹

In a somewhat similar vein, Rakovski published, in January 1915, an article in *Golos*, the social democratic Russian newspaper printed in Paris. He attacked primarily the territorial ambitions of the imperial government in these words:

Our French comrades assure us that the Allies, including Russia, are fighting in defense of the principles of nationalities. Those of us who live in Eastern Europe, in the immediate vicinity of the Muscovite Empire, will beg to doubt it We recognize that Austria has a policy of empire building in the Balkans, but who can swear that Russia does not equally endanger Romania and Bulgaria, who happen to block her way to the Straits?⁵⁰

Such a stand gave rise at once to a violent counterattack in Russia from all patriotic circles. Ranging from pillars of the establishment,

to the liberals, they were all outraged by such accusations (which were, nevertheless, not surprising), and called Rakovski "an international adventurer." The famous liberal periodical, *Vestnik Evropy* (*European Messenger*), was the first to suggest and, soon, to assert loudly that Rakovski was paid by Germany to write and spread such insults against Russia. This accusation, as we shall see, would stick to Rakovski all his life, until his trial in Russia in 1938.⁵¹

In one of its issues in the winter of 1915, *European Messenger* declared, without naming Rakovski, but implicating him as editor of the periodical *Lupta*; "Since the war started, Romanian Socialists received up to 300,000 marks from a German envoy called Südekum to advocate neutrality in the pages of their periodical, *Lupta*."⁵²

To understand Rakovski's relations with the German government through most of World War I—at first few and far between but, later, on a steady basis—we have to stand back and examine the military situation in Europe. We know that, after the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and the battle of Flanders in November 1914, German military leaders realized that they could not win a decisive victory in the first stage of the war. As for the Allies, they understood that the war would take much longer than anticipated, when, in the West just as in the East, it turned into a confrontation along an extensive front line. So, the Central Powers, like the Allies, came to the conclusion that, in order to win, they had to persuade the countries that had not yet declared war to remain neutral or, even better, to join them. At that time, Bucharest became a regular "parade ground," with embassies and legations vying with one another to buy up the most influential politicians and publications, and incite them to speak up for their causes. Trotsky wrote these lines:

If they stop being neutral, Romanian Socialists will be praised by the French, blamed by the Germans, or vice versa, according to which side the government seems to favor, and the deviation [will be] attacked by "neutral" Socialists."⁵³

The climate of the Romanian capital in those days can be seen from the coded messages sent by the Russian minister in Bucharest to Petrograd. The minister pointed out that all Allied official representatives were "compelled to give material help to the Romanian newspapers that have remained loyal to the Entente and to encourage, with occasional bribes, some agents of the local press who are used to tips and cannot work for nothing."⁵⁴ In a telegram dated May 1915, the same diplomat recorded that, "from the early days of the war," German and Austrian embassies found it necessary "to fight the sympathy shown by Romanian public opinion toward the Entente." They

had decided "not to spare money" and to print "their own papers, acquire some of the newspaper already existing, and buy some of the most gifted journalists in Bucharest."⁵⁵ As a rider to his telegram, the Russian minister asked also for a special allowance of some 50,000 francs,⁵⁶ to save two newspaper and a number of journalists "from the clutches of Germany."⁵⁷ He added apologetically that he had always thought "it impossible and useless to enter into competition in this area with the Germans and Austrians, who had really lost a considerable amount of money."⁵⁸ Yet, he could only insist on the fact that his colleagues of the Entente countries were too far ahead of him in this corruption race. He mentioned that his French colleague had already spent 100,000 francs to this end, and had asked for further funds. He added, "the British ministry had been allowed to spend £500 on the press." but had been "promised fresh credits if the other representatives of the Entente were granted equal funding." As for the Italian government, it had given its Bucharest envoy a sum of 25,000 to 30,000 francs for the press, and most of it "had already been spent" by May 1915.⁵⁹

It is clear that Rakovski the Socialist and the German government had established the same relations as Take Ionescu the Liberal enjoyed with the French government. A large number of outstanding Romanian politicians and journalists tried to draw as much advantage as possible from this war blackmail, using it to put forward their ideas. The only difference was that funds allocated to Ionescu helped the Liberal party to the benefit of democracy, while those given to Rakovski were used to support the Socialist party, thereby serving the international revolutionary movement.

It seems that the Central Powers had taken the initiative in this since, from late 1914, the Austrian envoy to Bucharest, Conrad von Hötzendorff, had told his government in terms that are familiar to us and can only confirm the Russian sources: "In order to influence Romanian public opinion, particularly politicians and the most prestigious newspapers, I have started secret negotiations on the lines followed by the German government."⁶⁰ He added that he had entrusted his "men" in Bucharest with large sums of money, observing that this action, which could not be "rushed," was carried out through intermediaries "with the utmost caution," and was progressing "satisfactorily." He hoped for "tangible results within a short time."⁶¹

Having established this, we must now examine the extent and significance of the relations that some members of the European Left undoubtedly kept up with the German government throughout World War I.

As far as we know, the leaders of the socialist movement, such

as Lenin, never dealt directly with the Central Powers, at least in this respect. But early in the war, when the Austrian foreign minister asked Viktor Adler whether he thought Lenin, as an internationalist, was "the enemy number one of the Allies," the leader of the Austrian Social Democrats answered: "Even more than yourself, your excellency."⁶² So, it may not be inaccurate to claim that the short-term aims of the Central Powers coincided, up to a point, with those made by revolutionary extremists.⁶³ Violent revolutionary action could help Germany defeat the Allies, just as German money could allow revolutionary forces to spread more effectively throughout Europe. In this sense, it can rightly be said that Rakovski was, at the time, "in the pay of Germany," as is reported in a secret document of the British secret service.⁶⁴

Rakovski received German money from the time when, in January 1915, he changed the name of his newspaper *România muncitoare* to *Joa Războiul* (*Down with War*) until the autumn of 1917, when he published the newspaper *Vestnik russkoi revoliutsii* (*Messenger of the Russian Revolution*) in Stockholm with the help of Radek, Vorovski, and Ganetski. He called on the workers to rise, and gave a close account of the Petrograd events in the new publication. Rakovski's collaboration with Germany was thus sufficient to justify Bratianu in his accusations at the time of the Genoa Conference of 1922. The Romanian Liberal leader mentioned Rakovski in front of Lloyd George as "this gentleman who had undertaken a propaganda campaign on behalf of the Germans, to prevent Romania entering the war;" he even added, trying to blacken Rakovski further in the opinion of the British prime minister, and describing it as the last misdeed of a thoroughly bad character: "After Romania entered the war, he continued his propaganda work until we put him in jail."⁶⁵ We know from the telegram of the German minister in Bucharest, H. Bussche, that early in 1915, the Romanian Socialists and "their leader, Rakovski," decided "to resume their agitation, through the press and public meetings, to prevent Romania entering the war against the Central Powers."⁶⁶ At the time, the resources of the Romanian Social Democrats were at a low ebb. Already, on the eve of the war, in April and again in May 1914, *România muncitoare* had appealed for help, since subscriptions had fallen to some 2,000.⁶⁷ Fully aware of the financial difficulties encountered by the Socialists, Bussche sent a telegram, on 13 January 1915, informing his superiors that he was "able to pass money on to them discreetly, which Südkum had found it "important," and asked "permission to spend 100,000 lei to that end."⁶⁸ On the next day, the vice-minister for foreign affairs sent a telegram approving the scheme, and Bussche immediately acted on

it.

So, we know now for sure that Rakovski was receiving subsidies straight from Berlin. We also know that the discreet intermediary between the German representative and Christian was a friend and collaborator of Trotsky, Parvus-Helphand.⁶⁹ The latter undoubtedly used this recommendation to get in touch with Rakovski and made the best use of him. So, as early as 14 January of the same year, Bussche could write to Zimmermann (vice-minister for foreign affairs) and send him some reports. Among them was one signed by Parvus, in which he explained in one sentence the part he played as an informer, and how Rakovski helped him. "Apart from Batsarias, I spoke to Christo Rakovski, who vigorously stands for peace, as we know. He also thinks that Romania will not be long in declaring war on the Central Powers."⁷⁰ The money received by Rakovski was used partly to cover expenses incurred in the peace propaganda campaign, in accordance with the terms of his deal with the Germans. In the summer of 1915, Bussche proudly announced that a socialist demonstration in support of peace had taken place in the Romanian capital on 4 July, with Rakovski as main speaker. He made a point of adding in his report that he was, "together with the Austro-Hungarian minister, the instigator of this demonstration."⁷¹ Rakovski used the remainder of the money, as we saw earlier, to finance his new newspaper, *Jos Războiul*, and also to cover the expenses of an electoral campaign. At this point, his reputation as a "German agent," which spread like wildfire throughout Europe (in France and Russia, as well as the Balkans), began to do him a lot of harm. When he tried to get elected to the Romanian Parliament, in June 1916, he polled only 199 votes, that is, less than half the votes he polled in 1911, 1912, and at both elections in 1914.⁷² This two-year period, from August 1914 to August 1916, when the Romanian government tried to remain "neutral" and was not able to decide which side to choose, since it could not see clearly where its best interest lay, proved to be a critical one for the socialist movement in Romania—as it was for the European left in general. In his autobiography, Rakovski dwelt on these difficulties, but did not breathe a word of his "privileged" relations with Germany. On the contrary, he used a rather hypocritical euphemism: "Within Romania, we had to support neutralism against warmongering parties, whether pro-Russian or pro-German."⁷³

Polemics that had been raging in the press, "with exceptional harshness," now more frequently spread to meetings and street demonstrations, which the Romanian government repressed with increasing brutality. In June 1916, Rakovski reported that "police forces shot at workers in Galați, and eight people died."⁷⁴ He himself was ar-

rested, and the authorities conducted a judicial enquiry against him, accusing him of attempting to organize a "rebellion." However, as they feared a popular uprising in support of such a personality, on the eve of entering the war, the government released him together with a number of Socialists who had just been arrested. In this way, the general strike that had been announced by the Social Democratic party was defused, and the agitation threatening to spread to most of the country was avoided. The Romanian government had good reasons for distrusting Rakovski because, while Berlin secretly helped him, his activities as a pacifist were not limited to Romania. He insisted in his memoirs on the fact that, as a member of the Romanian Party's Central Committee, he did everything in his power "to make contact with the parties, groupings, and individuals who remained faithful to the precepts of workers' internationalism."⁷⁵

In January 1915, the German representative in Bucharest reported how Rakovski maintained close relations with Socialists in another country that was still hesitating before committing itself—Italy. A few months later, in April 1915, our revolutionary was officially invited by the Italian Socialist party to take part in an international meeting against war in Milan. This "pacifist" meeting did not achieve anything, since a few days later, on 26 April, the Italian minister for foreign affairs signed the secret London Pact with the Allies ignoring the less attractive offers made by Austria. Rakovski came back to Bucharest very disappointed with the "opportunism" shown by Italian Socialist leaders, and violently attacked the "radiant days in May" when Italy joined the war on the Allied side. Later on, when several years had passed, Rakovski could not help showing his resentment toward Italian Socialists.

He had reached the height of his power. He was then president of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, as well as founding member, together with Lenin and Trotsky, of the Third International. It was in 1921, at the Third Comintern Congress in Moscow that he took advantage of new authority to launch a typically lengthy Bolshevik diatribe against those who had not listened to him in 1915—those Italian Socialists by whom he had been, as it were, betrayed. In the political report he presented to the Congress, he especially pointed out the danger that the Italian Socialist party's "opportunism" represented for the recently created communist international. It had "allowed the bourgeois class to enter into an open and ferocious struggle against the working class." Looking back to the recent past, he declared that: "Italian reformism poisoned the Socialist party during the war," recalled how he had been "persecuted" at that time by the Italian press, which tried to portray him as a

German agent. *Avanti*, the Italian Socialist party's daily, had refused to speak up for him.⁷⁶ Even now, he said, such "reformists" as Turati poison the heart of the Italian proletariat with lies to the effect that revolution is "a kind of marriage ceremony that holds no terror or hardship." He concluded with a scornful condemnation of Italian Socialists: "Italy can make ministers out of them, but she will not have a revolution, thanks to them."⁷⁷ He judged them hardly worthy of the accusation of officialdom "ministerialism," which had been banned by the Second International in peacetime but which had lured many of its members during the war. Rakovski wanted to put the Italian Socialist party of 1921 on a par with the leaders of the same party who, in April 1915, had refused to help him. Yet, as we shall see when we examine the relations between Trotsky and Rakovski at the time, the Italian Socialists were right about the accusations made against him: that he was a paid "agent" of both Germany and Austria.

On 1 May 1915, before leaving Italy, Rakovski sent a telegram to Trotsky to celebrate Labor Day, which had great symbolic value for him throughout his life. He let his friend know of his imminent arrival in Paris. Trotsky was there at the time and was working on the editorial board of the pacifist newspaper *Nashe slovo*.⁷⁸ The police were keeping a close watch on Trotsky, and intercepted the telegram and summoned him to explain what his actual relations were with Rakovski. The exchange between Trotsky and the police officer was written down by him, probably for its slightly unreal character: "Do you know Rakovski?"

"Yes."

"He sent a telegram to your address: is it for you?"

"Naturally, it is for me."

The police officer then proceeded to read the telegram aloud, insisting on the last word, "revolutionary." He continued:

"This telegram is absolutely meaningless, as far as I can understand it."

"Allow me to differ on this point."

"I mean it is of no interest to us."

"Then why did you ask me to come.?"

"Excuse me, we just wanted to make sure."

"Sure of what?"

"Sure the telegram was intended for you personally."⁷⁹

This was a dialogue of the deaf. Of course, the French police had a good idea of the relationship between the two revolutionaries, if only because of the accusations that Russian patriotic Socialist were openly throwing at them—for example, by the ex-Duman deputy, Gregory Alexinski, who published the newspaper

Prizvy (Appeals).⁸⁰ Alexinski, early in the war, had repeatedly declared that, when Trotsky left Vienna in August 1914, he "already had his itinerary mapped out," since he was going "on a mission on behalf of his friend Dakovski." The latter was described as "a Romanian socialist pacifist" (which can hardly surprise us) and, above all, "an Austrian agent."⁸¹ The police report we quote gives further information of the financial help Rakovski gladly gave to social democratic publications, among which were those close to his ideas, such as Trotsky's. So, when the latter arrived in Paris in January 1915, he had brought "better than his talent and his resources as a revolutionary activist and journalist; he was bringing the financial contribution of his friend Rakovski, a well-known Romanian Socialist, who had already helped him several times in his literary enterprises."⁸²

Rakovski came to Paris in May to get in touch with a group of pacifists and internationalists belonging to the Menshevik faction and friends of Trotsky. He also came with fresh money, in very short supply at the office of *Nashe slovo*. This newspaper, which was to strengthen Rakovski's convictions, had first been edited by Martov; Trotsky took over as soon as he was in Paris. In his opinion, the immediate objective of the publication was "to explain the significance of today's events to those Russians stranded in Paris, and to keep the flame of international solidarity burning."⁸³ His chief target for criticism was the "imperialistic" war and all those who, from the Socialists downward, only tried to delay the end of the war.

The fact that Russian émigrés were scattered all over Europe made for a really international supply of information, with first-hand news on the internationalist movement in many countries. For example, Chicherin wrote from London, Kollontai from Sweden, Uritski from Denmark, and, soon, Rakovski from the Balkans. From its early beginnings, the newspaper won Lenin's esteem; he declared it to be "the best socialist daily in Europe."⁸⁴ Yet, the basic problem for the newspaper remained a chronic shortage of funds.

Throughout the first half of 1915, Trotsky and his colleagues had to work wonders to keep the publication going, in spite of military and civilian censorship, which became stricter as the Germans were drawing nearer to Paris. Moreover, as Trotsky remarked later, on the eve of publishing the first issue late in January 1915, "the cash box on the editorial desk contained exactly thirty francs." He added, with a certain amount of self-satisfaction: "No sensible person would have thought it feasible to publish a daily newspaper with so little capital."⁸⁵ As Alfred Rosmer pointed out, the publication roused feelings of envy among the French Social Democrats, who, in the first months of the war, had no way of publishing anything

whatsoever.⁸⁶ True enough, Rosmer went on "Russian Socialists are more used than we are to working in siege conditions," and he added, with some naiveté for a man who was so involved with the newspaper, "they have, surprisingly enough, means far greater than ours in Paris to publish a brochure and even a newspaper."⁸⁷

Rosmer's remark is certainly naive, as he was already very close to Trotsky; he later had, in fact, mentioned the financial aid he was receiving from Rakovski. In an article published on 17 April, Trotsky publicly thanked his Romanian comrade "for the financial help" he had given to the "cause of proletarian liberation."⁸⁸ Trotsky, perhaps to forestall a fresh campaign of accusations against Rakovski as an "agent of the Central Powers," was clever enough to give a detailed account of the financial contribution Rakovski had made for about ten years to the cause of social democracy in Russia. On 25 April 1915, he published in *Nashe slovo* an article showing a characteristic of Rakovski's personal involvement:

In the years before the revolution [1905], Rakovski played an active part in the "ligue émigrée" of our motherland, contributing articles to *Iskra*, as well as financial help. . . . In 1905, he devoted himself entirely to the revolution . . . contributing to a number of social democratic publications, acting as paymaster to *Golos*, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, *Pravda*, and the workers' legal press. With the most influential of Romanian Marxists,⁸⁹ he became the benefactor of *Golos* and *Nashe slovo*.⁹⁰

Trotsky concluded with a reference to a letter sent by Rakovski to *Golos*, before it was banned. This letter figures on the front page of the newspaper because Trotsky thought it should be remembered "as a valuable proof of international cooperation, in contrast to the mad bloodletting of war."⁹¹

These acknowledgements show how valuable Trotsky thought his friend's activities were; before 1915, most of the money contributed was Rakovski's own; later it came from Germany, as well as Austria, through Bussche and Parvus, with the help of the Austrian representative in Bucharest. It also seems likely that part of the million marks transferred in December 1915 by Parvus from bank accounts in Copenhagen, Zurich, and Bucharest reached *Nashe slovo* through Rakovski's good offices.⁹²

This financial contribution, quite substantial for the times, made it possible for Trotsky's publications to sustain a propaganda campaign in favor of internationalism and pacifism. This aspect was emphasized by the Socialist delegates who gathered in the small Swiss

town of Zimmerwald in September 1915, to prepare a conference intended to be one of the first "collective manifestations of an international antiwar movement."⁹³ The French delegates, in their reports, stressed the importance of the publications' existence, since they were the only bridge between the various internationalist factions scattered all over Europe. As for Rakovski, he pointed out that *Nashe slovo* played a vital role in the growth of an internationalist attitude in the midst of the Balkan Social Democratic parties.⁹⁴ This came out strongly when the Balkan Socialist parties met in Bucharest in the summer of 1915 to clarify their position.

The conference seems to be a proof of the dynamism of the socialist movement in the Balkans, since, even before the Zimmerwald Conference itself, they managed to get together and pass a "firm resolution to launch a program for internationalism based on the class struggle."⁹⁵ No wonder that Rakovski, who organized the Bucharest Conference, became one of the chief spokesmen of the Zimmerwald movement (as we shall see from the documents held in the archives of the Swiss Socialist party).

In a letter he wrote in May 1915 to Charles Dumas, Rakovski regretted that Socialists of various European countries were unable to unite against war. He commented sadly that the fiftieth anniversary of the International was "proving to the world that the *international spirit* has not yet become a real force, that it is not more than a word, which has yet to be put into practice."⁹⁶ He also added, with bitter irony and little concern for his comrades' susceptibilities:

The socialist and internationalist awareness has proved, in some respects, to be even weaker than the *Catholic* consciousness;⁹⁷ seeing that while Catholic cardinals from Germany, France, England, and Austria have been able to meet in Rome to elect a new pope, our International Socialist Bureau has not met once since the war started, in spite of all the interventions and entreaties of Socialists from neutral countries.⁹⁸

Delegates of the Romanian, Greek, and Serbian Socialist parties met in Bucharest, and were joined by those Bulgarian Socialists, the *tesnyaki*.⁹⁹ The manifesto issued at the end of that conference demanded an immediate interruption of the fighting, and suggested setting up a federation of all the Balkan Socialist parties present at the conference. This was for Rakovski, who was elected general secretary of the new federation—an old dream come true—and the first step toward a federation of the Balkan socialist states that he hoped would exist one day.

We can see that Rakovski came to be the undisputed leader of

“pacifist” Socialists; his authority was recognized in the whole Balkan Peninsula. He was the friend and teacher, whose advice his comrades sought in times of trouble. A letter sent to him by the secretary of the Serbian Socialist party, Dushan Popovich, in October 1915, reveals the depth of respect and affection his “disciples” felt for Rakovski. Popovich described how torn he was when, as a militant, he chose defeatism and published the newspaper that would declare “death to war” in Serbia, the very country where it all had started. “You cannot imagine the conditions we have to put up with in our work,” he told Rakovski; but he undertook “to fight relentlessly against universal barbarity,” in the form of “capitalist imperialism,” because his convictions and ideals as a Socialist obliged him to do so. Popovich’s example shows how European Socialists often agonized in the struggle between their political beliefs and their love of country.¹⁰⁰ He said:

In fact, Serbia is fighting for its life and independence, always under threat from Austria even before the Sarajevo assassination. If social democracy has a right to vote for war, where more so than in Serbia? In our opinion, however, the crucial factor is that war between Serbia and Austria is only a small part of the picture, nothing but the start of the European, even world war, which, we firmly believe, can only be of imperialistic character. Consequently, as we are part of the great social and proletarian International, we thought it imperative to declare unequivocally against war. We did not want to cause any discord in the attitudes of various sections of the International, but, nevertheless, our resolution brought about precisely that, since, alas! almost all other Socialist parties voted for war.¹⁰¹

Rakovski never forgot the attitude of Serbian internationalists and praised them in a short but interesting study he wrote in Petrograd in 1917, which was published under the title *The International and War*. Rakovski contrasted the Austrian Social Democrats who, in their newspaper had qualified the day when war credits were voted as “one of the great events in the life of the German race,” and “the day of the German people” with “the small but heroic Serbian Social Democratic party, whose two representatives in Parliament bravely stood up for the internationalist point of view and voted against war credits, accusing the Serbian government and secret paramilitary organizations of orchestrating underhand chauvinistic agitation.”¹⁰²

One of the most important episodes of Rakovski’s international action in 1915 is the part he played at the Zimmerwald Conference, above all in its preliminary stage. Early in September 1915, Rakovski

went to Switzerland to attend the conference, where all Socialists loyal to the principles of pacifism and proletarian internationalism were meeting. It should be observed that the conference was organized at the demand of the neutral countries' Socialists—Rakovski foremost among them.¹⁰³

During his stay in Paris in May, Rakovski and Trotsky examined the conditions needed for such a conference. They both agreed that Lenin should be approached, and Rakovski left for Switzerland. There he met the Bolshevik leader and several leaders of the Swiss Socialist party whom he had met previously when he was a student in Geneva. He had written to them some weeks beforehand, with the help of the Italian Socialists whom he had met at the international meeting in Milan. This is why, when the Swiss Socialist party met on 28 March 1915, one of its members (Greulich) declared: "A conference of neutral countries must be called now, otherwise it will be too late. Italy and Rumania are all in favor . . ." ¹⁰⁴

The next day, Robert Platten wrote to the International Socialist Bureau in the name of the Committee of the Swiss Socialist party:

We felt obliged to make new plans for this business [the meeting of an international conference on peace—author's note] in view of a letter from Comrade Rakovski and the duplicate of a letter from the Social Democratic Workers' party in Bulgaria. Comrade Rakovski expressed his agreement with our decisions and our suggestions; he approved the convening of a conference of neutrals, and recommends it to take place in Switzerland.¹⁰⁵

Rakovski thought that such a demonstration for peace could have a large impact on countries like Italy or Rumania, which were still neutral but whose governments were visibly on the eve of entering the war. At a meeting of the Swiss Socialist party, on 22 May 1915, Grimm referred to a declaration made by Rakovski on this point. Rakovski had said that, if social democracy carried out its duty as defined by the congresses at Stuttgart, Copenhagen, etc., it "could largely contribute to an end to the war." He even added, using an example close to him: "The Balkan war ended the moment Socialists went on strike in the trenches and proclaimed the start of the class struggle."¹⁰⁶

Three groups soon emerged from among the pacifist Socialists gathered for a conference that went on from 5 to 8 September 1915. The majority were mainly interested in organizing a general demonstration for peace, and opposed to a radical break with the "social patriots" of the Second International. This group made up the

right wing of the conference and included most members of the German and the French delegations, a few Italians, Poles, and Russian Mensheviks.¹⁰⁷ A few who stood against those objectives they thought too "moderate" demanded all relations with "social patriots" to cease; they emphasized the necessity of a permanent class struggle in peacetime just as in universal civil war. They were the left wing of the conference, around Lenin.¹⁰⁸ Between the two groups was a small core of five or six people, among whom were Trotsky, Rakovski, Balabanov, Grimm, and Roland-Host.

The theoretical differences dividing the three groups involved the working class caught in the war and "bourgeois" society in the use of tactics that were incompatible, and seemingly irreconcilable. However, three drafts for a common manifesto were submitted to the conference secretary, who passed them on to a commission of seven members, including Trotsky, Rakovski, Grimm, Ledebur, Merrheim, and Modigliani.¹⁰⁹ The discussions within the commission concentrated, at first, on a problem of great concern to all the socialist delegates: the restoration of the International since, of course, it had not survived the shock of the European war.

In the name of the Mensheviks, Martov had long since stated that he refused to "accept Lenin's simplistic explanation of the collapse of the International being caused by the leaders' betrayal of the trust put in them by the masses."¹¹⁰ As soon as he had heard about the "betrayal" by the "social patriots," the Bolshevik leader had peremptorily declared, as if to put an end to the debate, "The Second International is dead."¹¹¹ He then broke with all the partisans of "defense," as he believed that a new International had to be instituted; this one would be under the influence of revolutionary activists and Socialists who were uncontaminated by chauvinistic patriotism, a feeling that could only destroy the brotherly bond existing in the laboring masses. Martov, on the contrary, regarded any rift in the international socialist movement as a catastrophe; this is why he suggested the reconstruction of Socialist parties from within, in the framework of what was left of the International. In his opinion, a breakup could only be the last resort, in the event of the internationalists being neutralized within the individual Socialist parties.¹¹²

At this point, we must establish what Rakovski's position was. Thirteen years later, when the quarrel between Trotsky's followers and those who adopted the "general line" advocated by Stalin was going on in the Soviet Union, Zinoviev had no qualms about accusing Rakovski of "voting with Martov" at Zimmerwald.¹¹³ He was trying to prove that Rakovski had differed from Lenin on a fundamental point. It is clear that Zinoviev, in 1928, presented Rakovski's position

up to January 1915 as the one he adopted in the autumn of that year, after his conversations with Trotsky and Lenin had been, to a large extent, instrumental in bringing about the internationalist meeting in Zimmerwald. In 1928, Zinoviev only recalled the fact that Rakovski, in his open letter to Charles Dumas, had "made concessions to the notion of defense of the motherland," and that he had declared "in favor of the reestablishment of the Second International." We know for sure that it was an assumption made by Lenin himself before

Rakovski had approached him in May 1915. In fact, Christian was much closer to Trotsky's position at Zimmerwald than to Martov's. Trotsky, while insisting in *Nashe slovo* on the idea that social revolution was approaching, even though he wanted a Third International to be created, refrained from mentioning it in the final manifesto that he drafted together with Grimm on the advice of the commission that they sat on with Rakovski.¹¹⁴

Lenin did not agree with the manifesto, which developed ideas put forward by Trotsky early in the year on "peace without reparations or annexations, no victors and no losers." At a meeting in Zurich, Lenin had already called this peace slogan launched by Trotsky a "pious platitude." He said, "if you think of it, it really implies civil peace and the rejection of the struggle by the oppressed classes in all the countries at war."¹¹⁵

Since neither Lenin nor Trotsky wanted to make concessions, and neither the German delegation nor the French one shared their point of view, it seemed, for a while, that the conference would founder, leaving no tangible result. But Rakovski suggested a compromise, in the hope that he could obtain an agreement by all the pacifist Socialists involved in the campaign against war. The manifesto that was finally accepted largely reflected Trotsky's proposals; it called on the European proletariat to fight "for peace with no reparations or annexation, on the principle of the peoples' self-determination."¹¹⁶ Lenin rejected this compromise, voted against it when it was submitted to a committee, and again at the final vote. The Bolshevik leader decided once more to be isolated rather than compromise on a solution that could only be temporary, since it favored the alliance of "opportunistic" elements.

As soon as the conference ended, halfway through September, Rakovski went back to Romania. A few months later, in January 1916, he ran for Parliament. We know that it was his fifth attempt, and he was no more successful than the previous times, as he only polled 109 votes. Yet, he was not disheartened, and went on being the indefatigable advocate of world socialism.

In the following month, Rakovski went to Switzerland again, to

take part in the Executive Committee's meeting of the Zimmerwald group in Berne, from 5 to 9 February 1916. This time, the "Leninist" group tried to have its motions endorsed, taking the delegates by surprise: they asked for the meeting to become a congress with full powers of decision. Their aim was to pass a manifesto to the effect that the time was ripe for the masses to start a revolutionary action under the lead of a new international. Yet, as Zinoviev was to relate later:

When the contents of the manifesto became known to the delegates, it transpired that *no one wished* for such a manifesto . . . except for us. It was obvious that this manifesto would be a large step forward for our policy. Martov was the leader of those who wanted to sabotage it. His reasons: too early, considerations of pure form, and a thousand others. Rakovski . . . raised objections in the same vein.¹¹⁷

As a matter of fact, the relative strength of each group had not been altered; neither had the delegates' ideas since Zimmerwald. Martov and the centrists like Rakovski, were opposed to Lenin's manifesto because it seemed to them that such a declaration could only be ignored by the masses and criticized by the French and German delegations.

Once again, Rakovski suggested a compromise that was acceptable: instead of issuing a manifesto that could not rally the masses, since they were too concerned with other problems, they would send a circular letter on this matter to the parties and movements that were in sympathy with the Zimmerwald group. Rakovski, Serrati, Martov, and Zinoviev made up, together with three other delegates, a committee whose task was to prepare the circular. The final version vigorously attacked the "social patriots" in France and Germany for their participation in World War I, and did not spare the International Socialist Bureau under Huysmans, blaming it for inefficiency and inertia. Strikes and demonstrations were called for, and the working class was exhorted to intervene.¹¹⁸

As we can see, some of these demands were already included in the manifesto issued by the Balkan Socialist parties in the summer of 1915. On the other hand, the letter showed a definite narrowing of the gap separating the center from Lenin's objectives on a number of crucial points connected with direct intervention by the workers. On the whole, a final break with the Second International had been avoided, but the latter was regarded merely as a "negative entity," remarkable only by its absence. We should not give Rakovski a disproportionate role, but one can safely assert that his initiative had

far-reaching consequences. He can certainly be regarded as one of the main protagonists of a movement that culminated in the Zimmerwald conference and found its achievement in 1919, in the setting up of the Third International in Moscow.

Much to his sorrow, Rakovski was unable to go to Kienthal in April 1916, to attend another conference organized by the Zimmerwald group. The theater of the European war had just been enlarged; in May 1915, Italy had declared war (as an Ally) followed by Bulgaria (with the Central Powers) in October. Since Romania was preparing to do likewise (also as an Ally), Rakovski did not obtain an authorization to go abroad.¹¹⁹ Up to May 1917, as will be seen later, he remained isolated from his pacifist friends in the international socialist movement, because he unwillingly stayed in Romania as a guest of the authorities.

The spring of 1916 was a time of extreme agitation in Romania: popular demonstrations following on the proclamation of a general mobilization, added to the discontent with the food rationing and martial regulations in force in a country at war, soon degenerated into serious unrest. Romanian workers felt directly concerned; on 13 June 1916, they called for a demonstration in Galați that attracted large numbers. The authorities ordered the army against the workers, and eight protesters were killed in the scuffles. The Romanian government proceeded to stifle all forms of opposition. The socialist leaders, with Rakovski foremost among them, were arrested at once. Legal proceedings were initiated against them; they were accused of "organizing a mutiny" against the lawful authorities.¹²⁰ The news of these arrests soon spread throughout Romania, and, when they reached other European countries, socialist organizations broadcast them far and wide. On 1 July 1916, the International Socialist Committee issued a proclamation in protest against the arrest of Karl Liebknecht (on the grounds of his taking part in the demonstrations of 1 May on the Potsdammerplatz in Berlin), and also against Rakovski being detained in Romania. The International Socialist Committee exhorted the workers: "Let us rise in protest! Let us fight; only through fighting can the International be strong and efficient."¹²¹

A general strike was announced in Bucharest, and it looked like it would spread to the whole country. Because the government was afraid of not being able to contain such social unrest on the eve of a declaration of war, it was thought prudent to free Rakovski and his Socialist comrades. Once again, the socialist call to public opinion on the national and European level had achieved its end, and a liberal government had been forced to draw back and choose a solution that saved it, for a time, from more serious difficulties. On 4 July, Trotsky

commented on what had just happened in *Nashe slovo*:

The offensive by Russian troops and seizure of Bukovina, which was occupied mainly to put pressure on Romania, has created a critical situation for Bratianu's government: it was forced to free its hands in case of an emergency. This is why Rakovski had to be gagged and the voice of socialist workers silenced; this is why the Galați strike was intentionally turned into a bloody clash. Rakovski was arrested next. The authorities followed up this measure with a ban on all street demonstrations. Yet, the government clique was soon losing ground. Rakovski was released "under certain conditions" and wisely. From now on, it is easy to guess what use the mercenary judges in Bucharest and Galați will make of these "conditions;" the more the Romanian ruling class is involved in the events of the war, the closer Rakovski will be to being jailed.¹²²

Trotsky's prediction proved accurate; on 27 August, Romania declared war on the Central Powers; one month later, Rakovski was under lock and key, apparently for a long time.

We have to observe, first of all, that the Romanian social democratic movement was so dependent on its leader that, once he was arrested, the Socialist party was reduced to almost total impotence. Through the end of 1916, until the spring of 1917, the fortune of the Romanian left reached its nadir since the creation of the Socialist party in 1893. Any kind of concerted action had to be practically abandoned; the authorities used a grip of iron to muzzle the Socialists, who in the last two years had campaigned against the war. All the meeting places where workers used to gather were closed. The party's main mouthpiece, *Lupta*, was forced to suspend publication; militants who were in an age group suitable for the front were inducted into the armed forces, while those who were too old were arrested.¹²³

Yet, only six months after the belated entry of Romania into the war, the fall of the Russian monarchy and the establishment of a provisional government in Petrograd faced the Romanian authorities with the prospect of a violent change in the government of their country. Romania had just undergone a series of painful defeats, and two-thirds of the national territory (including Bucharest) were now occupied by German and Austro-Hungarian troops. The royal family, many politicians, and a large part of the administration had taken sanctuary at Iași, the capital of Moldavia, only a few miles from the Russian border.¹²⁴ Ironically, Rakovski had to follow in the footsteps of the men in power as a "dangerous" political prisoner.¹²⁵

A few years ago, Romanian and Soviet historians became involved in a debate that may seem academic, but is not without significance. The problem was whether, in Romania between 1917 and 1922, there had been times that could be called revolutionary from an "objective" point of view, that is to say, when conditions obtained in which usually uncontrollable mass movements break out and can cause the ruling power to fall.¹²⁶ Romania, brought into the war at a late stage, had just been beaten on every front; concurrently, the effects of the insurgency movement that spread everywhere in the old tsarist empire were becoming visible among soldiers and also in the Romanian countryside, as had already happened between 1915 and 1917, after the first Russian revolution.

The crucial point is, of course, that no revolution occurred in Romania in 1917 nor, as we shall now see in detail, did it happen in 1918. Even if the Russian "model" was not imitated, the wretched circumstances of the people together with repeated failures on the part of various Romanian governments in the field of agricultural policy made for a social and political situation extremely unstable. No one had really tried to answer the wish of the peasants to own the lands they tilled nor to significantly improve the lot of urban workers. In the circumstances, the "revolutionary stimuli" in such simple slogans as "Peace, Land, and Bread" could only encourage Romanian workers and peasants to follow the example of the Russian revolution.¹²⁷ A desire to see the end of the shortages attendant on a disastrous war and a wish to secure a less unfair and hopeless future had spread to all sections of the population; the government was well aware of that.

It can be easily understood that, in a social climate growing worse daily, the events of February 1917 in Petrograd brought renewed social democratic agitation in Romania. The small socialist groups that had managed to escape from government repression now closely followed the development of the Russian revolutionary movement; they had endless debates on the consequences these events would have in their country.¹²⁸ Iași became their rallying point; they reopened the Socialist party club in the town, and resumed publication of a newspaper called *Social-Democratia*. Early in April 1917, as they became enthusiastic and full of revolutionary fervor, they decided to send a congratulatory telegram to the newly established Odessa Soviet. They expressed their confidence in the new era that had just opened up for all the oppressed peoples of Europe, especially the Romanians.¹²⁹

The Romanian government, which was also in Iași in exile, lost no time in responding to what it considered an unprecedented chal-

lenge to its authority and to the war effort that had to be sustained. All Socialist leaders still at large were arrested; their meeting places and printing works were closed down. These actions reveal growing anxiety on the part of the authorities; it is visible from the official correspondence of the times. In a secret telegram sent by a member of the Romanian government to the Russian ambassador in Iași, we can read the following: "The Petrograd events give rise to great anxiety in court and government circles, as well as in high society. Everyone is afraid of the Russian revolutionary movement arousing a feeling of sympathy in the Romanian population."¹³⁰

This fear was not unfounded. Instead of dying down, the Romanian activists' faith in revolution increased as they mixed with the Russian troops quartered throughout Moldavia. During the whole of August, Russian soldiers had organized meetings and street demonstrations in the population centers near their encampments.¹³¹ They invited Romanian soldiers and activists to join them to explain to them the events in Russia, and to impress on them the need to overthrow their government and become vehicles for spreading revolutionary ideas to the population at large.¹³² Toward the end of April, Russian soldiers helped the recently set up Romanian Soviets to prepare a massive demonstration in Iași to commemorate Labor Day. On 1 May at a working-class village near Iași, some 15,000 Russian and Romanian soldiers gathered to listen to the speech by a delegate of the Petrograd workers and to declarations by Russian and Romanian militants. One of the speaker said in plain language:

The Romanian people is suffering from the same yoke imposed by an oligarchy as the Russian people suffered from until recently. The reforms we were promised only resulted from the fear the ruling classes felt, but they will not become effective unless the people fight for them.¹³³

He ended his speech, emphasizing the similarities between the two peoples, an idea that would be the basis for Rakovski's future action and had always inspired his political beliefs: "Long live free and democratic Russia! Long live free and democratic Romania!" After listening to these words with enthusiasm, large group of demonstrators joined the population and marched through the town, as had been planned. The leaders in front were mostly Revolutionary Socialists (SR) and Mensheviks, who supported the war effort made by the Russian Provisional Government but who allowed the Bolshevik "extremists" to join them, although the latter demanded an immediate end to the fighting.¹³⁴ Before the end of the demonstration, a group of Romanian Socialists, supported by Russian soldiers,

marched on the prisons to liberate their captive comrades, as well as their leaders.¹³⁵ Another mass movement started, and, "in less than an hour," Rakovski was standing on a makeshift platform, "addressing a crowd of 20,000 people."¹³⁶ In a speech that reflected his thoughts in prison, he asked for the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. The new government would be of socialist tendency and would undertake to expropriate industries and large landowners for the whole nation. Yet (and on this point he disagreed with Lenin), Rakovski refused to believe that an armed insurrection started by the Socialist party would be the best way to achieve this end.¹³⁷

On the same day, Rakovski and several leaders of the Romanian Socialist party were taken "by special train to Odessa" to prevent them falling into the hands of the police, and to allow them to get in touch with their Russian revolutionary comrades.¹³⁸ After his arrival in Odessa, the first thing Rakovski did was to set up, together with his fellow countrymen and the local Soviet, "a Romanian Committee for Social Democratic Action," which would "bring back to life the party's sections and work groups to prepare a revolution on the Russian pattern in their country."¹³⁹

A major way of exerting pressure on the Romanian authorities lay in the large working-class population that the Romanian government had moved to Odessa when Central Power troops had started invading the national territory. This is how workers and sailors of the Galați dockyards, like those of the commercial fleets of the Danube and the Black Sea found themselves, together with a large number of Romanian railway workers, living in precarious conditions. They were unwilling exiles, uprooted and underemployed. Morale was low and the future looked uncertain; they blamed the Romanian government for all the mistakes that had been made and the reverses the country had suffered. Rakovski and his fellow revolutionaries could not have found more sympathetic troops for a "spontaneous" rising and for exerting pressure on the authorities and the as yet passive mass of people.

A major problem for the "committee" was to keep in touch with various socialist groups coming to life again on the other side of the border.¹⁴⁰ Rakovski was adamant that he was no leader of a revolutionary movement in exile. He staunchly defended this position until the years 1918-1919, when Lenin gave him responsibilities with the young and still undefined federation of socialist soviet republics, especially in the Ukraine. If these tasks were given to Rakovski, it was because, at the time, the revolutionary movement was, first and foremost, internationalist. Revolutionaries such as Radek, Dzerzhinski,

Felix Kohn, or Rakovski had long believed it their duty as Socialist activists to help their comrades consolidate Soviet power in a country that had taken the first "stride forward" before carrying the offensive farther west, to Central Europe and the Balkans.¹⁴¹

On 15 May 1917, the Petrograd Soviet, dominated by the Mensheviks and SRs, issued an "Appeal to Socialists in Every Country" together with the famous "Peace Conditions from the Russian People"—that is, "peace without annexation or contribution on the basis of self-determination for the peoples."¹⁴² As we know, it was a peace program similar to the one laid out by Trotsky a few months earlier, and approved by Rakovski. The latter published a paper in defense of this under the title *How to Put an End to the War?* as soon as he arrived in Petrograd.¹⁴³

After a fortnight in Odessa, Rakovski decided to make for Petrograd, the center of events. It was his answer to the 15 May appeal from the Petrograd Soviet that suggested a conference of Socialist parties of all countries in the old tsarist capital. On the other hand, a committee of "centrists," including Danish and Scandinavian Socialists, issued a similar appeal and an offer of an international congress against war in Stockholm.¹⁴⁴ The news coincided with preliminary conversations on conditions for an armistice between some Socialist leaders from Allied countries and their counterparts from the Central Powers.¹⁴⁵ In the middle of this proliferation of initiatives against war, several members of the Zimmerwald group decided to have a meeting in Petrograd, when all Social Democrats belonging to the group would air their views on the point of such a congress in Stockholm.¹⁴⁶

At the preparatory meeting in Petrograd on 28 and 29 May, Rakovski, Martynov, Natanson-Bobrov, and Grimm vainly tried to convince Trotsky, Zinoviev, Dyazanov, and Balabanova that the Bolsheviks and themselves, "left Zimmerwald" members, should go to Stockholm. Their main argument was that the Petrograd Soviet had just supported the motion. An alternative was finally accepted on the advice of Grimm and Angelika Balabanova; they would send invitations for a third conference in Zimmerwald, to take place before the International Congress at Stockholm where the "center party" would gather.¹⁴⁷ As we can see, as late as May 1917, Rakovski did not regard as final the schism within the old Socialist international; unlike Lenin, he rejected anything that could exacerbate the divisions born of war conditions inside the European socialist movement.¹⁴⁸

During his stay in Petrograd, from May until August 1917, Rakovski did not pay the least attention to the actions of the Kerenski government, while he closely followed any decision or resolution from the alternative power that was so much more influ-

ential than the former: the Petrograd Soviet. It was pointed out at the time that Rakovski's links with the Russian "extreme left" were "a serious embarrassment to the Bratianu cabinet in his relations with Kerenski's Provisional Government."¹⁴⁹ So, it was not long before Rakovski was presented with a proscription order, in the event of his continuing his activities and having regular contacts with the Bolsheviks, since the latter were banned. When the Russian democratic revolution was fighting for survival, being caught between insurgent popular masses, either led or restrained by the Bolsheviks (as happened in July) and the aborted *putsch* by General Kornilov at the end of August, Rakovski moved much closer to Lenin's followers. In the last days of August, for example, a Bolshevik organization kept him in hiding in the neighborhood of Petrograd. Yet, as he pointed out in his autobiography, he had, so far, refused to become a member of the Party "because he was in disagreement with it on some issues."¹⁵⁰ These were important, since they ranged from "lack of morality" among Bolshevik leaders,¹⁵¹ to Lenin's deviation (in Rakovski's opinion) of the Blanqui type—that is, his intention to seize power in the course of an armed fight, if necessary.¹⁵² After being in hiding, Rakovski managed to reach Kronshtat, where he sailed for Stockholm.

Rakovski decided to go to Stockholm in September 1917, in the same way as Lenin had gone to Finland early in the summer of 1917 after being tracked down by the Provisional Government's police. From these safe places, it was possible to keep a close eye on what was going on in Petrograd, and to remain in touch with the comrades who had remained on the spot. Moreover, Rakovski was keen on taking part in the third conference of the Zimmerwald group due to take place in the Swedish capital.

Since the last conference at Kienthal in April 1916, the European socialist movement had evolved significantly. The propaganda campaign for immediate peace, waged by the concerted action of workers, had been enlarged to the effort of mobilizing European public opinion in support of the Russian revolution not only to defend its achievements but to protect its very existence. A. Balabanova justly said:

Kerenski's determination to fight on, clearly demonstrated in the July offensive, and the Bolsheviks' harsh treatment after the Petrograd insurrection indicated that a wave of repression was about to break against revolutionary forces. . . . The fact that Zimmerwald was not only a "peace" movement, but that it had precise revolutionary implications made the work of its members dangerous inside the countries at war.¹⁵³

Rakovski had experienced the truth of these allegations, but danger had always been part of his life as a revolutionary and had not deterred him from his ideas and his "subversive" activities. When the Zimmerwald group met in Stockholm, he countered with impeccable logic the arguments put forward by Katslerovich and Popovich, his Serbian friends. They insisted that the Zimmerwald group was not redundant, since most of the Socialist parties had declared themselves in favor of peace.¹⁵⁴ It seemed to Rakovski, on the contrary, that it was vital to keep the Zimmerwald group going to prevent the Bolsheviks monopolizing their revolutionary beliefs.

As we can see, from May to September 1917, Rakovski had moved from the center to the left of the Zimmerwald group without quite joining Lenin's followers. In a pamphlet he had just published in Petrograd, he had shown his confidence in spontaneous mass risings:

The ideas expressed at Zimmerwald and Kienthal must prevail; . . . it is increasingly obvious to the proletariat and the masses that the war started by governments must be stopped by the peoples' revolutionary intervention. An example has been set by the Russian proletariat, which must now be followed in every country.¹⁵⁵

After the conference ended, Rakovski decided to stay in Stockholm to help organize antiwar propaganda and launching of a "pacifist" newspaper. The funds for this publication probably came from Berlin, maybe through Rakovski.¹⁵⁶ One fact is certain: Rakovski was still on good terms with the German authorities, as we can see from a telegram addressed by the German undersecretary of state for foreign affairs (Bussche) to the ministry's liaison officer to military headquarters on 16 November 1917. The undersecretary accepted the request made by Rakovski to have his wife, still in Bucharest, be "allowed to join him in Stockholm." This request was "supported by the minister to Bulgaria in Bucharest," which proves that Rakovski was doubly involved with his country's enemies.¹⁵⁷

The newspaper "edited" by Rakovski had as regular contributors such "professional" revolutionaries as Radek, Vorovski, and Ganetski, showing how close he had moved to Bolshevik ideas in the autumn of 1917.¹⁵⁸ All three made up the Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee Abroad, which had been sent to Stockholm by Lenin. Moreover, it is well known that, if the Bolshevik leader received subsidies from Germany at the time, they came through Ganetski, who was in touch with Parvus in Copenhagen.¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, we know that Rakovski and Pavus had negotiated with the German government as early as January 1915. From the telegram above, it appears

that relations between them were at their best in November 1917; they had even taken a rather "intimate" turn, since Rakovski begged the German authorities for a personal favor.

Rakovski and his new Bolshevik comrades had no qualms about using the money from Berlin in any way they chose. It seemed to them that they were not fighting against their country, since they felt no personal bond with the territories of the so-called "motherland," but were fighting against a handful of "reactionaries" clutching at power. The Bolsheviks accused those of being criminals, sending populations to their death on the European battlefields, while the revolutionaries were trying to save them and felt responsible for their well-being. The question of whether the means employed to that end were "morally right" could only be of minor importance. What mattered most was to fight energetically against war, and to bring about the revolution that alone could achieve the kind of society run on socialist principles and that would eliminate the primary causes of war. A. Balabanova gave the following account of the pacifist internationalists' feelings: "Those among us who looked to Russia from Stockholm experienced growing enthusiasm and constant worrying . . . the fate of revolution and socialism itself seemed to hang from a thread."¹⁶⁰ The primary objective of Rakovski and his associates was "to keep the socialist press in Western Europe informed of the latest events in Petrograd, and the magnitude of the revolutionary movement in the old tsarist empire."¹⁶¹ To start with, they issued a mimeographed bulletin twice a week under the title *Correspondence from Pravda*.¹⁶² This bulletin, which was distributed in German in Stockholm and in French in Geneva, was very successful with the European workers' press; later it changed into a more detailed weekly called *The Messenger of the Russian Revolution*, also published in two languages. The main problems facing the editorial board were not necessarily financial, as we know, but rather the range and reliability of the news coming from Russia.

Radek and Vorovski both reported in their memoirs that they were in the dark as to the events in Moscow, since censorship "did not let Bolshevik publications through the borders." They only got around the difficulty when they discovered that the Provisional Government's censorship did not extend to newspapers published in Finland. They had two newspapers of Leninist tendency sent from there, *Tiomes*, which "drew a large part of its news from Bolshevik publications," and *Volna*, the Helsinki Bolshevik mouthpiece, "giving mainly excerpts from *Pravda*."¹⁶³

However, toward the end of October and in the first "historic" November week, communications between Petrograd, Helsinki, and

Stockholm grew worse as popular unrisings against the Kerenski government spread widely. The team of the *Messenger* could not keep up with the events occurring ever faster. So, when a telegram informed them of the Bolshevik coup, "which they had not expected in the least," they remained "speechless" in their astonishment, rather "like in the final scene of Gogol's *Revizor*," as Vorovski related.

It is true that, at the time, they had no accurate description of the actual unfolding of the insurrection, and everything filtered "through a haze of uncertainty."¹⁶⁴ On 8 November, the day after the Bolshevik revolution, the International Socialist Committee (ISC) met, together with Radek, Rakovski, and Tinev (a "narrow" Bulgarian Socialist). By a large majority, they decided to send a congratulatory telegram to the Petrograd Soviet in the name of all the parties affiliated with the ISC. The decision was not unanimous, Rakovski proving more cautious than many of his colleagues, who did not understand his wait-and-see attitude. He made a point of asking the committee "to wait until the situation became clearer, until all Russian socialist parties and those in other countries had reacted to the events in Russia." He stressed the need "to ask the Russian socialist parties to unite."¹⁶⁵

We can see how far Rakovski remained from the stand just taken by Lenin. He did not know it at the time, but the policy he suggested was the one advocated by the "conciliatory" Bolsheviks behind Kamenev and Zinoviev: that is, a coalition government of all the parties of the left.¹⁶⁶ This solution proved impossible because it met with fierce opposition on the part of Lenin, on the one hand, and the Mensheviks and SRs on the other, as they began to join the fight waged by the committees of public safety against revolution.

On the evening of 8 November, the International Socialist Committee decided to publish the manifesto of the Third Conference of the Zimmerwald group. This manifesto had never been published, to avoid reprisals against delegates from the countries at war. It called on the peoples of Europe "to declare an international strike on behalf of Russian workers," and "a common struggle for peace by the working class." The Committee also decided to issue a special copy of the newspaper *Politiken*, which would concentrate on the Russian revolution and express the fellow feeling of most of the Zimmerwald members.¹⁶⁷ The main articles were to be written by Balabanov, Radek, and Rakovski, among others.¹⁶⁸

In less than ten days, Rakovski made up his mind to take a "leap forward." He decided to cast his political and personal future with the revolutionaries who had just seized power in Petrograd. He could now see that they wanted to realize their socialist principles not only in Russia, but in the whole of Europe. Lenin and his colleagues knew

that the only chance for the revolution to survive was for it to spread to the more advanced industrialized countries of Western Europe. The power takeover had really been "a toss of the dice," which Lenin, a gifted tactician, had decided on. Luck could, however, change.

To retain power, they had to avoid being crushed by Western European "bourgeois" governments; they had to widen their power base, and for this they had to take risks by placing their faith in the political maturity of the working class in the large industrial countries, Germany and France, where it would rise in large numbers. Such were Rakovski's thoughts, when he finally opted for Bolshevism. The immediate reasons for his decision were that a revolutionary movement spreading throughout Europe would inevitably end the war that had started and continued because of "reactionary" and "bourgeois" Western governments. Later, the influence of Bolshevik Russia would certainly carry Romania and, in its wake, all the Balkan countries into the Socialist camp.

On 18 November 1917, Rakovski sent from Stockholm a private letter to "the comrades of the Executive Central Committee of the Soviet delegates from workers and peasants" to congratulate them and pledge his support. Here are the exact terms of this vital document, which shows where Rakovski was standing at this juncture:

The profound feeling of exultation filling the heart of the European proletariat at the news of the successful proletarian and peasant revolution in Russia is compounded by a feeling of sorrow for us, Romanian Social Democrats, because, in these days crucial to the proletariat as a whole, the Romanian working class cannot extend full cooperation to the Russian revolution. . . . Before Romania entered the war, in its early days, Romanian workers, at the price of shedding their blood on the Galața barricades in June 1916, fought bravely for peace and socialism. Now the Romanian comrades will do their duty, encouraged by the thought that the Russian revolution will support them. However, they put their hope above all into the Russian socialist government, which all the peoples of the world are now turning to. The Romanian people also placed their hopes in the Russian socialist government. With a government such as yours, there cannot be any of the fear or distrust that was inspired in the populations by imperialist governments. Let revolution succeed in Russia: there lies the Romanian people's best interest.¹⁶⁹

This letter can be seen as a symbol of Rakovski's past and future

commitments. It is the logical conclusion of his early career as an internationalist revolutionary and socialist theoretician. He had proclaimed as early as 1905, to those who accused him of feeling more Bulgarian than Romanian: "I acknowledge no country other than the common country of the international proletariat."¹⁷⁰

Yet, in November 1917, his beliefs remained, in some respects, totally at variance with Bolshevism and the dictatorship that is an integral part of it. In spite of his wish to join the "maximalists" who had made the revolution and in spite of the genuine admiration he now felt for Lenin and Trotsky, Rakovski remained the heir of the egalitarian and democratic traditions of the French Revolution of 1789. This comes out when one reads the "revolutionary" program he outlined on 18 November in the same letter to the Petrograd Soviet for Romania. He only demanded from the lawful government "full amnesty, the reestablishment of freedom of speech and assembly, and the election of a constituent assembly on the principle of universal suffrage."¹⁷¹ It is a revolution of the "bourgeois" type or, rather, an *evolution*. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, under Lenin's influence, were now trying "to force the hand" of history by making "bourgeois" and "proletarian" revolution break out at the same time. In spite of Rakovski's efforts to become a "real" Bolshevik, to prove at times more Bolshevik than the Bolsheviks themselves (as in the Ukraine in 1919), he would always remain an outsider in the Party. Only in 1927, after losing a great deal of illusions and being exiled for Trotskyism by Stalin, did he understand this crucial element: the mainspring of Bolshevism is neither freedom nor legality, but necessity and illegality—that is, amorality.

Chapter 4

A Social Democrat Turns Bolshevik (1918)

Until the nineteenth century, history appears, in Kant's words, as "a melancholy hazard" and, according to Goethe, "a sad jumble, in which violence rules, and which has not meaning."¹ Of course, a utopian Socialist, such as Proudhon, could imagine a perpetual revolutionary movement, defining it as "a permanent revolution," an expression Trotsky would take up later.

Yet, it was not until the days of Marx and his scientific socialism, that man began to feel that he was not just a meaningless cog in the unfolding of history, but that, at last, he could understand it. Dialectical materialism seemed to be the secret spring of the historical movement. As they thought they knew the principle of this movement, the Marxists, especially the Bolsheviks, regarded themselves as the agents of historical necessity, as the masters of a destiny to which no one but they had a key.

It is not surprising that they should, therefore, have been ready to use force to realize their political aspirations, since they believed that they were helping in the historical progress. It was legitimate to use war to achieve victory for the revolution. Thus, while the idea of liberty had been central to the French Revolution in 1789, the concept of necessity was the moving force behind the Bolshevik revolution. According to Hegel, being free meant submitting to necessity because one understood it. In the name of Bolshevism, liberty would become necessity and necessity would be liberty.

We should now try to define the relations between Lenin and Rakovski before 1918. Before the October revolution, Rakovski had been radically opposed to the Bolshevik party's leader because he did not approve of his political theories or his methods from a moral point of view. Before 1918, as we have point out, Rakovski respected Western European democratic traditions. Politically, he also adhered to the strictest Marxist interpretation, and did not accept either the means or the ends of what would become the Leninist revolutionary theory.

In his unpublished notes on Rakovski, there is a remarkable description of the changing political relations between his friend and the

Bolshevik leader:

Rakovski was not influenced by Lenin during these early years, when Lenin only presided over "the extreme left wing" of the Russian revolutionary movement. Rakovski came to Lenin when he was a mature forty-year-old man, battle-scarred after his years of international struggle, and when Lenin was rising to the rank of international leader.²

Rakovski had made up his mind to become acquainted with Lenin when he first came to St. Petersburg in 1900; but the latter was in Pskov. (It was also impossible then because Rakovski left abruptly to escape arrest.) This did not prevent him supporting the launching of *Irska*, to which he had indirectly contributed earlier. It was Rakovski who had helped Zasulich enter Russia, where she had several interviews with Lenin. To avoid attracting police notice, she first came to Rakovski in Romania, where she was given a passport in the name of Kirova.³ When she reached Pskov to mainly discuss the financial problems plaguing the launching of *Iskra*, she emphasized the need to find large sums of money inside Russia. According to Trotsky, Rakovski was one of the first to support the revolutionary paper in a substantial way. In November 1900, Lenin asked Plekhanov to arrange for Rakovski to contribute,⁴ and the latter published several articles "attacking the populist and terrorist tendencies of Russian socialism."⁵ So, it was under the influence of the founding father of Russian Marxism, that Lenin and Rakovski first came into contact.

Rakovski only met Lenin two years later, in 1902, in Paris. He heard the speech delivered by the future leader of the Bolshevik revolution in a Russian restaurant in the rue de Flatters. This meeting sparked their first doctrinal debate, which became very heated. More than twenty years later, in an article written on the occasion of Lenin's death, Rakovski wrote:

My first quarrel with Ilich was on the question of insurrection . . . it was a really heated controversy. With his usual vigor in polemics, Ilich fought all my arguments, and because of his aggressive behavior, I nicknamed him the boxer.⁶

This expression was used again by Rakovski a year later, when the schism that was to finally divide Russian social democracy broke out. The Mensheviks also mentioned Lenin's "iron hand."⁷

We know from Lunacharski that Lenin never saw controversy as a mere debate; in his opinion, it involved "a confrontation between various human types."⁸ Based on moral principles in sharp contrast with Lenin's, Rakovski's effectiveness in political discussions was equally striking. When he was still in Geneva as a student, and was treated

as "the darling" of the Russian émigrés, Vera Zasulich noticed how "implacable the young man could be in doctrinal debates, when principles were at stake."⁹ A fellow student gave the following description of Rakovski's attitude in political arguments (as we saw earlier):

He was a thin young man, who because of his black beard looked very pale, almost sickly; yet his eyes usually soft and melancholy, sparked hard in a political debate; he got passionately involved, first in a restrained manner, but with great fire after a while.¹⁰

Though Rakovsky could be fierce in discussions (in his youth especially) he stood out from many Bolsheviks in showing political and moral integrity. Sometimes Lenin, although prudent, resorted to underhanded devices to obtain, for example, a majority in a congress.¹¹ Trotsky, by comparison, wrote the following: "An indefatigable fighter whose political daring combined with personal courage, to him [Rakovski] any thought of intrigue was completely foreign."¹²

The first doctrinal quarrel between Lenin and Rakovski arose on the question of insurrection. Under the influence of the democratic and pacifist ideas prevalent at the time, even among the "best revolutionary leaders," such as Guesde and Liebknecht, Rakovski imagined insurrection as "a spontaneous event with no help from outside," and he considered that taking practical steps for bringing it about was "nothing but Blanquism."¹³ While Lenin saw no contradiction in a spontaneous insurrection being encouraged, Rakovski would not argue with him until the successful insurrection in October 1917. At the Stockholm Congress in May 1906, Rakovski sides with Plekhanov, who had gone all out against Lenin and his "utopia" of seizing power by force. In June 1917, during one of the meetings of the Zimmerwald group in Petrograd, Rakovski stood against the need for an insurrection as advocated by Lenin, which would take place four months later. He still thought that "the takeover of power by the Soviets could happen legally."¹⁴

While Rakovski disagreed with Lenin on means for the unleashing of a revolution, he also rejected his interpretation of the Marxist doctrine. In the beginning, Rakovski sided with Plekhanov, who used his thorough knowledge of Marxism to prove that the same principle was at work in the historical course taken by Russia and Western Europe. Rakovski shared an opinion common to nearly all Marxists on the impossibility of creating a Socialist regime in Russia, historical conditions allowing nothing more than a bourgeois revolution. Lenin, on the contrary, became frantic and chose to accelerate the march

of history so that "bourgeois" and "proletarian" revolutions would merge. Drawing away from strict Marxist orthodoxy, which the Mensheviks upheld, Lenin preferred to be isolated within Marxist society. He was then able to create the instrument, strong and disciplined, which would allow him to seize power at the earliest opportunity—the Bolshevik party. Once again, Lenin preferred to remain isolated on the question of insurrection; he intended to start the revolution through an armed insurrection. When Rakovski questioned the validity of this theory, the Bolshevik leader retorted:

We shall be defeated but we shall try again . . . Revolution does not mean a single battle, but a succession of individual fights, some of which are lost; however, we know that victory will finally belong to the working class.¹⁵

When the October (Bolshevik) revolution had vindicated Lenin's theories on the possibility of starting a revolution of the proletariat in Russia, Rakovski called on Lenin, adopting an attitude of humble gratitude and he acknowledged his superiority, although they were about the same age.

The immense importance and significance of the events had demonstrated to Rakovski that Lenin was not the man of an "apparat," as he had thought previously, but a true "realist," as creative as Marx himself.¹⁶ Rakovski could now see what Trotsky meant by "the national logic in the Bolshevik development."¹⁷ He wrote: "I saw how far Vladimir Ilich had traveled on the road of understanding the sociophilosophical views that Marx had on the world," and the unsuspected sides of Lenin's ability as a theoretician and statesman became apparent to him.¹⁸ On the theoretical level, Rakovski was converted to the Bolshevik doctrine, to what Trotsky called "its open form." The Bolshevik past also appeared to him in a new light; in Russia, the high road to socialism could only be opened by a revolutionary alliance between workers and peasants. Rakovski wrote in 1924:

When one looks at Lenin's political strategy, it strikes you as remarkably simple. Lenin based all his tactics on the principle of the class struggle. In his opinion, it was not an abstract idea, but a tactical principle to be applied logically in real life. The greatest contribution that Lenin made to socialism was to understand very early that, while the first impetus for revolution had to come from the working class, which forms a comparatively small part of the population in Russia, the peasantry must necessarily become its natural ally.¹⁹

After 1917, Rakovski praised Lenin for "saving Marxism from degeneracy." He thought that "building on Marx's work, Lenin laid the foundations of Leninism, that is to say, the application of the law of class struggle to represent historical circumstances."²⁰ It appeared to him that Lenin's genius lay in combining three different elements in a revolutionary strategy, applicable to the old tsarist empire: the poor peasantry, the working class, and the oppressed nationalities.

When the successful Petrograd insurrection launched a huge wave of revolution throughout the tsarist empire, Rakovski thought that repercussions would inevitably be felt in Romania, as in the case of the 1905 revolution. On 18 November 1917, as leader of the Romanian Socialist party and secretary of the Federation of the Balkan Socialist parties, Rakovski pledged an oath of allegiance to "the comrades of the Executive Central Committee of the Council of Petrograd Workers and Peasants." Because he believed firmly in internationalism, and thought that the revolution unleashed by the Bolsheviks would abolish the old notions of country, nationality, and enemy peoples, Rakovski gave up the idea of an independent Romania. It seemed to him not only that socialism had no frontiers but also that it pulled them down.

We can understand why it seemed natural to him to Sovietize the Ukraine in 1919. A few years after the successful insurrection of 1917, Lenin reflecting on the future of the Bolshevik party, wondered: "How many of us know what Europe is, what the world working class movement is? As long as we remain alone with our revolution, the international experience of our party leaders is invaluable."²¹ Lenin implied that the revolutionary experience of people such as Radek and Rakovski was infinitely superior to that of "provincials" (as Trotsky called them) such as Molotov, Voroshilov, or Stalin. Trotsky added: "Among the handful of leading Bolsheviks, no one [but Rakovski] knew so well the prewar workers' movement and its leaders, above all in Slavic—and Romance-speaking countries."²² This explains the delight of Russian revolutionary leaders, when they saw the famous Romanian Social Democrat, "the famous internationalist, our comrade Rakovski," join the Bolshevik party. They marveled at such a remarkable figure of the European socialist movement becoming one of them. In December 1918, in an official message sent to the workers and leaders of the German Socialist Republic, Chicherin described Rakovski as:

One of the most deserving and faithful soldiers of the International of socialist workers who, for decades, devoted his exceptional energy to the international socialist movement, and [he] is well known among socialist workers of all coun-

tries, one of the most able leaders of their movement.²³

Let us now see the practical steps Rakovski took in 1918 to become a Bolshevik. We know that he opposed the Leninist theory of armed insurrection, up to October 1917, always keeping the concept of revolution apart from violent action in practice.

This is why the bloody police repression of the demonstration organized by him at Galața, in June 1916, with Romanian workers and fellow Socialists had made a painful impression in his mind. Up to a point, Rakovski was a "democrat" who refused violence as a means of achieving political ends. On the other hand, as an admirer of the French Revolution, he accepted the principle of an armed struggle in defending or extending the achievements gained by the revolutionaries. He wrote in 1905:

Revolutions and wars going on for almost twenty-five years, from 1789 to 1815, had the most unexpected and opposite consequences, because of their very nature. In Europe, they acted as a powerful thrust which brought to life all the moral and physical energy that had lain dormant in every nation. It was a time of noble struggles and intense activity when populations and the intelligentsia, as well as kings, had to make use of all their resources of intellect and willpower.²⁴

Rakovski, in 1917, understood that Leninism alone could bring about the victory of the revolutionary principle throughout Europe. The notion of class struggle could not remain an abstraction, it had to become "battle tactics" to be applied in real life. After the October revolution, he felt that he was, more than ever, a world citizen.

In January 1918, Rakovski took part in the Third All-Russian Congress of the Soviets and gave it a goodwill message from the Romanian Social Democratic party,²⁵ since he was still a member of it.²⁶ In the three months before the German occupation of the Ukraine (early January to mid-March 1918, when Odessa was captured), he was made chairman of the so-called "Romanian Revolutionary Council Against Counterrevolution in Romania."²⁷

Encouraged by Lenin's example and the easy way the Bolshevik takeover occurred in Petrograd, soon spreading to the whole country, Rakovski decided to launch the same movement in Romania. We know that he and the Romanian Socialists had reasons to think their country offered "objective" revolutionary conditions as a consequence of disastrous war and chronic unrest in the countryside. There was also the possibility of the Romanian workers and sailors, who had been moved to the south of the old tsarist empire, tilting the scales together with their fellow workers in the Danube delta.

Such was the situation when Rakovski arrived in Sebastopol, where he spent the whole of January 1918, organizing a party of Russian and Romanian sailors before the intended invasion of Romania.²⁸ On 8 February, he sent a proclamation to "the Romanian population," linking its fate with that of revolutionary Russia; it was published immediately in *Izvestiya* under his name. It reproduced the declaration made on 3 January in the Romanian social democratic committee newspaper, *Lupta*, published in Odessa:

We think it is our duty as revolutionaries to declare that we fight against the Romanian government, but not against Romanian workers, peasants, and soldiers, whom we regard as our brothers and whom we want to help to fight for the revolution, to sweep away the government together with the bourgeois and landowners. We give notice to all revolutionary armies fighting against counter revolutionary Romanian generals, that from five o'clock on February 16, a military offensive will start in support of the Russian revolution.²⁹

As early as January 1918, the first Romanian revolutionary battalion had been made up of Romanian soldiers and sailors, who numbered 2,000 in Odessa alone.³⁰ The revolutionary council under Rakovski set out to raise money, and held Romanian senators, deputies, and generals as hostages. They were charged with counter-revolutionary activity and arrested, to be released only after being parted from as much money as possible.³¹ In the last fortnight of February, well-equipped revolutionary troops defeated a Romanian division, then crossed the river Dniestr, and near Rybnitsa routed the Romanian troops sent to stop them. Within three weeks, the revolutionary armies had advanced so far that, on 5 March, General Avarescu, the Romanian prime minister and foreign minister, signed an agreement with Rakovski. He accepted the demand made a month earlier by the latter in his address to the Romanian population that Bessarabia be free of Romanian troops for two months so that a referendum could take place there.³²

A few days after the treaty had been signed, however, the Germans seized Odessa, and Rakovski had to flee to the Crimea. Bessarabia was occupied by Romanian government troops again, and the problem would cloud Soviet-Romanian relations through the 1920s.³³

When Rakovski came back to Moscow in April 1918, he immediately took charge of Romanian affairs within the People's Commission for Foreign Affairs. His "Romanian Revolutionary Council" was merged into the Narkomindel.³⁴ Within a few months, Rakovski had demonstrated to Lenin that he was able to set up a revolutionary

movement and recruit and organize an army; he had proved to be a political leader, as well as a soldier and diplomat.

Now, Lenin decided to use Rakovski's talents to further the cause of the Bolshevik revolution. At first, because of his thorough knowledge of Eastern Europe, he thought of sending him to Turkey to negotiate a preliminary agreement.³⁵ Lenin, at the time, was intent on securing support or friendly neutrality from neighboring countries to safeguard the Russian revolutionary movement. Time was of the essence if the revolutionary principle were to grow and expand while the Allies and the Central Powers were engaged in tearing one another to pieces. In the period from the end of World War I to the beginning of civil war in Russia, political power was anything but stable, and frontiers all around were ill-defined. Trotsky wrote later: "It was impossible to guess whether we would remain in power or whether we would be kicked out. . . . Others will come, and having learned from us, they will take different measures."³⁶

In an article Rakovski wrote for *Izvestiya* in August 1918, he described the uncertainty of Bolshevik relations with the outside world:

We have to wait for the struggle of the united international proletariat against international capitalism. The Russian Soviet Republic, by its very existence, will play a historic role. We must hold out, until the international revolution breaks out. The people who, with criminal levity, try to engage us in a war that would expose the Soviet Republic to fresh attacks, do not help international revolution. Instead they prevent the revolutionary movement spreading throughout the European working class. The fall of Soviet power would be a blow not only for the Russian working class, but for the whole international proletariat. On the contrary, each month that is granted to the Soviet Republic helps to bring world revolution nearer.³⁷

Rakovski delivered this address as head of the Soviet delegation to the negotiations that took place, in the summer of 1918, with representatives of Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky.³⁸ He had been appointed to the job on 18 April 1918, by a Sovnarkom decree signed by Lenin. In the conversations they had in Kursk, and later in Kiev, Soviet diplomats, Rakovski especially, had to avoid provoking Germany while her armies were occupying the Ukraine, according to the conditions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (3 March 1918). Up to the defeat of the Central Powers and the German revolution, the Bolsheviks lived in fear of an offensive against the young Soviet Republic provoked by a defiant gesture on their part. After November 1918, they felt

the same about the Allied countries.³⁹ Analyzing the international situation some time later, Rakovski remarked:

The German revolution was an immense help to the Russian revolution; at the same time, it meant for us a beginning of a new struggle. The end of the war meant that we now had to face the Allies. While the war was on, and the two sides were bent on destroying each other, we had a breathing space.⁴⁰

In August 1918, Rakovski branded as "mad criminals" those who tried to involve Soviet Russia in a war against Germany. He did not have in mind Bolsheviks like Bukharin, who had advocated a revolutionary war at the time of Brest-Litovsk, but the left SRs who had proved to be strong "patriots" at the Fifth All-Russian Soviet Congress, which had just taken place in Moscow. The assassination of Eichborn, the commander of German forces in the Ukraine, as well as that of Ambassador Mirbach, had been their unsuccessful attempt to wreck German-Soviet relations.⁴¹ When Lenin put Rakovski in charge of negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada, later with the government of Hetman Skoropadsky, and later still with the Germans themselves in the Ukraine and in Berlin (June-October 1918), he advised him to take his time. These conversations were intended to achieve a *modus vivendi* between a strong Soviet power and the various governments in power in the Ukraine.⁴² In reality, as Rakovski wrote: "Ilich contented himself with a few directives, as he thought all these negotiations for a temporary treaty were immaterial, useful only in providing a breathing space."⁴³

Throughout the summer of 1918, with the Soviet delegation in Kiev, the conversations proved useful for another reason, more practical; they provided a cover for the Bolshevik leaders who wanted to stay in the Ukrainian capital. They conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign, before being expelled forcibly in October.⁴⁴ Rakovski was to declare a few years later: "The Soviet delegation in Kiev became the center of political life in the Ukraine. Various Ukrainian groups got in touch with our delegation and I regularly kept Ilich informed of their attitude toward us."⁴⁵

These were Rakovski's first contacts with the Ukrainian revolutionary and Bolshevik circles. As for his diplomatic technique, he had described it in December 1917, when talking about negotiations between Imperial Germany and Soviet Russia: "We must not forget that we have reached a stage in negotiations when more bluff and double dealing are needed as tools of diplomacy."⁴⁶

During these conferences with the Ukrainians and the German General Staff, Lenin appreciated Rakovski's qualities as diplomat,

revolutionary, and a man of action. On 2 October, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party (RCP [b]) when the international situation was discussed, Lenin suggested sending Rakovski as ambassador to Vienna.⁴⁷

A fortnight later, the Bolshevik leader raised the matter again in front of Chicherin, and he must have stressed the urgency of sending Rakovski to Austria, since the revolutionary movement was gaining ground there.⁴⁸ Christian did not take up the post, however, though his nomination had been accepted by Viktor Adler. On 1 December 1918, the German minister for foreign affairs refused to let him pass through Germany in spite of Chicherin's loud protests.⁴⁹

Before the end of the month, Lenin appointed Rakovski as head of the Ukrainian Soviet government, to replace Pyatakov (January 1919). In this country, the Bolshevik regime had collapsed once before.

Chapter 5

Christian Rakovski, the Bolsheviks, and the Ukraine (1919)

In January 1919, Lenin put Rakovski in charge of the Provisional Ukrainian Government. After his appointment as chairman of the People's Commissars Council (Predsovarkom) and people's commissar of foreign affairs toward the end of 1919, he remained in office for nearly five years, until his dismissal by Stalin in July 1923.

Rakovski's role and power were then much greater than is commonly recognized. In his unpublished notes, Trotsky emphasizes this:

As a chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars and member of the Ukrainian Politburo, he dealt with every aspect of life in the Ukraine. He had the last word in every public decision. Obviously, since the Ukraine was completely independent, the Party line represented an essential link with Soviet Russia. As a member of the Central Committee, it goes without saying that Rakovski applied its resolutions. Yet, we must not forget that in the early years there was no question of the Party exercising its authority on every aspect of the work of the soviets, or rather the soviets being replaced by the Party. It is also true that lack of experience meant lack of routine. The soviets had many functions, and improvisation played a major part. Rakovski, in those days, was the soul and real master of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic.¹

For the greater part of the civil war, Rakovski was in control of the three main instruments of Soviet power in the Ukraine, the Communist party, the army, and the government. In 1919, when the civil war had taken a dangerous turn, he was appointed chairman of the Ukrainian Defense Council, and, until 1923, he displayed his talents as revolutionary activist, diplomat, politician, doctor, even agronomist. From the political point of view, as Trotsky pointed out, Rakovski had been placed by Lenin at the very top of the Russian and Ukrainian hierarchy. From 1918, he was a member of the Central Executive Committee (CEC), first of the RSFSR, later of the Soviet Union, as well as member of its Presidium until 1925. Up to 1924, he was also a member of the Ukrainian CEC. From 1919, he became

a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and of its Politburo.²

Let us now examine Rakovski's conception, in January 1919, of the sovietization of the Ukraine and the role the country should play in the world revolution that he was anxious to bring about.

We know that, between 1917 and 1921, the main problem for the Bolsheviks was to spread the revolution rather than increase the territory under their control.³ In July 1920, the manifesto of the Second Congress of the Communist International proclaimed: "In the three years since the Soviet Republic started, its borders have changed constantly. After shrinking under the assaults of world imperialism, they widened again when pressure became less great."⁴

In his first seven months of power (January to August 1919), Rakovski saw the Ukraine as mainly a source of help for the revolutionary forces. Angelika Balabanova was at the time in the Ukraine, to help Rakovski run what would become the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. She jotted down Lenin's words to her: "It will be easier to keep in touch with Central Europe from the Ukraine, in spite of the uncertain international and military situation."⁵

In fact, this uncertainty was the basis of Bolshevik hopes, since, in Western Europe, the ruling classes felt "they were sitting on a powderkeg, liable to be sparked off any day."⁶

In January 1919, Lenin had given Rakovski three objectives: organizing the struggle against inside and outside counterrevolutionary forces; turning the Ukraine into a Bolshevik state; and feeding the "starving North." Lenin thought the last point was crucial in cold winter conditions made worse by constant wars and hunger. The Bolsheviks thought of the feeding of Soviet Russia, especially the workers in Petrograd and Moscow, as keeping the flame of revolution alight. We must not forget it, when we come across evidence of "cynicism" in Rakovski's approach to the Ukraine early in 1919. The Russian revolutionaries did not regard the country as having an existence on its own; it was a springboard to Western Europe and an inexhaustible supply of grain. In December 1919, during the Eighth RCP (b) Conference, at which the question of sovietization in the Ukraine was examined, Rakovski gave an unambiguous summary of his first months in power. "We went into the Ukraine at a time when Soviet Russia went through a very serious production crisis: our aim was to exploit it to the utmost to relieve the crisis."⁷

Thus Rakovski admitted the Ukraine had been exploited, although he blamed Clemenceau for uttering the same words, a few years later.⁸ There was nothing new in the idea of making the most of the Ukraine; as early as October 1918, Rakovski declared in front

of the Second Congress of the Ukrainian Communist party, in exile in Moscow:

When there is a Soviet government in the Ukraine, we shall avail ourselves of huge human resources for our Red Army . . . as well as equipment and artillery supplies; we shall also possess an impregnable line of defense on the Black Sea coast.⁹

As soon as he arrived in the Ukraine, early in January 1919, Rakovski gave a detailed account of his government's intentions at a general meeting of the Karkov Soviet. The whole speech hinged on one sentence, which explains the Bolshevik attitude, when they set about conquering the Ukraine: "We came to further the cause of revolution in the Ukraine, up to its complete victory." He proceeded to describe the part the country would play in the growth of the European revolutionary movement:

The Soviet Ukraine represents the strategic center of socialism. Setting up a revolutionary and Soviet government in the Ukraine means the start of the revolution in the Balkan Peninsula. It also makes it possible for the German proletariat not to succumb to death, starvation, and German imperialism.¹⁰

It is clear that the Ukraine for Rakovski was nothing but a useful military base, which had no other significance than to be an asset to the Bolshevik cause. While the country remained outside Soviet control, and was partly occupied by White soldiers and Allied armies, it became the stage for warring international forces, "the laboratory for internationalism."¹¹ The Bolsheviks saw a positive element in the battles taking place in the Ukraine; they hoped that workers and peasants sent by Western European governments would become conscious of belonging to the proletariat as they came into contact with the Red Army. Skrypnyk said: "Yesterday, these soldiers were defending the bourgeoisie; today, life will force them to hear and to see; tomorrow, they will join our ranks to free the proletariat." The Ukraine was seen by the Bolsheviks as "the living link between East and West, . . . the bridge leading from proletarian Russia to bourgeois Europe."¹² The Ukrainian delegate, V. Zatonsky, expressed the same idea in front of the Eighth Conference of the Russian Communist party in December 1919.¹³

The Ukraine is on the highway of international imperialism, a region where our interests clash with theirs. In the future, the Ukraine will be a major bridgehead for the socialist revolution in its fight against world reaction. It is al-

ready a bridgehead and has to be occupied. It can be either Denikin's base, or the Soviet base, and it can only become so with the help of the Reds in the north.¹⁴

Before going into Bolshevik tactics and objectives in the Ukraine, let us examine the background of communist activities in the country. The first Soviet government was officially set up in December 1917, in Kharkov, but its leaders had to flee to Moscow in the spring of 1918. The second Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was created in Moscow in November of that year, and Rakovski presided over its installation in January 1919, with the Red Army's military intervention. By August 1919, Rakovski's government was in full rout and went back to Moscow. Only through fresh intervention by Russian Soviet troops could Rakovski establish a new Ukrainian Soviet Republic—the third one. This one succeeded in retaining power through the use of two power political instruments, the Red Army and the Communist party, but also because of change in the tactics used by the Bolsheviks vis-à-vis Ukrainian nationalist feeling and the peasantry.

The first Soviet government had been inaugurated in Kharkov in December 1917, through the efforts of G. L. Pyatakov and Evgenya Bosch, who had founded the Ukrainian Communist party.¹⁵ After the February 1917 revolution, the Bolsheviks had been much more in evidence in the Ukraine, although they were still in a minority inside workers' committees and soviets; SRs and Mensheviks were in a majority.¹⁶ As early as July 1917, the Party in Kiev, under Pyatakov, had tried to establish an all-Ukrainian Bolshevik organization. The young and ebullient leader had made it clear, from the start, that there was no question of having a "separatist" Ukrainian movement.¹⁷ Yet, to start with, the Kiev committee had little influence on the other Ukrainian Bolshevik organizations: 67 percent of Bolsheviks were in the regions of the Donbas and Krivoi Rog in 1917, and the Kharkov, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, and Lugansk organizations were strong enough to insist on their independence and enforce it.¹⁸

In September, October, and November 1917, the Bolshevik influence increased tremendously in the workers' soviets. However, neither the Kievan group (with Bosch and Pyatakov), nor the powerful Ekaterinoslav group (with E. Kvirring and Ya. Epstein-Yakovlev) believed in the possibility of a proletarian revolution in the Ukraine. After the successful October revolution in Petrograd and the Bolshevik takeover, the first all-Ukrainian Soviet Congress took place in Kharkov. On 25 December, the first Soviet government was established there. The government, under Pyatakov, moved to Kiev on 12 February, only to be expelled a fortnight later by Hetman Petlyura's troops and German armies.¹⁹ The government then broke

up, and on 7 March, Skrypnyk proclaimed all independent republics on Ukrainian territory liquidated. The Bolsheviks were gradually pushed back toward Ekaterinoslav (where the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress was held) and toward Taganrog, the capital of the "Soviet Republic of the Don." The Ukrainian Communist party was officially instituted in that town, and under Skrypnyk's leadership, declared its independence from the Russian Bolshevik party (19–20 April 1918).

In the meantime, a German army, 200,000 men strong, occupied the whole of the Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Communist party (UCP[b]) had to run for its life to Moscow. However, illegal Bolshevik organizations sprang up; in Karkov province, there were over 1,000 party members, 400 in Lugansk, 200 in Nikolaev, and 800 in Odessa.²⁰ In May 1918, representatives of these illegal organizations met to exchange information.²¹ One month later, they secretly got in touch with Rakovski, who had just been put in charge of "negotiations" between the Bolshevik government in Moscow and that of Hetman Skoropadsky. As Rakovski wrote: "The Russian delegation used its visit to the Ukraine to intensify the fight led by the Ukrainian workers and peasants."²² As mentioned earlier, the Soviet delegation in Kiev, soon became the "center of Ukrainian political life," and Rakovski had first-hand experience of Bolshevik lack of efficiency and coordination. He regularly reported his findings to Lenin, and when the German defeat and the progress of the Red Army allowed the Bolsheviks to come back in force in the Ukraine, Rakovski was appointed head of the new government.²³ As can be expected, one of the first directives he received from Lenin was to "restore the ranks of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communist party."²⁴

During his stay in Kiev in the summer of 1918, Rakovski realized that the Ukrainian Bolshevik movement was weak, primarily because of the small number of Ukrainian workers. Most of the country had a mainly peasant population (80 percent), and the industrial areas employed mostly Russian workers (Kharkov, the Donbas, and the Krivoi Rog region). The consequence was doubly unfortunate for the Ukrainian Bolshevik movement: it was a foreign phenomenon for the population and could only gain a foothold in cities. Up to 1923, the Ukrainian Communist party was described as a party consisting mainly of "Russians and Jews."²⁵

We need not concern ourselves with the question of the independence or otherwise of the Ukrainian party vis-à-vis the Russian Communists, as it has been done many times.²⁶ Let us merely point out that Lenin preferred Rakovski to Pyatakov to run the Ukraine, because the latter was plainly opposed to two fundamental Lenin-

ist principles: self-determination for nationalities and obedience to the Russian Communist party. Rakovski was probably much more flexible on these two points, but he was also an experienced and able politician. Here is an example of his diplomatic approach to politics: incorporating the *borot'bisty* into the Ukrainian Communist party early in 1920.

The *borot'bisty* were the only left-wing party with a popular basis in the Ukraine. They were on the extreme left of the Ukrainian SR party, and they split after the Fourth Party Congress, which met illegally in Kiev in May 1918.²⁷

Politically, the *borot'bisty* leaned toward the Bolsheviks, but they were in marked opposition on the question of Ukrainian national aspirations. The Bolsheviks had to admit the impact of the *borot'bisty* organization in the countryside, but in cities it was comparatively small. So the formers' influence was proportionately inverse to the latter's.

In 1919, during the first Rakovski government in the Ukraine, the *borot'bisty* were taken into account for their nuisance value only. Their nationalism gave them the appearance of counterrevolutionaries whose leanings to the left could only deceive and divide the masses. So, on 11 December 1919, after the second Bolshevik defeat in the Ukraine, Trotsky and Rakovski were asked by Lenin and the Central Committee "to prepare a more concise version" of the decree starting with the following:

The *borot'bisty* must be considered as a party that has violated the basic principles of communism, in their propaganda for the separation of the armed forces, and in the help they gave to banditism; these acts pave the way for the White forces and international imperialism. . . . Our overall policy must aim at the complete eradication of *borot'bisty*.²⁸

It could not be clearer; they had to be wiped out just as the SRs in Russia. Yet Lenin, in December 1919, had another solution in mind, politically more advantageous. He told the Eighth Conference of the RCP(b), on December 3:

Manuilsky makes the same serious mistake as comrades Drob- nis and Bubnov when he claims that I advised joining forces with the *borot'bisty*. I wanted to stress the need for us to join forces with the peasantry in the Ukraine; to apply this policy we have to adopt different tactics in our quarrel with the *borot'bisty*. . . .²⁹

Lenin was visibly balancing between either disbanding the whole party whose influence could rival the Bolshevik efforts to regain its

hold on the country or trying to assimilate them politically and use their influence in the countryside "to push roots" to villages. The Bolshevik leader chose the second solution early in 1920, and Rakovski was asked to put it into effect. Three months later, Lenin apologized for having hesitated at first, congratulating Rakovski warmly on his efficiency. He said in a speech to the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist party, on 30 March 1920:

When we told the Central Committee that we had to make many concessions to the *borot'bisty*, they laughed at us and said we were not following a straight line. But you cannot fight along a straight line if the enemy's line is not straight. When the enemy zigzags, we have to follow him and catch him at every turn. We promised as many concessions as possible to the *borot'bisty*, on the condition that they would follow a communist policy. . . . Instead of the expected *borot'bisty* revolt, and thanks to the policy correctly adopted by the Central Committee, and splendidly executed by Comrade Rakovski, we have now the best elements among the *borot'bisty* in our party, under our supervision and in agreement with us, while everything else has disappeared from the political scene.³⁰

So the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's influence, found it more profitable to assimilate the Ukrainian nationalist elements nearest to them politically, since they had a large impact on the population. We shall also see how Rakovski, in 1922, tried to ally himself with and use some Ukrainian nationalist groups in exile, especially the Ukrainian "National Committee," whose headquarters was in Paris. The Bolsheviks were all the more implacably opposed to the other Ukrainian political movements, which seemed to them antagonistic.

The tactics used toward the other left-wing parties, besides the *borot'bisty*, involved two distinct operations: first, an attempt at assimilation; later, straightforward elimination. Early in his first government, Rakovski led a fierce battle against Mensheviks and SRs to dismantle the organizations that had played such an important part in the workers' soviets before October 1917. On 5 February 1919, he said:

Banning the Mensheviks from the soviets and outlawing the SRs was the consequence of their opposition to Soviet rule. If they gave up their antagonism and were willing to cooperate with the leaders of workers' and peasants' soviets, they would remove the measure preventing us from admitting them in the soviets.³¹

In the fight conducted by the Bolsheviks against Petlyura throughout 1919, some left-wing political movements joined the anti-Soviet forces, but changed their minds toward the end of the year. Such was the case of the independent Ukrainian social democratic group (*ukapisty*) which organized an insurrection against "Rakovski's occupation government," in June 1919, in the Kiev province. The aim of this "directorate" was to free the whole of the Ukraine from Russian and Bolshevik occupation forces and to defend the independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian Republic.³² On 25 June, Hetman I. Mazurenko, the leader of the operation, sent an ultimatum to Rakovski:

In the name of the rebellious Ukrainian workers, I declare that Ukrainian workers and peasants have risen against you as representing the rule of the Russian conquerors. Under cover of slogans that are sacred to us: (1) power belongs to workers' and peasants' soviets, (2) a nation's self-determination can go as far as secession, and (3) let us fight against imperialism, the conquerors and despoilers of the laboring classes, you are not only distorting these sacred mottoes, and destroying the real power of independent workers and peasants in a neighboring country, but also you exploit them, and want to create a state that is not socialist.³³

Mazurenko concluded with an offer of twenty-four hours for Rakovski to relinquish power in favor of the insurgent revolutionary committees and to withdraw all Russian Soviet forces from the Ukraine. This ultimatum can be considered as an example of the pressure put on the Bolshevik by Hetmans Zelenyi, Sokolovsky, Anhel, or Tyutyunik in the summer of 1919.

Constant peasant riots and the advance of Denikin's troops forced Rakovski and his government to leave Kiev and the Ukraine in August, only to return late in 1919. At that time, envoys from the *ukapisty*—M. S. Tkachenko (ex-minister of Central Rada) and Hetman Hazurenko—asked the Ukrainian Soviet rulers to grant them an amnesty and legal recognition.³⁴ This group later called itself the Ukrainian Communist party, and, after admitting its errors, was allowed to work in the open. Still, the situation of the *ukapisty* left much to be desired, as, between 1920 and 1922, measures were taken to stifle old dissidents, left-wing movements, and the 'nationalist' movements that had not yet capitulated. Thus, in March 1920, Ukrainian Mensheviks were accused of anti-Soviet activities: they were tried in Kiev and sentenced for collaboration with Denikin's counterrevolutionary forces.³⁵

We know how important it was for the Bolsheviks to have a revolutionary army. The July 1920 manifesto of the Second Congress of the Communist International contained the following lines on the subject:

The ability to raise an army has, in the past, always been considered as a criterion of economic and political activity. The strength or weakness of its army is the yardstick to measure the economic strength or weakness of the state . . .

. . .³⁶

As soon as he arrived in the Ukraine in January 1919, Rakovski decided to take the most drastic measures "to create a well-disciplined Ukrainian Red Army."³⁷ He regarded this army as the vanguard and "consciousness" of the proletariat in its struggle for freedom on the internal, as well as external, revolutionary front. "As for a regular army," Rakovski admitted later, "we did not have any, and Lenin was the first to recognize the difficulties involved in organizing such an army in the Ukraine. He declared a few months later:

As regards organization, the Ukraine is far less advanced than we were [in Russia] after the October revolution. We inherited an industrial production structure from Kerenski; there is no such thing in the Ukraine The Council of People's Commissars invited Comrade Rakovski several times to discuss the question, and also sent comrades belonging to military command to the Ukraine.³⁹

To set up a Red Army, the first problem was to recruit officers. Like Trotsky in Russia, Rakovski was obliged "to use the more reliable and less compromised elements of the old tsarist army" in the Ukraine.⁴⁰ Most of these officers displayed unconcealed dislike for the Bolsheviks. However, they often had one thing in common: a keen interest in the theories of the famous German strategist, von Clausewitz. All through their military training, tsarist officers had been subjected to the writings of Jomini, Haushofen, and, above all, Clausewitz. The comments sent by Engels to Marx in 1857 on Clausewitz's main work "On War" are well known.⁴¹ Lenin had also studied the books of the German strategist with great care, concentrating more on the philosophy of war than on its conduct.⁴² Referring to Clausewitz's famous comments on the relations between war and politics, the Bolshevik leader wrote: "Marxists have always regarded this rule as crucial in every war."⁴³

But, before starting wars, it was imperative to recruit soldiers. In February 1919, Rakovski started to execute the plan he had outlined to the Kharkov Soviet on January 26: "Mobilization of all Ukrainian

workers and peasants to train them in the use of firearms," and also "enlisting in the regular army the greatest possible number of partisans."⁴⁴ This decision was in keeping with the directives given by Lenin to Rakovski: eliminate partisans, by either fighting them or enlisting them in the Red Army.⁴⁵ As was usual with him, Christian preferred to apply the second solution; of course, he said, "enlisting partisans is a risky business, but one has to improvise and rely to a certain extent on spontaneous uprisings as our armies approach territories we do not yet occupy."⁴⁶

The Red Army grew rapidly; but to become a revolutionary army, its soldiers had to get used to military discipline, and their minds had to be influenced. So, Rakovski made every effort to set up in the Ukraine the political instrument that had made the Red Army strong in Russia, The Republic's Political Administration (*Politicheskoe upravlenie respubliki*, or PUR). The main purpose of this institution was to give cohesion to the Bolshevik troops by providing political education for workers and peasants.

In his article entitled "The Soul of Victory," Rakovski described this huge organization that would grow into a full commissariat. Because its functions were mainly political, the PUR came under the War Commissariat, but it was also controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist party. Its head was usually a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Soviets, who also had to be a member of the Republic's Revolutionary Military Council.

In the Ukraine, Rakovski was closely concerned with the organization of PUR, both as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and member of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the Russian and Ukrainian Communist parties. It seemed to him that this organization would turn the Red Army into a "great revolutionary school," which "would help bring together urban and rural masses." He wrote that "millions and millions of peasants, whom we would have been forced to seek out in their faraway provinces, were exposed to our communist propaganda in barracks, camps, trenches, hospitals, etc."⁴⁷

Early in 1920, the PUR counted 600 men in Moscow and about 16,000 in the various sectors of the army and in military institutions. The PUR was set up in a hierarchical way, similar to the military. The republic's revolutionary military council had the upper hand on revolutionary councils attached to various fronts. Those controlled army revolutionary councils, which in turn ran divisional councils, etc. Likewise, the PUR controlled the army administration at every echelon.⁴⁸ Behind the front, the political structure was the same: it rested on regional political sections, which were under the direct

control of the PUR. In turn, these sections controlled government sections that kept a firm hand on local political sections. The latter were abolished everywhere in 1920, except in the Ukraine where Rakovski kept them.⁴⁹

In Moscow, the Central Committee decided to allocate large sums of money to the PUR, to increase communist propaganda, either among the Red Army soldiers, or among civilians. Thus, from June to December 1919, the PUR received 217,000 million rubles. This sum was in three parts: (1) 215,000,000 rubles were intended for the political sections of various fronts—106,000,000 went to military regions; (2) 47,000,000 rubles were allocated to the upkeep of schools to teach the greatest number of soldiers and civilians how to read and write, and 33,000,000 rubles went to schools already existing, with 14,000,000 for new schools; (3) the third part of the original amount was for providing mobile propaganda libraries with newspapers, books, and posters.

The republic's Political Administration had to open up schools and universities for the Red Army, clubs, theaters, cinemas, libraries, and reading rooms for peasants. The number of schools went from 674, on 1 May 1919, to 3,800 on 1 October; theaters from 642 to 1,415; cinemas from 133 to 250; drama circles from 12 to 161; libraries from 1,614 to 2,492. Moreover, there were three Red Army universities on 1 October, 8 courses of studies, and 400 reading rooms in villages.⁵⁰

As early as 1919, the PUR had at its disposal several propaganda trains: at each important rail junction, political instructors of the Red Army set up agitation centers (*agitpunkty*), which supplied soldiers and civilians with written propaganda.⁵¹ Rakovski thought highly of this political agitation, seeing it as the best means "to bind the masses to Soviet rule." It seemed to him essential to have every soldier in the Red Army understand that Soviet power gave him a major role in building the new society. It was also necessary to show the peasants what communism could do for them. Rakovski said that peasants and workers must be convinced that, in joining the Communists, they chose to fight in defense of their interests against bourgeois, landlords, and capitalists. To achieve this, one had to talk, discuss, and convince. He wrote:

The Red Army is the only army in which a man never ceases to be a citizen; the reason for this is that the Soviet state is the only one where army objectives are not in contradiction with the interests of the laboring classes. In the Red Army, military discipline is based on the evergrowing awareness of human rights; in bourgeois and capitalist armies, discipline is based on blind subjection to superior orders. The bour-

geois and capitalist army is strong insofar as its ranks of workers and peasants obey the slogan: "No argument." On the contrary, in the Red Army, the more a worker or a peasant "argues" on the subject of his interests, the better will he understand the need to be an honest and efficient soldier.⁵²

After a few months of political activity in the Ukraine, political commissars were asked to send a report. Early in May 1919, for example, the political commissar of the Second Ukrainian Division wrote in his report that he tried to "discipline and form the various elements of the division to mold it into a whole, through constant political agitation and propaganda, also by expelling dubious elements that had been pointed out by militants."⁵³ The commissar added that the best method for infiltration had been "appointing political commissars who firmly intended to see the high ideals of communism triumph in real life."⁵⁴ The report gives full details of political action among the civilian population, and the efforts made to create schools and sections that would devote some time to holding dramas and concerts.

On 14 May 1919, the military section of the Ukrainian Communist party Central Committee passed a motion asking for more political propaganda in the army: "they would choose good speakers, make them into groups to visit the front, provide them with subjects for their talks and suitable material."⁵⁵ Again in June, the Ukrainian Politburo chaired by Rakovski, stressed the need to intensify the action of political sections, especially on the Southern Front. Then they decided to abolish the Party school, which was not flexible enough, and "to intensify political work in Bubnov's Fourteenth Army, Pyatakov's Thirteenth Army, Zatonski's Twelfth Army, and Aussem's Eighth Army. To achieve it, the Ukrainian Politburo decided "to mobilize and borrow from the Party and Soviet institutions 50 percent of the communist members" to send them to the armies and "back up spoken and written agitation with extra brochures and publications."⁵⁶

As we can see, the leaders of the Ukrainian Communist party, and Rakovski foremost among them, considered the Red Army as the "soul of victory." The republic's Politburo played the same part on the internal front with the agitation, propaganda, and organization as was played by the Comintern on the revolution's external front: principles, methods, and final objectives were the same. On both fronts, Rakovski saw in the Red Army the crest of the immense revolutionary wave. He thought the army of workers and peasants must be the bonding agent to unite the proletariat all over the world. Sending the army into Romania, Hungary, or Poland, and later Western Europe,

meant the same as sending it to conquer the Ukraine. The final manifesto of the Second Comintern Congress in August 1920 declared: "The international proletariat will not lay down its weapons before Soviet Russia becomes a link in the chain of a world federation of soviet republics."⁵⁷

In 1919, Rakovski agreed in a way with Tukhachevski's idea that the Red Army must be the "spearhead" of the Communist International.⁵⁸ Let us now see how Rakovski set about realizing this aim.

Chapter 6

A Revolutionary Strategy: Comintern, Diplomacy,
and the Red Army (1919-1920)

In 1919 and 1920, Rakovski employed a three-pronged strategy for revolutionary conquest: the Comintern, Soviet diplomacy, and the Red Army. The revolutionary movement had to be helped to spread as fast and as far as possible into Western European industrialized countries and the Balkans. We have seen how Rakovski became a Soviet diplomat in the summer of 1918, and we know of his strong interest in the Red Army—to such an extent that Trotsky referred to him as “one of the founders of the Red Army.”¹ We also know of his close relations with the Second International. It was obvious that Lenin should wish to use Rakovski’s experience when he formed the Third International. From 1915, Christian had tried to give a new meaning to the word, in the Balkans as well as Western Europe, through the Zimmerwald group. As early as 1916, he had welcomed the revival of international solidarity in the working class and among Socialists in his book *Das Wiedererwachen der Internationale*.² Later he asserted at a public meeting in Berne: “The Third International already exists, its aim will be to avenge the war through a fight for world revolution.”³

Such was Rakovski’s aim and, in 1919, it seemed that its realization was not far off.⁴ In Europe, the more clear-sighted among statesmen could sense a dangerous climate of unrest. Lloyd George said:

The whole of Europe is filled with revolutionary aspirations. There is a deep feeling among workers not only of dissatisfaction, but also anger and resentment for pre-war conditions. The whole established order, in its political, social and economic aspects, is being contested by the popular masses, from one end of Europe to another.⁵

In March 1919, Lenin chose “our comrade Rakovski, the famous internationalist” as one of the founding members of the Communist International at the Moscow Congress.⁶ At the first sitting, Lenin read aloud the list of participants: he told the assembly that Rakovski had just left the Ukraine and would arrive the next day. “As far as Lenin

was concerned," Trotsky added, "there was no doubt that Rakovski would be one of the main participants."⁷

Here one can gauge the importance Lenin and Trotsky attached to Rakovski in political life, from the official picture made by Leonid Pasternak. Among the people on the official platform, Rakovski is seated on the right of Lenin, with Trotsky on his left. To include another country on the list of founders of the Third International, Rakovski represented Bulgaria (which had not been the case with the Second International), and he was also a delegate of the Federation of the Balkan Socialist parties.⁸ In reality, it was as chairman of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, founder of the Red Army, the tireless partisan of workers' internationalism that Rakovski gave his report to the congress.⁹

In a letter Rakovski wrote in November 1917, applying for membership to the Bolshevik party, he had committed the people and Socialist party of Romania to the cause:

Our hopes now lie with the Russian socialist government, which all the peoples in the world turn to. The Romanian people also entrusts its fate to the Russian socialist government. There can be no question of the kind of fear or distrust people might feel toward imperialist governments.¹⁰

If we remember Rakovski's expedition in Romania in 1918, it can be assumed that, when he came to power in the Ukraine the following year, he sought to bring about a socialist takeover in Romania, if necessary *manu militari*. Thus, at the First Congress of the Communist International, a cool and confident Rakovski suggested in a few sentences that armed forces of the first proletarian state should invade Romania. "In Romania," he said, "circumstances are favorable to the revolution; much depends on an offensive by the Red Army in the near future; its impact would, no doubt, add impetus to the revolutionary movement that is already strong."¹¹

On 21 March 1919 (only two weeks after the end of the congress), when a Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Hungary, the Bolsheviks could believe in a wave of revolutionary successes throughout Europe, and Rakovski saw in it an ideal opportunity to realize his plans without waiting for Moscow's orders. On 9 April, after Soviet troops had marched into Odessa, he sent a telegram to Antonov-Ovseyenko:

New prospects are opening up to the Odessa victors; the workers and peasants who are rising in Bessarabia, in Bukovina, and Galicia are calling for help.¹² The Red Army in the Hungarian Socialist Republic is holding out its hand to them, across the Carpathian Mountains. Ukrainian work-

ers and peasants are convinced that the Red Army, their revolutionary vanguard, will live up to its motto: Forward, forward, still forward . . .¹³

On 13 April, Antonov ordered his troops "to establish contact with Soviet Hungary by marching through Bukovina and Hungary."¹⁴ Only five days later did Lenin send a telegram to Rakovski, Podvoyski (war commissar in the Ukraine), and Antonov: "We regard it as necessary to concentrate the bulk of the Ukrainian army's forces in the area of the Donets and round Chernigov . . . [in Bukovina] we are trying to relieve Hungary."¹⁵

The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian troops, Vatsetis, then asked for precise instructions as to the depth of the Red Army's penetration into Hungary: "Which border do we stop at? How and with whom do we make contact in Soviet Hungary?" On 22 April, Lenin sent a telegram: "We must advance into Galicia and Bukovina to make contact with Soviet Hungary. This task must be carried out with more speed and determination."¹⁶ Yet, as the Bolshevik leader pointed out in his telegram, the internal front, above all the Donbas, was exposed to the Denikin's advancing troops; it seemed to him that the internal front was more important to the revolution than the external one. "We are in the greatest danger," Lenin wrote, "the Ukraine must regard the Donbas as its most urgent front."¹⁷

On the same day, he sent a telegram to Vatsetis to urge him "to exert himself to help us crush the Cossacks as soon as possible, and to take Rostov, even at the price of weakening the western Ukraine for a time, for the situation is catastrophic."¹⁸

However, the leaders of the Ukrainian Red Army under Rakovski refused to alter the plans they had made for an invasion of Romania and helping Soviet Hungary. On 24 April, the commander of the Third Army, Chudyakov, issued an order to his troops:

To liberate Bessarabia and make urgent preparations for an offensive in Romania with the River Seret as an objective, we aim at establishing proletarian power in Romania, with the help of the rebels in northwest Dobrudja who are friendly toward us.¹⁹

At the time, Antonov-Ovseyenko felt sure that the revolutionary movement was ready to spread to Bulgaria. On 24 April, he even advised Lenin to make the Ukrainian Front independent of the Russian Southern Front, for flexibility. Lenin sent a withering reply the next day; he blamed Antonov for "his independent posturing," adding sternly: "It is imperative to throw the Ukrainian armies toward Taganrog immediately."²⁰ The strongly worded telegram did

not make much impression on Rakovski, who was determined to provoke a conflict between the Ukraine and Romania, in the hope that Romanian workers would throw in their lot with the Red Army to overthrow the Romanian oligarchy. On 1 May, a date which had symbolic value for him,²¹ Rakovski sent an ultimatum to the Romanian government, demanding Bessarabia be evacuated.²² The next day he sent another ultimatum to Romania, which he signed as chairman of the People's Commissars Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic:

Bukovina, which could have hope for freedom from class subjugation and national oppression, has fallen prey to the Romanian military and civilian oligarchical power. . . . The workers' and peasants' Ukrainian government is fully determined to protect at all cost the right of the Bukovinian workers and peasants to national self-determination. The Ukrainian working class cannot allow Bukovina to remain enslaved, in view of its position between Soviet Hungary and Ukraine.²³

Rakovski granted the Romanian governments forty-eight hours to evacuate its troops from Bukovina. After the two ultimata, he thought the Romanian bourgeois leaders would send their soldiers to fight him, and that the soldiers would defect and turn against the establishment. To that end, his Romanian socialist comrades had prepared the ground; throughout 1919, they had tried to sow the seeds of rebellion in the army. The manifesto distributed by communist soldiers to their fellow soldiers in the batalions in December 1919 is significant:

Soldiers, you were promised demobilization by your leaders and commanding officers three months ago; demand it now. . . . Soviet Russia does not wish to gain one inch of Romanian territory; it only wants factories to belong to the people who work in them, and land to belong to poor peasants, just as in Russia nowadays. Soviet Russia cannot be the enemy of the Romanian people since it is a republic of poor workers and peasants; it desires heartily to see the Romanian people free and happy. . . .²⁴

However, these declarations were not sufficient to carry the day, and Rakovski was well informed as to the strength and whereabouts of the Romanian army.²⁵ The start of the offensive was only a few days away. On the Hungarian side, Ukrainian troops had started to march through Galicia. On 25 April, the commander of the Third Ukrainian Army had helped to set up Soviets in several cities, and he sent a report from the front ending with these words: "The day is

near when Ukrainian Red armies reach Red Hungary and, with the help of Galician workers and peasants, will fraternize with her.”²⁶ Two weeks later, Rakovski was certain that a revolution would erupt in Central Europe, carrying everything with it. On 19 May, he sent a telegram to Béla Kun, confirming a general offensive of the Ukrainian armies:²⁷

We congratulate Soviet Hungary for the Red Army’s victories, and we ask the Ukrainian people’s Commissar’s Council and military command to give full support to our sister country in her bloody struggle. At the moment, helping the Hungarian proletariat means helping the German proletariat, which is threatened with complete subjugation by international imperialism. . . . The Ukrainian people’s Commissars’ Council proclaims its firm commitment to the policy of a joint revolutionary front with Red Hungary, helping her with ultimata to Romania and our offensive.²⁸

We can see how Rakovski “forced Moscow’s hand” as he was to do “a good many times,” in Trotsky’s words.²⁹ In fact, it seems that the ultimata to Romania and the help offered to Hungary only brought the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic nearer. When Béla Kun counted on Ukrainian support, he was let down.

In July 1919, the Hungarian Red Army launched the offensive against the Romanian troops scattered along the border drawn between the two countries by the Allies. As the Hungarian plans were known to the Romanian general staff, and also many Hungarian officers deserted, the offensive soon turned into a disastrous rout all along the front.³⁰ On 30 July, the Romanian armies started marching on Budapest; two days later, on 1 August 1919, the Soviet regime in Hungary collapsed. No help could come from the Ukraine because Rakovski’s government was in full rout after Denikin’s successful offensive.

When one examines the relations between Lenin and Rakovski from May to August 1919, they seem to have taken a sharp turn for the worse. Until late April, Lenin relied on Rakovski fully, whether in military matters or in economic, political, or social problems. On 28 April, for example, Lenin sent the following telegram to L. B. Kamenev, who was in the Ukraine. “Joffe is useless in the Crimea, but he would be valuable in the Ukrainian government where Rakovski could find a post for him to fight independent tendencies.”³¹ But, early in May, Lenin started to worry about the way Rakovski kept emphasizing the external front at the expense of the internal one. On 4 May, Lenin sent a telegram to Rakovskik Podvoyski, and Antonov:

So far you have not given us accurate information as to which units, how many rifles, swords [or] field guns are being sent to the Donbas and what railway stations the first echelons have arrived at. The fall of Lugansk proves the truth of the accusations against you, that you are aiming at a march against Romania. Do not forget that you will be held responsible for the catastrophe if you delay proper assistance to the Don Basin.³²

Thirteen days later, Rakovski sent a telegraph to Béla Kun, nevertheless, announcing an offensive by the Ukrainian troops toward Central Europe. At the same time, the Bolsheviks had to retreat in the Ukraine, until on 26, 28 and 29 May, Lenin violently accused Party and army leaders in the Ukraine of failing to carry out their duty: only two of the regiments promised for the Southern Front had arrived, and they were in "no state to fight;" mobilization had been decided for 20,000 workers but had not been put into effect. Makhno "was on his way west, leaving the flank of the 13th Army exposed. "In conclusion," Lenin said, "Antonov and Podvoyski are criminally guilty for each additional minute we have to wait."³³ On 20 May, Lenin exploded: "Not one promise has been carried out; no help came to the Don Basin; the pace of mobilization is painfully slow. You will be personally held responsible for the impending catastrophe."³⁴

Three months later, the Bolsheviks were expelled from the whole territory of the Ukraine. On 13 August 1919, Lenin sent a telegram to Rakovski, Trotsky, and Kossior with these fateful words:

I demand instantly that all commissariats be closed, with the exception of those dealing with military, communications, transport, and supply matters. We have to call up every single man . . . to hold out if only for a few weeks after merging the People's Commissars Council with the Defense Council, the Central Executive Committee, and the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party into one single body . . .³⁵

Seeing the complete failure of the policy he had advocated, Rakovski could now understand the problems the Soviet federation as a state would face in the future.

The most drastic solution to end the state of isolation of the first socialist state was to start a European revolution through an armed insurrection. We know how unsuccessful Rakovski was in his attempt in Hungary and Romania in 1919. The beginning of the Soviet-Polish war in April 1920 and the march of Soviet troops toward Warsaw clearly show the Bolshevik approach to their relations with

the outside world: diplomacy, Comintern, and the Red Army.

In February 1920, as the the Red Army resumed its offensive on the internal revolutionary front (Odessa had just been captured by the Reds again), Rakovski started a "diplomatic offensive" aimed at Poland. On 19 February, he sent a proclamation offering peace to "all the peoples and governments, every single one" in the name of the Ukrainian Soviet government that he had just established. The Whites and "international imperialists," by then, had been pushed out of most of the Ukrainian territory:

The Ukrainian Soviet government declares its strong determination to uphold the independent and sovereign Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and also its wish to live peacefully with the people and government of every country, and thereby invites them to open economic and diplomatic relations with the Ukraine.³⁶

In the same note, a poisoned dart was sent "to the chauvinistic circles of the Polish Republic," people "whom enemies of the Ukrainian workers and peasants turn to for help in their counterrevolutionary plans, at this moment, and who try to bring the Polish people into a war against the Ukrainian people."³⁷

Rakovski ended with an appeal in which he stressed the need to sign a peace treaty between the two independent republics of the Ukraine and Poland. Three days later, he sent another note to the Polish government again invoking "the extreme importance, in the interest of both peoples, to conclude a peace treaty."³⁸ These renewed appeals seem interesting when one remembers that, at the time, he started secret negotiations with the German Foreign Ministry. In this connection, let us examine a fact mentioned by Trotsky in his notes on Rakovski:

As Ukrainian foreign minister, Rakovski used to send protests and issue solemn declarations for purposes of propaganda. . . . Yet, much more important was the diplomatic work he did behind the scene, which helped him force Moscow's hand on several occasions. When documents so far kept in archives are published, they will reveal many interesting things in this respect.³⁹

On 7 February 1920, "a political figure from the Soviet Ukraine" [unidentified because of the need for secrecy] called on a German diplomat in Berlin, and praised the Red Army for its strength, adding a warning on its aims in the next offensive:

The army will soon start operations, not only in Russia, but also abroad, and the next objective is Poland . . . the main

campaign will start from Minsk. . . . The visitor was in no doubt, [the German report adds] as to the wisdom of the operation, since the Poles are no match for the Russians in manpower, arms, and army command. Moreover, agitation work has been going on in Poland for a month to rouse hostility to the present government. This operation is meeting with great success.⁴⁰

Toward the end of the visit, which was reported to Ago von Malzan, head of the Eastern European Department at the German Foreign Ministry, the Ukrainian diplomat asserted that "the fate of Poland [was] definitely sealed." He also described the grand future Germany would have if she decided to throw in her lot with Russia. It would put an end to the treaty of Versailles, and the old German eastern frontier would be restored. Finally, the visitor encouraged the German government to send a delegate to Moscow and the Ukraine immediately, to establish contact with the Red Army about to enter Poland. The German report concluded: "The Ukrainian assured me again that a Russian attack could be depended on, and also that it would be successful."⁴¹

The only comment made by Malzan was short but meaningful "Ja." So, a successful advance by Soviet troops in Poland could have resulted in the country being partitioned between Germany and the first socialist country. It is obvious that Lenin, no less than Rakovski, thought that, when the Red Army came near the German border after going through Poland, popular uprisings would bring about a revolution in Germany that would be given a "helping hand" by Soviet troops. Let us remember the first words uttered by Rakovski in January 1919, after he was appointed as head of the Ukrainian Provisional Government:

The Soviet Ukraine is the strategic center of socialism. The creation of a revolutionary Ukraine means the start of a revolution in the Balkans, and it will allow the German proletariat to survive in spite of the risk of hunger and death it suffers at the hands of German imperialism.⁴²

Thus, Rakovski was carrying out his plan, one item after the other. To make it easier for Soviet troops to enter Poland, he used the only means he could, the Comintern. Toward the end of October 1919, at a meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's Orgburo, chaired by Rakovski, it was decided to set up an organization bureau of ten Bolsheviks for the Communist party of Western Galicia and Bukovina. This is from the shorthand notes taken at the meeting:

The main task for the Orgburo [of Western Galicia and Bukovina] is to create a communist organization that could control and direct the revolutionary movement growing in those areas. The Orgburo is answerable for its actions to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist party as represented by the Western Front Bureau, which will send political and organizational directives to it. Since there are a number of Communists of Galician extraction in Tashkent and some Siberian towns, an envoy from comrade Levcheko will be sent to Tashkent to organize the return of our Galician comrades to their native country. Moreover, letters must be sent to Party Committees, which will move all Galician Communists to the Orgburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee, where they will be directed to their new posts. A sum of money of a hundred rubles will be paid to the Orgburo of Western Galicia and Bukovina.⁴³

The ground was well prepared for the invasion of Poland by Soviet troops.⁴⁴ According to the Ukrainian diplomat mentioned above, the agitation work carried out on Polish territory was very satisfactory by February 1920. A few days later, a communist leader of Polish extraction, Joseph Unshlikht, received a top secret telegram from Moscow giving the same instructions:

We know the Poles are going to attack. We are doing all we can to strengthen our defensive positions: we have to increase agitation in Poland as much as possible. We shall help you, if necessary, with men, money, and newsprint.⁴⁵

Throughout the spring months of 1920, Trotsky was, among Bolshevik leaders, the one who put most emphasis on the urgent need for conducting an intense political campaign in Poland; he was the one who suggested "general mobilization among Polish Communists."⁴⁶

The Polish Communist party was used by Moscow as the vanguard of the Red Army. A Central Committee of the revolutionary army was set up, specializing in political work among the soldiers of the Polish army, the way the TsK KP (b)U had asked the Orgburo to "work" on Polish peasants.⁴⁷ The Comintern also sent a party of revolutionary agents to the front to infiltrate Polish lines. Their task was to "lower the Polish army's morale through propaganda," to publish a revolutionary newspaper (*Dawn*), and to cooperate with the Polish Communist party to organize strikes and sabotage actions and anything that could make a quick advance by Soviet troops easier.⁴⁸

The Russian leaders, foremost among them Lenin, were genuinely deceived into thinking that the communist propaganda was influenc-

ing Polish peasants and workers. Besides, they believed that Polish Communists were docile and would obey directives from Moscow. It is true that the First Congress of the Polish Communist party (created in the last days of 1918) had rejected the idea of an independent Polish state. "The Polish proletariat rejects such slogans as autonomy and self-determination."⁴⁹ Judging that a direct military intervention by the Red Army was imminent, in March 1920, the Polish Party had leaflets distributed, asserting that the support given by the Russian proletariat to the coming Polish revolution "would not be regarded as an invasion."⁵⁰

However, the Bolsheviks were not the only ones to prepare for war, or to try and "forestall" it by a rapid and decisive offensive. The Polish government under Pilsudski dreamt of military conquests and territorial gains at the expense of the Ukraine. In the end, the Polish general was the first to attack, taking the Bolsheviks by surprise, so they could not resist even the first Polish offensive. On 28 April 1920, four days after the beginning of military operations, Rakovski had to recognize at an extraordinary meeting of the Kharkov Soviet that:

Since we did not have enough resources to drive back the armies of Polish White Guards straight away, our troops had to abandon a number of important positions. . . . At the moment we are not in such danger as last year. We can revise our strategy and our military objectives. We still have the capacity to strike the final blow to drive the Polish White Guards armies back to the walls of Warsaw.⁵¹

In July, the Soviet troops successfully resisted Pilsudski's attack, but he had penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory and Polish troops had taken Kiev, on 7 May, only two months after the war began. The Russian troops went on the offensive, and drove the Poles back all along the front, after which they entered Poland. The impetus of the Red Army now seemed impossible to resist. Rakovski, who had been sent to Smilga as political commissar with Tukhachevski's troops, wrote:⁵²

It is now almost three years since the era of revolutionary ward started. . . . It is difficult to say when it will end. It will depend first of all on the revolutionary movement abroad. We can state, however, that so far the Soviet Federation has succeeded, and the Red Army is our guarantee that we can, in the future, act as conquerors in a war that was imposed on us.⁵³

Thus, the Second Congress of the Communist international met in July 1920 under the auspices of revolutionary armies marching

irresistibly through Europe. Zinoviev recalled later (at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist party in March 1921) that the delegates sitting opposite a huge map in the Palace of Congress "came to realize that the fate of the international proletarian revolution depended on each step forward taken by the Red Army."

Through Paul Levi, the Second Congress of the Communist International sent its best wishes to the German workers, encouraging them to come into the streets to carry out their revolution. The march through Poland seemed to be over by now, and the country had become a jumping board toward Germany.⁵⁴ Paul Levi explained how, after bourgeois Poland had fallen, the real danger lay in the fact that the Allies could "make peace" with the German generals and capitalists; they could help them start an armed fight against the German proletariat and turn Germany into a base to attack Soviet Russia. So, time was ripe for German workers to put into practice the promises made a thousand times in mass demonstrations: go over to their Russian brothers and with them, fight for liberation.⁵⁵

In his speech to the all-Russian conference of the Polish Communist party (PCP [b]),⁵⁶ in September 1920, Lenin declared: "The whole of Germany came near to boiling point when our forces were within reach of Warsaw."⁵⁷ The question was whether the leaders of the German Communist party would be capable of rousing the German proletariat and lead it into an assault against their masters. As for Rakovski, he was skeptical; this is why he violently attacked the "parliamentarian" independent German Social Democratic party at the Second International Congress on 30 July 1920. Christian believed this attitude of the Social Democratic party was responsible for a full-scale proletarian revolution failing to occur in Germany in the past three years. In his speech, he wanted to prove that the Germans had always refused to recognize their fundamental error in 1918, when an alliance between Bolshevik Germany and Russia would have ensured the final victory of revolutionary forces in Europe.

In 1918, it was obvious to every revolutionary that Germany who had just rid herself of the yoke of William II, who had just lived through a proletarian revolution, this new Germany would join forces with Soviet Russia against the Allies. This is precisely what the Independents have refused to see so far, although they say that Germany was in a very critical situation at the time, besieged by death and famine. They say they had to join the government to save their country. Yet, they knew full well that the Socialists in a majority government would be the lackeys of bourgeois Germany and capitalist Allies. . . . Sometimes, the bour-

geois itself happens to be in a tight corner, so they turn to the working class and say "Let us share power." It seems to me that, in this case, it is time for the revolutionary class and party to pin them with their backs to the wall and break them instead of cooperating with them.⁵⁸

In July 1920, the leaders of the independent Social Democratic party made the same mistake as in November 1918, remaining within the German government, so that Poland could not be crushed between the Russian and German forces; there was no rebellion in Germany, and the impetus of the Red Army broke against the walls of Warsaw, never to spread to Western Europe. The "walnut shell" could not be broken, because of the Polish people's resistance.

In his speech of 22 September 1920 to the Ninth Congress of the RCP (b), Lenin gave as one of the main factors in the Bolshevik defeat the fact that "we were unable to influence the working-class Polish proletariat, further than the Vistula and Warsaw."⁵⁹ Until early in August, the Bolsheviks had counted on the Polish proletariat going over to them. It did not happen, and Lenin admitted, in a conversation with Clara Zetkin in the winter of 1920, that they had not been able to turn the war between nationalities into a class war, a European civil war:

The Polish peasants and petty bourgeois saw in the Red Army soldiers not brothers come to liberate them, but enemies. . . . The Polish revolution we hoped for did not take place. Peasants and workers deceived by Pilsudski and Dashinski's followers fought in defense of their class enemies, letting our brave Red Army soldiers starve, and laid ambushes to kill them.⁶⁰

If we try to understand the reasons why the Poles in the Ukraine, like the Bolsheviks in Poland, only managed to stay in control for a few weeks, we soon realize that neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians got any help from the popular masses of the country they had just invaded. The strength of patriotic feelings had not been taken into account.

Their recent history and the traditional antagonism between Ukrainians and Poles made it impossible for either invader to pass as "brother and liberator." They had both chosen to use armed force to prove their goodwill, and their methods, if not their aims, were too similar. On 23 April 1920 (five days before the Polish attack), Pilsudski had signed an alliance with Petlyura, who became the ruler of a non-Soviet Ukraine under Polish influence.⁶¹ This alliance was no more successful in drawing popular support in the Ukraine than ne-

gotiations between Russian Bolsheviks and Polish Communists were in attracting the sympathy of the Polish people.

As early as July 31, the Bolshevik leaders had set up a "Polish Provisional Revolutionary Government" in Moscow. As in the case of the Ukraine, they failed to take into account the bad impression a government imported from Russia would make on the Polish nation. On 11 August, Litvinov sent from Copenhagen the following message to Kamenev, who was in London at the time:

I regard it as essential to sign a peace treaty, or at least an agreement with the present Polish government on preliminary conditions, before we occupy Warsaw and sovietize Poland. Setting up a Soviet government in Warsaw before our troops enter the city would be the ideal solution.⁶²

Felix Dzerzhinski (who was the head of the Soviet Cheka), Julian Marchlewski, Felix Kohn, and Josef Unschlikht had been appointed members of the Polish Soviet government by Lenin, and they set up soviets in Poland along the lines of the Red Army's advance into the country. As Felix Kohn was to explain later to Louis Fischer, their greatest success had taken place in Bialystok, one of the major industrial centers in Poland. Workers had mingled with Soviet troops, government services had begun to operate, a daily newspaper and numerous declarations were distributed, plans for expansion had been drawn.⁶³ But, between Bialystok and Warsaw, the Red Army did not come across another industrial center, and the machine of the political administration had nothing to grind. By contrast, the Bolsheviks could only antagonize the rural population because of food requisitions for Soviet divisions separated from their bases by their rapid advance. They had no way of gaining the peasant's goodwill, and they only offended Polish patriotism all around.⁶⁴

In this context, the circumstances of the invasion of Poland by Soviet troops could be compared to those in the Ukraine. There, the Bolsheviks had encountered the dual antagonism of the peasants' attitude of independence and Ukrainian patriotism. Nevertheless, they did not lose the support of Russian workers in Kharkov and the main industrial centers. Let us now examine the relations between Soviet rulers and the Ukrainian rural population.

Chapter 7

Christian Rakovski and the Sovietization of the Ukrainian Campaign (1919–1920)

At the Eighth Conference of the RCP (b), in Moscow in December 1919, Lenin accused Rakovski of having rushed through the program of sovietization of the Ukraine and of making the same mistake after his reinstatement, thereby losing peasant support. "As for the speech by Comrade Rakovski," the Soviet leader said, "I must say that his assertion of soviet farms being the base on which to build communism is wrong. In no way can we approach the problem so. We must realize that only a very small amount of land can be distributed to soviet farms, otherwise the peasant masses will not support us, we need them."¹

Rakovski admitted later that the Eighth Conference had been crucial in finally giving up the "erroneous" policy followed by his first government, and "arriving at the right formulation of a solution to the peasant problem." This became a vital element for Bolshevik power, and gradual control of the countryside followed.²

In December 1919, Rakovski was singled out as being the main culprit in the Bolshevik failure not only on the external front in trying to help the Hungarian revolutionary movement, but also in the Ukraine itself. The Ukrainian delegate, Yakovlev,³ blamed Christian for imposing "an arch-communist legislation, trying to be more communist than the communists, made worse by being applied in the wrong way so that the peasants, who had always been uncooperative, came to hate the Bolsheviks."⁴

Rakovski answered these harsh criticisms of his agricultural policy with an argument of no small importance, if we want to understand this era: the mistakes made in the Ukraine arose not so much from the methods used, as from the spirit in which the country had been conquered. It meant "utter subjugation" and "complete exploitation" to the benefit of the Russian revolutionary movement under the Bolsheviks. Christian declared in front of the delegates at the conference: "We went into the Ukraine at a time when Russia was going through a severe production crisis, and we sought to exploit the Ukraine as much as possible to relieve the crisis." Such an approach

had made the Bolsheviks overlook the economic, political, and social features that gave the country its cohesion. We saw earlier how Lenin had appealed to Rakovski, before he left for the Ukraine, to do his utmost "to feed the starving North." Enough wheat and sugar had to be sent to prevent workers in Petrograd and Moscow from dying of starvation, as they were the driving force behind the revolution and its most reliable instruments. To achieve this aim quickly, in conditions of civil war, trouble, and insecurity, Rakovski decided, in January 1919, to use methods of "war communism." Factories and manpower were mobilized, the means of production and land were nationalized on the soviet lines. On January 25, he explained his plan to the Kharkov Soviet, as chairman of the Ukrainian Provisional Government:

Part of the government's plan is to mobilize and give arms to the Ukrainian worker and peasant population. . . . As for agriculture, the government policy is to take over the main sectors of the economy and to give the laborers land belonging to absentee landlords.⁵

Rakovski reckoned that sovietization in the Ukrainian countryside would be along three main lines: (1) a propaganda campaign to support the communes, and effective collectivization of agriculture; (2) setting up model soviet farms (*sovkhoses*), and (3) large land concessions for sugar factories.

The application of these principles demanded support from the rural population, so far deeply hostile to the Bolsheviks. So the various strata of the Ukrainian peasantry had to be set one against the other, to achieve conditions of class struggle between rich farmers (*kulaks*) and poor peasants (*bednyaks*). The official aim was to use *bednyaks* as revolutionary agents, militiamen, and grain collectors. To give them a sense of urgency and keep them under control, Soviet leaders set up Committees of Poor Peasants (*komitety nezamozhnykh selyan*).

Trotsky wrote later that Rakovski had been the instigator of these committees.⁶ In fact, Lenin had thought of them as early as 1918, but Rakovski was the first to have them on a large scale.⁷ It took over a year to make the system operational, and the statute of these committees was recognized officially after a declaration of the Ukrainian Provisional Government on 17 January 1919, followed by a decree approved by the CEC of the Ukrainian Communist party, on 14 May. The committees were made up exclusively of poor peasants with no more than five *desyatins* of land, who did not employ paid labor and who had not been deprived of their voting rights by the

Soviet constitution. Their role was "to speed up the politicization of peasants, and systematically promote the socialist and revolutionary rule of peasants and workers all over the Ukraine."⁸

These committees were firmly established in 1920; they became veritable revolutionary militias and were to play a part in the Bolshevik penetration of the Ukrainian countryside, in the setting-up of soviet farms and in the fight against *kulaks* and gangs of armed peasants. Rakovski wrote in 1921: "Committees of poor peasants made up platoons whose task was not only to prevent roving gangs entering villages, but also to chase them away and destroy them entirely,"⁹

In the first four months in 1919, the Ukrainian countryside came under increased pressure; each peasant who owned more than ten *desyatins* was treated as a *kulak*, and his property was confiscated in the same way as that of large landowners.¹⁰ Moscow's instructions were crystal clear: an administrative system had to be created in the Ukraine to guarantee "fifty million *puds* of grain before 1 June and as much coal as possible."¹¹ Lenin had no doubt that, without coal and grain from the Ukraine, the revolution would founder. "Lack of coal brings railways and factories to a standstill, lack of bread is exposing workers in cities and small towns with no agriculture to widespread famine."¹²

On 1 February 1919, *Pravda* printed an editorial under the headline "Coal and Bread."

Soviet Russia is in the throes of famine, but the troops of the Ukrainian Soviet have occupied the whole of the left bank of the Ukraine, where a faithful supporter of the international proletariat is in charge and acts in the best interest of Soviet Russia. . . . Now they [the Ukrainians] give us wheat, sugar, and raw materials. Since every piece of bread, every lump of sugar is priceless, we must urgently find transport for what our Ukrainian brothers give us.¹³

If one takes into account the resistance to more requisitions, after the levies made by the Germans and Skoropadsky's government throughout 1918, Rakovski scored an impressive success. What levies amounted to 800,000 *puds* only (instead of the 50 million demanded,) but the global exports to Moscow from January to June 1919 amounted to 1,766,505 *puds*. This sum includes 109,373 *puds* of meat; 48,417 *puds* of pork fat; 97,498 *puds* of meat-based foodstuffs; 11,517 *puds* of fish; 7,599 *puds* of butter; and 29,739 eggs.¹⁴ However, resentment among peasants rose less from requisitions than from the collectivization of agriculture; the former were unpopular with *kulaks* but the latter antagonized *srednyaks* smallholders. Let us now see the

results of the collectivization drive.

Rakovski's administration had to deal with setting up communes and *sovkhozes* on land that had been confiscated. This policy had been outlined at the Third Congress of the Ukrainian Communist party in March 1919, when the Red Army was occupying most of the Ukrainian territory.

The main effort to enact our agricultural policy must be the transition between individual farming and collective farming. Soviet farms, communes, and collectives are the surest ways to achieve socialism in agriculture. So individual farming must be regarded as a temporary phenomenon, on the way out. Land that was confiscated must be used for socialist, collective farming mainly, and if there is anything to spare it can be given to private farmers.¹⁵

Between the spring and the summer of 1919, over a million *desyatins* of land was turned into *sovkhozes*: nearly 800,000 *desyatins*, producing sugar beets in the past, were nationalized by the People's Commissariat for the economy. However, these decrees were not applied because of growing opposition to Soviet power among Ukrainian peasants.

In 1919, the Ukrainian *kulaks* got the better of Soviet rule in rural areas; redistribution of land was impossible, and Rakovski drew the following conclusion from the experience: "We have to destroy the dictatorship of armed *kulaks*." He went on:

In the Ukraine, we have been unable to liquidate landowners whose land was seized to give it to peasants with only a small plot or nothing at all. We gave some of that land to peasants, but only in theory. A comrade reported that, in the Poltava region, he even saw a landowner strutting about his village holding a red umbrella. . . . The peasants never got near the land that had been given to them, they were too afraid. In one village, I once met an old peasant who explained this with much common sense: "Why should I take this land? Let me tell you what happened to me: last year I took some cattle from the nearby estate of a general; I duly paid for it, then the *haydamiki* arrived. . . . they took the cattle from me, and, of course, did not return the money. . . ." ¹⁶

By December, Rakovski was convinced that an agricultural policy of land redistribution could not work without a really powerful Soviet government, which would split the rural population into classes by gaining support among the underprivileged. It turned out that, in 1919, general insecurity and unfavorable circumstances made it

impossible to set up *sovkhoses*, so poor peasants soon felt deeply disappointed. One of them complained to Yakolev:

In the past, I had no land, but I had a small house; now, under Soviet rule, I have no land either. . . . Nearby, there is a large estate, but it is occupied by one of their committees, which stays there like a dog in its kennel; they don't eat, but they don't produce food either. There is no control, no authority. . . . So, such *sovkhoses*, they can keep them. . . .¹⁷

On 19 November, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who was in the Ukraine at the time, wrote to Lenin and emphasized how important it was to improve relations between Soviet leaders and Ukrainian peasants if the revolution was to survive:

I am utterly convinced that our policy of using force to bring peasants together into communes does not make sense and leads to disaster. This time, we must all, at all cost, find a common language with the Ukrainian peasant.¹⁸

This letter is an example of the renewed interest of the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian peasantry and its specific character after their military defeat in the summer of 1919. As Manuilski pointed out, while the Ukrainian *muzhik* had fought with the Bolsheviks in 1918, he turned against them in 1919. "We were not beaten on the military or strategic level; we were beaten because the entire *muzhik* front rose against us during the summer."¹⁹

The Bolsheviks came to consider the Ukrainian peasant as totally different from the Russian *muzhik*. In two years of civil war, a large number had been uprooted from their villages and turned into a floating population ready to join militiamen, *haydamaki*, and other bands of armed peasants who were roaming the countryside in those days. Rakovski wrote later that "in large sections of the population, this state halfway between a militia and a gang of highwaymen had become the only means of survival."²⁰ Conditions of permanent chaos and lawlessness had been grafted onto Cossack traditions.²¹ Yakovlev wrote in 1919:

Individualistic tendencies and an inclination to anarchy have suddenly taken the upper hand in Ukrainian peasant society. . . . They live on their own ground, in their villages, in complete autarchy and can easily do without the cities for all practical purposes. Yet, although they do not need them, cities can be a lot of trouble. Dozens of separate rulers have descended on peasants, each with new requirements, each stealing wheat from them. So it is hardly surprising

that anarchism should appeal to the population, whether the Makhno variety or the kind held by other anti-Soviet gang leaders. . . .²²

A sharp turnout occurred at the Eighth Conference of the RCP (b) as to the way of dealing with Ukrainian peasants; since they had not been subjugated, they had to be cajoled into cooperation. A few years later, this change of policy was described thus in official Party circles:

After paying too little attention to the psychological attitudes of the large Ukrainian peasant population, the Soviet rulers learnt from their mistakes. Through their new agricultural policy and specific measures intended to benefit poor peasants . . . they fostered good relations between urban laboring classes and rural ones.²³

The first to draw his conclusions from the failure was Lenin, and he forced the Party to vote a new agricultural law for the Ukraine. He wanted to accommodate smallholders (*srednyaks*), who made up a social stratum different from the *kulaks*. By 1919, any peasant who owned over ten *desyatins* of land had been called a *kulak*, and his land had been taken from him. This had to come to an end; also, the number of *sovkhozes* and communes had to be reduced. Excessive sovietization had to be avoided as a basis for agricultural policy in the Ukraine. Rakovski accepted this "strategic withdrawal" and, like Manuilsky, undertook to prepare a new law for agriculture "under immediate supervision from Ilich" in Moscow.²⁴ When they had both completed their plans, Lenin chose Rakovski's. The substance was the same in both projects but they were different in their form. Rakovski presented his as a law, while the other was a mere declaration. Lenin thought it wrong to issue decrees rather than laws; from the psychological point of view, the latter had a much greater impact on peasants, according to him.

The law was sanctioned by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee on 5 February 1920. All the land previously belonging to large landowners, or the crown, or monasteries went to landless or small peasants; those were also given all unoccupied land. While the law was very generous to *bednyaks* and *srednyaks*, it was extremely harsh on the *kulaks*, as "all landlords not exploiting their land themselves, and those who rent it out" were going to be expropriated immediately. The redistribution of land and agricultural equipment would become effective within a month.²⁵

As a result of the new law, small peasants and poor peasants received 15.5 million *desyatins*, 1.5 *desyatins* of which came from

sovkhoses. Smallholders were further protected by an additional law issued at the same time: "Soviet authorities will not adhere always to a strict application of the principle of distribution of land; some exceptions will be made to avoid harming the middle peasantry."²⁶

By 1920, the number of *sovkhoses* fell by half and the acreage by about a quarter. They remained as experiments or model forms, but nevertheless, as Skrypnyk wrote in 1920, "In spite of adverse political circumstances, collectivization was carried out at a greater pace in the Ukraine than in Russia."²⁷ He added that, in the twenty-five Russian provinces, there were only 500 communes in 1920, while in the nine Ukrainian provinces, over six months, 497 communes and agricultural cooperatives (*artels*) had been set up. Skrypnyk supported Rakovski in this policy of rural sovietization; but, even if the Ukraine in 1920 was ahead of Russia in this respect, statistics show how much damage the new law inflicted on the program.²⁸

Up to the end of 1920, the Bolsheviks were generally accused of failing to assert their power anywhere but "in cities and along railway lines." Rakovski contested this in 1921: "Soviet power has put down strong roots in Ukrainian villages."²⁹ He used as a proof the fact that, even in right-bank territories, where *hetmans* and *haydamaki* were still strong, on and off, 80 to 90 percent of the taxes had been collected in 1921. "Without support from the local peasants," Rakovski said, "we would never have achieved such a result."³⁰

Yet, in the first half of 1921, there were still hundreds of gangs of armed peasants present in several provinces; in the areas of Kiev and Podolsk on the right bank, and in the provinces of Poltava, Alexandrovsk, and the Donets on the left bank. According to Rakovski, some of these gangs were acting under the authority of Petlyura's émigré staff; some others were anarchists supporting Makhno and his followers; finally a third group was made up of uprooted peasants. Only in 1921 were these gangs wiped out, when scores of *atamans* closely connected with Petlyura, Grigoriev, and Tyutyunik, surrendered to the Bolsheviks with their men and weapons. Later, Makhno himself, with only sixty to seventy men, escaped to Romania.

Rakovski gave several factors as an explanation for the end of bandit rule in the Ukraine: first there was a general yearning for peace after long years of war and insecurity. It also seemed to smallholders and poor peasants that Soviet rule was the lesser evil after the application of the 5 February land reform. Peteyura, one of the leaders who might have won power in the Ukraine, was under Polish influence, which was an abomination; Denikin and Wrangel were on the side of large landowners and of "Russia one and indivisible;" last, the rule by hetmans and anarchists could only be short-lived

and meant constant internecine struggle. The Bolshevik government was the only one to show some kind of stability, and militarily it had proved strongest. In 1921, the Soviet high command had been relieved from pressure on two main fronts: in the south and in the Crimea where it faced Wrangel; and in the west on the Polish front. Military leaders succeeded in attracting a number of followers and in defeating the others by using their tactics: guerilla warfare. Finally, the Soviet government committed all its administrative and judiciary services, as well as the apparatus of the Communist party, to the repression of lawlessness.

In September 1920, a "decree issued by the chairman of the Ukrainian People's Commissars, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council for the Southwest Front, Comrade Rakovski," was published in the official newspaper, *Kommunist*.³¹

It declared the following:

1. Any gang leader or member of a gang are outlawed. Any outlaw taken prisoner will be shot on the spot as an enemy of the worker and peasant government.
2. The outlaw's close relatives will be taken hostages and sent to concentration camps. The property of the outlaw and his close relatives will be confiscated and given to local poor peasants.
3. Villages supporting bandits by supplying them, either with vehicles, horses, or volunteers, will be isolated by military means and punished. Sentences will be the following:
 - a. levies in kind;
 - b. levies in cash;
 - c. the land of rich peasants confiscated;
 - d. villages shelled and razed to the ground.

Note a. The brunt of reprisals will be born by rich peasants.

Note b. It will not be accepted as an excuse that villages were forced to contribute volunteers or foodstuff.³²

The law sounded worse than it actually was, and Rakovski took care to combine repression and lenience. However, the decree was altered somewhat to allow more room to impress the population. Instead of shooting "bandits" on the spot, they were to be tried publicly before execution. So, in August 1922, several trials took place and caused quite a stir. Forty-eight people belonging to the "right-bank Rada" were arrested and accused of counterrevolutionary action, along with the Polish army and Petlyura's general staff. The Rada had operated in Podolia, Volhynia, and Odessa provinces.³³ Its members were all sentenced to death and executed immediately. Almost at the same time, eighty-eight people who belonged to another organization known as "District of the Eighth insurrection" were tried

in Kiev by the revolutionary tribunal and condemned to death. Like the right-bank Cossack Rada, this group was supposed to have close connections with the Polish army, with Petlyura, and a splinter of Tyutyunik's movement. It was also accused of conducting counter-revolutionary agitation in the Red Army and in the population and preparing insurrection against the Bolshevik government. Finally, a mass trial took place in Elizavetgrad in the summer of 1922; seventy-five people were also accused of plotting with Petlyura and conspiring against the Soviets. They were mercilessly punished.³⁴

Public, economic, and social order was gradually restored, either by political moves or by force. The Bolsheviks used the same tactics with regard to the other obstacle blocking their way into the Ukraine, and preventing the establishment of a Soviet regime and patriotism.

Chapter 8

The Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian National Question (1919)

In an open letter Lenin sent to Boris Suvarin in the latter half of 1916, he explained his views on wars of national liberation.¹

I am not in the least opposed to wars waged for the defense of democracy or against national oppression, and I am not afraid of words such as "defense of the motherland," when used about this kind of war or insurrection. . . . It would be equally nonsensical to deny the legitimacy of wars conducted by oppressed nations against their masters, wars which could break out at present, the Irish revolt against England, for example, Morocco against France, the Ukraine against Russia, etc. . . .²

Although Lenin had always been aware of the right of peoples to national self-determination or, as we can see, the right of peoples to wage an armed struggle for independence, many Bolsheviks were scornful of these "outmoded" principles. So at the Seventh All-Russian Conference, from 24 to 29 April (2 to 12 May) 1917, in Petrograd, a motion was proposed by seven votes against two. It proclaimed that the question of nationalities could only be solved by means of a socialist revolution, "Down with Frontiers" being the motto. The solution of "breaking up large groupings of states into small national states" was rejected, and the motion ended with an assertion of the right to national self-determination being "only a sentence devoid of precise content."³

Rosa Luxemburg shared this point of view, going so far as to describe the Ukrainian national movement, in the autumn of 1918, as "a ridiculous farce set up by a few university professors and students," which had been "artificially inflated into a political factor" by "Lenin and company" because of their doctrinaire agitation for self-determination.⁴ In Russia, G. L. Pyatakov represented the same "leftist" tendencies, and when he became, for a short while in 1918, the head of Soviet Ukraine, self-determination was ruled out as "counterrevolutionary." Defending the proletariat as opposed to the nation, Pyatakov called on all workers' movements in every Russian nation

to come under the central control of the Communist Internationale.⁵

However, as we know, one of the main consequences of the 1917 revolutions was to strengthen the national aspirations of the border countries, above all Finland, Poland, and the Ukraine. In December 1917, Trotsky declared: "The Ukrainian masses must know that Soviet rule would not be opposed to Ukrainian soviets in their struggle against bourgeois politics."⁶ Trotsky saw the question of self-determination as one of minor importance. "While we recognize the right to national self-determination, we take care to explain to the masses its limited meaning, and we never attach more importance to it than to the interest of proletarian revolution."⁷

Lenin's position contrasted sharply with that of Trotsky: he thought national movements to be vitally important, because they could often be used as levers in a revolution. The problem was how to control them, and make use of "the best elements among nationalists." We saw earlier how Lenin had decided to merge the *borot'bist* party with the Ukrainian Communist party early in 1920. A few months before that, in December 1919, Lenin had written in a "Letter to Ukrainian Workers and Peasants" that:

It goes without saying, that we fully recognize that the Ukrainian workers and peasants alone, in their own All-Ukrainian Soviet Congress, can decide whether or not the Ukraine must unite with Russia or remain as a separate independent republic, and, if so, decide what kind of federation must exist between that republic and Russia.⁸

In the Soviet Union as he imagined it, Lenin wanted "to promote fully real trust between the laboring masses of various countries and various nations."⁹ This generous concept would come to the fore at the time of the Georgian affair in 1922, or rather when Lenin took a fresh look at the problem after falling ill and after Stalin had started to take over.¹⁰ On the other hand, Lenin had always emphasized the strength of capitalist society and its remarkable organization. Under such circumstances, only "an international alliance of workers, an international brotherhood" could break it. They had to unite the proletariat in all countries into a *voluntary* union—"A union that cannot allow any coercion by one nation over another, a union based on absolute trust, on the full acknowledgement of brotherly unity, on a completely voluntary agreement."¹¹

In 1918, Rakovski was closer even to Trotsky's position than to Lenin's; his personal experience of national questions in the Balkans, had shown to him how many ills can result from narrow and fanatic nationalism. As a Socialist, he was strongly in favor of the principle of

a federation of the Balkan countries, a principle he had always upheld in his publications.¹² If he had become a member of the Bolshevik party in November 1917, and had been made welcome in it, it was mainly because these revolutionaries saw his internationalist spirit and universal ambitions as the mainspring of socialism. However, since the Bolshevik party at the head of the revolutionary movement was essentially Russian, Rakovski had to bear in mind the words W. Liebknecht wrote to him in 1896, "You must at all cost avoid this danger: acting in the interest of socialism, try not to work in the interest of Russia alone."¹³

In principle, Rakovski regarded internationalism as an essential part of the proletarian state, just as nationalism was part of the bourgeois state and of all previous states. In 1920, he wrote these words in an article:

The general characteristic of all previous forms of government was isolation and lack of openness, whether in aristocratic or democratic governments, absolute monarchies or constitutional ones, republics, etc. . . . Nationalism is the ideology of the bourgeois state.¹⁴

He further showed how nationalism was part and parcel of the bourgeois state, because of the economic basis of the capitalist system. The bourgeois state rested on the principle of private property in land and production means each proprietor aiming at increasing his share. Since competition opposes owners and capitalists, economic and territorial rivalries turn bourgeois states into "competing organizations." He concluded from these premises that "we can then witness the absorption of the weaker states, or at best their total subjugation to the stronger states. Bourgeois étatism is most visible in these isolated, national states fighting one another."¹⁵

In contrast, the proletarian system, in refusing private property in the means of production, refuses also private property on the territory of the state itself. Thus, the major principle of the socialist state is the interest of the working class as a whole, not of private individuals. It follows that "the borders between socialist states are no longer political, but become ordinary administrative limits." By its very nature, the socialist state requires production to be "organized and nationalized, keeping to an overall plan that encompasses the whole state, and on an international as well as a national scale."¹⁶

Rakovski, at this point, stressed that bourgeois governments were bound to close ranks in the face of common danger. In fact, when Lenin seized power in October 1917, the principles of the Bolshevik revolution were seen as a challenge to the bourgeois governments

of Western Europe, a challenge of the "Roman heritage,"¹⁷ to "the West,"¹⁸ and to "the sacred rights of democracy." Against this "bourgeois internationalism," it became imperative to form a common front of all the forces in favor of revolution, if only for security.¹⁹ Rakovski wrote in an article entitled "Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine":

The trend of the socialist revolution is toward political and economic centralization, under the temporary guise of an international federation. Of course, this federation cannot be made at the stroke of a pen, but it will result from a process of uncertain duration that will abolish particularism, provincialism, and bourgeois prejudices, as well as democratic and national ones.²⁰

When he was appointed as head of the Provisional Ukrainian Government in January 1919, Rakovski asked Lenin a far-reaching question: Whether the fact that he was not Ukrainian in origin would make his task more difficult? The answer came humorously: "Could he not unearth a Ukrainian grandmother among his ancestors to establish his legitimacy?"²¹ Christian also wrote later that "ethnic differences between Russians and Ukrainians are in themselves immaterial, . . . it is more relevant to observe that Ukrainian peasants do not have what is usually termed national consciousness."²²

It seemed to him that, in the Ukraine, any feeling of nationality had emerged late in comparison to Poland or Finland.²³ So, he came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian national movement was "an invention of the authors of the Third Universal," and nothing more than a ploy for the Ukrainian intelligentsia to seize power. He went even further in his disbelief, since he did not recognize the Ukraine as a nation. It was only the area encompassed by the borders of nine provinces.²⁴

As we can see, in 1919, the Ukrainian national movement was a useful device, in his opinion, for reactionary elements: this feeling was "forced on the masses" by the intelligentsia and became all the more dangerous to the revolution because, "at the moment, the national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses stands in the way of their social or class consciousness. In the Ukraine, as throughout Russia and most European countries, the struggle has changed from one between nations to class struggle."²⁵ Let us point out that Rakovski's position on the subject of self-determination for national minorities was very close to Stalin's. The latter stated that bourgeois governments were only trying to "dress up in national costume the struggle of the laboring classes against their rulers."²⁶ He concluded: "It all goes to show that the principle of self-determination does not apply to the

bourgeois class but to labor. It must be a weapon in the fight for socialism and used to serve its interest.”²⁷

In 1919, Rakovski saw a close connection between the national liberation movement in the Ukraine and foreign intervention. He thought the nationalists would not have a chance to win without outside support from powers who would benefit from a split between the Ukraine and Russia, since it would weaken the latter as a great European power and stop the revolutionary movement from spreading. As a matter of fact, the Ukrainian nationalists had to appeal, in turn, to the Austrians and the Germans in 1918, to the French in 1919, and finally the Poles in 1920. When French troops were landing in Odessa, in January 1919, Rakovski declares:

The Allies are, in reality, only carrying out a policy that aims at splitting and balkanizing Russia; they support the creation of several states that would be based on the principle of national self-determination, and would lead to endless international wars.²⁸

A month later, he showed how full autonomy could only be found in sovietization, “the principle of Soviet policy is workers’ and peasants’ self-determination.” that is to say, the need to join the revolutionary movement. On 3 February 1919, Christian ended a speech in Kharkov with these words: “We recognize the right of every nationality and territorial unit to form its own government, but essentially, Soviet power is international.”²⁹

Rakovski, at the time, aimed at world revolution, and complete sovietization in the Ukraine in the near future. Peasant resistance had been one of the main factors in the Bolshevik failure in the country, and the policy change that took place in December 1919 was necessary to avoid antagonizing the whole Ukrainian population.

Just as Rakovski had to slow down the sovietization of the Ukrainian countryside after the military defeat suffered by the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1919, so now was he compelled to look more closely into the characteristics of the Ukrainian national movement. The problem was not to repeat the mistake of an open conflict with such a considerable force and to try to reduce it forcibly. He told the Eighth Conference of the RCP (b):

We must be more careful in the press when we refer to the Ukraine. Last year, when it was reported to VTsIK *Izvestiya* that Comrade Petrovski, the appointed chairman of the Ukrainian TsIK, had just arrived in Kiev, this did not help to create favorable conditions for dealing with the Ukraine. Likewise, when we state in newspapers to the front

and in other newspapers that the Ukraine is ours, Kiev is ours, etc. That, comrades, prevents us from building up the right conditions for a constructive approach. Kiev is a Soviet city, yes, but we must try at all cost to avoid anything that sounds imperialistic. . . .

It is imperative to take the national factor into account, to do so until it dies down by itself, until we have completed the process of splitting the various rural classes, and until the growth of production has brought about new conditions, and who can tell how long this will take.³⁰

Lenin was quick to emphasize that, in building the first proletarian federation on the ruins of the tsarist empire, a serious danger had to be avoided—Russian chauvinism. Thanks to a combination of historical circumstances, Russia had become “the guide and guardian of the international proletariat in its struggle against international imperialism.”³¹ This predominance would be a constant threat to the true principles of socialism.

In his analysis of national movements inside the Soviet Republic, Zatonski declared to the Tenth Congress of the RCR (b), in March 1921:

The fact that Russia was the first country to follow the road of proletarian revolution, after being a mere colony of Western Europe, she became the center of a movement for world liberation, this fact fills with pride the hearts of all those who are committed to the Russian revolution and is the source of this extraordinary Russian Red patriotism.³²

In the interval between the Russian revolution and the defeat of Germany in the following year, the relations of Soviet Russia with the border countries had not been settled; at a time when the threat of foreign invasion had receded, cooperation between peoples was still vague and without rules.³³ However, the Bolsheviks were soon guilty of Russian nationalism; most of them cared less for a real Soviet federation than a federation that would be “one and indivisible.”³⁴ As we saw earlier, in the beginning, the first socialist state had to do its utmost to keep together all the revolutionary forces.

The constitution of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was adopted at the Third Congress of Ukrainian Soviets (March 1919). For the first time, a close economic and military alliance between Russia and Soviet Ukraine was officially established. The new republic declared itself “in full solidarity with the other existing Soviet republics: it decided to form the closest political union with them to continue the fight until the victory of world communism, and to

cooperate fully on all questions of communist organization, which is only possible on an international scale.”³⁵

Yet, maybe because of ambitions of his own, which were visible when he tried to help Soviet Hungary by attacking Romania, Rakovski started showing signs of independence at the end of March 1919.³⁶ The Bolsheviks had regained most of the Ukraine, and Rakovski declared that “until the Ukraine has an army of her own, she has to rely on the support and experience of the Russian comrades.”³⁷

A few months later, the Bolsheviks were forced to leave the Ukraine, and these gestures of independence came to nothing; in June 1919, the RCP (b) Central Committee decided to merge the commissariats for war and for labor of the ex-Ukrainian Republic. Rakovski’s government was, at the time, following in the footsteps of the Red Army, and only when the latter regained possession of the Ukraine, late in 1919, was it possible to reorganize the administration of the republic.

Relations between the Ukraine and Russia became clearer in December 1920, when an important Military and Economic Union Treaty was signed for the RSFSR by Lenin and Chicherin and for the Ukrainian SSR by Rakovski. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure that, in the future, the actions of both republics would be “conditioned by the common interest of workers and peasants.”³⁸ The emphasis put on the basic identity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples’ revolutionary interest did not leave much room for independence. Yet, Lenin could not help adding a sentence on the principle of self-determination for the Soviet Ukraine, to disculpate himself of any accusation of Russian imperialism. “The fact that its territory was in the past part of the Russian Empire is in no way binding for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.”³⁹

According to the treaty, both governments agreed on joining their commissariats for Military and Naval Affairs, External Trade, Finance, Communications, and Post and Telegraph.⁴⁰ Lenin made the operation look like the result of proletarian solidarity, but one must point out that he allowed the Ukraine to have her own Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Rather, the commissariat, created by a decree of the Ukrainian Central Committee on 16 March 1920, was not amalgamated with its Russian equivalent by the Union Treaty signed in December. We shall have to find out the reasons for it, and, above all, the consequences it had for relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the outside world.

Chapter 9

The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Ukraine (1919–1923) and Its Domestic Implications

The myth of Ukrainian diplomacy concerns the years 1919–1920, and can be explained with a few examples, showing the “defensive” and “offensive” reasons behind the Russian Soviet government’s choice. Later, it will appear that the “myth” became “reality,” mostly at the hands of Rakovski.

In a study of the legal aspects of an independent foreign policy by the two governments the Ukrainian historian, M. Reichel remarked in 1925:

The RSFSR and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic were never one state as regards international relations. Their foreign affairs commissariats were wholly apart as organizations; they only consulted each other and coordinated their actions. Their diplomatic representatives abroad, if they had any, were also distinct and each acted on behalf of his republic. In the more sensitive places, such as Genoa and Lausanne, joint delegations were formally set up; yet, from the legal point of view, special agreements between the two republics were made, before a joint action was taken. The delegates’ mandates were also issued separately.¹

Although Ukrainian diplomacy seems to have enjoyed a measure of independence, the reasons for this remain unexplained here.

One motive that Lenin must have had in allowing the Ukrainian government some independence in foreign policy was “defensive.” For the Kharkov government to be officially recognized, the Ukraine had to appear reasonably independent on the international stage. The Ukrainian SSR was presented as a legal international body in opposition to the Ukrainian governments-in-exile, which were recognized internationally at the time, and had even some hope of returning to the Ukraine. Here are two examples of how the concept of an independent Ukraine was put to good use. At the time of the civil war, Rakovski sent a large number of protest notes to the various Allied governments. In March 1919, he accused the French foreign minister of not answering him directly, which showed aggressive dispositions:

M. Pichon gives no direct answer to the Ukrainian government and makes no proposal. If his ignoring the Soviet Ukrainian government is intentional, we can only explain it in this way: the French government acknowledges the right of the Russian Soviet government to represent all the Soviet Republics, regardless of their nationality. . . . If this intentional action means that France only recognizes the Directory government, which was left with hardly any territory, and survived only by fleeing, then the French government will prevent peaceful relations between the Ukraine and France being reestablished, without lessening the authority of the Ukrainian Soviets in the slightest.²

One month earlier, Rakovski had already used the "bourgeois" concept of national self-determination to prove that the invasion of the Ukraine by French troops was "patently in contradiction with the principles advocated by President Wilson on the right of peoples to decide a future for themselves." On 26 February, he sent another note to the French foreign minister, expressing the Soviet Ukrainian wish "to conclude a peace treaty with all governments, but on condition that the French government stops regarding the Ukraine as a future colony for French capital, as another Madagascar, another Morocco, another Indochina." His message ended with these words, expressing both the Bolshevik meaning of self-determination and the purpose of Ukrainian diplomacy at the time: "Any agreement that would not take into account the full independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is doomed to failure."³ Rakovski here used the concept of freedom in relations between the Ukraine and bourgeois governments; but, when it came to relations between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia, he referred to the rule of necessity.

The Bolsheviks also knew how to make use of the independence of Ukrainian diplomacy in an "aggressive" way; a typical example is the ending of the Soviet-Polish war in the summer of 1920. In mid-August, when the first peace negotiations between Russians and Poles were taking place in Minsk, the Russian Delegation asked the Polish government to give full powers to their representatives to allow them to negotiate with Soviet Ukraine as well. To gain a few more days, when Soviet troops were still advancing toward Warsaw, on 16 August, Chicherin sent a telegram to the head of the Soviet delegation, Danishevski. He remarked that the Ukrainian representatives were the "delegation of the independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which is not part of the Russian Republic."⁴ Before entering talks with the Russian and Ukrainian delegations, the Polish delegates had to show a special mandate signed by their government. This was a diplo-

matic success in itself, since the Poles were driven to acknowledge an independent Soviet Ukraine, officially distancing themselves from their erstwhile ally, Simon Petlyura. Finally, the two representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet government, E. Kviring and Y. Kotsyubynsky, signed the Treaty of Riga on 18 March 1921, together with the Russian representative, A. A. Joffe.

Within a year, Rakovski tried to assert the independence of his government's diplomacy and to promote the Soviet Ukrainian Republic as an international influence.

From 1920 to 1923, the Ukrainian Republic signed several official treaties with Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Lithuania. Yet, these only reflected relations between Soviet Russia and Western Europe, as well as the beginning of political, diplomatic, and economic confrontation between the two blocs. The history of these official treaties has been written about at length; they are the external evidence of a profound hidden change.⁵

The official line of Ukrainian diplomacy was accurately described by V. I. Yakovlev, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Republic, in an interview in *Izvestiya* in August 1922:

As regards foreign policy, the Ukraine must have the same concerns as Russia, since it is, like the Ukraine, a proletarian state. Russia's heroic struggle against the imperialists, carried out with the Ukraine's full cooperation on every front, internal or external, is now changing into a diplomatic front, in the same close alliance. The Ukraine has an independent foreign policy, where her specific interests are concerned. But in matters of political and economic interests, common to all other republics, the Russian and Ukrainian commissariats for foreign affairs work as a joint federal body.⁶

It is remarkable that, two years earlier, the same Yakovlev had said, in a private conversation, that the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs was not in the least independent, it was merely "a department of the Central Committee."⁷ It follows that the Ukrainian commissariat was even less independent. Yet, the two commissariats were run by two very different persons, and contrary to Chicherin, Rakovski fought to assert and even add to his prerogatives.

Although both men had joined the Bolshevik party only after its victory in Russia in October 1917, the political influence they gradually acquired in the administration of the first socialist state is not comparable. The best evidence of this is their position in the hierarchy of the Russian Communist party; while Christian was a member of the Central Committee, the Central Executive Committee, and its

Presidium, as well as the leader of the Ukrainian Communist party (a member of its Politburo, CC, and CEC), Chicherin was never made a member of the RCP (b) Central Committee, and did not have any political responsibility. This was, in fact, the only sector of any importance in the Soviet Union, as even nowadays the government is kept under the strict control of the Party and is seen as a department of it. In any case, Chicherin had never been "political," as Trotsky pointed out in his notes on the "official head" of the Russian Soviet diplomacy. Before 1917, when he was secretary to the Russian Marxist organizations in exile in Western Europe, "Chicherin kept silent whenever we came to political discussions; he would only give factual information from time to time."⁸

Lenin's opinion of the new head of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs who replaced Trotsky was one of a "hardworking, extremely conscientious, intelligent, and a scholar." He added a significant comment: "Even if his weakness is lack of authority [*komandirstvo*] this is not a major defect. There are so many people on earth who suffer from the opposite."

Chicherin's disposition and unconditional acceptance of Lenin's directives are illustrated in an article he wrote in 1924, when the Bolshevik leader died; his repeated use of the words "carrying out," "subordinates," "precise," "accurate," is characteristic:

Working with Vladimir Ilich meant carrying out precisely the instructions he gave, which were always a response to actual facts, and were well thought out and accurate. . . . Vladimir Ilich, more than anyone else, valued those among his subordinates who had an overall grasp of a situation, who knew what to do in an emergency, and could apply a directive to the smallest detail, whatever the difficulty. . . . The exact application of a plan was the result of a careful study of the facts, and could be seen in matters of importance but also in lesser ones. This is what we have to learn from Lenin: giving the utmost care even to humble details, and displaying the greatest good will, combined with accuracy in the execution of a task.¹⁰

The sharp contrast between Chicherin's and Rakovski's characters, courage, and political gifts is shown in Chicherin's article entitled "To Lenin," which treated "what the young have to learn from Lenin," and was published in the same issue of *Molodaya Gvardiya* for which Rakovski wrote his highly theoretical "Lenin and Marx." He studied all the political differences that had separated him from Lenin up to 1917.¹¹ Although Rakovski greatly valued Chicherin's

diplomatic gifts, he could not help feeling somewhat scornful of his lack of political courage. He wrote: "Every time G. Vasilevich pulls his handkerchief out of his pocket, he has to send a report to the Politburo."¹² In 1921, Rakovski was determined to act independently in the Ukraine.

Toward the end of 1921, Rakovski expressed his deep-seated conviction of the need for the Ukraine to be granted real autonomy, and for practical solutions to be found. In a report to the Sixth Conference of the Ukrainian Communist party on 10 October 1921, (on the anniversary of the Russian revolution), he declared that "we must give more independence to Ukrainian organizations, especially those that are already united, for the simple reason that the other organizations are [already] independent."¹³ Lenin understood clearly the meaning of Rakovski's words and the new direction he was going to impart to relations between Kharkov and Moscow. The Bolshevik leader admitted a few months later, with a smile:

The Ukraine is an independent republic, we all agree on that. But . . . sometimes . . . let me see, how could I phrase it? Sometimes she tries to get around us, and we shall have to put this right. Over there, the people in charge are cunning, and, I would not go so far as to say their Central Committee deceives us, but somehow it keeps itself at a distance.¹⁴

The occasion of this outburst was a recent decision of the Ukrainian government in the field of external trade. It will appear below that it was also a direct consequence of Rakovski's desire to have Ukrainian diplomatic representatives abroad.

Early in January 1922, the Ukrainian Economic Council, under Rakovski's influence, voted a motion by which "trade agreements entered into by the RSFSR are not valid in the Ukraine."¹⁵ Two months later, the head of a British trade delegation to the Ukraine, Major Dunlop, reported to the Foreign Office that "the Ukrainian government seems set on gaining full control over its Commissariats, as in the case with the Commissariat for External Trade, which is no longer a branch of the Moscow one."¹⁶

In his report to the Sixth Conference of the Ukrainian Communist party, Rakovski stressed the fact that the Ukrainian Commissariat for External Trade had just received two large subsidies: one amounting to 15 percent (about 50 million gold rubles), and the other to 20 percent (about 20 million) of the federal reserves.¹⁷ He also announced that, from then on, he would insist, in Moscow, on keeping Russian and Ukrainian spheres of influence really separate: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria would be un-

der Ukrainian influence, while everything else would go to Russia. After an agreement signed early in 1922 by Rakovski and Krasin, the Russian commissar for external trade, the preferential zone for the Ukraine was Poland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Thus, the representative for Ukrainian external trade in Turkey was appointed as chairman of the Joint Ukraine-RSFSR Mission. There is little doubt that, between early 1922 and July 1923, when the constitution of the Soviet Union came into effect and Rakovski was dismissed as head of the Ukrainian Republic, the Kharkov government tried to assume ever-increasing responsibilities. It is therefore easy to understand the sense of relief that can be detected in L. B. Krasin's letter to his wife, dated 6 July 1923: he explains his satisfaction that Russia will again have the upper hand as a result of the new constitution:

I have just attended a sitting of the Central Executive Committee, and the new constitution of the Federal Republics' Union has been approved. The Union Commissariat has just been elected, and I am now Union commissar instead of Russian commissar. In the independent republics, I shall no longer deal with commissars, but with assistants.¹⁸

The year 1923 marked the end of an era of independence for the Ukraine, after three years of Rakovski's rule. Relations with the representatives of the American Relief Organization, established toward the end of 1921, show the degree of autonomy that had been achieved in particularly difficult circumstances.

In 1921, as we know, famine hit the whole of southern Russia, along the Volga Valley. The Ukraine was affected south of a line running from Razdelnaya (eighty kilometers northwest of Odessa) to Vosnesensk, Dolinska, Chigrin, Kobelyaki, Konstantinograd, and Kopiansk.¹⁹ Of course, because of war conditions, troop movements with resulting local food levies, and lasting instability in a country that had been a battlefield for over three years, Ukrainian peasants had found it increasingly difficult to till the land and supply cities.

Before World War I, the Ukraine had been the "granary" of Russia, since nine-tenths of all the cereals exported by Russia came from the Ukraine, which sent out also 230,000 head of cattle per year. Sugar production, amounting to 1,000,000 metric tons before the war, had dropped to 38,000 metric tons in 1921.²⁰ During the civil war, the various armies had requisitioned horses and oxen to pull their artillery and move their camps. They had also killed a large proportion of the cattle, either for food or as reprisals against rebellious villages and peasants. Between 1916 and 1921, the number of horses had dropped

by 47 percent in the Ukraine; cows and oxen by 43.25 percent; sheep by 46.25 percent and pigs by 18.25 percent.

If the agricultural yield had fallen sharply, it was due both to scarcity of animals for ploughing and to antiquated equipment and land implements, since they had not been maintained and no spare parts were available. The Ukrainian village, as seen above, lived in autarchy, many of the factories had been closed, and the blockade proved effective. So, while 50 percent of Ukrainian farms had used poughs before 1914, by 1921 only 25 percent did so; likewise, when 75 percent were equipped with harrows before the war, only 50 percent used them in 1921.²¹ Since wheat could not be transported to the towns, Ukrainian peasants, afraid of having it confiscated, began to cultivate a smaller area of land. While, in 1916, nearly half the acreage was under cultivation, (19,000,000 *desyatins*) the figure fell by 15 percent in 1921 (16,000,000 *desyatins*).²²

Now it so happened that a catastrophic drought devastated the Volga Valley in the summer of 1921, as well as the provinces of Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolaev, and the Zaporoshe region. Two-thirds of the wheat crop were destroyed, and, in the far south of the Ukraine, not enough grain was produced to allow sowing in the next year. In such circumstances, severe famine, together with mass epidemics, raged in the countryside. In the above mentioned regions, 20 percent of the inhabitants were in the grip of famine by January; the figure climbed to 31 percent in February, 34 percent in March, and 38 percent in April. Between May and April, the figure rose to 40 percent, that is to say 4 to 5 million people.²³ One of the most painful features of this phenomenon was the number of children who suffered. The numerous pogroms of Jews that had taken place in the Ukraine during the civil war, the shooting of workers and poor peasants who had supported the Bolsheviks and vice versa, and rich bourgeois and *kulaks* killed by the Bolsheviks for their support of the Whites had left thousands of children unprovided for. From statistics given to the Société des nations by the head of the Red Cross, the Ukrainian government, in the spring of 1922, had undertaken to feed up to 1,383,000 people, 783,000 of whom were adults and the rest children without families for the most part.²⁴

Toward the end of 1921, governments in several West European countries and the United States had become concerned about the situation and they had decided to offer aid to the starving populations. One year later, late in 1922, half of the hungry people could be fed; 523,824 by the Ukrainian government, and 1,298,658 by various foreign organizations. Among those, the commission set up by Dr. Nansen, the famous Norwegian explorer and naturalist, helped

more than 100,000 people in 1922.²⁵ Other bodies were run by U. S. and Dutch Mennonites who rescued, respectively, 45,000 and 21,000 Ukrainians, a substantial volume of aid came from the Czechoslovak mission, the Jewish Social Committee, and the German Red Cross. Some isolated examples were very moving; thus, the American Immigrant Union of Workers collected \$25,000 among its members, allowing thirty wagons of wheat, ten wagons of flour, and thirty wagons of medicines to be sent to the Ukraine.²⁶

The largest volume of aid came from the American Relief Administration (ARA), run by the to-be president of the United States, Herbert Hoover. Alone, this organization fed 1,132,660 people in 1922, that is, twice as many as the Ukrainian government. Yet, in spite of the grim circumstances, Rakovski showed his determination to defend his principles, especially that of national independence. Late in 1921, the representatives of the American Relief Administration came to Karkov. They had just signed an agreement in Riga with the Russian Soviet government and wanted it endorsed by the Ukrainian government. First Skrypnyk, then Rakovski categorically refused to do so on the ground that the Russian government's deeds and treaties were not binding on the Ukraine. In spite of the Americans' insistence that "they came to the Ukraine, not for politics, but to feed the starving," Rakovski refused to budge:

After magnanimously explaining the understandable ignorance of the ARA representatives about the Ukrainian status of sovereignty, seeing they came from a distant country . . . he asked them to make another draft, including the points of the Riga agreement and adding a few minor changes. To fulfill their promises, the ARA representatives added the following sentence: "We recognize that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is not concerned with the Treaty of Riga and its conditions are not binding on it. . . ." ²⁷

No further explanation is needed to demonstrate how much Rakovski insisted on Ukrainian independence in internal and external affairs. Moscow felt unable to protest, and foreign reluctance was overcome by Rakovski's inflexibility.²⁸ Rakovski would show the same inflexibility when it came to the question of Ukrainian embassies and legations abroad: they always had to be separate from the Russian ones.

In April 1920, Rakovski appointed his first diplomatic representative abroad, M. Levitsky, who was sent to Prague. Although the Czechoslovak Republic had recognized neither Soviet Russia nor the Ukraine, Levitsky established himself in Prague and was officially ac-

knowledged only two years later, when the two countries signed a temporary treaty.²⁹ Early in 1921, Vladimir Khristianovich Aussem was appointed Ukrainian envoy in Berlin. He proved very active and requested an equal status with Krestinski, the Russian representative there. He signed the first agreement with Greece on behalf of the Ukrainian SSR, for example.³⁰ His brother, Otto Kristianovich Aussem was appointed as representative of the Ukrainian Commissariat for National Education, first in Berlin in January 1922, then Prague.³¹ Last, in the autumn of 1921, a third Ukrainian diplomat, A. Shumsky, was sent as permanent representative to Poland.³²

The Ukrainian diplomats were very active, whether they were on the permanent staff or emissaries sent to negotiate. The first treaties signed by the Soviet Ukrainian Republic independently, were with Lithuania on 14 February 1921, with Latvia on 3 August 1921, and with Estonia on 25 November of the same year. Separate negotiations were conducted with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and also Italy, France, Germany and Great Britain. Before analyzing these relations, it may be useful to examine how Rakovski's government dealt with the Ukrainian émigré groups. It will be the background to Rakovski's relations with Western powers, especially Germany and France.

In the interview Yakovlev gave to *Izvestiya* on 13 August 1922, he declared that one of the most pressing problems the Ukrainain Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had to solve, was the émigré Ukrainian one. The question was to reduce the influence that nationalist groups, which called themselves the "Ukrainian National Government," still exerted in the Ukraine herself and in several European countries:

These improvised Ukrainian national republics which, for the last two years, have not controlled a single square meter of Ukrainian territory, were until recently represented in many European countries. To put an end to the claims of these adventurers was no mean task, but because both sides, especially the Western European countries, had to reestablish economic relations with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, they concluded treaties with us. This is how Petlyura's illegal government and his representatives ceased to be recognized.³⁴

Of course, the Soviet government, whether Russian or Ukrainian, was very concerned with "White Guards" agitation. However, according to the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) reports, these groups were in a sorry state by 1922 because of their financial difficulties, which were a useful weapon for Rakovski.³⁵

In a report dated 13 July 1922, the SIS agent in Vienna (who

got his information from a Ukrainian closely connected with one of the main émigré groups) divided the Ukrainian nationalist into four categories: First, the group of Archduke William, with an Austrian archduke as a leader; this group was on its last legs; the last subsidy received from Germany had been paid on 1 April 1922. Moreover, the archduke seemed personally skeptical of the success of an insurrection. "He only kept in touch with his sympathizers from afar, willing to take an initiative if conditions dramatically improved."³⁶ Second was Petlyura's group, which was "near financial collapse" by 1922. Among Petlyura's ministers, Nikovsky and Hieronimus had accepted positions in the Ukrainian Soviet administration, and Christopher Baranovsky had been appointed as a member of the Ukrainian trade delegation in Berlin. Petlyura's headquarters in Poland had been dissolved, for lack of funds, and his base in Bucharest had just been taken over by Skoropadsky. This next group—Skoropadsky's—was, in fact, the only one with any military value by 1922. It was in the position Petlyura used to have in the Ukraine, and was supposed to have a "military agency" in Chernovitsy. In Poland, Skoropadsky's representative was General Zelinsky, who was said to be "in touch" with the French Military Mission in Warsaw. In 1922, many thought that Skoropadsky would "try to cooperate with General Wrangel, to retain in the area of Budapest all the Ukrainians, who under these circumstances cannot enter Russia."³⁷

The two Vienna groups that, until 1922, had been separate looked now "as if they would merge," as the fourth group under the leadership of Yu. Kotsyubysky, head of the Ukrainian Soviet Mission in Vienna.

Trying to weaken the influence of these émigré Ukrainian groups, Rakovski decided to come to terms with them and gain their support. He selected the two groups with the most influence. The first was the Vienna group, the second was run from Paris by Markotun, the chairman of the "Ukrainian National Committee." In July 1922, a Ukrainian informer working for the British SIS reported: "The Soviet agents in Austria are nowadays engaged in active propaganda among the émigré and encourage them to return (to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic); Agapyev has recently received 1.5 million crowns to set up an office in Vienna for this work."³⁸ Rakovski's greatest success with the nationalist groups was undoubtedly in his relations with Markotun. It will be described later, since Christian made use of Markotun's group to get in touch with Poincaré.

The aims of some members of the French government and general staff were clearly outlined in a confidential conversation General Weygand had with the British ambassador, Lord d'Abernon, in Berlin, on

1 October 1922. Weygand wished "to divide [the old tsarist empire] into several independent units. . . ."³⁹ Western European countries would first enter the Ukraine, which is the most fertile region, and later would endeavor to civilize the other regions. The basis of Western trade must be the Black Sea and Odessa."⁴⁰

Thus, in 1922, France had not forgotten her 1919 plans for a "protectorate" in the Ukraine. These ambitions rested largely on economic reasons; as we know, before the Bolshevik revolution, French industrialists had invested large amounts of money in the Ukrainian mining and metallurgy industry, mostly in the areas of the Donets and Krivoi Rog. In January 1919, when the Directorate was still in power in the Ukraine, General d'Anselme, commanding the French occupation forces, had tried to safeguard French interests in the country. Colonel H. Freydenberg, his chief of staff, had got in touch with the Directorate, which seemed willing to make important concessions to ensure the continuation of French military support and technical aid.⁴¹ Talks began immediately, on 26 February 1919, a communiqué of the French general staff announced that a French-Ukrainian agreement had been drawn up "on the basis of joint action against the Bolsheviks." On the same day, Rakovski sent a note to the Allied Command, denouncing the agreement and declaring the treaties between France and Directorate null and void, since they were "wholly fictitious." He also showed his knowledge of the terms of the agreement that had just been signed, summing up the concessions made by the Directorate to France in this way: (1) France is granted a concession on the Ukrainian railways for fifty years. (2) The Ukraine promises to compensate France for the debts she inherited from the tsarist government and the Provisional Government. (3) The interests are guaranteed by the income of the railways, which will be allocated to the Ukrainian government. (4) The Directorate has to set up a 300,000-man army within a year. (5) The whole of the financial, commercial, industrial, and military policy of the Ukraine is under the control of French representatives from the day of signature of the treaty.⁴²

It was a kind of "protectorate" over all aspects of Ukrainian life, and a reward for military, financial, and moral aid from France. These plans came to nothing, however, because of the Directorate's military defeat in the following month (March 1919). Nevertheless, France continued to support the anti-Bolshevik forces, still active in the south of the old tsarist empire. This is shown in the belated recognition of the Wrangel government in April 1920, at the start of the Polish offensive in the Ukraine. Although the Poles and General Wrangel could not keep their foothold in the Ukraine, Poincaré's gov-

ernment did not forget the French interests in the country. So, two years later, at the time of the Genoa Conference (April-May 1922), partly intended to remedy the paralysis of the European economic system after the division between East and West, the French government's representatives outlined, in a secret conversation, a plan of economic aid for the Ukraine. The British experts (Sir Maurice Hankey and Sir Cecil Hurst) summed up their conversation with their French counterpart, Seydoux and Fromageot, in a letter to the Foreign Office:

The French think we should start with agricultural development in Russia. Until Russia can grow its own food, there is not much we can do to help her, since we cannot possibly feed such a large country.⁴³ The French idea—Mr. Seydoux implied that Belgium agreed—is to set up centers with tractors and agricultural implements to help peasants to improve their yield. He does not think it necessary to train peasants in agriculture; they only need the kind of aid which French farmers receive. He rejected M. Krasin's offer of agricultural land concessions: the French government wishes to start their scheme in the most easily accessible areas, and gradually to extend it further afield.⁴⁴ France could provide rolling stock and locomotives, which can be altered to fit the gauge of Russian railways. He also said they had just completed plans for rebuilding Russian railways. He mentioned an English-French-German trust in which Stinnes represents Germany. . . . There are also plans for rebuilding factories and reopening coal mines and oil wells. On the French side, however, the trouble lies in the shortage of capital. He admits there are large reserves in the world, a great deal in America, and quite a lot in England, Holland and Switzerland, but not much in France. He thinks there should be a joint venture with an international corporation or such like⁴⁵

At the time of the Genoa Conference, France had not given up her support of the anti-Bolshevik forces, which had a chance, although small, of replacing the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. Thus, while the British government would have nothing to do with émigré Ukrainian groups, Poincaré's government was much more friendly toward them.⁴⁶ The French, at the time, wanted at all costs to maintain their influence in the Ukraine. So it dealt in turn, (or simultaneously) with émigré Ukrainian groups that were more or less hostile to the Bolsheviks and, finally, with the Bolsheviks themselves. However, the

Genoa Conference, at which the Soviet government alone represented the old tsarist empire, marked a sharp decline for the émigrés.

One month before the conference, the French government was still involved with émigré Ukrainians, who had high hopes of the Soviet government collapsing under outside pressure. On 27 March 1922, the head of the Ukrainian Republic Mission in Paris, Alexander Shulgin, sent a private letter to Poincaré. He pointed out that "the recovery [sic] of the border states of the old Russian Empire, among them the Ukraine, is, from all points of view, assigned to play a dominant part."⁴⁷

In Shulgin's opinion, Ukrainian economic life could not be re-organized "while the ruinous foreign occupation lasts." He thought that Ukrainian peasants neither could nor would sow and reap, since they knew "Red troops would take their crops without paying for it." Shulgin ended his letter repeating the offer he had made to Poincaré in his previous one.⁴⁸ "The Ukrainian government is ready to make the Ukraine an international base for Western supplies, as soon as the Red troops leave our country."⁴⁹

These statements were interesting for the French government, but it was difficult to forget that the same promises made by the Directorate had come to nothing, because of the military strength of the Bolsheviks. This is why Poincaré had to contact less extreme émigré Ukrainian groups, which could open the way to negotiations with the Soviet Ukrainian government. On the other hand, Rakovski, as was seen above, had been introduced to some Ukrainian émigrés; he took advantage of his stay in Genoa for the conference to deal directly with Markotun, the chairman of the "Ukrainian National Committee in Paris."

Early in June 1922, émigré Russians were astonished to hear about the correspondence between Rakovski and Markotun, following on their meeting in Genoa. The step taken by Markon was regarded in Paris as "a complete turnabout" by the Ukrainian National Committee. It caused "deep consternation among anti-Bolshevik Russians, who had always regarded the Ukrainian organization as radically anti-Bolshevik."⁵⁰ The same people would have called it a betrayal if they had known the terms of the agreement drawn up by Markotun and Rakovski. The Ukrainian leader was willing to act as go-between with the Ukrainian Soviet government and the French government. As compensation, and in view of the Ukrainian Committee's acceptance of the Soviet regime as the only power to represent the Ukraine and exercise power, the committee "was allowed to become an officially recognized party and an ally of the Soviets."⁵¹

In London, the *Times* uneasily remarked that, if one looked

closely at some parts of the letters exchanged between Markotun and Rakovski, it became obvious that "the French government made no objection to this new development." The British newspaper went on to say that, "if some of it were realized, the French would become involved in the activities of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic."⁵² As for Markotun, he seems to have, on Rakovski's instructions, opened talks with both the French and the German governments. Competition between the two great European powers, in Christian's opinion, could only "lower the rate of interest" they would ask in exchange for economic aid. If we are to believe a report of the British SIS on Markotun's negotiations in the summer of 1922:

The Germans want to use the "White" Ukrainians who are well disposed towards them to bring about an understanding between the Ukraine and Germany. This would make it possible for anti-Bolshevik Ukrainians to take an active part in German plans for rebuilding the Ukraine under a Soviet regime.⁵³

Thus, Markotun was acting as a double intermediary and, late in 1922, a SIS report quotes a "frank" declaration he had made, confirming "the strong" impression he and his colleague, Navashin, gave of being "Soviet agents." The report ended with these words about the two men who were at the moment go-betweens in the talks between the Ukrainian Soviet government and the French government. Markotun was quite open about his activities in a letter he sent to Poincaré in early November. He tried hard to blacken Germany and praise a Russia "one and indivisible." "For four years, the Ukrainian Committee said that if the Ukraine is split from the rest of Russia it is because of the German general staff. . . . The Ukrainian people regard this situation as a shameful betrayal."⁵⁴

Since this letter was written on the eve of the Lausanne Conference, when France and Great Britain were in opposition on the question of the Straits and the Middle East, Markotun ventured to put forward a request that may have been suggested by Rakovski:

Work will soon begin for the conference to settle matters concerning the Middle East. . . . The Ukrainian National Committee is convinced that the French government, which has never missed an opportunity to protect the Russian national interests, will appreciate how important the question of the Straits is for Russia, and hopes that the French government will do its best to ensure that representatives of the Russian Republic are able to uphold Russian interests on the occasion of this conference.⁵⁶

Rakovski submitted this plea to the French because he knew full well how much France was concerned about the future of Russia and the Ukraine. It was about the time when negotiations started between France and the Ukraine for setting up a "Company for French-Polish-Ukrainian Trade," intended to reopen the Donets mines. Early in December 1922, French, Polish, and Ukrainian delegates presented their respective governments with an overall plan; on the eighth of the same month, Rakovski sent a message to Paris, announcing that the Ukrainian Economic Council had just approved the contract for the creation of the company above mentioned.⁵⁶ No news leaked in the press.

On the subject of this agreement, a well-informed member of the British Embassy in Paris, Eric Phipps, commented that there was no apparent obstacle left to prevent the development of trade between French and Ukrainian commercial firms. However, apart from problems of distance and delicate questions of commercial contract law, there remained a major obstacle. France could not provide the Ukraine with a long-term loan, since she was short of capital. Besides, as Eric Phipps wrote in his report to the Foreign Office, "the high exchange rate of the franc in relation to German, Czechoslovak, and Austrian currencies, made competition very difficult on the Ukrainian market."⁵⁷

These last barriers prevented the development of economic relations between France and the Ukraine. Four years later, when a journalist asked the general secretary of the Concession Committee, L. Perlin, what was the French share of capital in the recovery of the Soviet economy, the latter only answered, "a small one."⁵⁸

From 1920 to 1924, negotiations took place between the two countries to allow French industrialists to regain the part they had played in the Ukrainian industry before 1917. One instance is the Limited Company of Krivoi Rog Iron Ore. This company had been founded in 1881 with a capital of 9 million francs, which had later been increased to 13.5 million and finally to 38 million, divided into shares amounting to 500 francs each. The company owned the iron ore mines of Krivoi Rog in the Kherson province; it had expanded steadily until 1918, when work came to a standstill because of the decision of the Soviet government to nationalize all the mines.⁵⁹ After lengthy negotiations in 1923, a trial agreement was signed on 12 November by the company's representatives and the Russian Soviet government. It concerned prospecting and exploiting the iron ore and coal mines of the Donets Basin, as well as running a metal work factory and several machine tool plants in the Krivoi Rog area. The final agreement should have been confirmed within 100 days, but was

never signed, although fresh talks went on throughout 1924.⁶⁰ In the meantime, the Ukrainians had established diplomatic and economic relations with several European countries, especially with Britain and Germany.

The close relations that developed between Germany and the Ukraine were based on a common wish to cooperate in military affairs. As we know, according to the Treaty of Versailles, signed in June 1919 by Germany and the Allies, the Reich had to accept disarmament for the German army. To overcome this difficulty, the Berlin military establishment had come to an arrangement with Moscow, by which some military equipment would be supplied to Soviet Russia, and in exchange German pilots could train on Russian territory. German engineers would also reorganize production in Soviet armament factories.⁶¹ Undoubtedly, many of the concessions obtained by the Krupp factories were used in this way.⁶² Similar agreements had been entered into by the Ukraine, as the British consul to Chernovitz reported on 7 September 1922:

Many German officers are employed by the army, the air force, and some technical departments in Kiev. Most of them stayed on after German troops left the country, but there is a steady trickle of Germans coming in and they always find employment.⁶³

However, on the whole, the Germans tried "to do business" with the Ukraine and establish economic relations between the two countries. Already, air mail communications were established between Kiev and Berlin, and the British consul in Chernovitz remarked in his report that it worked "very well," a letter sent from Chernovitz via Kiev arrived in Berlin within three days.⁶⁴

Relations between the two countries were also strong in another field, national education. In an effort to assert its independence, the Ukrainian Soviet government sent for new teaching methods from Germany. As we know, Otto Kristianovich Aussem had been posted to Berlin by Rakovski in January 1922, and later in Prague as representatives of the Ukrainian National Education Committee. In the autumn of 1922, the Ukrainian Commissar for Education, H. F. Hrynko, went around Germany and Austria. Apparently, German teaching experts were very interested in the educational system of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, and Hrynko made a detailed study of German teaching methods.⁶⁵

To put relations between Germany and the Ukraine on firmer ground, Rakovski decided to draw up a separate economic treaty with Germany, as he tried to do later with Britain. On 13 August

1922, the deputy commissar for Ukrainian foreign affairs, Yakovlev, declared that "full negotiations" had started for concluding an economic treaty with Germany. The two sides were very eager, and he went on: "The Ukraine always imported industrial goods from Germany; as for Germany, she sees in the Ukraine not only a large market for buying raw materials, but also a country where it will be possible to invest capital on a large scale."⁶⁶

The future treaty between Germany and the Ukraine was probably similar to the one signed in Rapallo, on 16 April 1922, by Germany and Soviet Russia. It would, however, be wrong to assume that they would have been identical. Although Rakovski had been one of the most zealous promoters of a German-Soviet rapprochement, to such an extent that von Malzan called him "the spirit of Rapallo," Rakovski meant to adapt the terms to the Ukraine's specific needs.⁶⁷

On 31 May 1922, the German press learnt from "reliable sources" that talks between Litvinov and the German Foreign Ministry, "to extend the Rapallo Treaty to the Ukraine and Transcaucasian Republics," had been broken off. The reason for this failure lay in differences between the Russian delegate and representatives of the independent republics. Litvinov saw these negotiations as a mere formality for an extension of the privileges of the Rapallo Treaty to the independent republics; however, the delegates of these republics, and most of all the Ukrainian representative, wanted to reach a new agreement. The German communist newspaper, *Rote Fahne*, wrote that "V. Aussem, spokesman for the Ukrainian Republic, has just laid down conditions that are unacceptable to the German government. The Ukrainian government demands the 400 million marks, which had been claimed from Germany after the occupation, to be paid, in spite of the clause [of the Rapallo Treaty] stipulating the dispute had been brought to an end."⁶⁸

This request by Rakovski's government was apparently unexpected; it was a source of embarrassment for Litvinov, and on 1 June a German newspaper announced: "During the negotiations . . . representatives of the other Soviet republics, up to now, have tried to assert their economic and political independence from Litvinov, the Russian representative."⁶⁹ The journalist concluded that the moving force behind this opposition was the Ukrainian delegate. In such circumstances, Litvinov took drastic measures; he sent a telegram to Moscow, denouncing a "plot," and Chicherin was sent posthaste to Berlin. "The Ukrainian representative received a formal warning from the Russians, to inform him that he was by no means entitled to conclude a separate treaty with Germany, and that the Russian delegate was sole spokesman in these negotiations."⁷⁰

If Litvinov and, later, Chicherin failed to regain control and had not brought the talks to an end immediately, Rakovski meant to "use, as a basis for future trade transactions between Germany and the Ukraine," the sums demanded as reparations for the German occupation of the Ukraine and its requisitions in 1918. This idea was not surprising considering the shortage of capital that was the main reason for the slow growth of the Ukrainian economy and commercial exchanges with Western European countries. To try and remedy this serious impediment, Rakovski had already turned to Great Britain, and had even personally opened negotiations with British representatives.

Diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries started in January 1922, when a British trade mission under Major Dunlop arrived in Kharkov; it stayed for nearly two months. The major was received immediately by Rakovski, and sent this description to the Foreign Office:

Mr. Rakovski is known as a gentleman; at any rate he is very pleasant. He is highly civilized and very influential, as he probably is the only person of any standing round here. He is a relentless worker and finds time for writing articles for the press, mainly on agriculture. I am told that, when Lenin and Trotsky disagreed last year, Rakovski chose to side with the latter. Nowadays, he seems to carry out Moscow's instructions quite faithfully, although he is ultimately supposed to seek his own benefit [sic].⁷¹

From his first interview, the British delegate drew four main impressions: Rakovski insisted on his independence in questions of foreign policy; he wanted, on the one hand, to expand Ukrainian agriculture as much as possible and, on the other, to give a new start to industry; he also wanted to know how far Britain was prepared to go in granting long-term sizable credits to the Soviet Ukrainian Republic.

There is no need to dwell on the first point; let us only remember Major Dunlop's remark that "The Ukrainian government seems determined to exercise full control over its Commissariats."⁷² The second point, on agriculture, is more important. Given the catastrophic conditions of the Ukrainian agriculture in 1922, Rakovski foresaw a drastic change in cultivation. Since wheat was devastated by summer drought at regular intervals, he thought it imperative to encourage the culture of a plant that would be heat-resistant but as useful and nourishing as wheat, and could be harvested in the autumn. Christian knew the qualities of maize and millet, which were still unknown

in the Ukraine and Russia, from his years as a gentleman farmer on the estate his father had bequeathed to him in Mangalia. He found information on the subject from specialized books published by the University of Wisconsin, and he wrote a lengthy article published on the front page of *Pravda* under the headline, "Famine and Maize."⁷³ This article attracted Lenin's notice, and, three days later (17 October 1921), he sent the following circular to Krzizanowski, Osinki, Avanesov, and all members of the Council for Labor and Defense (STO; Sovet truda i oborony):

I would like to draw your attention to the article written by Comrade Rakovski "Famine and Maize," in the issue of No. 231 of *Pravda* [14.10.1921]. After reading it, I am sure you will agree that the concluding paragraph of the Gosplan subsection on the question of growing maize does not go far enough.⁷⁴

Lenin instructed the Council of Labor and Defense to study the matter of growing maize thoroughly, and find ways of getting peasants to grow it. Finally he ordered enough seeds from abroad to cover the whole of the Povolzhe region in the spring of 1922.

Rakovski brought up the subject in his conversations with Major Dunlop, asking whether Britain could supply agricultural machinery. As we know, there were serious shortages in this area. Shortages were mainly due to the weakness of Ukrainian industry, which could not recover because of chronic lack of capital. Of course, Rakovski's government had called on private investors; there had been a change in policy since January 1919, when the whole Ukrainian industry had been nationalized, in keeping with socialist principles, in the belief that a more rapid growth would follow. Since there was no capital to start with, in 1920, Rakovski decided not to run industry with trusts, but to have it under local government administration. He wanted to achieve a measure of decentralization, to come to grips with difficulties as they arose, and to ensure a better response to local needs. To tap the only source of capital available at the time, that is, private local capital, the government decided to rent out all enterprises, companies, and factories to private parties. From the report prepared in May 1922, for the second session of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Executive Committee, dealing with industrial problems, we can obtain the following information: "There are at present 54 provincial associations of 304 enterprises. Until November 1921, 703 Ukrainian enterprises were let."⁷⁵

The overall value of the annual production in enterprises farmed out to private people was estimated at 19, 750,000 gold rubles. Yet,

according to the same report, "because of inflation and temporary business difficulties in many of these enterprises, only a small percentage of this amount has been paid."⁷⁶ To improve the situation, twenty centralized trusts were created; their function was to keep in touch with the fifty-four provincial associations, and to organize conferences in Kharkov for discussions on matters of common interest.

Two of these conferences took place in the first half of 1922. Trusts and associations decided to work, not only for the Ukrainian market, but also for the whole Federation of Soviet Republics. However, since the Ukrainian Economic Council could not provide them either with credits or reserve capital, they could not deliver their goods to tradesmen (whether private or cooperatives) or to the state, unless they asked for immediate payment. In the circumstances, factories had to slow production down or even stop altogether, and the condition of workers became increasingly precarious. The report of the second session of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Executive Committee stated bluntly:

In almost all industrial sectors, workers' wages have dropped sharply in the last few months. The situation of those who are fed by the state has also fluctuated with the sums of money levied in food tax. The rate of the Soviet ruble in relation to prewar currency has been revised from time to time, by the Finance Commission. These figures show that, in real terms, wages are falling badly. Unemployment is very high in the Ukraine, and workers' living conditions are very difficult, especially those who live in areas hit by famine. There is no hope of any improvement before the next harvest.⁷⁷

Undoubtedly the situation was critical, both in agriculture and industry, with production plummeting.

There was one solution left to give a new impetus: foreign aid through trade concessions.⁷⁸ Rakovski approached this question in an interview with Major Dunlop. The latter wrote afterwards:

In answer to my question whether the previous owners had any changes of re-opening their factories, he said it was merely a matter of agreeing on terms. He added that any such agreement had to be negotiated with the Ukraine, because the authorities of this country regard themselves in no way bound by decisions made in Moscow. He gave me his permission to quote his words officially.⁷⁹

In his own words, Rakovski wanted to "deal directly with Great Britain," and he asked Major Dunlop to convey his query to Lord Curzon: "Would it be feasible to conduct relations between the Ukraine

and Britain on the same footing as those between Russia and Britain?"⁸⁰ This amounted to asking the British government to sign the same trade treaty with the Ukraine as the one that had been signed in March 1921 in Moscow.⁸¹ As a result of this treaty, Soviet Russia had been recognized *de facto* by Great Britain, and representatives had been exchanged to conduct diplomatic and business affairs.⁸²

During the interview, it was decided to send to Great Britain "a ship with a cargo of Ukrainian produce, which would be suitable for the London market."⁸³ On the other hand, the Ukrainian Foreign Trade Commissar, M. Bron, asked Major Dunlop for information on the price of some goods that might be imported into the Ukraine to relieve famine, especially herring. They also decided on I. Novakovsky, the official representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in Prague, to be in charge of negotiations between individual English firms and the Ukrainian government.⁸⁴

The last question to be examined by the Kharkov authorities and the British delegate was that of credits. Both sides came to the conclusion that the best way to remedy the shortage of capital, which slowed or even prevented economic expansion, was to set up an Anglo-Ukrainian merchant bank. A London banking trust showed interest in the Ukrainian market; it was financed by the prestigious Cunard Shipping Company.⁸⁵ Late in October 1922, negotiations started in London between members of the British External Trade Ministry (DOT, Department of Overseas Trade) and Cunard representatives, "on the question of setting up an Anglo-Ukrainian bank, in Berlin or elsewhere, which would finance commercial ventures in the Ukraine."⁸⁶ The Cunard representatives wanted exclusive commercial rights between Great Britain and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They meant to act as a go-between with British owners despoiled by the Russian revolution and the Ukrainian government; they also insisted on "all commercial offers to the Ukraine [by British firms] to be made through their offices." At the end of their talks with members of the DOT, the British businessmen added that "they would be extremely pleased if His Majesty's Government could sign a trade treaty with the Ukrainian Republic similar to the one entered into with the Moscow central government."⁸⁷

Another move they made was to require that an entry visa for Great Britain be granted to the Prague representative "to allow him to conduct negotiations in person with the Foreign Office."⁸⁸ On 8 November 1922, a temporary contract was finally signed by the British trust representing Cunard and the Ukrainian government. A company with a capital of £1,000,000 was set up in London "in order to give financial backing to a bank with a capital of 1,000,000

marks," whose offices would probably be in Berlin. According to the agreement:

The Bank will give credit to Ukrainian trade as regards imports as well as exports; it will also finance industry, agriculture, the transport industry and all enterprises connected with any sector of the national economy; it also undertakes to finance all banking operations necessary to the activities of the Bank itself.⁸⁹

Early in December 1922, visas were given to the Ukrainian representatives, Novakovsky, Sheiner, Rappaport, and Aussem, to allow them to come to London "to conduct negotiations prior to the creation of the Anglo-Ukrainian Bank."⁹⁰ V. Aussem's visa was easy to obtain, because he had already been in London in June 1922, to set up the "Company for Anglo-Ukrainian Trade," which was approved on 8 December 1922 by the Ukrainian Economic Council.⁹¹

The company had capital of £10,000; it had been credited to a London bank some time earlier. The Ukrainian Economic Council intended to obtain agricultural and industrial machinery through it, but also chemicals (mainly for leather conditioning), jute, and copra. The Ukrainian body concerned with purchases, was a cooperative called "Vukospilka," which dealt directly with the Anglo-Ukrainian Commercial Company whose offices were in London. Since the Ukrainian government could not pay cash for purchases made in Great Britain, they decided to supply raw materials in exchange: hemp, pig's bristles, sheepskin, wool, manganese, timber, either in the form of trunks or manufactured into pannels or casks, planks, etc. . . .⁹² It is remarkable that the development of these economic relations only served to strengthen Rakovski's autonomy from the Moscow central government in the area of foreign affairs. So, when Lord Curzon (in May 1923) threatened to cancel the trade treaty concluded two years earlier by Great Britain and Soviet Russia, Rakovski sent a conciliatory telegram to London. He commented on the "anxiety" that had filled the Ukrainian masses when they heard of the harsh British plans against the RSFSR, "an ally of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic." He added:

[The Ukrainian government] deems it necessary to draw the attention of the British government to the dangerous situation facing economic relations between the Ukraine and Britain, which have just been tightened through Ukrainian wheat exports to English ports; these relations will bear more fruit in the near future, and it is in the interest of both countries to encourage them. After the hardships of civil

war and foreign interventions, the Ukraine is today trying hard to restore its economy, and relies entirely on the peaceful disposition of the English people and the wisdom of its government, as evidenced in many diplomatic notes, to find a speedy solution to any misunderstandings that may have arisen between Russia and Britain.⁹³

Until July 1923, relations between the Ukraine and the outside world increased considerably.

Ukrainian commercial relations did not concern only the three large countries mentioned above. They soon expanded to several European countries, especially Poland. Toward the end of 1922, the Polish commercial attaché in Paris told his British colleague, Eric Phipps, "the volume of commercial exchanges between the Ukraine and Poland was now quite substantial."⁹⁴ It was the same with Italy, who bought tobacco from the Ukraine. Under conditions stipulated in a trade treaty signed on 26 December 1921.⁹⁵ a big shipping company, Trieste Lloyds, made regular crossings between Trieste and Odessa, which remained the main commercial port on the Black Sea.⁹²

As early as January 1922, the Ukrainian commissar for external trade decided that 10,000 tons of manganese and iron could be exported from Nikolaev each month, as well as 4,000 carloads of timber (mainly high quality oak).⁹⁷

The policy of concessions to foreign firms was also being developed. In August 1922, the deputy commissar for foreign affairs declared: "The Ukrainian government has received many offers in this area, especially from German settlers and large Czechoslovak enterprises."⁹⁸

Late in 1922, the Ukrainian government announced that the Ukrainian Transport and Industry Bureau was studying the setting up of a company for mining small and medium coalfields with the help of Western firms, and also the creation of a company for importing technical equipment.⁹⁹

In January 1923, in famine conditions, the newly established relations with the United States brought another development. A group of U. S. textile workers asked the Ukrainian Economic Council for permission to start production in one of the large abandoned textile factories. They soon received it, and were able to choose either a factory in the Poltava area or a plant in Odessa.¹⁰⁰

About the same time, Rakovski's government organized an exhibition in Kharkov, which "had great impact on Ukrainian trade."¹⁰¹ Two months later, in March 1923, a far bigger fair was opened in Kiev. Rakovski wanted to turn it into an international fair; it attracted forty-five Polish firms, ten Austrian ones, three from Swe-

den, one from France, and one from the United States. The goods in the exhibition were mostly tractors, engines, technical equipment of various sorts, office equipment, clothes, etc.¹⁰²

In June 1923, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist party put an official seal on the policy of the two previous years: a decree was issued requiring foreign companies to obtain permission to open offices or branches in the Ukraine from the Concession Committee run by the Ukrainian Economic Council. Any agreement signed before in Moscow was cancelled, and the various firms and trusts concerned had to ask for ratification of their agreement by the Ukrainian Economic Council within a month. If not, contracts would expire. This measure was the last the Ukrainian government ever took. A month later, it became inoperative, when Rakovski was suddenly forced to resign by the general secretary of the RCP (b), Josef Stalin. The new centralizing constitution of the USSR had just been introduced.

Rakovski's forced resignation was a direct consequence of his long opposition to Stalin, when the latter was commissar for nationalities and head of the RCP (b)'s bureaucracy. In July 1923, Christian was condemned to "diplomatic exile," where he would prove his skill throughout the 1920s.

Chapter 10

Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bureaucracy

To understand the increasingly divergent views of Rakovski and Stalin in the 1922–1923 period, let us examine the evolution of the Bolshevik ideology as regards concepts of internationalism, nationalism, and bureaucracy in the context of the world revolution.

With the defeat of the Red Army in the vicinity of Warsaw in 1920, an abrupt change occurred in the Bolshevik doctrine of spreading the revolutionary movement throughout the world. If the Russian Soviet government could not start a revolution in the Western European industrialized countries, it had to create the right conditions for the growth of a revolutionary movement in Asia, since these masses alone, because of their size, could sweep the world into the revolutionary whirlpool. In other words, many Bolshevik leaders, from 1920 on, came to the conclusion that they had to lay less emphasis on the need for violent action by the Western European working proletariat and more on persuasion tactics intended for the underdeveloped peasantry of Asian countries. Fundamentally, the Bolsheviks still considered the future of socialism in Russia and the countries which used to be part of the tsarist empire, in relation to world revolution. They imagined the progress of the revolutionary internal front as closely linked with the external one. Rakovski always remained loyal to this opinion and, as he wrote to Trotsky a few years later (1926):

I fully understand your point of view and I share it. "No home policy will be successful without an adequate program, sustained over a long period, for an international proletarian revolution;" Lenin had already summed up our revolution as the result of the theoretical and revolutionary experience of the international proletarian movement, to which was added the Russian experience of 1905, and he regarded it as the first episode of the international proletarian revolution otherwise the following will happen: capitalism will smother us. . . .¹

In 1918, Stalin had been one of the first to stress "the universal significance of the Russian revolution," to be seen in the creation of "a new revolutionary front embracing the Western proletariat and the oppressed peoples in the East through revolution."² Stalin showed

how great the problem to be solved was before the revolutionary front could advance. In those days, fresh thinking was needed if the movement of liberation that emerged among oppressed nationalities were to benefit the cause of revolution. Rakovski wrote on this subject:

In Marx's days, the question of nationalities was only a European problem, relating to the unification movements of Italy and Germany, or to the efforts made by the Poles to free themselves of the tsarist yoke. The nationality movement had not yet spread throughout Europe, and there was no question of Africa or India being affected by it.³

Lenin also acknowledged how complex the problem was; in November 1919, he told the representatives of the Second Congress of Asian Peoples' Communist Organizations: "You will not find a solution to these problems in any communist book."⁴ He gave them an original interpretation of the international significance of the national liberation movement, stressing how important was the fact that the masses in the East were becoming politically aware of their historical individuality and their independence. "This majority that, up to now, has remained outside any historical progress because it could not represent an independent revolutionary force, early in the twentieth century no longer plays a passive role."⁵

In Lenin's opinion, the Bolsheviks had to channel the national liberation movements that had developed outside the Soviet Federation, into the anti-imperialist struggle. "The days of the first awakening of the East to contemporary revolution," he said in 1919, "will be followed by days when the future of the world will be in the hands of Eastern peoples."⁶ Four years later, in the last articles he wrote, in March 1923, Lenin outlined the contribution the Eastern masses were making to world revolution:

In the last resort, the result of the struggle [between socialism and imperialism] will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, and China make up the overwhelming majority of the earth's population. In the last few years, with amazing speed, these populations joined the fight for independence. . . . In this sense, the full victory of socialism is a certainty.⁷

It was of vital importance to ensure that "hundreds of millions of Asian people" enter the course of history by following the path of the Bolshevik revolution. One way was open: to win the confidence of these peoples by showing them the progress made in Soviet Russia under the socialist order, as compared to capitalism. Obviously, the Eastern masses had first-hand knowledge of the sins of the "capital-

ist" powers; they would willingly turn to Soviet Russia, whose aim was to bring about the fall of the oppressors. Soviet Russia was "the only fortress that all the oppressed peoples could turn to in their fight for freedom."⁸

The Bolsheviks could offer the experience of their revolution to these underdeveloped peasant masses; this was already a departure from pure Marxist doctrine. Lenin had made "a revolutionary alliance" between workers and poor peasants. In the East, peasant masses were large enough to sustain a revolutionary movement. At the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist party held in Moscow in April 1923, the Soviet leaders, from Zinoviev and Stalin down to Radek, Rakovski, and Bukharin expressed their awareness of the importance of the Russian example for the Eastern peoples. Stalin declared: "The East looks to our united republic as to an experiment."⁹

On 30 April 1923, Rakovski wrote that the first socialist country had become an arena and training ground to coordinate the action of Communists drawn from every country in the world. But, the main thing was that the Soviet Federation must be a training ground "not only to learn a program, but also its application."¹⁰ He thought that nationalities outside the Soviet Federation, especially those who were becoming politically conscious, in China and India for example, would only trust the Bolshevik party if the latter proved its respect for national minorities, treating them according to socialist law.

He could only regret the fact that the October Revolution had not brought a solution to the problem of nationalities any nearer, as regarded the first socialist state. It only established certain conditions, "which should lead, after a long process, lasting perhaps not ten, but a hundred years, to the elimination of these national characteristics which had developed in the course of history, language, customs, local traditions. . . ." ¹¹ He declared at the congress that it was already the third time they had discussed the problem, and added: "The more we raise the question, the further we shall be from understanding the problem of nationalities and finding a communist solution to it."¹²

This shows the bitterness and disillusionment of a man who had supported the principle of a socialist federation of free peoples since the start of the century. In the Balkans as well as in the old tsarist empire, he had always thought such a federation would solve all economic, political, social, and religious conflicts between peoples. He could see now that, even in the framework of a so-called socialist federation difficulties remained, even if they were slightly different.

Inside the Party, opposition had grown between Rakovski and

Stalin in 1922 on this subject. On 10 August, the Politburo had ordered the Orgburo to appoint a commission that would make a draft on relations between the RSFSR and the other republics in time for the next session of the Central Committee. The Central Committee was made up of Stalin, Kuibyshev, Ordzhonikidze, Rakovski, Sokolnikov, and Molotov.¹³

In the autumn of 1922, when the commission met, Rakovski, on several occasions, raised the subject of the autonomous republics having to fight constantly not only for their prerogatives, but also for their very existence. There were numerous examples of Russian commissariats signing international agreements for the Ukraine, "while they have no constitutional right to do so."¹⁴ If central bodies were incapable of controlling their own excesses and their bureaucratic tendencies, there was no way of building socialism. Lenin had rightly called Soviet bureaucracy "an aristocratic and bourgeois remnant, baptized in communist water,"¹⁵ and he knew full well the nature of the "authentic Russian, the Great Russian, chauvinist, dishonest, tyrannical, the typical Russian bureaucrat."¹⁶ In April 1923, Rakovski told the XIIth Party congress that:

We deeply regret the absence of Vladimir Ilich for many reasons, one of them being the question of nationalities. We shall miss his leadership and his understanding of conditions at home and abroad, which could have shaken the Party into realizing that it was making dangerous mistakes on the question of nationalities. Comrades, this has serious implications for Soviet Russia and the Party. This is one of the questions, which, we have to admit it frankly in front of the Party congress, poses a threat of civil war, if we do not show enough understanding. It is the question of relations between the Russian revolutionary proletariat and the 60 million non-Russian peasants who, under their national colors, ask to participate in the political and economic life of the Soviet Union.¹⁷

Rakovski saw the need for reexamination of the concept of revolutionary internationalism in the light of national liberation movements. In his opinion, the difficulty lay in "finding common ground between our proletariat, communist internationalism and the national consciousness of large peasant masses striving for an independent life in which they could express their national culture and have their own government."¹⁸ He was afraid this alliance might be now impossible to achieve, not because the revolutionary proletariat could not combine respect for national minorities with an ideal of internationalism,

but because three "reactionary" factors were at work to separate nationalism from internationalism: the aggressive force of Russian nationalism, the oppressive Russian bureaucracy, and finally the gap becoming more and more visible between the theory and practice of socialism in Soviet Russia. Rakovski insisted on this point, which seemed to explain everything else, "the split which is widening every day between, on the one hand, our Party and our program and, on the other, our political apparatus."¹⁹ Bureaucracy is our major danger, he added:

The trouble is that our central organizations are now considering the running of our country from the point of view of administrative convenience; of course, it is not easy to govern twenty republics; they say, if they were grouped together, we could govern the whole country at the touch of a button. This would be really convenient."²⁰

Rakovski was drawing on Lenin's last political considerations, his famous *Testament*, the publication of which had been prevented by Stalin, but which was well known by party members attending the Twelfth Congress. The Bolshevik leader blamed Stalin, Dzerzhinski, and Ordzhonikidze for their brutal handling of Georgian Communists, who had shown their preference for real national autonomy. Lenin knew what consequences these methods would have, inside as well as outside the Soviet Federation. Such a situation, he said, could "raise doubts as to our sincerity in calling for a fight against imperialism. Tomorrow will be precisely the historic day when peoples who were oppressed by imperialists up to now will rise and start the long, hard struggle for freedom."²¹

Lenin saw the need for winning the trust of nationalities. To achieve that, "it was better to go too far in the way of accommodation and gentleness . . . than not far enough." These were his recommendations:

We must in no way be averse to retracing our steps, . . . that is to say, maintaining the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics only in the area of military and diplomatic matters, and handing back full and complete independence to individual commissariats. . . . We would be guilty of unforgivable opportunism if, on the eve of the East rising, and in the early days of its awakening, we weakened the prestige we enjoy in their minds by committing violent deeds or taking unjust measures toward our national minorities.²²

Bearing this in mind, Rakovski told the Twelfth Congress, "We must take nine-tenths of their prerogatives away from the Commis-

sariats of the Union, to give them to national republics.”²³ He refused the “Council for Nationalities,” as advocated by Stalin, and suggested creating a “Council of States,” to be entirely different. He also objected to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, which would soon become the most powerful constitutional body of the Soviet state, playing, until the 1936 constitution was put into effect, the part of central executive power.²⁴

In 1923, Stalin thought that the central task of the Communist party was to “strengthen workers’ power;” all other problems had to be subordinated to this, among them the development of national aspirations. As early as November 1922, Stalin had argued against Rakovski’s suggestion of creating a second chamber in which national minorities would be represented. Such an organization, Stalin said, “would not be to the taste of national republics, if only because the two-chamber system is not compatible with a Soviet government, at least in its present stage of development.”²⁵ A few months later, in February 1923, Stalin had to accept the principle of two houses of parliament under pressure from Lenin and a few other Bolshevik leaders. The Council of Nationalities was set up and became official in an appendix to the Soviet constitution. In fact, Stalin was still in a better position than his opponents, since the council was unchanged from the one he had created in April 1921, that is to say, under direct control of the Commissariat for National Affairs, which he ran. The only change was the addition of deputies from the three independent republics.²⁶

Nobody was taken in by this device, and Rakovski foresaw the decay of the Communist party, and a threat to the very future of socialism. He warned the delegates to the Twelfth Congress: “I have to admit, seeing how passive Party members are, especially the Russian ones, during debates [on nationalities] . . . I can only tremble for the future of our Party.”²⁷

His doubts were confirmed when the centralizing constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was adopted (July 1923) and a federation was set up, instead of the confederation he had hoped for; but Rakovski showed his customary political courage. He declared:

If centralization means all powers being concentrated into one central body, and the popular masses turned into docile instruments that can only carry out orders from central government, if centralization means doing away with initiative, economic, political, and administrative independence, if centralization means the dead hand of centralized bureaucracy, synonymous with tyranny, then, of course, there can be no greater enemy of Soviet power than centralization. Soviet

rule means drawing working masses and, through them peasant masses into the country's political life. But if this is the privilege of a handful of people, then it goes without saying that the laboring masses will never share in the running of the country, and Soviet leaders will forfeit their main support. Communists have to fight such centralization with staunch determination.²⁸

In these words, Rakovski showed his will to fight the emergence of Stalinism. He contrasted his solution of "democratic socialism" with the "bureaucratic centralism," which the general secretary of the Party was gradually imposing. This meant the disappearance of the latter's opponents among top leaders. At the Twelfth Congress, Enukidze, who was at the time close to Stalin, was the first to attack Rakovski. He declared: "Comrade Rakovski, in his embattled stance [in defense of national minorities], has shown more punch than the whole Caucasian lot."²⁹

If we are to believe Trotsky, early in 1923, Stalin started "plotting" against Rakovski. At the time, the Party general secretary, who had gained an enormous influence, was undoubtedly the master in "distributing jobs, allocating key positions at his whim." He had become "the undisputed ruler of Russian bureaucracy."³⁰ Between April and May 1923, Stalin, under various pretexts, demoted several leaders of the Ukrainian Communist party, who were devoted to Rakovski, to replace them with his henchmen. Very strong pressure was also exercised on the Ukrainian Party to force it to relieve Rakovski of his responsibilities.³¹ So, only two months after denouncing the ideas Stalin succeeded in imposing on the Russian Communist party, and his methods for "building socialism in one country," Rakovski was abruptly dismissed. He did not wish to expose any dissensions among communist leaders, so he merely said, "I am very sorry to leave the Ukraine."³²

On 6 July 1923, the second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved the new constitution and instituted the United Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. On the same day, the London *Times* announced the appointment of Christian Rakovski as representative of the Soviet government in London, to replace L. B. Krasin.

Now more than ever, Rakovski had first-hand experience of arbitrary power. He realized the extent of Stalin's power; above all, he realized that the general secretary would employ all available means for administrative pressure and repressive action to defeat his political enemies. As he wrote to Trotsky in 1928, he saw in it the main cause of Bolshevik party decay:

Interfaction quarrels were the first consequence of the erroneous methods employed in running the Party, that is, the practical disappearance of all safeguards that are necessary to the very existence of the Communist party as a party of the working classes. . . .³³ The reason for all this is that the ruling clique has lost sight of Lenin's doctrine on government, especially the dictatorship of the proletariat.³⁴

This strong condemnation of the Stalinist system reveals how Rakovski saw the fundamental principle of socialism: observance of Marxist tenets, colored by internationalism, and awareness of the democratic vocation of European socialism coupled with the recent experience of the Bolshevik revolution led by Lenin.

Chapter 11

Relations between Soviet Russia and West European Governments (1921–1922)

The Political Context

1. General Implications

The year 1921 marked for the Soviet Republics the turning point between the period of war, intervention, and civil war, and the apparent lull of peaceful recovery that followed. In fact, the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the “bourgeois” governments of Western Europe was only to switch from open warfare to secret political moves, propaganda, and diplomacy by conference. Two antagonistic principles were locked in a struggle to maintain or destroy the political and economic order of Europe as it had hitherto prevailed.

a. Importance and significance of the problem.

For Germany which had to accept the Treaty of Versailles, as for Turkey which was submitted to the harsher Treaty of Sèvres, the new settlement imposed on them by the Allies appeared to have been built upon their spoils. Both countries had been effectively excluded from the realm of European diplomacy; Germany could proclaim that it was as much the target of French attacks, as was Turkey the victim of British policy. In consequence, and inasmuch as they found themselves in a disadvantageous position that the “victors” had created and would not remedy, Germany and Turkey were bound to turn eastward in the direction of the Soviet Republics. There loomed the one potentially powerful state whose avowed aim it was to resist the hegemony of the Entente powers, and to challenge it whenever possible. In March 1921, the *Russian Press Review* knowingly proclaimed: “Soviet Russia is the only stronghold to which all those who are oppressed and who do not wish to remain slaves may look for help.”¹

Change in Europe was also made possible by the fact that the union of the wartime Allies began to break down almost as soon as the terms of the peace treaties had been agreed on. France and England, although they sought to reduce friction by constant compromises,

repeatedly found themselves in opposition in the West as much as in the East because of the fundamental divergence of their traditional policies and of their actual economic interests.

In 1921, the economic channels that had existed between tsarist Russia and Western Europe had been blocked by eight years of war, civil war, misgovernment, and the general depression that had ruined the economic balance of Europe. In March of that year, the conclusion of peace between the Soviet Republics and Poland coincided with the proclamation by Lenin of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and with the signing of the first commercial agreement between Soviet Russia and a "bourgeois" power: the Anglo-Russian trade agreement.² In the spring of 1922, the Genoa Conference convened by the European powers witnessed the efforts made by the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, to come to terms with Soviet Russia, after France had blocked the talks on the German question and refused to try and negotiate with the Bolsheviks.

To maintain the balance of power on the continent, but also to resume, increase, and accelerate her commercial exchanges, Britain could hardly submit herself to what she considered as the "negative" policy of France. For a long time, indeed, the latter stuck to the terms of the Versailles Treaty and insisted on implementing a strict policy of "security and relations" in regard to Germany. On the contrary, it was in Britain's interest to conceive a more "active" policy that implied a rapprochement with the Soviet Republics and with Germany. If the British scheme might have contributed to relieving the European economy from its paralysis, it excluded the participation of France, which had grounds to feel itself dangerously threatened by such an initiative.

At the gate of the Near East, Britain and France were again at loggerheads, this time on the question of Turkey. France was working for a rapprochement with the nationalist Turkey of Kemal Pasha, while Britain, on the contrary, supported the weak shadow Sultan in Constantinople. To strengthen her position, France could easily conceive that her interest lay in the creation of strong links between herself, Turkey, and the Soviet Republics. Yet, such a plan meant a direct threat to the British Empire and to Great Britain. A strong Turkey might help to block the road to the oilfields, the Near East, and India.

Both the French and the English realized the drastic implications which each of the two plans might have if it came to be implemented. In each case, it was not so much the rapprochement between Britain and Germany on the one hand, or between France and Turkey on the other which could tip the scales for the worse. In 1921, these

rapprochements were partly carried out. Danger would come if Russia succeeded in joining either one of the two groupings.

Analysis of the Genoa and Lausanne conferences, of their context and of their implications, will show us a most interesting diplomatic game of chess.

After the end of the Civil War and of foreign intervention, the Soviet Republics feared Europe much less and thought they could gain much through diplomacy. The immediate aim of Soviet diplomacy was to divide the "bourgeois" governments of Europe by attracting those who found themselves in a disadvantageous position, or those who badly needed to trade with the Soviet Republics. In the instructions which he wrote on the eve of the Genoa Conference, Lenin stressed the need for Soviet diplomacy "to defend Germany and Turkey."³ It was clear that the strength of the industrial proletariat in Germany as much as the surge of the nationalist movement in Turkey presented strong revolutionary potentials. It was also clear that, to try and better their positions, these two countries would constantly sway between East and West, and enter with the Soviet Republics into what Lord D'Abernon called an "unholy intimacy."⁴

At the same time, the Soviet leaders could not forget that their country was in complete economic chaos; thus, while telling bourgeois diplomats how much they distrusted them, the Bolsheviks could not help looking with envy on the technical advance of Western Europe and wondering how they could use it to their profit. Rakovski summed up these thoughts when he declared in a pamphlet written on the eve of the Genoa Conference:

When in connection with the Genoa Conference, diplomats begin to talk of economic restoration, we must understand that this does not prove the sincerity of their intentions. . . . We must not forget that we actually find ourselves in a period of war.⁵

In his report to the Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b), Lenin stated in a key lower than that of Rakovski that the question of the Genoa Conference was "not, say, one of war because that term is likely to be misunderstood, but at all events one of rivalry."⁵ The Bolsheviks' tone was set. It was useless, Lenin claimed "to play a hide-and-peek" game with the capitalist countries because every Russian peasant and worker knew very well that he had fought throughout the hard years of the intervention against those countries which had failed to vanquish him." The bourgeois governments had put the Bolsheviks to the test, "not the test of words . . . but the test of the bludgeon."⁷ In the same speech, Lenin warmly congratulated Trotsky

on the call for vigilance that the latter had issued after hearing of the proposed Genoa Conference: "Let every man of the Red Army know all about the diplomatic game and what is meant by force of arms, which, up to now, has decided all class conflict."⁸

Lenin, however, realized that the years 1921-1922 were the first in which the Bolsheviks were given the possibility of devoting all their efforts "to the real, main and fundamental task of socialist construction." They would go to Genoa not as Communists, but as "merchants" for the practical purpose of expanding trade and creating the most favorable conditions for its successful development on the widest scale.⁹ The Soviet government was determined to strive for practical compromises with Western European countries: its aim was to get the much-needed machinery, techniques, and experience from various "rival" countries who would be allured by the advantages of concessions.

b. The question of concessions and its impact on the inner life of the Bolshevik Party (1922).

Proposals for concessions to foreigners were made in Soviet Russia as early as the summer of 1918, when the council of People's Commissars appointed a commission to consider the conditions of which these might be granted to capitalist industrialists. The project was practically abandoned during the Civil War; a new decree was adopted on 23 November 1920, in which it was stated that the rate of recovery of the Russian economy could be "increased many times over" by bringing in foreign firms or institutions "for the exploitation and the development of the natural riches of Russia."¹⁰ Very soon, the introduction of NEP facilitated the policy of concessions by removing many practical and psychological obstacles inherited from war communism. At the time of the Eleventh Congress in March 1921, Lenin did not hesitate to declare that, in order to get the help from the West necessary to start the engine of Russian economy, he was ready to give extensive concessions "to the most powerful imperialist syndicates"—for example "a quarter of Baku, a quarter of Gronzyi, a quarter of our best forests." To oil and timber concessions he also added large concessions of iron ore.

On the eve of the Genoa Conference, however, the bolshevik leader was careful enough to make it clear in his speech to the Eleventh Congress that "the retreat had come to an end." He considered that the Soviet government had already made so many compromises in its domestic policy with the introduction of NEP that it was vital to prevent all attempts at economic intervention by foreign capitalists. Indeed, officials of the British Foreign Office considered that it

was vital to prevent all attempts at economic intervention by foreign capitalists. Indeed, officials of the British Foreign Office considered that, if a number of foreign enterprises were introduced into Russia and if, at any rate at the beginning, a special jurisdiction guaranteed the personal liberty of the staff working on these enterprises, "little oases of civilization would flourish." The argument ran smoothly in its boundless naivety and ignorance of bolshevik principles: as these enclaves would compare favorably with their communist surroundings, Russian public opinion could easily agitate for an extension of the system throughout the country.¹¹ As will be seen later, the Bolsheviks were quite ready to take the necessary steps to prevent such an eventuality.

Yet, at that time, a great part of the devoted communist rank-and-file and the high-ranking party members who had formed the so-called Workers' Opposition in and around 1920 accepted with great difficulty the policy of internal and external concessions imposed by Lenin upon the Party.¹² They felt that such concessions were a breach of promise to the proletariat and that it would prove very difficult to put limits to such indulgence toward counterrevolutionary forces. Lenin duly admitted to the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922 that "considerable nervousness, almost morbid anxiety" was observed in Party ranks whenever the question was discussed.¹³ As an example of the discussions taking place on that issue at the top rank of the Russian Communist party, we can take the "very secret" report of a meeting the delegates to the Genoa Conference attended in the Kremlin on 10 February 1922.

At this meeting, the Political Commission consisted of Krasin, Rakovski, Litvinov, and Ioffe; the Commission of Trade Unions comprised Shlyapnikov, Sapronov, and Rudzutak; Mdivani, Narimanov, and Khodzhaev formed the Federative Commission; and last, a Conciliation Commission was composed of Lenin, Chicherin, and Zinoviev—the latter in an advisory capacity (he represented the Third International). The longest and most heated debates were on the subject of concessions. The opposition argued that the proletariat of the world had not yet become sufficiently imbued with the knowledge of the needs of the class struggle to start making such concessions. In these circumstances, any important concessions made at the Genoa Conference "to enlist the sympathy of the bourgeoisie and to find a basis for negotiations would be detrimental to the interests of the Communist program." On the insistence of the opposition, it was decided that, at Genoa, "all projects of concessions would be dropped."¹⁴ This result was mainly due to Rakovski, who was backed on this issue by Shlyapnikov and Kollontai. As a British secret report on Rakovski

tells us, the latter was

before the Genoa Conference . . . the candidate of the left or Workers' Opposition then opposed to the granting of concessions to Europeans in Russia, for the chairmanship of the Russian delegation at Genoa in opposition to Lenin and Chicherin.¹⁵

This information is certainly reliable, as Rakovski's position on the question of the Genoa Conference differed to some extent from that of Lenin.

It is important to recall, first of all, that Rakovski was not a member of the Workers' Opposition at the time of the heated discussions on the trade unions in 1921.¹⁶ He had then signed the Trotsky-Bukharin platform, which had been submitted to the Tenth Party Congress and had opposed both the platforms of Lenin-Zinoviev and Shlyapnikov-Kollontai.¹⁷ On the other hand, we know that Rakovski had always belonged, since the Revolution, to the left wing of the Party. At the Eighth Party Conference in December 1919, he had advocated for the Ukraine a complete and immediate socialization of the economy; he had then been attacked by Lenin on the grounds that such an action would alienate the Ukrainian peasantry.¹⁸ In the same way, the introduction of the NEP had not been an obviously desirable step for Rakovski because of his strict ideas on socialization and on the mobilization of labor by the state: he fully backed Trotsky on this last point.¹⁹ In one of the articles that he wrote at the death of Lenin, Rakovski used a very revealing expression in connection with NEP for it tells much about the kind of relationship that had developed between the two men. He wrote: "Lenin *explained to us* [F.C.] the so-called New Economic Policy."²⁰

Rakovski showed that he was consistent with himself when, after admitting the need for domestic concessions under the pressure of the "master," he opposed the policy of concessions to foreigners. At the beginning of 1922, he proclaimed, with the greatest emphasis, a point of view that remained that of a revolutionary rather than that of a "merchant." He summed up the relationship between the Soviet Republics and the capitalist countries of Western Europe on the eve of the Genoa Conference with the words:

Our whole problem is to hold, not to count on a loan, on credits that might come after the Genoa Conference. We must not forget we are still passing a phase of a revolutionary epoch; we must turn to ourselves to find remedies for our own ills; we ourselves must fight the famine and the breakdown of our system of transport; and we must make our

Red Army even stronger because this army is our only support. If this opinion, if this realization supports us as well in the future as in the past, economic agreement will soon be reached. The entire question rests on self-restraint, on continuing our struggle, on keeping up our fighting mood.²¹

These last words explain much of Rakovski's psychology and the reasons that urged Lenin, although their views sometimes diverged, to make of him one of the leading, if not the leading, Soviet diplomat in Western Europe during the 1920s. In a letter he wrote to Chicherin on 7 February 1922 on the subject of the impending Genoa conference, the bolshevik leader insisted on the necessity of adopting a policy that would be supple yet stick to communist principles.²² Rakovski's resolute opposition to easy compromises with bourgeois governments was to be used by Lenin. Indeed, the latter had known for years that he was very strict where matters of principle were involved, while he remained remarkably supple and kept all his urbanity and personal charm. Thus, on the eve of the first general meeting between the Bolsheviks and Western European political leaders at Genoa, Rakovski appeared as the right person to prepare the ground. Before dealing with this particular problem, and to try to give it its real scale and significance, we must consider the view on the Soviet Republic of three major European countries: Germany, Great Britain, and France. For his part, Rakovski considered that the time had come when the Soviet Republics would have "to face the greatest trials: most important of all, two systems of government, different in principles and in aims, will face each other at Genoa."²³ In this trial, Germany was to be extremely useful to the Bolsheviks: to lure Germany away from the Western Powers was to break the "united front" of bourgeois imperialism.

2. German-Soviet Relations (1918-1922)

We know that the road that eventually led to Rapallo was a "clandestine path," which had been carefully shaded on both sides from all forms of publicity.²⁴ Indeed, the possibility of surreptitious trade with the Soviet Republics must have dawned on German minds as soon as the ink had dried on the Versailles Treaty. When Great Britain concluded her trade agreement with Soviet Russia in March 1921, Germany felt secure enough to move openly toward Soviet Russia: the German-Soviet trade agreement was signed two months later on 6 May 1921. The first official representative of the Moscow government—N. N. Krestinsky—arrived in Berlin at the end of October 1921, followed by Stamonyakov (the trade representative) and by envoys such as Krassin, Radek, and Smilga. By January 1922, it was

publicly known that some German companies intended to specialize in the economic restoration of the Soviet Republics. In the first days of that month, one of the directors of *Wirtschaftsstelle für Handel und Industrie in der Osten* gave an interview to the newspaper *Rul'* in which he provided considerable information about the projects of the trust he represented.²⁵ The trust comprised banks and commercial and industrial undertakings; it included representatives of the technical and scientific institutions and of the principal organizations of the German trade unions. Specialists were to be sent to various districts of the Soviet Republics, and adequate chambers of commerce were to be formed. The first task was to reestablish railways and motor transport in Russia, as this was essential to import necessities and to reestablish normal conditions in the country. Negotiations were proceeding to this effect with the U. S. banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Co. for the formation a German-American fund of £62,500,000. Conversations had started in Moscow with Chicherin and in Berlin with Krassin. In his interview, the director of the trust summed up the situation with the words: "Our object is to bring about the restoration of Russia with the aid of German economic forces backed by American capital and supported by our labor organizations."²⁶

German-Soviet relations were certainly not limited to economic considerations, for both countries realized how much they could gain if they presented a common front in the forthcoming negotiations with the former Allies. On 16 January 1922, Lord D'Aberon informed Lord Curzon about the scheme they were putting on foot for the Genoa Conference:

German industrialists propose to arrive at some kind of arrangement with Moscow for reciprocal support at the Genoa Conference, which will be the first at which both the Germans and the Russians will be present. . . . The idea is that Germany and Russia will stand side by side as the two countries most oppressed by the Entente and will back each other up in the obtaining of advantages.²⁷

A few days later, D'Aberon warned the Foreign Office about the progress of the rapprochement: he made it clear that conversations were to be held shortly and that they would be "of a preliminary nature."²⁸ The reaction of the Foreign Office was one of incredulity: P. M. Roberts, who annotated D'Aberon's telegram in the Northern Department, considered that the Germans were "unlikely to achieve anything on a big scale except hand-in-hand with us."²⁹ Thus, many British officials ignored the details that Sir Basil Thomson—the director of intelligence at Scotland Yard—transmitted to Sir Robert

Vansittart on 20 February 1922:

It was suggested that the Soviet people should put forward at Genoa such pro-German arguments as the Germans dare not put forward for themselves. . . . At the German F.O. a secret agreement was arrived at under which 100 million gold marks was agreed to, and this is now in force. The big industrial firms are each to provide its quote of the goods on credit.³⁰

If such an achievement suited German plans for economic recovery to perfection, it excluded the participation of either France or England, and gave Germany the best part of the Russian market. "Victors" and "vanquished" being equally ruined after the Great War, both had to try and find a quick and effective escape from the economic chaos that seemed to threaten them. In Britain, Lloyd George was determined to win the day and ready to go far on the path of compromise.

3. British-Soviet Relations: A Brief Survey (1921-1922)

Putting aside the too obvious and fundamental conflict with Soviet Russia, Great Britain accorded *de facto* recognition to the latter in signing the trade agreement of 15 March 1921. This was considered by both the British and the Russians as a capital "preliminary agreement" for the resumption of peaceful trade and commerce between the two countries. The preamble of the agreement made it clear that this represented only a first step, "pending the conclusion of a formal general Peace Treaty between the governments of these countries by which their economic and political relations shall be regulated in the future."³¹ The two words "political" and "economic" were pronounced in a formula that implied that the agreement as such was not complete. For Britain as for the other "bourgeois" countries of Western Europe, the problem was to know whether a mere trade agreement would be sufficient to allow commercial exchanges to develop without any sort of political bid.

In itself, the first move made by Britain for an economic rapprochement with Soviet Russia represented a distinct victory by the British prime minister and the Board of Trade over the staunch resistance by Curzon and Churchill. Lloyd George commented sarcastically that the latter had in fact remained personally "obsessed by the defeat inflicted on his military projects by the Bolshevik armies."³² For his part, he considered that "it would be folly not to help Russia to return to the community of European nations," for he realized that "the restoration of European trade and business was impossible without bringing Russia into the circle."³³

Already on 11 January 1922, Lloyd George had received a telegram from the British trade union leaders and many personalities of the Left, which stated very clearly:

Eight million of organized British workers realizing the close connection between the decay of British trade with the consequent dangerous growth of unemployment and the Russian exclusion from the comity of nations strongly urge full recognition of the Russian government by Britain, preferably jointly with Allied Powers, otherwise alone.³⁴

The prime minister was obviously impressed by the argument, at a time when the threat of a general strike in the summer of 1920 was still fresh in all minds. If, taking into account the growing rate of unemployment, the British government did not take any serious measures, Lloyd George sincerely feared that there could be in the near future "such a revolt among the working classes that no government could withstand it."³⁵

To prevent Great Britain from suffocating economically, he decided at the end of 1921 to take two radical steps that, in his mind, were bound to rescue the European economy from its paralysis: to switch the emphasis from the German problem to that of Russia, and to recognize the Bolshevik government. These two moves would inaugurate an era of peaceful relations between European countries that would lead, in its turn, to a rapid development of economic exchanges. Not everybody was convinced by the ideas of the prime minister as the following example will show us.

From Capetown, the prime minister of South Africa argued with Lloyd George in 1922 that to deal first with Russia and not with Germany was "to begin at the wrong end." He added: "We must deal with Germany first. The immediate future of Europe depends on Germany and not on Russia."

He considered that Germany meant "infinitely more to European unity and restoration than Russia" and that, moreover, Russia was "politically and economically an almost insoluble problem today."³⁶ While many British politicians hesitated to recommend that their government should concentrate on one country rather than the other, the essence of the solution they proposed remained the same. In January 1922, Chicherin, with much insight, defined it to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (CEC): "The triumph of English statecraft is to enter into alliances with new historical forces for the purpose of rendering them harmless. The present representative of this traditional art in England is Lloyd George."³⁷

The choice lay between either rendering Germany "harmless" by

including it in the League of Nations and adopting a more lenient attitude toward reparations, or recognizing *de jure* the Soviet government and developing trade relations with it as much as possible. While the insistence of the French government on a strict implementation of the Versailles Treaty blocked all immediate solution of the German problem, Lloyd George placed his hopes on a more complete agreement with the Bolsheviks.³⁸ Economic arguments played then a considerable part in the decision of the British prime minister.

Reports from his closest advisers and personal secretaries such as E. F. Wise, Edward Grigg, or Hilton Young reminded him that European Russia alone was as large as the rest of Europe and its population nearly half that of the continent. Before the war, Russia exported primarily to European countries: the Russian export of wheat averaged some 4 million tons, a quarter of the exportable wheat of the world; half of the timber imported into the United Kingdom came from Russia; two-thirds of the flax required in Europe was supplied by the same country; half the world's output of hemp was grown in Russia. British businessmen knew that practically the whole of Russia was still engaged in occupations not competitive with their industries, but were necessary and complementary to them. Thus, the two great advantages of developing economic links with Russia were that trade with that country was "a question of revival and not of creation," and that its recovery would "create a customer and not a competitor" (as opposed to reviving similar links with Germany). In brief, the "Easterners" around Lloyd George were convinced that "it was quite hopeless that a plan of reconstruction of Europe could have any chance of success unless it included Russia."³⁹ This latter country had the capacity to produce; it only lacked the tools.

Lloyd George, however, was too experienced a politician to believe that trade could solve problems without a true settlement of the political question. To start with a purely economic agreement in the absence of any valid political settlement was not only starting from the wrong end, it meant preventing economic exchanges from gathering any real momentum. A foreign capitalist whose properties had been nationalized by the Bolsheviks could hardly be expected to invest his capital again in large enterprises if he was not sure of a return. He would not rebuild a factory or a railway if he did not feel secure about both the internal and external security of that country. Lloyd George knew this perfectly well when he explained to Austen Chamberlain the reason why trade had failed to develop between Soviet Russia and Britain, although the road appeared to have been opened by the trade agreement of 1921.

Trade is largely psychological and, as long as you have po-

litical unrest in Europe, the trader won't send his capital out into the weather. It is therefore the basis of any policy of trade restoration that peace in Europe should be firmly established.⁴⁰

In the practical steps they envisaged, members of the Foreign Office considered that internal security had to be achieved by setting up a "proper judicial system" within the borders of the Soviet Republics; this was considered as "an absolute prerequisite to trade."⁴¹ For Lloyd George, external security could only be obtained through the official recognition of the Soviet government; this would guarantee the security of the Soviet borders. J. D. Gregory—the head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office—summed up the thoughts of a great part of British business circles when he wrote:

Capital can only be introduced into Russia on its own conditions, and these conditions are political rather than economic. The economic disorder is the result of political disorder and the remedy must therefore be political.⁴²

France, however, saw the Russian problem in a different light, the more so that the leading French politicians held very different opinions on this controversial subject.

4. The British-French Negotiations Concerning Soviet Russia (December 1921-January 1922)

When, early in January 1922, Lloyd George and Briand met at Cannes to discuss the problems of Germany and of Russia, the *Times* correspondent described with clear-sightedness the relationship that existed between the two prime ministers and the links each had with his own government in regard to the Russian issue. He wrote:

France has been utterly opposed to any steps that may be taken in regard to Russia which imply any recognition of the Soviet government. . . . Mr. Briand, who is much more closely clutched by his government than is Mr. Lloyd George by his, will be compelled to treat perhaps too delicately for the liking of his protagonist of the Prinkipo proposals.⁴³

It is certainly true that Lloyd George acted with little consideration for his colleagues when he virtually forced the cabinet to accept *de jure* recognition of the Soviet government as a possibility at the heated session of 16 December 1921. Then the British prime minister had obtained "a free hand" to examine, in his forthcoming conversations with Briand and Loucheur at Cannes, not only the problem of German reparations, but "all aspects of proposals for the economic reconstruction of Russia subject to possible conditions, e.g., recognition

of Russian debts, the control of Russian railways and customs, and diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government." However, as the secretaries of state for the colonies (Winston Churchill), for India (Edwin Montagu), and for foreign affairs (Lord Curzon) had had strong reservations, it was agreed that, "before diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government was agreed to, the Cabinet should be consulted and that, in the meantime, ministers were in no way committed."⁴⁴

For his part, Lloyd George had been fully convinced by the claim that L. B. Krasin had made to him in their conversation of 16 December 1921. The Soviet representative in London had argued that "there could be no serious economic arrangements and even no significant commercial exchanges with Russia as long as the Soviet government was not officially and definitely recognized."⁴⁵

Lloyd George had replied that he "fully understood the importance of these arguments but foresaw that France would make difficulties." Indeed, Briand was still opposed to the idea of negotiating with the Bolsheviks. In April 1921, in a long conversation with Lord Hardinge, he clearly stated his point of view about the strike movement that was spreading in Great Britain and Hardinge reported to Curzon in a private letter that

[Briand] said that he had long regarded the present situation in England as bound to arise owing to the P.M.'s dealings with the Bolsheviks and playing with revolution. . . . He had no doubt whatsoever that Bolshevik money has played an important part in the present strikes, for it was the aim of the Bolsheviks, above all others, to create a revolutionary movement in a country such as England. . . . He said that he had more than once spoken to the P. M. quite strongly on the subject.⁴⁶

A few months later, however, Lloyd George agreed in a conversation with Krasin "to try and convince Briand that it was necessary to enter into discussions with Russia." It was, he felt, vital not to give the impression that "perfidious Albion, having sacrificed its anti-Bolshevik principles, is merely interested in pinching the Russian market."⁴⁷ To this effect, the British prime minister considered that parallel discussions between Sir Robert Horne, Loucheur, Rathenau, and Krasin should start as rapidly as possible: the aim of the talks would be "to define more concretely the means and possibilities of work in Russia."⁴⁹

At the end of December 1921, a gathering of important industrialists and bankers from England, France, Italy, Belgium, and Japan met in Paris under the chairmanship of the French finance minister,

Loucheur. They set the basis of a European consortium for which an investment of £20 million sterling was foreseen. At the Cannes Conference, the Supreme Council of the Allies declared that it approved of "the establishment of an International Corporation . . . for the purpose of the economic reconstruction of Europe," which meant for a great part the reconstruction of the Soviet Republics.⁴⁹

Briand was in favor of the scheme and seemed convinced by the policy of appeasement toward Russia as expounded by his British colleague. He agreed to the proposal that Russia should be invited to a general "Economic and Financial Conference" at Genoa.⁵⁰ On the golf links of Cannes, Lloyd George led Briand on from strictly economic to political considerations. He carefully stressed the fact that equality had to be accepted as much by the Western Powers as by the Soviet Republics in regard to the problems of security and mutual noninterference. As a proof of their loyalty, the French and British prime ministers agreed that, if the Soviet government accepted and respected these conditions, they would recognize it *de jure*. Lloyd George stated with great emphasis:

We should make it clear to Russia that we can only trade with her if she recognizes the honorable obligations of every civilized country—namely, that she should pay her debts. . . . If we insist that Russia shall not attack her neighbors, we must also insist that her neighbors shall not attack her, and if the conditions under which trade alone is possible involve the recognition of the Soviet government, then that also should be done. . . .⁵¹

After the approval of the Cannes resolutions by the French premier, it seemed as if a European peace settlement was in sight. The British-French Alliance appeared to have been renewed through the fostering of eventual collaboration with Soviet Russia. On the other hand, Franco-German collaboration seemed more securely established after the Wiesbaden agreements of October 1921, whose purpose was to bring France much needed reparations through a share in the output of an expanding German industry. The official recognition of the Soviet government and the development of economic exchanges would have completed the circle. Chicherin described the political situation very accurately when he declared to the All-Russian CEC on 27 January 1922 that

to the policy of bullying Germany, Loucheur opposed a policy of utilizing Germany as an economic ally in developing the economic wealth of France. Thus business-like policy of Briand and Loucheur harmonized at Cannes with the pol-

icy of Lloyd George and made possible the calling of the International Conference.⁵²

In the event, by the time the conference met at Genoa in the spring of 1922, the French and British attitudes toward Soviet Russia were further apart than they had ever been. In France, Poincaré had replaced Briand as the head of the government.

5. The French Attitude toward Soviet Russia (1921-1922)

The French attitude toward Soviet Russia was certainly a strange one. On 9 January 1922, the correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph* cabled from Cannes that he had found French public opinion "aghast" at the ease with which Briand had acquiesced in the conference with Russia and the possibility of an almost immediate recognition of the Bolshevik government.⁵³ The Cannes resolutions of 6 January stated unequivocally that

in order to secure the conditions necessary for the development of trade in Russia, the Russian government demands official recognition, the Allied Powers will be prepared to accord such recognition only if the Russian government accepts the foregoing stipulations [on noninterference].⁵⁴

Less than a week later, after a stormy session in the Chamber of Deputies on 12 January, Briand handed in his resignation and that of his government. He refused to stake his political future on the Russian issue and felt that French public opinion was not yet ready to back the move he had just made. The French deputies demonstrated that they were not at all willing to allow the Soviet government any important political concession in exchange for problematic economic advantages. They argued that France was far less dependent on trade than Britain. The latter country seemed overindustrialized and mainly lived on its overseas trade; the stifling of commercial exchanges could lead to permanent pools of employment. The French population, on the other hand, lived to a considerable extent on the products of the land and was, as Lloyd George himself put it, "more than occupied in restoring the devastation of the country."⁵⁵ The cautious behavior of French businessmen could also be understood after the Bolsheviks had confiscated their properties. Thus, Briand quickly realized that only a few people would back him in his last move, and the president of the republic, Millerand, less than others.⁵⁶

Millerand's attitude toward the Soviets is well known. In a confidential interview, he told a U. S. journalist that he had warned Lloyd George long ago against "pursuing a phantom in Russia."⁵⁷ He considered that the most pressing need was to conclude a Franco-British

pact that would frustrate all possible machinations on the part of Germany or Soviet Russia, or of both countries together. This was exactly the policy that Briand's victorious opponent Poincaré was advocating, notwithstanding the paradoxes of his position vis-à-vis Britain and Soviet Russia. Lloyd George, however, would not hear of it as he wrote to Lord Derby in February 1922: "As you know, every group except the groups behind the government is hostile to a French Pact and even amongst our supporters there is growing distrust of French policy."⁵⁸

Poincaré, for his part, continued to proclaim that British-French cooperation was "the cornerstone of peace in Europe." He admitted, however, that he did not consider it possible that "England and France should be always of the same opinion": it so happened that on the problems of Germany and of Russia "he held one opinion and Lloyd George another"; he "stuck to his opinion about reparations and Versailles," and thought in doing so that France remained "logical and consistent throughout." On the other hand, the French premier admitted that, on grounds of security, he saw as one of the advantages of an agreement with Russia the fact that there would be French traders "all over Russia." This would present an excellent opportunity "to watch the German proceedings there."⁵⁹ Thus, Poincaré made the link between the Germans and the Russians, whose actions it was vital to watch. At the same time, he showed he was conscious of the advantages that trade with Soviet Russia could represent. It should not be forgotten that, oddly enough, he was one of the first French politicians to advocate a cautious rapprochement with that country. While he was still out of power in July 1921, he admitted in his articles in the *Revue des deux mondes* that it was high time for the French government to adopt a clear attitude toward the Bolsheviks instead of wavering perpetually between an aggressive policy that had failed and inaction that would prove sterile. He concluded his notes with these words: "Si le monde ne nous écoute pas et si, malgré nous, il va à Moscou, devons-nous éternellement nous lamenter sur le bord du chemin? La temporisation n'est pas une politique."⁶⁰

Many of the French businessmen who had had interest in Russia before the October Revolution certainly agreed with Poincaré, and were incensed by the inactivity of their government. Jacques Bardoux (a close friend of Poincaré) told the same U. S. journalist that the Frenchman in the street was convinced that Lloyd George's main objective was "to monopolize Russian oil and oust the French and Belgian concession holders."⁶¹ All these reasons urged Poincaré to make overtures to the Soviets or at least to listen more carefully to

those they were making. Already, in an interview of 24 July 1921 to *Humanité*, Chicherin had tried to tempt the French government, which was still led by Briand. He argued not without humor:

I do not think that France will gain anything by sulking in her corner. . . . The choice morsels will go to England. . . . If the French do not get them, let them call Clemenceau and Millerand to account. In the Bible, Mary, who did nothing, received everything, while Martha, who did everything, got nothing. In our poor world, it is the contrary that happens. If France remains inactive, she will have nothing.⁶²

As was to become their wont, the Soviets were offering a bargain: in exchange for political advantages, they would be ready to grant economic advantages to France. Chicherin insisted that the Soviet government refused "to alleviate for the French capitalists the burden of the mistakes of their own governments," and concluded the interview with the words:

Let the French government change its attitude towards us, and we shall welcome with open arms all the French merchants and businessmen who offer us serious deals. But we will do nothing as long as the plans of the French government remain what they are.⁶³

Throughout the interview, Chicherin clearly urged Briand to make a move toward Soviet Russia, indirectly hinting at the first contacts that had taken place early in June 1921. As the French government still refused to have any official dealings with the Bolsheviks, Krasin had then sent a note to Briand through the intermediary of a French industrialist, Mr. Maréchal.⁶⁴ The next day, Mr. Maréchal went to the Quai d'Orsay, where he was told that the government would not change its attitude until the Bolsheviks pledged themselves to reinstate or compensate the French bondholders and property owners and to refund the prewar debts. Under these conditions, no compromise could even be thought of. Nevertheless, the Soviets continued to make proposals to the French government until secret talks were initiated on the eve of the Cannes Conference. In a telegram of 18 December 1921, Karakhan (who was then the Soviet representative in Poland) informed Lenin of his conversations with two representatives of French business circles, who apparently hid under the pseudonyms of Max and Panafe.⁶⁵ Lenin was quite anxious to know how closely their views corresponded with those of the French government. Krestinski began secret talks with the French ambassador in Berlin, and, on 27 December, Lenin asked Chicherin and Litvinov if they thought that "additional conversations would be

necessary.”⁶⁶ These conversations are confirmed by the confidential statement the German foreign office received at the end of December, to the effect that “a French Commission has offered to recognize the Soviet government on the condition that Russia recognizes the Versailles Treaty and all Russian debts to France.” Russia could then demand “compensation in accordance with the Versailles Treaty and indemnify France out of amounts payable by Germany.”⁶⁷ This proposal was certainly made to the Soviets by the French representatives; we shall see that this became one of the arguments the Soviet delegation at Genoa used in order to frighten Germany into signing the Rapallo Treaty. In December 1921, however, the French were reluctant to come to a separate agreement with the Soviet government: they had already criticized the British government for doing so by signing the Trade Agreement of March 1921.⁶⁸ On 6 January 1922, the day on which Lloyd George and Briand agreed at Cannes on the possibility of official recognition of the Soviet government by Great Britain and by France, an official announcement appeared in *Le Temps*: this was a *pieux mensonge* that denied the persistent rumors that “negotiations had started between France and the Russian Bolsheviks.”⁶⁹

6. Rakovski's Views on Soviet Diplomacy and His Secret Missions to Western Europe (January-February 1922)

On 22 January 1922, Lenin gave the order “to hasten Rakovski's arrival in Moscow and his departure to Prague.”⁷⁰ This marked the real beginning of Rakovski's career as “the ambassador of the Revolution.” His knowledge of the weak points of the bourgeois governments⁷¹ made him the best person to apply the celebrated Soviet tactics of “playing off one power against another, if not in the political, at least in the economic field.”⁷² Lenin said over and over again,

We must be clever enough, by relying on the peculiarities of the capitalist world and exploiting the greed of the capitalists for raw materials, to extract from it such advantages as will strengthen our economic position—however strange this may appear—among the capitalists.⁷³

To this key principle Lenin added a recommendation to which he attached the greatest importance in his “Draft of Directive for the Vice-President and All Delegates to the Genoa Conference”: “be the first to take the offensive.”⁷⁴ The bolshevik leader himself decided to take the offensive through his Ambassador Rakovski.

At the beginning of February 1922, Rakovski stopped in Berlin for a few days before proceeding to Prague. Lenin had asked him to explore the ground as much in the direction of France as in that

of Germany,⁷⁵ and to use the information and the contacts of L. B. Krasin and K. Radek (who were then in Germany)⁷⁶ to write a general report on the attitude of France, Great Britain, and Germany towards the Soviet Republics. On 2 February, Rakovski sent to Moscow a long confidential memorandum in which he expounded his scheme for "an economic and political union between Germany and Russia, combined with political alliance between these two powers and Turkey, and treaties between all three and France."⁷⁷

In Rakovski's eyes, this combination would enable the Soviet Republics "to enter the family of the Great Powers."⁷⁸ The first problem he had to tackle in Berlin was, of course, that of German-Soviet collaboration.

The first instruction Rakovski had received from Lenin was to try and secure a loan of 300 million gold marks from Germany.⁷⁹ This was part of the tremendous effort the Bolsheviks were making to stabilize the ruble. At the end of 1922, Lenin was to declare to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International:

What is really important is the problem of stabilizing the ruble. We are now grappling with this problem, our best forces are working on it, and we attach decisive importance to it. If we succeed in stabilizing the ruble for a long period, and then for all time, it will prove that we have won.⁸⁰

In January 1922, the Soviet government had already obtained a temporary credit of 200 million gold rubles from the Elberfeld Bank to buy machinery and locomotives.⁸¹ Rakovski considered that it was vital to strive for other successes, and mainly for political successes, for he considered that such loans "would always be consumed like straw."⁸² In fact, the first impressions that he got from the German-Soviet situation were bad: late in January, Radek had appeared in Berlin and had "surpassed even his own record in stirring up trouble."⁸³ He had told German representatives that France was urging Russia to come to a general agreement with her, and had quarrelled with Rathenau when he urged the latter to start a counteroffensive that ought to include a substantial loan and the establishment of diplomatic relations.⁸⁴ Rakovski saw Rathenau⁸⁵ and used all his diplomatic gifts to clear up the mess. He was not particularly hopeful of a German-Soviet rapprochement in the immediate future, in view of Germany's exhaustion and inability to provide the cash resources that the Soviet government needed so much. In the longer run, however, the Soviet Republics, in his view, would find no great difficulty in establishing closer links with Germany because of the isolated position both countries had in Europe and because

of their complementary economic interests. Rakovski personally considered that the real difficulty facing the Soviet Republics in their efforts to escape from isolation was that of securing a fruitful collaboration with a great power such as France or Great Britain. If the Soviet diplomats succeeded in making terms with either of these two powers, he felt certain that the collaboration by Germany "would follow suit."⁸⁶ He seemed perfectly right to think so, and to combat Chicherin's pro-German tendencies.

In mid-January, the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, had informed the British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, that Germany appeared to be "anxious not to take any step with regard to Russia which might conflict with view of H.M.G."⁸⁷ As the rapid conclusion of the German-Soviet trade agreement of May 1921 had shown, Germany would not lag behind in the event of a British advance to the Soviets. Yet, Rakovski did not favor a British-Soviet rapprochement as Litvinov openly did. Or, rather, this represented his second card. He believed that the interests of the British Empire and of the first Socialist state were so divergent that, if they met, it would only lead to "a long and protracted struggle, for life, or death."⁸⁸

When the first sign of reconciliation between Great Britain and Soviet Russia had been made public, Rakovski had declared in a speech at Sebastopol on 16 April 1921 that:

Our latest victory is the conclusion of a Trade Agreement with England—up until now the very soul of the coalition. The change came because we have proved to the entire world that our victorious Red Army will frustrate all attempts on the part of foreign capitalists to choke Soviet Russia by force of arms.⁸⁹

In the memorandum he wrote to Lenin on 2 February, Rakovski argued that a combination of compensating alliances between Germany, Russia, Turkey, and France would defeat the British plan for an economic rapprochement between Great Britain, Germany, and Russia.⁹⁰ It is important to note that he was also right when he guessed that the latter plan was that of Lloyd George, who was to become the real "father of Rapallo." In a letter he wrote to Lord Derby on 18 February, the British prime minister admitted he was "genuinely anxious" at the idea that he was forced to envisage a scheme that "would alter the whole European situation": "It would be fatal if Italy and ourselves were driven into making arrangements with Russia and Germany on a commercial basis with France opposing."⁹¹

Rakovski did not favor the British plan because he interpreted

it as an exploitation of Russia "by allowing Germany to prepare the way for English capital." He was convinced that this last combination would necessarily be "to the advantage of Britain alone." In a conversation with a German Socialist—a conversation obviously meant to be overheard by both the French and the British governments—Rakovski explained in great detail the reasons why Russia was endeavoring to make friends with France, whereas France had no intention of facilitating the task. To the usual economic reasons, Rakovski added strategic considerations, which always had an important place in his thinking. He argued that the Soviets wanted to be absolutely sure of their Western frontier for, he said:

France can influence Poland, Rumania and Turkey. We are not quite comfortable about Central Asia and Siberia. If we could spare several corps from our western front we could put things straight in the east and settle with some tiresome fellows there. As long as France is hostile we daren't take troops away from the western frontier, owing to her influence with our Petite Entente neighbors.⁹²

Rakovski admitted to the German Socialist that "negotiations with France had not got very far." He then defined Millerand's attitude, which was "very hostile to Russia and . . . violently against the Quai d'Orsay," which was "anxious to come to terms" with the Soviet government.⁹³ While he was in Berlin, Rakovski strove to make contacts with French journalists and businessmen, and, at the beginning of February, he finally met an "envoy" of Poincaré. This intermediary, who did not reveal his name, was in fact Jules Sauerwein, the well-known journalist who wrote in the Paris newspaper *Le Matin*.⁹⁴ Active talks were started until they were apparently, and inadvertently, sabotaged by Radek. On 17 February, *Le Matin* published an interview in which Radek "revealed the talks with the French government" and made "untimely" attacks against Britain.⁹⁵ Chicherin was incensed by Radek's action, which he denounced to Lenin as a most serious "blow to Soviet diplomacy." Lenin fully shared the indignation of his commissar for foreign affairs and concluded: "Radek has proved once again in this case that, notwithstanding his numerous qualities, he is absolutely not suited to be a diplomat."⁹⁶ In fact, it seems that Poincaré played a rather tricky game all through these negotiations with the Soviets. Already on 13 February, when he felt that the talks between Sauerwein and Rakovski could not be conclusive, he covered his retreat and possible leaks by instructing his ambassador in London, St. Aulaire, to inform the British government of the "persistent efforts by the Moscow authorities to open negotia-

tions with France." He then made a late show of sincerity, which did not cost him much by adding that "no action would be taken unless in conjunction with Great Britain."⁹⁷ In this way, he could expect a similar "honesty" on the part of the British government.

We see that at this time each of the four countries was playing a double game: Lloyd George and Poincaré were trying to outwit one another, while the Soviets were striving to play off France against Britain, and Germany against both countries. Poincaré proved consistent when, on 1 April 1922, he publicly declared to the Chamber of Deputies that "representatives of the Soviets have tried different avenues of approach to the French government, and have sought to make contact with it separately from and without the knowledge of its Allies."⁹⁸ To make sure that the British government had not missed the hint, *Le Temps* printed long extracts of the premier's speech three days later.

The Soviet government realized that they had been duped all along and voiced their resentment through Chicherin. As soon as the letter arrived in Berlin on 2 April to begin the negotiations that led to the Rapallo Treaty, he published a strong denial of the supposed intention of his government. He took care not to refute the fact that there had been negotiations between Moscow and Paris, but rejected most emphatically any suggestion that these talks were directed against France's allies. In doing so, he was obviously trying to outwit Poincaré at his own game of denouncing secret talks once these had failed. He declared with his usual sense of humor that "it was not through the medium of veiled ladies but through officials of French Missions and through well-known members of Parliament that Russia proposed to France to enter into negotiations."⁹⁹

For the sake of completeness, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs should have added that another important intermediary between France and Russia had been the European statesman whom Lord Curzon ironically called "the eternal go-between," Eduard Beneš.

At the beginning of February, Rakovski had had a long interview with Beneš in Prague which had no positive outcome. Rakovski's aim was to try to learn more about the attitude of the Little Entente toward Soviet Russia in connection with the forthcoming Genoa Conference, and about Beneš's impressions of the possibility of a rapprochement between France and Soviet Russia.¹⁰⁰ The Czechoslovak minister remained very much on the defensive throughout the interview because of his lack of enthusiasm for either the Bolsheviks or the Genoa Conference. Indeed, Beneš was "not disposed to be optimistic" about a gathering of the European powers, which seemed to him premature, and all the more so if Russia were invited. He person-

ally suggested to the French and the British governments a meeting beforehand to reach a "preliminary agreement between the European powers chiefly interested in the future of Russia." Beneš argued that:

Before the Germans and Russians appear at Genoa he would like to see an exchange of views between Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and the countries of the Little Entente so that a possible agreement might be reached on the policy to be put before the Soviet representatives.¹⁰¹

Beneš considered that the British government should confine itself to economic questions, and that there should be no undue haste in granting *de jure* recognition. This was not very much to the taste of Lloyd George who, for his part, doubted the practicability of an earlier conference and favored *de jure* recognition before the Genoa Conference. However, the Czechoslovak foreign minister succeeded in persuading both Lloyd George and Poincaré to meet at Boulogne on 26 February 1922.¹⁰² By that time, however, the French and British plans had very seriously diverged. Poincaré had a "maximum program" which also was that of Millerand. Their idea was to work for a Franco-British pact of guarantee, which would have to be concluded before the Genoa Conference to impress both the Germans and the Russians: the ex-Allies would thus constitute a common front of creditors, and prevent Bolshevik endeavors to reach a separate agreement with either France or Britain. Such a plan could not satisfy Lloyd George, who preferred not to exhaust Germany, and to establish some sort of stable relationship with the Bolsheviks so as to develop trade.¹⁰³

A. The Time of Conferences

1. The Genoa Conference (10 April-19 May 1922)

By this time, it was clear that France would do everything to sabotage the forthcoming Genoa Conference. The former French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, expressed the opinion of many French politicians when he wrote that it was necessary to "couler la conférence,"¹⁰⁴ for it could only be "encore un de ces traquenards où la France perdra quelques plumes."¹⁰⁵ Poincaré entirely agreed with Cambon and took all the necessary measures to whittle down, as much as he could, the scope and significance of the conference. On 26 February, at Boulogne, he had already obtained an assurance from Lloyd George that the question of German reparations would not be discussed. Once the two statesmen had agreed that the conference would focus its attention on the Russian question, the French premier strove to confine the discussion to economic matters. This,

as we know, ran counter to the dearest hopes of the British prime minister, who believed that a political settlement was a prerequisite to the development of trade.

a. The political context.

A few days before the opening of the conference, Lloyd George sought to obtain Poincaré's agreement to the creation of a political committee that would discuss the Russian dilemma and transform the Genoa meeting from a merely economic into a political conference. M. de Montille, an official of the French Embassy in London, was immediately sent to the Foreign Office to talk to Sir Edward Grigg. The French diplomat readily agreed that the Russian question was "in the main political," but explained that "the establishment of a regular Political Committee would lead to misapprehension in France." M. Poincaré had definitely stated that "there would be no political discussions at Genoa." M. de Montille added that the French premier quite agreed that political discussions were inevitable, but suggested that "political questions should be referred as they arose to a Committee of Powers."¹⁰⁷ A few days earlier, Poincaré had already sent a strongly worded telegram in which he instructed Ambassador St. Aulaire to inform the Foreign Office that

the question whether there shall be immediate *de jure* recognition shall only be dealt with and settled at the close of the Genoa Conference. Should the British delegates begin by advocating immediate recognition, the French delegates would retire from the Conference.¹⁰⁸

Such a telegram could only reinforce Lloyd George's decision to refuse France the role of "dictator" of the European order. He was determined to make of "his" conference a political gathering, to recognize the Soviet government if that was possible and necessary, even if the United States refused to take an active part in the conference.¹⁰⁹ If the French were obdurate, he would facilitate a German-Soviet rapprochement that he would try to join.

While Great Britain and France realized how far they had traveled one from the other since the time when Briand had almost agreed to recognize the Bolsheviki, the latter were making continuous efforts to come closer to the Germans. There is no need here for yet another detailed description of the Genoa Conference.¹¹⁰ We shall simply try to follow the stages that, six days after the opening of the Genoa Conference, led to the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany. We shall see how, at the same time, Christian Rakovski was instrumental in the Soviet-German rapprochement to the point where he was called the "father of Rapallo" by his German counterpart, Baron von Maltzan.¹¹¹

b. Rakovski's attitude as spokesman of the Soviet delegation.

One of the most interesting features of the Genoa Conference is that the "bourgeois" powers of Western Europe gathered to meet for the first time the representatives of the Soviet Republics. Thus, if Rakovski was officially considered as an expert on the financial commission of the conference, he also played an essential part in "public relations," and as intermediary between the German and Soviet delegations. At the same time, he was at pains to make contact with Markotun's Ukrainian émigré group. The latter became his informant on many matters, and served as intermediary between the head of the French delegation, Barthou, and Rakovski.¹¹²

From the first day of the Genoa Conference, which opened on 10 April, the tendency was for the official sittings "to become merely formal and for their sole function to register what had been done behind the scenes."¹¹³ Secret moves became everyday practice for all delegations, and discreet propaganda the prerogative of the Soviet representatives. Rakovski was put in charge of the Soviet Press Bureau and organized informal conferences that took place first in his hotel room and then in the University Hall, as the number of listeners increased day after day.¹¹⁴ A member of the British delegation reported that

Rakovski created a favorable impression on all who had dealings with him. Of all the Russian delegates [he was] the most presentable and the easiest to get on with. . . . He was a very able man with a special talent for dialects. Though he probably held extreme views, he was fully capable of disguising them.¹¹⁵

Rakovski had set himself the task of "correcting some Western misconceptions": he gave the most detailed lectures on the Soviet Republics and on the Soviet order, and was clever enough to make his audience listen "not only with interest, but even with a certain feeling of sympathy."¹¹⁶ John Saxon-Mills tells us that newspaper correspondents "of all shades of opinion . . . spoke well for him,"¹¹⁷ including Ernest Hemingway, who was the special correspondent of the *Daily Star* in Genoa.¹¹⁸ All of them spoke of

that singularly attractive person Mr. Rakovski . . . who took up the parable of Russian propaganda in lucid and deliberate French. . . . His manner and diction were indeed perfect, and he gave an impression of imperturbable strength and confidence, as well as of intelligent acumen and a pronounced sense of humor. He no whit resembled

the Bolshevik as pictured in many a British and French imagination.¹¹⁹

Saxon-Mills considered that most of the foreign correspondents had imagined that the social revolution had been the cause of famine and ruin in Russia. Rakovski tried to convince them that these distresses were "far more the result of the revolutionary wars forced on the Soviet government through the help given by the Allies to those anti-Bolshevik leaders, Generals Denikin, Koltchak and Yudenitch."¹²⁰ These wars forced upon the new Russia had caused occupation by enemy troops of vast territories and crushing requisitions from the people, and had compelled the upkeep of an army of 4 or 5 million men. In reply or counterclaim to the Allied estimates of Russian obligations, Rakovski, as the Bolshevik spokesman, presented "a bill so enormous that, even if Russia's creditors had cancelled it, they would still have had a big adverse balance against them."¹²¹

c. The Soviet expert on the Financial Subcommittee.

This is precisely the line that Rakovski followed at the official session of the Financial Subcommittee of the conference, on 17 and 24 April, more particularly.¹²² At these meetings, he put forward Soviet claims that amounted to (approximately) £4,067,227,040 for destruction wrought on Soviet territory both by direct foreign intervention and by the aid given to Koltchak, Yudenitch, Denikin, and Wrangel. The Soviets and the former Allied countries decided to match their claims and to write down the Russian war debts and the Soviet claims.¹²³ But the "bourgeois" politicians firmly stated that there could be "no allowance made to the Soviet government against either the debts and financial obligations due to foreign nationals, or the right of such nationals with regard to the return of their property, and compensation for damage or loss in respect thereof."

At the session of 24 April, the Belgian expert, Cattier, asked Rakovski about the restoration of foreign bank deposits seized by the Bolshevik government. The Soviet representative explained that these had been nationalized and, therefore, could not be restored. Whereupon Cattier inquired what the Bolshevik attitude would be if Russian deposits in Belgian banks were seized, and received the unflinching reply: "We should insist on their being paid to us, because you have not nationalized them!"¹²⁴ Such answers became famous in Genoa, and it is not surprising that Sir Robert Horne, on the Financial Subcommittee, should have complimented Rakovski on his "perfect parliamentary manner."¹²⁵ Even the correspondent of the *Times* showed a certain admiration for Rakovski's technique when he wrote on 27 April:

Mr. Rakovski . . . gave a delectable economic version of Louis Veuillot's famous principal enunciated on behalf of the Jesuits against the French liberals: "We demand liberty in the name of your principles and we deny your liberty in the name of ours."

As Lenin had repeatedly told the Bolshevik delegates before they left for Genoa, they had to go to Western Europe with the mentality of "merchants." They should not agree to discuss the problem of debts and nationalized properties, except in connection with the credits they hoped to get. It was Krasin's job during the conference to lure Western businessmen by dangling rich concessions, while Rakovski wrote a detailed memorandum on the credits the Soviets would like to get from the West.¹²⁶

In this, he made a detailed analysis of the economic situation of the Soviet Republics, insisting on the fact that, in the years of intervention and blockade, it was materially impossible for the Russian government to give the necessary attention to economic questions. Indeed, during the three years 1918-1920 "all the efforts of Russia were concentrated on a struggle for existence."¹²⁷ He then explained the measures taken for the recovery of agriculture as part of the New Economic Policy, and concluded by stating that, if all the available resources of the state were taken into account and if the program of reconstruction were reduced to a strict minimum, the reestablishment of Russian agriculture still necessitated credits from abroad. He reckoned that, within the following three years, credits to the extent of 1 milliard of gold rubles would be necessary to relieve agriculture alone. Two-thirds would be payable in machines, and one-third in money.

As far as industry was concerned, Rakovski explained that the second half of 1921 could be considered "a period of intense activity in the history of Russian industry." This activity had continued during the year 1922 with certain fluctuations due, principally, to difficulties in provisioning the country. A whole series of figures were quoted to demonstrate this point, but Rakovski admitted that, if these figures were compared with those of the prewar period, it would be seen that "Russian industry has still a long way to go before it can satisfy the requirements of the country." According to the plan drawn up by the Higher Council of National Economy, the Soviet state industry required a capital of a milliard gold rubles to be invested in a period of three years.¹²⁸

An important chapter in Rakovski's memorandum was that concerning transport. Indeed, a great part of the Russian railways were destroyed during the civil war, and some 4,000 bridges had to be rebuilt by the Railways Administration with the assistance of the

Red Army. During the four years from 1918 until 1922, new railway lines had been constructed amounting to 4,534 kilometers, of which only 1,700 were working by 1922. In the course of 1921, 679 vessels were refloated, and it was proposed to do the same in 1922. Construction work had been carried out by the Maritime Services in the ports of Murmansk, Novorossiisk, Odessa, Petrograd, Mariupol, and Arkhangelsk. All in all, some 5 million gold rubles had to be found abroad. If the program for the reestablishment of railways was reduced to the strict minimum, that is the reestablishment of the main lines, a total of 15,000 *versts* that constituted less than a fourth of the total system, the credit necessary for the railways alone was 1 million gold rubles.

Realizing the vital importance of guarantees for such credits and loans, Rakovski went a long way to tempt the bankers and industrialists of Western Europe. He declared that among the guarantees the Russian government was prepared to offer to its future creditors were "the general revenues and the special revenues of the budget [for example, customs revenues], production in platinum, and foreign exports, which, in the course of time, would become considerable seeing that foreign commerce is a monopoly of the state." Another series of guarantees consisted of the various agricultural, industrial, and other concessions the Russian government might grant to foreign capitalists. The share of income coming to the Russian government from these concessions would constitute "an ample guarantee" for the payment of interest and the amortization of the capital of the loans and credits granted to the Soviet Republics.¹²⁹

Lloyd George was, undoubtedly, the Western politician most in favor of direct financial help to the Soviets; Russia seemed to him "like a cart which had got into a rut; once it was lifted out it would run, but the organized resources of the West were necessary to lift it out."¹³⁰

The British prime minister considered that the credits that could be granted to the Soviet Republics depended much more on the City (of London) than on his government. He knew that "the City had money," but "would only come in when the people originally interested in Russian trade were satisfied with the conditions."¹³¹ France reckoned that, by reason of the effort it was obliged to make in order to restore her own devastated regions, it could not at this moment afford direct financial assistance for the reconstruction of Russia. Lloyd George was so upset by the attitude of obvious noncooperation on the part of the French delegates that he declared to Barthou on 11 April, the day after the opening of the conference:

Mr. Poincaré cannot absent himself from the Conference

and yet claim power to press a button in Paris at any moment to stop or delay its work. . . . If that were attempted he would have to put the whole position frankly to the Conference and explain that France was destroying Europe's hopes.¹³²

The French government then accepted what Briand had agreed to at Cannes, i.e., the principle of participating in an international corporation on an equal footing with Britain. France suggested that she could send to Russia "seeds of all sorts." Detailed plans were being prepared for the dispatch and use of tractors. Several thousands of these tractors could be sent with the necessary technical personnel. Machines and technical personnel could also be sent in order to establish veterinary stations and institutions for agricultural study. As for transport, France could offer rolling stock of approximately 1,200 locomotives, 25,000 goods wagons, and 3,500 railway carriages and vans. Finally, French industrialists, who in great number had contributed to the wealth of many parts of Russia, would be able to restart their establishments as soon as they received the necessary guarantee.

Italy, by subscribing to the international corporation, was prepared "to give her full support to any enterprise intended specially to reestablish efficient transport conditions, and foster the marketing of Russian products." It was further prepared to contribute, through its agricultural organizations, to the restoration of agricultural productivity, and, by way of cooperative association, to take a share in the industrial as well as the agricultural reequipment of Russia.

Offers of help were also held out by Japan. The Japanese government, with a view to encouraging trade with Russia, granted a credit of 8 million yen to the Russo-Japanese Trading Company.

The Belgian Parliament also voted a special credit of 250,000,000 francs in order to facilitate exports. The greatest part of the sum was available and could be used to the benefit of Russia.¹³² In fact, most of these proposals remained on paper, and nothing practical really came out of them. The Germans, for their part, did help the Bolshevik government, but in a very different way: they signed at Rapallo a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia that upset European statesmen.

d. The Treaty of Rapallo (16 April 1922)

In 1919, Lloyd George had explained that the League of Nations had been partly conceived as "an alternative to Bolshevism" in Europe and in the world.¹³⁴ He argued that the best means to induce Germany "to resist Bolshevism" was to attract her back into the

comity of European powers. As we know, Germany was only to join the league in the wake of the Locarno agreements of 1925, at one of the rare moments when Great Britain and France came together to agree on the German question and to present a common front against the Soviet Republics. In the meantime, their differences played into the hands of both the Germans and the Soviets.

The British prime minister, with his usual perspicacity, had written in his final draft of the Fontainebleau Memorandum (1919):

The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms.¹³⁵

His object, at the time, had been to convince the French that an excessively harsh peace treaty would drive Germany into the arms of Russia. On the eve of the Genoa Conference, on 25 March 1922, he gave this confidential document to the British press with the same idea in mind.¹³⁶ Indeed, he knew as well as the French government did that a German-Soviet rapprochement was already well underway. Regular reports were sent by Lord D'Abernon from Berlin to the Foreign Office about the conversations that had started at the beginning of 1922 between Soviet Russia and Germany. On 16 January, the British ambassador informed Lord Curzon about the tactics they were contemplating for the Genoa Conference:

German industrialists propose to arrive at some kind of arrangement with Moscow for reciprocal support at the Genoa Conference. . . . The idea is that Germany and Russia will stand side by side as the two countries most oppressed by the Entente and will back each other up in obtaining advantages.¹³⁷

A few days later, D'Abernon warned the Foreign Office about the progress of the rapprochement: he made it clear that conversations were to be held shortly, and that they would be "of a preliminary nature."¹³⁷ Lloyd Goerge did not ignore the warning: in mid-February, he had a discreet meeting with one of the German industrialists (a representative of Krupp) who had taken part in discussions with Radek and Rakovski.¹³⁹ The British prime minister already planned to strive for a rapprochement between Great Britain, Germany, and Soviet Russia if France continued to "sulk in her corner." It will be remembered that Rakovski, on his side, envisaged a rapprochement with Britain if Soviet overtures to France proved fruitless. As he put it in the conversation with a German Socialist

previously mentioned, "Russia is endeavoring to make friends with France. . . . If we find France obdurate, then we will throw ourselves 'hair and skin' into the arms of England."¹⁴⁰

On their way to Genoa at the beginning of April, the Soviet delegates stopped in Berlin. By then, they knew full well that France would not take a step toward them but would, on the contrary, try to sabotage the conference. Indeed, the conversations Rakovski had had with Sauerwein had shown Poincaré that the Soviets were tough negotiators. While they were in the German capital, the Soviet delegation (Chicherin, Litvinov, Krasin, and Rakovski) pressed hard for a political agreement with the Germans so as to put before the Allies a *fait accompli* just on the eve of the conference. As the German secretary of state, von Haniel, admitted later on to a British official: "We constantly discussed the same questions more or less as we had been discussing them since 1918."¹⁴¹ These questions were Article 116 of the Versailles Treaty, under which the Russians could join the "victors" in order to get reparations from the Germans; the confiscation of German property in Russia; the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach; and diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government. "Many drafts" were prepared, but no real agreement was reached. This was mainly for two reasons, as von Haniel testified:

We did not want to go faster than England in the matter of recognition. We did not want in any way to compromise our position at Genoa or tie ourselves there. We all recognized that we should eventually come to terms with the Russians, but we were deliberately keeping the negotiations back until after Genoa.¹⁴²

If the Germans had had a treaty with the Russians "in stock in Berlin" ever since the autumn, they were trapped into signing it by both Lloyd George and the Bolsheviks, as documentary evidence clearly shows.

On the first day of the Genoa Conference—10 April—Chicherin had cabled to Moscow that it was "absolutely clear that England and Italy want to reach some sort of an agreement with us."¹⁴³ Very soon, private and secret talks began between Lloyd George and the Soviet delegation, while the Germans were deliberately kept aside. The first result of the talks was that both the British and the Russians started to blackmail the Germans, after having tacitly agreed on tactics. Italy accepted the role of intermediary. On 14 April, an Italian delegate (Giannini) was dispatched to the Germans "in an official capacity."¹⁴⁴ The go-between told the German chancellor, Dr. Wirth, that "during the last few days conversations had taken place

between the Allies and the Russians." A few hours later, he again informed Wirth that "an understanding would be reached," and gave some details of the content of the "understanding":¹⁴⁵ the Soviets seemed ready "to recognize their prewar debts by the payment of long-term obligations" if they obtained full *de jure* recognition.¹⁴⁶ It is hard to believe that the Bolsheviks could have agreed so quickly to such a bargain. Nevertheless, negotiations between them and the "Allies," even *dlya vidimosti*, as Chicherin commented, were enough to frighten the Germans.¹⁴⁶ This is precisely what happened. After the signing of the Rapallo Treaty, Chancellor Wirth admitted to Lloyd George that, when he heard the discouraging news brought by Giannini on 14 April,

He had feared that there was a possibility of something taking place to the detriment of Germany. . . . He had then taken Dr. Giannini by the hand and taken him to Dr. Rathenau, who was with Freiherr von Maltzan and Herr von Simon. There had been a long meeting between the three, and he himself had returned to his room. The result of this conversation is that they decided to conclude the separate treaty with Russia. . . . He had considered it necessary to go forward with the Russian negotiations in order to save something for Germany.¹⁴⁸

As Rathenau also admitted to Lloyd George on 19 April, "They had concluded this agreement under the impression that their interests would be completely ignored and ruled out of order."¹⁴⁹ While Lloyd George had deliberately isolated the Germans and kept them in the dark about his conversations with the Russians, the latter, for their part, were putting as much pressure as possible on the Germans.

On the eve of Rapallo, 15 April, the German and Russian delegations met to exchange views on the recent negotiations with Lloyd George. At 10 o'clock, Maltzan met Rakovski and Ioffe in a Genoese cafe. "He related the events of the preceding day and obtained from them accurate outlines of the negotiations in Lloyd George's villa."¹⁵⁰ This kind of talk was perfectly in line with the understanding that the Soviets and the Germans had concluded in Berlin. Yet, exactly as the emissaries of the British prime minister had done, Ioffe and Rakovski let the Germans suppose that British-Russian agreement was being reached. At this stage, Rakovski hinted that, unless the Russo-German treaty was signed, the Russians would "demand war indemnities under Article 116 of the Versailles Treaty," as "they had been offered French assistance in this respect." He then mentioned that "a proposal from French sources to the effect that the Soviet gov-

ernment should claim war indemnities from Germany and sign these over to France in payment of the Russian debt."¹⁵¹

This looked like a final threat that the Soviets could enforce, as they had hardened their position since 12 April, when Maltzan had noted that the Russians "had shown themselves very accommodating as regards Article 11."¹⁵² This was distinctly playing on the nerves of the Germans.

Late at night on the same day (15 April), Rakovski called Maltzan from Rapallo and suggested that the two delegations meet to negotiate "since the Soviet delegation had already signed with England and France." "No, that is not true," Rakovski retorted, "the negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily, but no agreement has been reached." Immediately after Rakovski's telephone call, Maltzan informed Rathenau and roused the entire sleeping German delegation, which then gathered for what has since been called the "pyjama party."¹⁵³ The result of the discussions was accurately described in the telegram Litvinov sent to Moscow on 17 April, the day after the treaty was signed:

Our semi-private negotiations with the Supreme Council instilled anguish into the souls of the Germans, and Rathenau rushed to us yesterday paralyzed with fear (*ni zhiv ni mertv pribezhal k nam*) and proposed on the spot to sign the very same agreement which he had avoided signing when we passed through Berlin.¹⁵⁴

It is worth noting that there was only one difference between the treaty, as it was finally signed, and the Soviet draft, which had been considered in Berlin on 4 April. A secret clause was added, which Litvinov described as follows to his colleagues in Moscow:

In case we satisfy the claims of other countries, viz. [in respect of] the nationalized properties, the Germans will be granted the same conditions; Germany commits herself not to take part in the transactions of any international consortium without our agreement.¹⁵⁵

For some time, the Russians remained quite discreet about the fact that they "almost danced a quadrille" with Lloyd George, as Rokovski said later on. In the report he gave on 12 May 1922 to the Third Session of the Central Executive Committee, Jan Rudzutak summed up his impressions of the political circumstances that led to the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty in very revealing terms:

The signing of this treaty took place at the moment when our relations with France were particularly strained, and when France was threatening to break off and leave. I was left with the impression that the Germans were pressed to sign

the Russo-German Treaty by Lloyd George, for whom it was essential to create a threat to France which took the form of the separation of Germany from the common bloc.¹⁵⁶

What Rudzutak does not say is that, if Lloyd George had facilitated the German-Soviet rapprochement, it was with the hope of joining it. One of the first results of Rapallo was, however, to improve considerably the bargaining position of the Soviets and to stiffen their attitude. When Lloyd George tried to initiate a rapprochement with the German-Soviet bloc, he found the Bolsheviks obdurate. He then tried to persuade the Germans to come to his help. In a secret conversation he had with Wirth and Rathenau on 4 May, he pleaded his case saying:

He hoped that the German delegation would use its influence with the Russians not to surrender to their Oriental temper and to try and start bargaining. If they insisted that they could not take this or that, there would be no result. . . .
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There was indeed no result, however, because when Chicherin, Rakovski, and Krasin gave the impression that they were ready to yield some ground on the question of the nationalized properties, they were immediately called to order by Lenin, who even threatened "to disavow them publicly and to dismiss them from their function" if they had any other hesitation, "even the smallest."¹⁵⁸ A week later, the Bolshevik leader instructed Chicherin from Moscow "not to take the least shadow of financial obligation in any case whatever, not even to grant a semi-recognition of the [tsarist] debts, and not to fear a break."¹⁵⁹ By that time, Lloyd George had definitely lost the day. Without real backing from his own government, with the French paralyzing all general discussion on the Russian problem, with the Russians obdurate and looking for a good occasion to break off, with the growing pressure of British bondholders, the British prime minister could achieve nothing.¹⁶⁰ He could not prevent the conference from ending in a total failure for British and for European diplomacy. The prediction of the head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office was certainly borne out: "The Mountain of Genoa" had "given birth to a more than ordinary ridiculous mouse."¹⁶¹ The first and only fruit of the conference had been the Rapallo Treaty.

It is certainly possible to say that, if Lloyd George was instrumental in the conclusion of the German-Soviet treaty in a "positive" way, Poincaré facilitated the rapprochement between the two outcasts in a "negative" way. The French premier had known of the negotiations in Berlin, but admitted that "the actual signature was unexpected."¹⁶²

In any case, he considered that the Rapallo Treaty brought water to his mill, as it had "debased Germany in the eyes of European public opinion." In his confidential conversation with a U. S. journalist (18 May), he argued that Rapallo was "an act of signal stupidity on Germany's part," and added quite cynically: "Happily we can still count on Germany doing the stupid thing. Now she has ostracized herself again, and on the first occasion of coming back to European councils."¹⁶³

One of the most debated questions concerning the German-Soviet treaty is that of the "military clause," which many have tried to discover but without success.

e. Was there a military clause attached to the Rapallo Treaty?

The first point to remember in this respect is that the treaty considerably furthered military collaboration between the two countries. On the other hand, it is probable that no secret clause was added on this subject because a verbal understanding was the ideal formula. It allowed German officials to have a clean conscience when they vouched that nothing of the sort had been signed;¹⁶⁴ it also allowed German officers, and General Ludendorff in particular, "to state positively that the Bolsheviki had concluded a military understanding with Germany."¹⁶⁵ At the time, all European secret services—and particularly the British, French, and Belgian—agreed that there existed "some form of understanding with regard to possible assistance to Russia in the form of supply of technical help and ammunition." It was generally admitted that the establishment of German arms factories was to be camouflaged under the heading of concessions, and assumed that "the Soviet government could cooperate with Germany in an attack on Poland."¹⁶⁶ The very pro-German D'Abernon repeatedly treated all allusions to a secret military convention between Moscow and Berlin as "gossip."¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, when on 20 April the Foreign Office called him to order, "expressed its concern at the absence of information regarding the Russo-German agreement," and inquired "whether Lord D'Abernon was satisfied with his means of information and as to the honesty of the ministers with whom he had been in communication," the British ambassador in Berlin replied by making excuses for Germany's action.¹⁶⁸ He stated openly in the conclusion of his memorandum of 29 April:

It is clear that two powers like Russia and Germany subject to similar and simultaneous pressure from the same creditor will put their heads together as to the best means of defence. It has long been known that conversations were go-

ing on. The difficulty has been to devise precise stipulations which—*rebus sic stantibus*—would be of mutual benefit and would not involve undue internal complications or external dangers. . . . For myself, it is a matter of surprise that with the enormous number of military and naval officers hanging about in Germany with nothing to do and very little to live upon, that a great many more of them have not filtered over the Russian border. . . . German assistance in the manufacture of munitions has been discussed. . . .¹⁶⁹

We see that the signing of the Rapallo Treaty was by no means “incidental,” as D’Abernon had proclaimed in a previous memorandum. It was a deliberate policy whose importance was to be considerable for the whole development of international relations between the two world wars.

f. The significance for the Soviet Republics of the Rapallo Treaty.

There is no doubt that the Rapallo Treaty marked the victorious entry of the Soviet Republics into European political life. It was, first of all, a moral victory, then a victory on political, economic, and military grounds. It was a moral satisfaction for the Soviet leaders to know that they had disrupted the “imperialist front,” created friction between the bourgeois powers of Western Europe, and drawn Germany to their side. Germany had officially recognized the Soviet government and established consular and diplomatic relations with her. In the telegram he sent to Moscow on 17 April, Litvinov had a right to claim that “by means of the Russo-German treaty, Russian-German diplomacy has managed to establish definitely the moribund state of the Great Entente, the fact of its disruption, with the inevitable moral isolation of France. . . .”¹⁷⁰

Economically, the Bolsheviks had shown the West how tempting oil, timber, and other concessions could be. The secret clause of the Rapallo Treaty ensured, however, the exclusion of Germany from any international scheme for exploitation of Russian resources and the establishment of a common economic front between the two countries. Militarily, we saw that the treaty did much to further German-Soviet collaboration. Yet, as Rakovski noted, “the significance of the treaty was more political than economic.”¹⁷¹ Thus, he was certainly right when he declared in 1923: “We have now realized that the climax of our influence for a certain period—how many years, I do not know—came last year in Genoa.”¹⁷²

2. The Lausanne Conference (20 November 1922–24 July 1923)

The first "victory" that the Bolsheviks won over the capitalist countries at Genoa filled them with pride, and increased their confidence in the effectiveness of their diplomacy. They were not intent on giving the first "proletarian" states the standing of a great power. In a significant article that Iurii Steklov, the editor of *Izvestiya*, wrote at the time of the Lausanne Conference, it was clear that the Soviets saw themselves as the heirs of the Russian Empire. They admitted that their country had "temporarily disappeared from the international horizon" as the result of imperialist and civil wars. But the Russia born from the Revolution had now gathered enough strength "to speak its word in international politics."

The Soviet Republic has been growing stronger and stronger every day, and has taken advantage of existing dissensions among the European powers with no less skill than the old Russia. Aware of her growing strength, Soviet Russia can never be discouraged by temporary diplomatic failure, since final victory is eventually assured. Russia is coming back to the international stage. Let us hope that the day is at hand when this reappearance will be felt so strongly that no one will dare contradict her voice.¹⁷³

a. The political context.

One of the first and most important characteristics of the Lausanne Conference is that the pattern of tactic alliances that had prevailed at Genoa a few months earlier was reversed. On the problems of the Near East, France and the Soviet Republics found themselves at loggerheads. In an analysis of the changes that occurred in the sphere of international relations between Genoa and Lausanne, Rakovski gave the clue to the riddle when he wrote, "Our relations with the English deteriorated because of the problems of the East."¹⁷⁴

When at Genoa we discussed European affairs, England showed that she apprehended every increase in the strength of France; being faithful to her traditional policy of supporting the balance of power in Europe, England almost danced a quadrille with us. Yet, when the English purse, the Near East and the Straits, when the peoples of the East came to be involved in our relationship, as they were at Lausanne, the English and ourselves found each other in opposite camps.¹⁷⁵

By a remarkable coincidence, the Trade Agreement between Soviet Russia and Great Britain had been signed on the same day (16 March 1921) as the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood between the RSFSR and Turkey. At that time, however, Soviet Russia was already backing the Turks in the war they were fighting against the Greeks who, for their part, were supported by the British government. At first, the prospect of developing trade relations had urged the Russians and the British to play down their antagonism on the issue of Turkey, as they were doing on the whole for the problems of the East. Nevertheless, the two sides continued to pursue diametrically opposed aims. In 1921, when the Greeks could have extricated themselves from Asia Minor, they did not do so, in part trusting Lloyd George's support. In the same way, the treaty of March 1921 between Soviet Russia and the Ankara government provided Kemal Pasha with much needed moral, financial, and military support to fight the Greeks.

It gradually became clear that France and Soviet Russia were following roughly parallel policies toward Turkey. France was suspicious of British activities in the Near East and decided to make a move toward the Ankara government. In October 1921, France and Turkey signed a treaty that ended hostilities between the two countries and provided that France would evacuate Cilicia and surrender territory in northern Syria to Turkey. As we know, Rakovski favored a rapprochement between the Soviet Republics, France, and Turkey. As head of the Ukrainian Soviet government, he decided in 1921 to come to a separate agreement with Turkey.

b. Relations between the Soviet Republics and Turkey.¹⁷⁶

In December 1921, Rakovski sent M. V. Frunze, who was then commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Soviet forces, to Ankara to open negotiations. The final treaty was signed less than a month later, and provided for financial and military help to the government of Kemal Pasha. There were reports of the Ukraine lending Ankara £150,000 in gold, and of ammunition shipped from Odessa to Turkey.¹⁷⁷ At this stage, the Bolsheviks, and Rakovski in particular, had decided to use Turkey as a trump to facilitate their entry into the political life of Eastern Europe. This move was similar to the one they were making at the same moment toward Germany in order to enter the political life of Western Europe. Yet, partly because of the difficulty of their own economic situation in 1922, the Bolsheviks only carried out the minimum of their promises necessary to keep the Kemalists amenable. This attitude created the ground for many of the misunderstandings that were to spring up between the two countries.

At first, the Turks gathered the impression that the propaganda the Soviet permanent representative (Aralov) was making for an economic alliance was camouflage for an attempt at political penetration. In 1922, Aralov established Soviet consulates at Kars, Artvin, Samsun, and Bayezid. He also placed "agricultural experts" at Mersina, Erzerum, and Kastamuni.¹⁷⁸ This policy could only antagonize Kemal Pasha, who had always been at pains to insist on Turkish independence vis-à-vis Russia and the West alike. He declared in 1921:

We are a popular government; our policy is clear and stable. It is not that of the democratic groups or of the Socialist party. We are not of any party; the character of the administration that we shall adopt concerns only ourselves and is adapted to our particular needs.¹⁷⁹

The Turkish foreign secretary, Akmed Mukhtar, drove the point home when he added that the Turkish government considered itself the "natural ally of Soviet Russia as long as the two countries fight together against the common enemy and defend the principles of the freedom of peoples in defiance of the imperialists of the West."¹⁸⁰ However, at the beginning of 1922, the Turks badly needed ammunition and money for their last campaign to expel the Greeks from Asia Minor. In March 1922, Kemal Pasha began to voice his discontent with the failure of the Soviets to implement the terms of the treaties they had signed. Statements were also made in the Ankara Assembly about the inferiority of the arms supplied by the Soviet Republics. Aralov, for his part, argued with Moscow that "if only Russian promises of arms were fulfilled, he would have Angora in his pocket."¹⁸¹ Moreover, the Turks protested that they had received none of the money promised to them. It soon appeared that, in Moscow, Sokolnikov at the head of the Commissariat for Finances (Narkomfin) was blocking the funds allotted to Turkey. When Chicherin intervened to settle the matter, Lenin sent the following explanatory note to Molotov: "I consider that Chicherin is absolutely right and ask the Politburo to take a decision in support of Chicherin's point of view that payment should be made on the date previously agreed on."¹⁸²

At the time of the Genoa conference, the Turks were grateful to the Soviet Republics for supporting their claims to be invited, but did not fail to press Rakovski personally for the dispatch of the promised supplies.¹⁸³ Kemal Pasha had by then decided to bend all the energies of the young nationalist Turkey to overwhelm the Greeks. When, early in September 1922, the Turks had expelled the Greeks from Asia Minor after capturing Smyrna, the road to Constantinople was open. The ancient capital was, however, situated in the neutral

zone guarded by the Allies. If the Turks continued their advance, they would inevitably clash with the Allied troops. At that fatal moment, Lloyd George chose "to blow the trumpets of war." He ordered the British garrison of General Harington to stand firm at Chanak, and asked the Dominions and France to back his action. Both failed to answer the call. For reasons of political strategy, the French troops even withdrew from their position.¹⁸⁴ On the other side, while there were wild rumors of Soviet mobilization, the Turks did not want in the least to see Soviet troops in Anatolia. The crisis was over, and the pact of Mudanya signed on 11 October 1922: the Turks agreed to respect the neutral zone until the conclusion of peace. A few days later, Lloyd George had to resign.

With Lloyd George gone, the Soviets had lost the statesman who had first championed them in Western Europe, although he eventually opposed them in the Near East. With his departure, the main opponent of the Soviets in the British government, Lord Curzon, recovered much of his power as secretary of state for foreign affairs. After the end of the war between Greece and Turkey and the peaceful settlement of the Chanak crisis, the problem of the "freedom" of the Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) once again loomed large in European diplomacy. Early in December 1922, a conference of powers gathered at Lausanne to work out a general international agreement. At the first session of the conference, Chicherin inevitably seized the opportunity to declare that "the conference proved that Russia must be regarded as an essential factor in international life."¹⁸⁴

c. Franco-Soviet relations on the eve of the conference.

The first problem the Soviet Republics had to tackle was that of gaining admission to the conference. On 24 September 1922, a British semiofficial statement had named Great Britain, France, and Italy as the countries most interested in the question of the Straits. Chicherin did not fail to send a strong note of protest that summed up the Soviet case:

No decision on the Straits taken without Russia will be final and lasting. It will merely sow the seeds of fresh conflicts. The freedom of the Straits which Britain has in mind signifies only desire of a strong naval power to control a route vitally necessary to other states in order thereby to keep them under a constant threat. This threat is directed primarily against Russia and Turkey.¹⁸⁶

In Moscow, the Soviet government had decided that the Lausanne Conference would mark the official entry of the Soviet Republics into the political life of the East, even if they were admitted only

to discuss the problem of the Straits, as they eventually were. A means to this end was to work for the rapprochement with France that Rakovski had always advocated. On the eve of the conference, he considered that Turkey would be the ideal intermediary between the Soviet Republics and France. At this time, he had grounds for believing in the success of his general scheme: "an economic union between Germany and Russia, combined with a political alliance between these two powers and Turkey, and treaties between all three and France."¹⁸⁷

To stress the reality of this plan, he noted that the idea of a rapprochement between France, Germany, and Russia was not a new one: it was implied at the meeting Nicholas II had with the kaiser at Bjorkö on 24 July 1905; this, moreover, would only have been a consolidation of what had happened in 1894, when the three countries came together to oppose Japan and Great Britain on the question of the partition of China.¹⁸⁸

After the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood of January 1922 with Turkey on the one hand, and the Rapallo Treaty of April 1922 between Soviet Russia and Germany on the other, a successful deal with France would have completed the scheme. Yet, the final success of the plan depended to a great extent on bad relations between Britain and France while it precluded hostility between the latter and Germany. In the autumn of 1922, Rakovski considered that it was vital not to miss the opportunity offered by the Lausanne Conference to persuade France to enter the game.

To initiate a first rapprochement, Rakovski used two intermediaries. The first was M. Frick, who was Dr. Nansen's assistant on the League of Nations in Moscow.¹⁸⁹ Lord D'Abernon, who was always so well informed, considered that Frick had "manoeuvred a great deal to bring the French and the Russians together. His idea was a great commercial combination—France, Russia, Germany."¹⁹⁰ The second intermediary was Markoutun, the president of the "Ukrainian National Committee" in Paris, whose activities were briefly mentioned above. In the first half of November 1922, Markotun sent Poincaré a letter that looked as if it had been written by Rakovski himself. It said:

The time approaches when the work of the Conference on Eastern Affairs will commence. . . . The Ukrainian National Committee is convinced that the French government, which has never disassociated itself from any question related to the protection of Russian national interest will not fail to appreciate the importance which Russia attaches to the problem of the Straits, and is further assured that the

French government will do what it can to make it possible for the Russian republican representatives to defend properly Russian interests during the conference.¹⁹¹

Indeed, Rakovski believed at first that Poincaré would side with the Soviet Republics against Britain to defend the interests of Turkey.¹⁹¹ He thought it no mere coincidence that Edouard Herriot, the leader of the French Radical Socialist group, had proceeded to Moscow in the autumn of 1922. To begin with, it was known that the Radical Socialist program comprised the establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Republics on both political and economic grounds. Further, it was a fact that, political differences notwithstanding, Herriot was a close personal friend of Poincaré. Many politicians concluded that, although Herriot's mission was unofficial, it had the approval of the French premier and was a proof of the latter's desire for a rapprochement with the Soviets. This idea was strongly underlined by the semiofficial editorial of *Le Temps* that stated: "This year, Russia has made her diplomatic reentry into Europe. . . . In any European policy it will be necessary in the future to take Russia into account." In Moscow, Herriot was given the opportunity to meet many prominent Bolsheviks, among them Lenin, Trotsky, and Dzerzhinski. On his way back, the French politician was also received by Rakovski in the Ukraine.¹⁹³

As could be expected, all these attentions did not fail to worry British statesmen. The correspondent for the *Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian* in Moscow, Michael Farbman, put a very pertinent question to Lenin in an interview that took place on the eve of the Lausanne Conference, and just after the departure of Herriot from Moscow. Farbman asked bluntly, "Is it true that Russia regards British policy in the Middle East as a challenge and is ready to conclude an agreement with France directed against Britain?"

Lenin's answer is revealing because it clearly indicates a negative attitude toward Britain as opposed to an evident wish for a rapprochement with France. It was the more interesting because Lenin was careful to play down the issue in this interview with a British correspondent. He declared:

We do not consider the differences between Britain and ourselves to be in any way insurmountable. . . . We certainly value very highly both Herriot's visit to Moscow and the step taken towards a rapprochement with France or towards negotiations with her, which have now become possible and, I should like to believe, essential. Any rapprochement with France is something we very much desire, espe-

cially in view of the fact that Russia's commercial interests imperatively demand closer relations with this strong continental power.¹⁹⁴

Nevertheless there was to be no rapprochement between France and the Soviet Republics at that time. Indeed, France and Britain soon became anxious to patch up their disagreements, and they did so to the greatest disadvantage of Turkey and Germany. When Lord Curzon went to Paris at the beginning of October 1922, Poincaré agreed to remain neutral when the problem of Turkey was discussed at the Lausanne Conference. In exchange, Britain would remain neutral on the question of Germany.¹⁹⁵ In June 1923, Rakovski commented on this issue:

To defend her interests in the East, England partly sacrifices her interests in Europe. Hence we see that France occupies the Ruhr district while England has not made a protest in five months. . . . The English were the first to ratify the annexation of East Galicia to Poland. Why? Because France renounced the oil of Mosul which goes to the English.¹⁹⁶

In such cases, Rakovski realized how difficult it was for Soviet diplomacy to deal with "bourgeois" diplomats, for he considered that the rules of the game were different. He declared quite openly that

It is sometimes extremely difficult for us to obtain anything . . . as a result of conversations with bourgeois diplomacy. Was it like that in the old days? It was easier then to reach an agreement. If the Persian question cropped up—let us divide Persia. You take the South, we take the North. If the Indian question arose—Afghanistan for us, India for you, Armenia for us, Mesopotamia for you, and so forth.¹⁹⁶

When the Ruhr was invaded by French and Belgian troops on 11 January 1923, the participants of the Lausanne Conference had already realized that the struggle on the problem of Turkey and the East had been reduced to a duel between Great Britain and the Soviet Republics.

d. The conference.

After the first sessions of the conference, the secretary to the Soviet delegation, V. V. Vorovski, wrote in a personal letter to his wife, "The French who want to have a free hand on the Rhine have yielded repeatedly."¹⁹⁸ The interest of the Soviet Republics on the other hand lay in defending as strongly as possible the freedom of Turkey and restricting the passage of the Straits to commercial fleets: the Straits

should be closed to all military fleets other than those of the Black Sea powers. Very soon, however, Chicherin found himself to be "more Turkish than the Turks," as Lord Curzon noted sarcastically.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, it was clear from the start that, for the Kemalist government that had switched the center of political power from Constantinople to the more reliable town of Ankara on the plateau of Asia Minor, the Straits had lost much of their significance. This attitude allowed Curzon to proclaim ironically that "Russia had thought fit to put forward a plan for the Straits with which no one, not even the Turks, agreed. . . ." ²⁰⁰

The Turks certainly were more interested in rescuing the oil of Mosul from British hands. At the very beginning of the conference (on 4-5 December 1922), the second Turkish delegate, Riza Nur Bey, called privately on Lord Curzon to whom he frankly exposed the views of his government. He claimed that Turkey would meet Britain "on every point, would conclude a satisfactory treaty and even break with the Soviets" if only the British "could give them the Villayet of Mosul."²⁰¹ The Turk based his argument on ethnic, historical, and economic grounds. Each of his arguments was combated by Curzon who declared:

Mosul cannot be given away without the loss of Bagdad, nor Bagdad without the loss of Irak and collapse of Irak kingdom, nor collapse of Arabs without return of the Turks and final defeat of British policy in the East.²⁰²

The Turks, however, were intractable: they defended themselves with the greatest energy, but their only support was the Soviet delegation.²⁰³ The latter knew how vital it was for them to stand by the Turks for military, political, and, not least, for economic reasons: before the Revolution, Russia had sent out 40 percent of her exports through the Dardanelles, including 80 percent of her grain and practically all her oil.²⁰⁴ The Soviet delegation could then only try to inspire the Turks with more determination, and this, in return, could but irritate the British. In the only private conversation Curzon had with Chicherin at Lausanne, on 16 December 1922, the British statesman used the most offensive tone to remind the Russian that "they were not here to arrive as he [Chicherin] thought, at a compromise between the views of Great Britain and Russia about the Straits, which appeared to be diametrically opposed."²⁰⁵ No compromise was indeed thinkable, even if "the respective policies of Europe and Russia have not been reversed."²⁰⁶

Before the bolshevik revolution, Britain and other European powers had blocked tsarist expansion into the Mediterranean Sea by

closing the Straits to the Russian Navy. At the time of the Lausanne Conference, however, Britain knew that the Soviet Navy was almost nonexistent, as most of the Russian vessels in the Black Sea had been taken over by Wrangel and then by the French. For the Allies, freedom for the French and British fleets to enter the Black Sea meant the possibility of maintaining a certain pressure upon the shores of the Ukraine and Caucasus, should this be necessary. From their experience of French descents during the civil war and in 1921, at the time of the Bolshevik conquest of Georgia, the Russians had serious grounds to fear the opening of the Straits to warships.²⁰⁷ The Soviet delegation found no support on this matter, for countries such as Rumania felt they would undoubtedly be safer if the Black Sea were transformed into an "English lake" than if it became a Russian one.

The conference broke up without agreement, but the Turks favored the draft that declared that the Straits would remain open to the fleets of all countries. This was finally accepted at the second session of the Lausanne Conference in July 1923. In theory, the Soviets were radically opposed to this solution, which represented a distinct victory for the British standpoint. Chicherin declared:

Under these conditions there cannot be any decision in the Straits question. There is none and there will not be any without Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia. If the convention is signed without Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia, the latter will retain an entirely free hand and complete liberty of action. If certain powers sign this convention without Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia, the Straits question remains and will remain open.²⁰⁸

Such a redundant style could only hide embarrassment. On his return to Moscow, Chicherin revealed his private thoughts on the subject, and fought hard to have the convention signed. He argued that Soviet Russia had to subscribe to it, if only because it would be the first international agreement to bear its name, and would mark the official entry of the Bolsheviks into the political life of Europe. He argued through the medium of the official organ of the commissariat for foreign affairs that

our refusal to participate in it can only do harm, and will in any case rob us of the possibility of controlling the acts of other powers—preventing abuses, demanding reforms, and, when necessary, appearing to the entire world in defense of our own and Turkish interests.²⁰⁹

For his part, Rakovski strongly opposed Chicherin's proposal,

which he considered to be a concession to British aims in the East and a ratification of their diplomatic victory. As early as January 1923, on his way back from Lausanne, he had declared to *Izvestiya* that

the Lausanne Convention will be one of those innumerable conventions which mark the termination of one war and the beginning of the preparation of the next one. . . . We shall not give our signature to the transformation of the Black Sea into an English lake. . . . As soon as we stand more firmly on our feet in our domestic and international situation, then the dollhouse of Lausanne will collapse.²¹⁰

It is important to note that Rakovski was fully backed by Stalin in his opposition to Chicherin.²¹¹ The Party general secretary, however, did not share Rakovski's views that, in the future, a military intervention could possibly repair the wrongs done in the East by imperialist powers. In his interview, Rakovski proclaimed that one of the essential changes that occurred during the Lausanne Conference was "the growth of our influence among all the peoples of the Muslim world."²¹² For the Bolsheviks, this was one of the crucial issues around which the entire conference had revolved. This was also the reason why there could be no truce between the Soviets and the British Empire.

e. The Bolsheviks and the British Empire.

Rakovski believed that, although there was no immediate clash between the Soviet Republics and the British Empire because of the relative military weakness of the Red Army, there could only be "a long, protracted life and death struggle."²¹³ In his pamphlet on the subject, he repeatedly stressed the fundamental antagonism between the two countries, due mainly to the geographical position of their empires and to their respective aims in Asia. He noted ironically that

the misfortune, both for us and for England, lies in the fact that we, the Soviet Republics, exist at all; it is our misfortune that, from the Adriatic Ocean to the Black Sea, we lie across the path which leads from England to her Indian possessions—our misfortune that we, in India, are looked upon as the defenders of the oppressed.²¹⁴

This basic opposition had been symbolized at Lausanne by the personal enmity that arose between Lord Curzon and Chicherin. At one of the first sessions of the conference, the former tsarist diplomat turned to the former viceroy of India with a rather vicious personal remark:

You are uneasy because our horsemen have reappeared on the heights of the Pamirs, and because you no longer have to deal with the halfwitted Tsar who ceded the ridge of the Hindu Kush to you in 1895.²¹⁵

The next sentence the Soviet delegate pronounced was to propose peace, but a peace "based on the principle of a partition wall between us." This was certainly a disingenuous proposal as, throughout the private conversation they had had on 16 December, Curzon had called the attention of Chicherin to the subversive effects of bolshevik propaganda in the East. The Soviet foreign commissar did not fail to reply in kind. He first gave as a flimsy excuse the fact that "the Soviet government was not responsible for what irregular Russian agents might do," and went on "to accuse H.M.G. of intriguing against Russia in Afghanistan, Northern Persia, and the Caucasus."²¹⁶

At Lausanne, Curzon became definitely convinced that "nothing will come from conversations with people who belong to the Communist sect."²¹⁷ Peace was impossible because, to the expansionist policy of tsarist Russia, the Bolsheviks had added the disruptive might of propaganda. The final comment Curzon made in his private conversation with Chicherin symbolizes the attitude he had decided to adopt toward the Soviet Republics. He told Chicherin that, if any agreement between the two countries meant that "there would be only 50 percent Bolshevik propaganda instead of 100 percent, no minister of the Crown would accept it."²¹⁸ Curzon proved that he was ready to enforce his policy when, a few months later, he sent his celebrated ultimatum to the Soviets, and strove to break off diplomatic relations with them. At the time of Curzon's death, Radek was to give a revealing if stinging portrait of the former viceroy of India and of his policy.

The fear of Russian tsarist imperialism constituted for this representative of British imperialism the central point of his policy. To prevent Russia from penetrating into Asia was the dominating idea of Curzon. . . . He hated Russia, even quite independent of the class which was ruling in it. He hated the Russian people in general because of that role which it was called upon to play in the awakening of Asia, this selected object of English exploitation.²¹⁸

These words were very much to the point, as the "Curzon ultimatum" showed. But, before dealing with this particular problem, we must come back to the last period of Rakovski's activities as foreign minister of the Ukraine. If he had personal ideas on the general problems the Soviet Republics had to cope with, he also held very precise

views on the question of the particular interests of the autonomous republics. He considered that a Soviet Republic such as the Ukraine could have its own problems, and that it had to find its own solutions. To his mind, these solutions might diverge considerably from those adopted by Soviet Russia.

Chapter 12

The Reality of Ukrainian Diplomacy (1922–1923)

A. An Independent Foreign Policy in the Political Context of the NEP

If the Soviet diplomats had fought hard in Genoa as on the eve of the Lausanne Conference to get an agreement with a Western power, it was partly to have access to Western technical aid in repairing the devastated Soviet economy. We shall take the Ukraine as a revealing example.

1. The Disastrous State of the Ukrainian Economy

At this time the Ukrainian Republic had a territory as large as Italy (nearly 173,000 square miles) and a population of 26 million inhabitants. It had always, of course, played an important part, economically, in the former Russian Empire. Before World War I, nine-tenths of all grain exported from Russia actually came from the Ukraine, which also exported annually about 230,000 head of cattle. Industrially, it was no less important; thus in 1913, it accounted for over 70 percent of the output of metal ore in the whole empire. The Ukraine also provided about three-fourths of the total output of coal, and had, in addition, many sugar refineries and other factories.¹ During the Civil War, however, the country was heavily damaged by the movements of warring armies and by forcible sovietization. It still suffered on a large scale from roaming companies of bandits. These difficulties, as well as continued requisitions, had left the country particularly bereft of stocks.

The main industry was the mining industry, and the first place belonged to coal. The production of this mineral, which amounted to some 1,550,000,000 *puds* in 1913 had fallen to 9,000,000 in 1921. The production of metals (cast iron, wrought iron, and steel) had almost ceased in 1920 and 1921, whereas, in 1913, the output of cast iron was 190,000,000 *puds* and of wrought iron and steel 141,000,000 *puds*. To take another vital industry, the sugar industry: the total number of refineries in existence in the period 1914–1915 was given as 200, with a total production of 85,000,000 *puds*, whereas, in 1921,

the State Sugar Administration only proposed to put 119 factories into operation, with an estimated production of 600,000 *puds*.

During 1920 and 1921, the production of agricultural machinery was at an extremely low level, varying between 2 percent and 4 percent of the prewar figures. Toward the end of 1921, it was almost impossible for the producers to dispose of the machinery made: the peasants were so impoverished by the heavy fighting and by the local crop failure of 1921 that they could not afford to buy new machinery, while the producers were not in a position to give credit. In 1922, the production of ploughs (50,000) was 10 percent of that of 1911. Between 1916 and 1921, there was a reduction of more than 15 percent in the sown area in the Ukraine. In 1921, a severe drought resulted in crop failure over much of this reduced area. In the north of the Ukraine, the harvest was about one-third of the normal harvest, while in the southern provinces the yield was insufficient even for reseeded. The situation was extremely grave as agriculture was of paramount importance in the Ukraine.

In 1920, some 21 million people (80 percent) lived in rural areas and only 5 million in the towns. Moreover, a large proportion of the urban population, especially in the small towns, was employed in agriculture and market gardening. When famine raged in the Volga provinces, the Ukrainian government sent its last stocks to Russia. But, in the late autumn of 1921, reports from Ukrainian districts afflicted by the shortage became more and more disquieting. The situation was almost as disastrous as in the Volga regions. In the provinces of Odessa, the Donets, Ekaterinoslav, Zaporozhye, and Nikolaev, the number of starving in January 1922 was 20 percent, in February 31 percent, and the average from May to August amounted to 40 percent. The most dreadful features of the famine were the large number of starving children and the rapid spread of infectious diseases. It had not been expected, immediately after the harvest of 1921, that the famine would attain such terrible dimensions, and the organization of relief measures was rather delayed. At the end of 1921, the governments of many countries of Western Europe and the United States, which were already sending help to the famine areas in Russia itself, came to the aid of the starving Ukraine. A few months later, in May 1922, a total of 1,383,000 (about half of them being children) were fed by various organizations: 523,824 were fed by the Ukrainian government and social organizations of the republic, 1,132,666 were in receipt of relief from the American Relief Organization (ARA) of Herbert Hoover. Other foreign organizations included Dr. Nansen's Commission (which fed 101,636 persons), the U. S. Mennonites, the Jewish Social Committee, the Society of Friends, the Swedish and

German Red Cross, etc.²

As we can see, the American Relief Organization alone fed twice as many people as the Ukrainian government itself. Yet, notwithstanding the terrible plight of the Ukraine, Rakovski's government showed how strict it was when matters of principle were involved such as national independence. At the end of 1921, the representatives of ARA went to Karkov to ask the Ukrainians to ratify the agreement that had just been signed in Riga between that organization and the Russian Soviet government. Skrypnik and Rakovski categorically refused to ratify the agreement on the ground that the Ukrainian government was in no way committed by acts and treaties signed in Moscow. Despite the insistence by the Americans on the fact that "they had come to the Ukraine not to deal with politics, but to feed the hungry," Rakovski refused to change his decision. It was, he said, perfectly understandable that the representatives of ARA were not aware of the sovereign status of the Ukraine, as they came from a very distant country, but he must ask them to draft a new treaty. The Americans agreed to draw up a new text, which contained the articles of the Riga agreement plus a few "minor changes." The most significant change was the statement at the beginning of the agreement that "The Ukrainain Soviet Republic declares that it is not concerned by the [Riga] agreement which does not bind it in any way. . . ." ³ The formula was clear enough, and allowed Rakovski to show Moscow as well as foreigners that he would not sacrifice the sovereign rights of the country he governed. He signed the treaty on 10 January of the year 1922, which was to see the rapid development of Ukrainian independence in matters of foreign policy. We saw how Rakovski established contacts with the Ukrainian émigré groups, which gave him the possibility of negotiating with West European governments. We know that the following step was the sending of Ukrainian representatives abroad. We must now try to see how far Rakovski went in the Ukraine.

2. Franco-Ukrainian Relations (1922-1923)

As was previously pointed out, one of Rakovski's pet schemes was political and economic collaboration with the European country he knew best, i.e., France. He had reason to believe that such collaboration was possible because of the important part that French capital and French engineers had played in the industrialization of the Ukraine before the Bolshevik revolution.

In February 1919, in the telegram he had sent to the French government, he had stressed the desire of his government to enter into diplomatic relations with France,

but on the prior condition that the French government shall cease considering the Ukraine as a future colony of French capital, as a new Madagascar, Morocco, or Indo-China. Any agreement which does not take into consideration the complete independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is condemned in advance to failure.⁴

On 29 May 1921, Rakovski sent a similar note to Briand's government insisting on the interest that both countries had in establishing normal diplomatic and economic relations.⁵

French designs were clearly summarized by General Weygand in a conversation he had with the British ambassador in Berlin on 1 October 1922. Weygand said he anticipated

a split-up [of the former tsarist empire] into several semi-independent units. . . . The West would penetrate then through the Ukraine, which is the richest point, and gradually recivilize the rest. The base of western commerce must be the Black Sea and Odessa.⁶

Such an attitude was very much in keeping with the plans of economic takeover that the French experts had expounded a few months before to their British colleagues during the Genoa Conference. The French idea was "to begin with the development of agriculture in Russia" (i.e., also in the Ukraine, which was never regarded as a separate entity at that time), and, in particular, to set up tractor centers with various farm implements, which would "assist the peasants to increase the cultivation of their land."⁷ The French, as opposed to the Germans, "scouted the idea of concessions for the cultivation of new territory." They preferred to begin operations "in the more accessible regions of Russia," and gradually extend the sphere of operations. Moreover, they had "complete schemes for the reconstruction of the Russian railways," and thought of an Anglo-French-German combine of which Stinnes was the German member. Their plans also included "the reconstruction of factories, coal mines and oil wells."⁸

Rakovski soon heard of these plans and was prepared to try and work out decent conditions that would relieve the Ukrainian economy without giving up, in any way, an independence that the country had so dearly won. He considered that one of the most urgent tasks was to restore the Donets mines and their equipment. For this, he knew by then that foreign credits and technical help were absolutely vital. Although, at the end of 1921, energetic measures had been taken to improve the organization of the Ukrainian mines, and output had increase in consequence, this improvement could not be maintained in the famine conditions of the spring of 1922. The shortage of food was

so acute that every miner of the Donets mines who possibly could forsook his work and went back to his village to help his family till the land.⁹ When they learned how much the Ukrainian Soviet government needed their help, French and Polish industrialists who had previously worked in the Donets proposed to create a Franco-Polish-Ukrainian Trading Society to reorganize the exploitation of the mines. At the very beginning of December 1922, representatives of the three countries started negotiating and finally proposed a common project to their respective governments. On 8 December, a message was received in Paris to the effect that "the Ukrainian Economic Council had ratified a contract for the organization of the Franco-Polish-Ukrainian Society," but it was kept secret and no announcement was made to the press.¹⁰ A year later, the directors of the very important Société anonyme des minerais de fer de Krivoi Rog expressed their desire to resume operations in the Ukraine. The company had been founded in 1881, with a capital of 9 million francs, which was subsequently increase to 13.5 million francs and, on 13 January 1920, to 38 million on 60,000 shares of 500 francs each. The object of the company was to work the iron mines situated at Krivoi Rog in the province of Kherson. However, since 1920, its business had been at a standstill, as the works were confiscated by the Soviet government. On 12 November 1923, a preliminary agreement was signed by this company and the Soviet government on a general basis: it provided for the prospecting and the exploitation of iron ore and coal mines in the whole Donets Basin, and also for the exploitation of one metallurgical works and a number of mechanical factories at Krivoi Rog. The agreement that should have been ratified within a period of 100 days was never actually signed, notwithstanding the renewal of the negotiations that lasted throughout the year 1924.¹¹ The reasons for the failure of the talks were perfectly clear to all observers, and particularly to the expert of the British Embassy in London, Eric Phipps. In his report to the Foreign Office, he noted that there appeared to be no formal obstacle in the way of private agreements between French firms and Ukrainian trading organizations. He considered, however, that there were considerable difficulties in the way of any big development of such economic relations, apart from difficulties of distance and contractual problems. The major obstacle that blocked real progress was the inability of the French government to raise money for a substantial loan to the Ukrainian Soviet government. This had been mentioned already by Seydoux to his British colleagues during the Genoa Conference. There, the French expert had not concealed the fact that "the difficulty from which the French suffered was capital." He admitted that in the world there was "a good deal of capital—plenty in Amer-

ica, some in Great Britain, some in Holland and Switzerland—but little in France.”¹² Moreover, Phipps reckoned that another impediment to the considerable extension of French trade there lay, under existing circumstances, in the high exchange rate of the French franc in relation to the currencies of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, which rendered very difficult any competition in the Ukrainian market.¹³

These various obstacles were, in fact, to prove so great that economic relations between France and the Ukraine were never to develop to any great extent. Until 1924, French politicians refused to take the steps that might have alleviated the burden of these economic impediments. Thus, when, four years later, the question of the participation of French capital in the Soviet economy was put to L. Perlin, the general secretary of the Concession Committee, he replied that it was “weak.”¹⁴

3. The Ukraine and Austria

It appears from various sources that economic cooperation between the Ukraine and Austria developed quite rapidly. From an interview the vice-commissar for foreign affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Yakovlev, gave to *Izvestiya* in August 1922, we learn that, long before the conclusion of the first political treaty with Poland, the Ukraine had entered into negotiations with Austria regarding the repatriation of civil and military prisoners. In March 1923, Rakovski declared he was “delighted” to see that all the former misunderstandings between the two countries had been settled. Indeed, Austria had recognized “the right of the Soviet Ukraine to have its own representative in Vienna.”¹⁵ He also said that economic relations were being adjusted satisfactorily for both sides. A fair amount of trade was already being done: the Ukraine was buying from Austria agricultural machinery and implements, paper, and motor vehicles, while Austrian firms were taking part in a big international fair in Kiev. During the summer of 1923, the Russo-Austrian Share Company opened up branches at Karkov, Odessa, and Kiev. The founders of the company were the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the Austrian Trading-Industrial Syndicate, represented by the Austrian Arsenal factories, which manufactured agricultural and other machinery. To begin with, the company imported into the Ukraine ploughs, scythes, and other agricultural machinery and implements, automobiles, motorcycles, and bicycles, chemicals, and dyestuffs. There were, however, two serious obstacles to the establishment of active exchanges: on the one hand, the unsettled state of both railway and water transport between the two countries; on the other hand, and to a greater

degree than with France, close trade relations were hindered by the deplorable financial position of Austria, which was itself in the greatest need of foreign capital.

4. The Ukraine and Germany

If Rakovski did not hope to get much money from Germany, he knew that economic and military collaboration with that country would be of the greatest help to the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that military cooperation existed between the two countries and that it was similar to the activities carried on between Soviet Russia and Germany. In a report from the British Consulate in Czerowitz dated September 7, 1922, we learn that "many German officers are employed in Kiev by the military, the aviation, and other technical services. Many of these had remained after the German troops had left. Others are arriving daily to find ready employment."¹⁶

The same report added that there were "many Germans in business." A Kiev-Berlin airmail service had been organized, which was said to "work well." Thus, a letter from Czernowitz via Berlin arrived at Kiev within three days. In his conclusion, the British diplomat emphasized the point that "the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would seem to have some actuality," and that "relations between Ukrainians and Muscovites are improving." Rakovski's aim was to preserve Ukrainian independence, and one of his ways to achieve it was education. In the autumn of 1922, the British representative in Moscow reported that, in the Ukraine, schools were now "numerous," and that, "for the first time, Ukrainian children [were] taught in Ukrainian."¹⁷ Precisely at this time, the Ukrainian commissar for education, Grinko, was sent by Rakovski on a tour to Germany and Austria. Pedagogic circles in Germany were said to have shown great interest in the theoretical system of Soviet education, and Commissar Grinko to have carefully studied the efficiency of German education.¹⁸

A strong link between Germany and the Soviet Ukraine is to be found in economic matters. Rakovski began serious economic negotiations with Germany in the years 1921-1922. In August 1922, the vice-commissar for foreign affairs of the Ukraine indicated that "active negotiations were proceeding" between his country and Germany "for the conclusion of an economic treaty." He considered that both sides were "keenly interested" in the furthering of the conversations, and noted that

the Ukraine has always imported the products of German industry; Germany, on the other hand, sees in the Ukraine not only a huge market for the purchase of raw products, but

an almost inexhaustible sphere for the application of capital on a large scale.¹⁹

The treat that was then negotiated between the two countries was one "analogous" to the Rapallo Treaty.²⁰ To conclude that it was the same, or that Rakovski simply signed the Rapallo Treaty for the Ukraine along with the Russian delegation, as he was himself the "father of Rapallo," would be a mistake. As in the case of the agreement with the American Relief Organization, he refused to sign automatically what Moscow had previously agreed on. He considered that a treaty that suited the plans of Soviet Russia had to be adapted to the historical, social, and economic conditions of the Ukraine before one could possibly sign it.

It is certainly significant to note that it took four months for Rakovski to sign with Germany a "new" Rapallo Treaty. On 12 May 1922, the German press learned that the negotiations between the German Foreign office and Litvinov respecting the extension of the treaty to the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Transcaucasian Republics had been interrupted. Indeed, the Ukrainian Republic, through its spokesman, Aussem, had put forward demands that the German government "could not accept." More especially, the Ukrainian representative declared that the 400 million marks, which they had laid claim to since the German occupation of the country, had to be paid in spite of the clause of the Rapallo Treaty stipulating that Soviet Russia and Germany waived their respective claims.²¹ The unexpected attempt by the Soviet Ukraine to make Germany pay the money that had been "plundered" by the German Imperial Staff during the summer of 1918 came as a great embarrassment to the Russian delegation and to Litvinov in particular; this was the more so that it soon became obvious to the whole German press that

in the course of the negotiations respecting the extension of the Rapallo Treaty, the representatives of the other Soviet Republics have hitherto sought to emphasize their economic and political independence in opposition to the Russian representative Litvinov.²²

The *Lokal Anzeiger* specified that the "soul of the opposition" to the Russian delegation was the Ukrainian envoy. When news of the "plot" arrived in Moscow, the matter was taken very seriously indeed, and Chicherin himself was immediately sent to Berlin. In the meantime, very strict directives were sent to Litvinov who took a first decisive step. According to the German press,

the representative of the Ukraine received a very clear hint from the Russian side that he was not justified in concluding

an independent agreement with Germany and that the Russian representative was the real spokesman in these negotiations.²³

Before Chicherin arrived in Berlin, however, the conversations between the German government and the Soviets were broken off because the Ukrainian envoy would not yield to pressure from Moscow. The central Soviet government refused to admit that the second republic of the federation might have a distinct foreign policy that diverged so much from its own. The intention of the Ukrainian government of Rakovski was, in fact, to use the sums recuperated from Germany as "a basis for future business transactions." This aim was quite understandable when we remember that the main impediment to active business transactions between the Soviet Ukraine, on the one hand, and France, Austria, and Germany, on the other, was the lack of capital. In an effort to overcome this major obstacle, Rakovski decided to grant Germany a share in the development of the Ukrainian economy under the form of concessions, for this required a smaller cash investment, and involved mainly the use of advanced techniques and effective management.

Concessions were envisaged in several sectors of the economy: agriculture, mining, timber, railway transport, and trade. There were to be two forms of agreement.²⁴ The first concerned "pure concessions," giving foreign companies complete control of undertakings on which they merely paid a royalty to the Ukrainian government. The second type of agreement, which the Soviet side preferred, was for the establishment of mixed companies, in which the Ukrainian government or its organs were partners in the business, contributing to its capital either in kind or in money, sharing loss and profit, and participating in the administration. We shall take the characteristic example of the Krupp agricultural concession in the Ukraine.

On 16 January 1923, the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissaries ratified the amended contract with the German firm of Krupp, conferring one of the most important concessions the Ukrainian government had yet granted. The firm acquired the right to exploitation of 25,000 *desyatins* (roughly 67,500 acres) of virgin land in the Saalsk district of the Don province "for grain cultivation on modern lines." The concessionaires agreed to cultivate a minimum of 1,400 *desyatins* in the first two years, increasing the area of cultivation by fixed additions to 23,500 *desyatins* at the end of six years. The lease dues were levied at the rate of 17.5 percent of the total harvest delivered free on rail to the nearest railway station. The Ukrainian government reserved the right to purchase the remainder of the harvest at current grain prices ruling on the Rotterdam Corn Exchange, less the cost of freightage. At the expiry of the term of concession, all enter-

prises were to be handed over to the Ukrainian government in proper working order. After twelve years from the commencement of the concession the government had the right to acquire the concession by purchase.²⁵ It is interesting to note that the major part of the initial capital of the Krupp concession (£40,000) actually came from Britain through the "Russian Land Concession Mantyeh Ltd."²⁶ The representative of the Krupp Agricultural Concession, a Mr. Klette, arrived a few months later in Rostov-on-Don. In an interview, he stated that the object of his firm was "to help the Ukrainian nation in fighting the possibility of bad harvests by creating a big agricultural organization which should raise the yield from the soil and as far as possible preserve it from danger due to natural causes." In addition, he intended to build large workshops for the repair and improvement of agricultural machinery in the possession of the local population. He expected that his firm would receive payment for such services either in kind, that is, agricultural products, or in labor power needed on the concession. He also intended to hire out, over a wide area, the machines bought by the firm, under capable instructors, in return, for the same kind of payment from the local population. The staff of workers consisted of only six individuals who were German citizens: most of them had either been born in Russia or in the Ukraine, or had lived and worked there for a very long time. The representatives of Krupp thought that the rest of the administrative and working personnel would be recruited from the local inhabitants.²⁷

For many reasons, this enterprise was something of a disappointment to the Germans, but it did help Ukrainian agriculture, and contributed to the improvement of its methods of cultivation. Moreover, when Rakovski learned that the major part of the capital came from London, he decided to enter into direct relations with the British government.

5. The Ukraine and Great Britain

These relations began in January 1922 when a British mission headed by a Major Dunlop arrived in Karkov. Dunlop was immediately received by Rakovski, of whom he gave a firsthand account to the Foreign Office:

Mr. Rakovski has the reputation of being an honest man, but is at any rate, very pleasant to deal with. He is thoroughly civilized and carries [great] weight, being, there seems little doubt, the only real able man here. He works very hard, and manages to do a lot of writing for the press, his main subject being agriculture.²⁸

From his interview with Rakovski, Major Dunlop gathered three

main ideas. First, that the Ukraine would insist on its independence vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, as far as foreign policy and foreign trade were concerned; second, that Rakovski gave priority to restoring agriculture in the famine-stricken Republic; third, that industry would have to be revived on the basis of concessions to the former foreign owners rather than to new ones, because of the severe lack of cash resources that paralyzed the Ukrainian Soviet government. Analyzing the chances of British trade with the Ukrainian SSR, Major Dunlop wrote to Lord Curzon in January 1922 that

Mr. Rakovski . . . touched upon the work of the factories making agricultural machinery, this being one article greatly needed by the peasants, and in reply to my question as to the chances of the former owners being able to resume work, he said it was all a matter of terms. He said that any agreement on the subject would have to be made with the Ukraine, as an arrangement made in Moscow would not be considered binding by the Ukrainian authorities. He authorized me to quote this as his official statement. . . . I should add a warning for the benefit of firms who are proposing to do business, that a number of unscrupulous merchants are eagerly waiting for the resumption of private trading, when they hope to be able to offer their services to British firms.²⁹

In the same interview, Rakovski expressed the eagerness of his government to come to terms directly with Great Britain. He even requested the British envoy to put on record as a question from him: "What prospect is there of relations between Great Britain and the Ukraine taking the same form as relations between H.M.G. and Moscow?"³⁰

It was decided at the same time that a small steamer would be sent to Britain with an assortment of Ukrainian produce, "in order to get the London market interested." On the other hand, Rakovski's commissar for foreign trade, Bron, informed Major Dunlop that "herrings were of interest to them as foodstuff" and asked for particulars.³¹ The first contacts between British firms and the Ukrainian government could be made through the official representative of the Ukrainian SSR in Prague, I. Novakovsky.³²

The result of Major Dunlop's mission to the Ukraine (which lasted more than two months from January until March 1922) and of Rakovski's energetic action was a project for the establishment of an Anglo-Ukrainian Commercial Bank. This took shape in November 1922. On 8 November 1922, there was a meeting in London between members of the British Department of Overseas Trade and private

businessmen "in connection with the foundation in Berlin or elsewhere of an Anglo-Ukrainian Commercial Bank for the purpose of financing operations in the Ukraine."³³ The British bankers expatiated on the great possibilities of future trade between the two countries and suggested that the bank "might possibly act as an intermediary . . . with a view to restoring property to former British owners," and also that "all future proposals in regard to opening up the trade of the Ukraine would practically have to be linked up with their organization." The British businessmen added that "they would be very glad if H.M.G. were able to enter into a trade agreement with the Ukrainian Republic on lines similar to that concluded with the Central government in Moscow," and asked that Mr. Novakovsky should be allowed to enter Britain "with a view to inaugurating informal discussion with the Foreign Office with this object."³⁴ The Department of Overseas trade learned soon afterwards that the group of British businessmen were backed by the Cunard Steamship Company.³⁵

By October 1922, an agreement of a preliminary nature had already been signed between the British group and the Ukrainian government. It embodied the principles on which the parties had agreed for the formation in London of a company with a capital of £1,000,000 that was, in its turn, to finance a bank whose headquarters would be in Germany or elsewhere. The agreement stated that

the Bank undertakes the financing of the Ukrainian import and export trade, of industry, agriculture, transport undertakings and any other undertakings connected with all these economic branches, and to carry out all banking operations which are requisite for the purpose of the Bank.¹³⁶

At the end of December 1922, British visas were apparently granted to Novakovsky, Sheiner, Rappaport, and Aussem, all of them representatives of the Soviet Ukraine in Western Europe, with the aim of "advancing the negotiations for the proposed Anglo-Ukrainian Bank."³⁷ Vladimir Aussem obtained his visa without difficulty, as he had already been admitted to Britain in June 1922 in connection with the organization of a British-Ukrainian Trade Company similar to the Franco-Polish-Ukrainian Trading Society, whose formation had been ratified on 8 December 1922 by the Ukrainian Economic Council.³⁸

The Ukrainian Economic Council was chiefly interested in obtaining from these trading companies materials required by agriculture and industry, including jute and copra, machinery of all kinds (and especially agricultural machinery), tanning extract, and other chemicals. On the Ukrainian side, trading was concentrated in the hands of the Commissariats for Foreign Trade (Narkomvneshtorg) and of

the cooperative organization Vukospilka. Major Dunlop noted in his report to the Foreign Office that both these bodies lacked cash resources; all they could offer in payment would be raw material such as hemp, bristles, wool, sheep casing, manganese ore, timber, and timber products such as veneer, barrel, staves, etc.³⁹

At the beginning of the summer of 1922, Rakovski also got in touch with Irish industrialists and offered special advantages for the establishment of an agricultural bank to be run jointly by Irish industrialists and Soviet representatives.⁴⁰ But Rakovski did not keep his eyes fixed on the British Isles only, and turned to the south, namely to Italy.

6. The Relations of the Soviet Ukraine with Other Countries: Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the United States

As early as December 1921, the Ukraine had concluded a preliminary agreement with Italy, and trade had already begun. Vessels owned by Trieste Lloyd, a big Black Sea shipping company, made regular voyages between Odessa and Trieste. In 1924 a final agreement was to be reached regarding the concession to Italy of a vast coalfield in the Donets region. The mines were to be ceded to an Italian syndicate for thirty-three years, and the enterprise financed by the Banca Commerciale Italiana, which had made a first allocation of 40 million lire.⁴¹

As we know, Rakovski paid the closest attention to events in Western Europe in the countries that bordered the Ukraine, and had sent his first official representatives to Poland and Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1922, the Polish commercial attaché in Paris told his British colleague Eric Phipps that "a considerable volume of regular trade was already being carried on between Poland and Ukraine."⁴² In August 1922, Yakovlev told *Izvestiya* that "the Ukrainian government had received a whole series of proposals [touching various concessions] which came from big business firms in Czechoslovakia."⁴³ Through the *Russian Information and Review* and other press organs, Rakovski's government advertised, at the end of 1922, the establishment of a company for the exploitation of the small and medium-sized enterprises of the Ukraine, and the creation of a company to import large quantities of technical products from abroad; it requested applications from West European enterprises.⁴⁴ It was also at this moment that the Ukraine established connections with the United States.

At the beginning of 1923, it was announced that a group of textile workers from the United States had applied to the Ukrainian Economic Council for permission to operate one of the Ukrainian state textile enterprises. The request was granted, and the group was

allowed to work either a Poltava or an Odessa factory, in accordance with a definite agreement that remained to be settled.⁴⁵ In February of the same year, a land concession was granted to a U. S. guild of agricultural workers called the "California Commune"; it consisted of 1,000 *desyatins* (about 2,700 acres) of land in the Saalsk district of the Don region, the area in which foreign concessions (e.g., the Krupp enterprise) were concentrated. The concession was granted for a term of twenty-four years, and the commune undertook to employ modern agricultural methods to develop the full capacity of the leased lands. It was decided that one-half of the land would be tilled and prepared for sowing in the current year. Payment of lease would not be demanded until the lapse of three years, when it would amount to 5 percent of the total crop.⁴⁶ It is also significant that the Ukrainian government made arrangements at this time for the return of the Canadian *dukhobors* to their land of origin.⁴⁷ This tells much of the tolerance of the Ukrainian Soviet government under the direct influence of Rakovski, who closely supervised relations with foreign countries and the granting of concessions on the territory of the Ukraine.

By 1923, it was clear that the Ukrainian government had the firm intention of taking the national economy into its hands. With this aim in mind, they organized an Agricultural Exhibition in Karkov in January 1923: this was said to have had "considerable importance in stimulating Ukrainian trade."⁴⁸ Another important fair was held in Kiev in March 1923, which attracted "considerable attention on the part of foreign firms." The goods received by 5 March totalled over 5,000 tons and transactions were completed at the same time to the value of £250,000. Foreign exhibitors at the fair included many foreign firms: forty-five came from Poland, ten from Austria, ten from Germany, three from Sweden, one each from France and the United States. The main exhibits were agricultural implements, various technical equipment for factories, tractors, motors, office equipment, and articles of clothing.⁴⁹

In June 1923, the All-Ukrainian Central Committee issued a decree whereby foreign firms were empowered to open offices in the Ukraine only with the consent of the Concession Committee of the Ukrainian Economic Council. The existing offices had to obtain permits within a month; offices that did not apply for the necessary permit would be closed down. The law seemed quite abrupt, but actually masked the last feat of independence of the Ukrainian Soviet government under the leadership of Rakovski. In July 1923, he was dismissed from his posts of president of the People's Commissars and commissar for foreign affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, and immediately "exiled" to a diplomatic post abroad.⁵⁰

B. The International Significance of the Nationality Problem: Nationalism Versus Bureaucracy (1923)

We have seen that, until the end of the civil war, Rakovski was a staunch advocate of centralization within the borders of the first socialist state. The aim of all Bolsheviks, from Stalin to Rakovski, was obviously to further the dictatorship of the proletariat and to strive toward a communist society through socialism. However, as the ultimate aim seemed to recede further and further, the methods used to reach it could diverge considerably. In 1919, Rakovski considered that centralization would save the first proletarian state from particularism, provincialism and democratic "bourgeois" prejudices, and concentrate all resources for the benefit of the Revolution. Nationalism could then only appear to him as a divisive and, hence, counterrevolutionary force. Yet, three years later, Rakovski became one of the most fervent and efficient advocates of national independence for the autonomous republics of the Federation, against the high-handed efforts of Great Russian bureaucrats to concentrate power in their own hands. Ironically, he put the following words in the mouths of the partisans of centralism: "Well, you know, we have settled the problem of the nationalities since the time of the October Revolution; we are a communist country, we are all for internationalism."⁵¹

In April 1923, which saw the climax of his efforts to reinforce the independence of the Soviet Republics, Rakovski declared to the Twelfth Party Congress that "we must deprive the Union Commissariats of nine-tenths of their rights and give these rights to the national Republics."⁵²

If we try to understand why Rakovski had traveled so far from the views he held in 1919, we shall find that he had simply adapted his views to changing external and domestic circumstances. Indeed, one of his firmest beliefs was that "only the imbecile never changes."⁵³ Rakovski's initial conception of the way to build a true socialist society had been revised because the revolutionary wave, which was thought to have gathered enough momentum in the years 1918-1920 to break over Western Europe, had finally receded. For how long it had receded, no one could say, but the Bolsheviks soon realized that the miserable peasant masses of the East could give a new impulse to the advance of revolution.

As early as November 1918, Stalin had emphasized the "world significance of the October Revolution," whose impact had created a "new revolutionary front" running "from the proletariat of the West through the Russian Revolution to the oppressed peoples of the East, against world imperialism."⁵⁴ In his address of November 1919 to

the Congress of the Peoples of the East, Lenin stated the importance of the fact that the Oriental masses were gradually awakening to a historical and political consciousness of their individuality and of their independence:

That majority, which up until then had been completely outside the orbit of historical progress because it could not constitute an independent revolutionary force, ceased, as we know, to play such a passive role at the beginning of the twentieth century.⁵⁵

The Russian Bolsheviks considered that, if they could only channel and lead the nationalist movements outside the Soviet republics into the fight against world imperialism, the masses of the East would become a decisive factor in favor of world revolution. With this idea in mind, Lenin claimed that "the period of the awakening of the East to the contemporary revolution is being succeeded by a period in which all the Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world."⁵⁶ In pronouncing these words, Lenin clearly realized that this constituted an adaptation of the strict Marxist theory, which applied to the industrialized proletariat of Western Europe and to the large peasant masses of the East. In itself, this adaptation was similar to that which Lenin had already made in adjusting Marxist theory to the social conditions of Russia. These problems had to be thought over with a genuine independence of mind, because, as Lenin declared to the Congress of the Peoples of the East, "you will not find their solution in any communist book."⁵⁷

Rakovski considered that Lenin had succeeded remarkably in adapting Marxism to the new circumstances created by the movement of history. The problem of nationalities and that of colonialism already existed but, Rakovski argued:

In Marx's time, the problem of nationalities arose as a purely European problem, in connection with the striving for unification in both Italy and Germany, in connection with the Polish aspiration for liberation from the tsarist yoke. The movement of the nationalities had not even seized the whole of Europe, and there was no question of taking into account such a movement in India or Africa.⁵⁸

In his article on "Lenin and Marx," he wrote that Marx brought to the understanding of history what Newton had brought to that of physics. Taken by itself, the law of the class struggle is as easy to grasp as the law of gravity, but Newton's law only becomes meaningful when applied to mechanics, and Marx's law when applied to such a problem as that of nationalities. Then, Rakovski added, "continuing

the work of Marx, Ilich laid the the foundation of Leninism, i.e., the application of the law of class struggle to the existing historical circumstances.”⁵⁹

Thus, in the last notes that he wrote at the beginning of March 1923, Lenin explained with more insight than ever before the significance that the revolutionized masses of the East were acquiring:

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle between socialism and imperialism will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc. account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And during the past few years it is this majority that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity. . . . In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured. . . .⁶⁰

Lenin, however, was not primarily interested in meditating on the “inevitability” of the victory of socialism, because this did not help the cause of revolution in the least. What interested him was the working out of the tactics that would further the cause. The purpose of these tactics was not only to increase and maintain the revolutionary spirit of the Eastern masses; it was, more precisely, to make “the hundreds of millions in Asia” enter the stage of history in the wake of Russian Bolshevism. To reach this aim, there was only one method: to gain the confidence of these primitive masses by showing the concrete and palpable progress that the socialist order of society would represent for them over the capitalist-imperialist order. At that time, Lenin reckoned that these large masses, which, in his eyes, the capitalists of Western Europe were exploiting without mercy, would have enough strength to start their revolution. They had only to be shown how to free themselves.

At this stage, the Russian Bolsheviks could offer their personal experience of a successful revolution in a huge peasant country; they had to attract the masses of the East by showing them that the nationalities that lived within the borders of the former Russian Empire had reached an unprecedented state of development under the new order of society. At the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in April 1923 leading Bolsheviks—from Zinoviev, Radek, and Stalin, to Bukharin and Rakovski—showed themselves acutely aware of the international importance of a Soviet “nationalities policy.” Stalin himself proclaimed that “the entire East is looking at our Union Republic, as at an experimental field [*optynoe pole*].”⁶¹

On 30 April 1923, Rakovski wrote that the first socialist state had become “the arena and the school” that would coordinate the

activities of the Communists of all countries. Pursuing Lenin's ideas, he considered that the Soviet republics had to become such a school "not only by its program" (as Stalin tacitly assumed), "but mainly by the way this program is carried out."⁶² Rakovski thought that the nationalities outside the union, and more particularly the emerging nationalities, would feel confident only if the peoples within the republics were treated according to the true spirit of socialist legality. This, he argued, was not the case. Not only was Stalin's program regarding the nationalities of the Soviet Union not put into practice, but the program itself was insufficient and suffered from bureaucratic and administrative deficiencies. Rakovski did not hesitate to declare to the Twelfth Party Congress:

If, for a whole series of reasons, we do regret the absence of Vladimir Ilich among us, the treatment of the nationalities is one of these reasons. His authority, his understanding of both internal and international circumstances, his authoritative words are lacking to give a resounding blow to our party, to show our party that it is making fatal errors as far as the nationality problem is concerned.⁶³

He stated that this was the third time that the nationality problem had been discussed officially at the congress, and argued: "the more we raise this question, the further we move away from a communist understanding and solution of the nationality problem." He claimed that the October Revolution had, as yet, brought no solution whatsoever to this question. The point was to elaborate a new understanding of the concept of revolutionary internationalism in connection with the nationalist movements existing within the first socialist state. He admitted that the great difficulty of the moment was

to find a link between our proletarian and communist internationalism and the national development of the broad peasant masses striving for a genuine national life, for national culture, national self-government.⁶⁴

He feared that this alliance would prove almost impossible to realize, not because these two elements could not be allied, but because three factors were at work to prevent the union (*smychka*): the aggressive force of Great Russian nationalism, the oppressive force of Great Russian bureaucracy, and also the widening gap between the theory and practice of socialism. Rakovski rested his argument on the tremendous danger for socialism of "this cardinal divergence which is created day after day, which grows wider and wider between, on the one hand, our party and our program, and, on the other, our political apparatus."⁶⁵ The danger was the greater in practice because

the so-called communists leading the Party apparatus were "yielding to the psychology of their own bureaucratic apparatus," which Lenin had rightly defined as "an aristocratic and bourgeois remnant, anointed with the communist chrism." Rakovski declared bluntly to the Twelfth Party Congress:

The point is that our central organs have come to look at the direction of our country from the point of view of their bureaucratic convenience. Of course, it is inconvenient to rule over twenty republics; well, they say, if we made a whole of the lot of them, if by pressing one button we could govern the entire country, this would really be convenient.⁶⁶

At the head of the Soviet Ukraine since the hard days of 1919, Rakovski was in a very good position to talk about the fight the so-called autonomous republics had to sustain for their very existence. There were "perpetual examples of Russian commissariats signing international agreements in the name of the Ukraine," whereas, "even according to the Union constitution, they have no right to do this."⁶⁷ If the central organs were incapable of controlling their own bureaucratic tendencies and impulses, Rakovski argued, the huge masses of the nationalities that strove for independence within the republics, as much as outside, would turn away from Soviet Russia: Great Russian bureaucracy would transform the forces of these nationalities into counterrevolutionary forces, although historical circumstances were pushing them on the road to bolshevism. Again and again, he warned his colleagues about the real importance of the danger:

Comrades, this [national question] is one of those questions which are pregnant with very serious complications for Soviet Russia and the Party. This is one of those questions which, this must be said openly and honestly at a Party Congress, threaten civil war, if we fail to show the necessary sensitivity, the necessary understanding with regard to it. It is the question of the link of the Russian revolutionary proletariat with sixty million non-Russian peasants, who under the national banner raise their demands for a share in the economic and political life of the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

At this time, Rakovski wrote a very revealing pamphlet entitled *The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: A New Stage in the Construction of the Soviet Union*. He gives us a detailed analysis of the interconnection between socialism and the three forces of nationalism, internationalism, and bureaucracy. He wrote that the Russian Revolution of October 1917 had only begun to create the conditions "that would lead, after a long process, which could last not tens, but hun-

dreds, of years to victory over those national peculiarities that have grown out of human history.”⁶⁹ Language, customs, and local habits are all the products of a certain historical development. The peoples awakening to a form of national consciousness would never allow foreigners to crush the very symbols of their independence. However, a first misunderstanding of the meaning of internationalism had denied any sort of independence to the nationalities; then, bureaucracy had arisen. The nationalities that had been denied existence in 1919 by such communist theoreticians as Bukharin were not mishandled by the bureaucrats. Now, Rakovski thought as Lenin did, that it was “better to stretch too far in the direction of complaisance and softness toward the national minorities than too little.”⁷⁰ To suppress completely a nascent imperialistic relationship with the oppressed nationalities, and to try and gain their confidence, Lenin had gone a long way in his recommendations to the Twelfth Party Congress:

We must in no way renounce in advance [the idea of] turning back . . . that is, retaining the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics only in the military and diplomatic spheres and in all other respects restoring the full independence of the separate commissariats. . . . It would be unforgivable opportunism if, on the eve of the emergence of the East and at the beginning of its awakening, we should undermine our prestige there with even the slightest rudeness or injustice to our own minorities.⁷¹

With this aim in mind, Rakovski insisted on the necessity of adding a second chamber to the Union legislature that would represent the national groups. In this way, the Soviet Union was to become a confederation. In November 1922, Stalin had first opposed Rakovski on this issue, stating that such a liberal view

will undoubtedly find no sympathy in the national republics, if only because the two-chamber system with the existence of an upper chamber is not compatible with the Soviet government, at any rate, at the present stage of its development.⁷²

In February 1923, however, Stalin was obliged to change his mind, largely under the pressure of other leading Bolsheviki who had been convinced by Lenin's last notes on the urgency of a compromise with the feeling of independence of the nationalities. A Council of Nationalities was formed and officially mentioned in the Soviet constitution: in practice, it was the same Council of Nationalities that Stalin had formed as part of the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs in April 1921, with the addition of deputies from the three Union Republics. Stalin staffed the new council with devoted followers, who

completely obliterated the significance of this body. When he realized the full extent of and the reasons for forcible centralization, Rakovski foresaw the degeneration of the Communist party and the possible failure of Soviet Russia in its efforts to build socialism. He declared to the Twelfth Party Congress: "I must frankly admit that, when I look at the calm with which particularly the Russian part of our party contemplated the debates [over the national question] . . . I am alarmed for the fate of our Party."⁷³

When his fears about the passivity of a great number of Communists were confirmed by the rejection of the motion he had proposed—to give more independence to the nationalities—Rakovski voiced his disapproval of bureaucratic centralization with the greatest energy and political courage. He wrote:

If by centralization is understood the concentration of power in the hands of a central organ and the transformation of the entire mass into the obedient instrument which will execute the orders of the central power; if by centralization is understood the elimination of all initiative, of all economic, political, and administrative independence; if by centralization is understood a dead bureaucratic centralization which is the synonym of tyranny, then there is no greater enemy of the Soviet power than centralization. . . . If political life becomes the privilege of a handful of people then, of course, there will never be any participation of the working masses in the direction of the country; and the Soviet power will lose its main support. Against such a centralization, Communists will always fight with the greatest determination.⁷⁴

Thus, Rakovski outlined the meaning of his uncompromising opposition to Stalin. In the same pamphlet on the building of the Soviet Union, he distinguished between two conflicting conceptions of socialism: "democratic socialism," which he favored, and Stalin's "bureaucratic centralism," which he had decided to fight. That was the time when, almost simultaneously, Lenin accused Stalin of being "too rude," while he referred to Rakovski as to "a genuine European."⁷⁵ But then Stalin had already begun "to emerge with increasing prominence as the organizer, the assigner of tasks, the dispenser of jobs, the trainer and master of Soviet bureaucracy."⁷⁶

On 6 July 1923, the second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR proclaimed the new Constitution of the Union, and launched the All-Union Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.⁷⁷ The very same day, the *London Times* published the news of the impending appointment of Rakovski as the new Soviet representative in Lon-

don. Kamenev later affirmed that this was the first time that Stalin dared use administrative repression against a high-ranking Bolshevik official to remove a vociferous opponent from the political scene.⁷⁸

Chapter 13

British-Soviet Relations(1923)

The relationship that developed between Great Britain and the Soviet Republics from 1921 until 1927 can be compared to the regular ebb and flow of a tide. The motion of the tide was governed by the will and, at times, the obsessions of the British politicians who succeeded one another in power, even more than by the economic and political context of Europe and of the world at that time. Lloyd George's "leniency" toward the Bolsheviks started the flow, which rapidly reached the high waters of the Trade Agreement of March 1921 and saw the evident effort of the British prime minister to come to an understanding with the Soviets at Genoa in the spring of 1922. With the fall of Lloyd George and the rise of Lord Curzon, a reaction inevitably set in, which led to the presentation of an ultimatum a year later in May 1923. Almost immediately, however, the tide turned when Ramsay MacDonald came to power; it reached the high mark of official recognition seven months later after the Curzon ultimatum, of 1 February 1924; then it subsided again with the rise of Austen Chamberlain. As a Conservative who had been an ally of Lloyd George, Chamberlain could afford to have more patience with the Bolsheviks than Curzon ever had. Progressively, however, starting with the isolation of the Soviet Republics after the Locarno Conference of the fall of 1925, the tide receded until the rupture of diplomatic relations in May 1927.

It is significant to note that, while Lloyd George and MacDonald struggled to come to terms with the Soviets, they had averted their eyes from Bolshevik activities in the British Empire, and tended to focus their attention on the future of Europe. Given the same general circumstances, Curzon and then Chamberlain came to a break with the Bolsheviks because they were primarily concerned with the future of the Empire, and blinked at the consequences that an open break with the Soviets might have on the future of Europe and of the world. The Liberal and Labor parties emphasized the advantages of an economic rapprochement with the Soviets while the Conservatives mainly stressed the political disadvantage.

A. British-Soviet Relations before Rakovski's Arrival in Britain

On their way back from Lausanne, both Chicherin and Rakovski

realized that the Soviet Republics were in a far worse position than before the conference.

1. The Aftermath of the Lausanne Conference

In the west, the Bolsheviks had failed to secure a rapprochement with France while they had antagonized Britain on the problems of the East. In the Near East, Turkey had taken its distance from Moscow, and the settlement of the problem of the Straits was decidedly unfavorable to the Soviet Republics. Moreover, the former Allies were giving the impression of getting closer to one another, even if this was done to the detriment of Turkey and Germany. D'Albernon noted in his diary that all reports from Moscow agreed that Chicherin "had lost a great deal of his influence."¹ He was criticized for having let the Turks act independently and come to an agreement with the British regarding the Straits. Chicherin himself admitted in an interview he gave to the British journalist A. Ransome in February 1923 that

I and my colleagues of the Russian government have been much saddened by the effect which the Lausanne Conference had on our relations with Britain. We saw that the British delegates pursued a policy that must necessarily alienate Russia.²

Chicherin had indeed some reasons to feel dejected, for all the plans that he and Rakovski had tried to implement had failed. Rakovski had come to the conclusion that Curzon was "the representative of the policy of seizure and conquest" and concluded:

We are aware that Curzon personifies the arrogance of thoroughbred British aristocracy, who regards what is now the highest achievement of human progress—the Soviet Power, the Workers' Government, and Communism—as mere delusion.³

In a way, the Lausanne Conference had shown that the Soviet Republics were a country that had to be reckoned with in all international problems. It had also shown that they were not yet strong enough to play a leading role on the international stage, nor to impose their will on the Western Powers. This was to be clearly demonstrated in May of the same year when the British government, and Lord Curzon in particular, felt it was high time to ask the Soviets to account for their incessant propaganda both in Great Britain itself and throughout the British Empire.

2. The Effects of Bolshevik Propaganda in Great Britain and in the British Empire

At the time of the first British-Soviet negotiations, which started at the end of May 1920 and led to the trade agreement of March 1921,

Lord Curzon had already been infuriated by Bolshevik propaganda, and had exacted the expulsion of L. B. Kamenev, who was negotiating with Krasin and Lloyd George. Indeed, British intelligence had intercepted a telegram to Chicherin in which Kamenev expressly wrote: "All the intelligence work which it was possible to do has been done."⁴ In effect, the British services had intercepted so many of these compromising telegrams⁵ that Churchill himself could claim in January 1921 that these perfectly illustrated "the perfidy and malice of these ruffians."⁶ By July 1920, it was already clear that the majority of the Soviet delegates to London were spending part of their time and all their money making anti-British propaganda. They had been less than a month in London when it became obvious that the pro-Soviet organization, Hands Off Russia, had received money from a Soviet envoy (Nogin). A telegram Krasin received from Theodore Rothstein on 9 September 1920 advised "energetic action among the masses" through the medium of this society. Moreover, there was "definite evidence that Krasin, on instructions from Moscow, had made use of the *Daily Herald* for the purposes of propaganda." Both he and Klyshko were present at the luncheon party Francis Meynell and George Lansbury gave on 9 June at which a subsidy for the *Daily Herald* was agreed to. It was then arranged that Krasin would bring the promised subsidies; a few days later, it was learned from a deciphered telegram that the Soviet delegation disposed of £40,000, which they handed over to the newspaper, and that they expected to realize another £60,000, out of which a further £10,000 was to be paid to the *Daily Herald*.⁷ Thus, the evidence had accumulated in ever increasing volume that the Soviet representatives were "not only daily and deliberately breaking their pledge," but also that they were fomenting in Britain an agitation that, as Curzon claimed, "was intended to destroy our institutions and to produce a revolution in this country."⁸ In September 1920, Curzon had thus come to the conclusion that "the presence of these unscrupulous agitators is too high a price to pay even for the chances of a peaceful settlement."⁹ He was never to change his opinion, as witness his ultimatum of May 1923 to the Soviets.

After the fall of Lloyd George at the end of 1922, Curzon felt that, at last, he could have a free hand in dealing with the Bolsheviks, and that he was at liberty to put them in their place in the East and the Middle East. By this time, however, the Soviets had considerably reduced their propagandist activities in these parts of the world, and a Foreign Office memorandum of May 1922 on the "anti-British activities of the Soviet government" clearly showed that these activities were "objectively on the wane."¹⁰

The author of the memorandum (R. A. Leeper) argued that the Bolsheviks were still doing what they could to damage British interests in the East "though more secretly and with more limited resources." The chief center of intrigues in the East seemed to be Baku, which was the headquarters of the Council of Action and Propaganda. All instructions continued to be sent from Moscow to Baku, and, from the latter center, they were distributed farther, mainly to Meshed and Tashkent. In May 1922, the school of propaganda in Tashkent still remained open. According to a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) report dated 13 February 1922, the number of students was about 100, chiefly Sarts, Persians, Afghanis, and Indians.¹¹ Propaganda literature was being produced at Tashkent in large quantity, and attempts were made to send it into India via Persia across the Baluchistan frontier. In his review of Bolshevik activities in the various countries of the East, R. A. Leeper noted that the Bolsheviks were still particularly active in Persia, especially along the southern coast of Caspian, in Meshed, which was considered as an outpost for India, and in Teheran. In Persia, Bolshevik activities were led by Theodore Rothstein, who had been appointed Soviet ambassador there at the beginning of 1921.¹² He was charged not only with the execution of the Russo-Persian Treaty (26 February 1921), but also with propaganda work on behalf of the Comintern in Persia, Azerbaidjan, and Georgia. He had large sums of money at his disposal (some £183,000) "for the support of Persian Communists and for the establishment of a Bolshevik Academy."¹³ In November 1921, eighty Iraqi notables had sent a secret letter "to our dear friend the protector of the oppressed," the Russian minister in Teheran:

As the Federal government of Russia is well aware of the selfish and destructive designs of the oppressive British government, and our beloved friend the government of Russia holds the same views as ourselves on the matter, we put forward the following points in our petition. That today is the day of vengeance, and if the Russian government will support our enterprise, we can drive the perjured British back to India and thus obtain our object. . . . We request that when you have been informed of our miserable and heart-rending condition, you will send us a reply giving us the necessary instructions so that we may put the work to hand.¹⁴

In his reply, Rothstein informed the Iraqi notables that he had held several sessions with "our comrade the Afghan minister and the Keamlist Committee." He told them that "a secret committee of

Mesopotamia in Teheran" had just been formed, and sent them two of his agents. As the British were perfectly well informed of these moves, they had no difficulty in counteracting them. The British official who minuted the report noted only that "the list of dignitaries should prove useful" to the local police.¹⁵

Soviet intrigues with Indian revolutionaries were still flourishing in 1922, but were meeting with "little success": according to the Foreign Office official, the Indians were still devoting the greatest part of their energy to squabbles among themselves rather than intrigues against the British. In the same way, information from Afghanistan showed that Bolshevik propaganda there was being whittled down, and that Raskolnikov, the Soviet representative in Kabul, was "discouraging the dispatch of any further Indian [revolutionaries] to Afghanistan."¹⁶ As Leeper compiled several memoranda for Lord Curzon, he felt that it sounded quite innocuous, and attached a series of SIS reports dealing with recent Bolshevik activities throughout the East, but nevertheless came to the following conclusion:

The information contained in these reports is not very definite and the general impressions conveyed is that though the Bolsheviks have not abandoned their plans in general, they have slowed down considerably in practice chiefly owing to lack of funds.¹⁷

Curzon's reaction when reading the memorandum tells us indirectly a great deal about his mentality and his attitude toward the "Bolshies": "I can't help thinking that with a more vigilant watch we might have done better."¹⁸ It was clear that Curzon was determined to chastise the Soviets as much for what they had done as for what they were doing. His intention was to denounce the trade agreement of 1921, which had been signed against his will, and which, he thought, would never bring great relief to British economy. One might give a precise example to show how Curzon acted at that time.

A month before the ultimatum, at the beginning of 1923, Vickers Ltd. pressed for permission from the Foreign Office and the Admiralty to sign an important contract with the Soviets. The firm had been offered an order of 500 submarine mines for the Soviet government. Vickers argued that the contract would relieve unemployment not only at their construction works at Barrow, but also in other districts where component parts of the mines would be manufactured.¹⁹ The Admiralty was influenced by the argument and thought that it was "preferable that Russia should be in possession of mines the characteristics of which are known to us rather than those of foreign manufacture, the nature of which is uncertain, and which may there-

fore cause considerable trouble if the minefield has to be swept later on." The Admiralty further argued in favor of Vickers' demand that Russia would undoubtedly obtain the mines from another country if British firms were refused an export licence.²⁰ Curzon was infuriated by this last argument and by the idea of selling British arms that could kill British soldiers. He wrote in revealing fashion:

I have the utmost contempt for this [commercial] argument which is always used to justify our doing some shady thing. How can I possibly ask the Cabinet to consider whether we should break off relations with the Soviet government if at the same time we are selling them submarine mines?²¹

In consequence, the Foreign Office made it clear to the Admiralty on 25 April that Vickers should be informed that, "for the present on political grounds the proposed transaction is considered as highly undesirable."²² The ultimatum to the Soviet government followed two weeks later, at a time when Bonar Law was on the verge of resigning for ill health, and when Curzon believed that he would at last become prime minister.

3. Conservative Public Opinion and the Bolsheviks

If Lord Curzon was able to send his ultimatum to the Soviet government despite the "rather meager" discoveries of the British intelligence services on Bolshevik propaganda, it was largely due to the strength of conservative public opinion at home as well as abroad. In Britain, many conservatives considered bolshevism as a disruptive force, wild and blind, and the Bolsheviks as dangerous persons who would never be capable of learning the fair rules of competition and decent rivalry. In August 1922, for example, at a time when the Soviet government still thought that Lloyd George would grant them official recognition, the British representative in Moscow, R. Hodgson, wrote to Lord Curzon a report that was characteristic enough and summed up the conservative case:

Experience has abundantly shown that the individuals who control the destinies of Russia at the present time are refractory to reason; that it is only a driving force of circumstances that can impel them to adopt policy in harmony with that of the outside world—in other words, that evolution is taking place in Russia, not with their goodwill, but in spite of their effort to retard it. . . . They are to a man conspirators, ex-convicts or fugitives from justice, who have spent their lives as outcasts. They have the tortuous brain of the conspirator, his suspiciousness and the inabil-

ity to be straightforward themselves or to understand the straightforwardness of others.²³

Thus, the agents of the Russian Revolution appeared as "wild men" to the Conservatives who felt repelled, first of all, on moral grounds. But Conservatives mainly feared for the security of the British Empire. To them, as Churchill claimed with the greatest energy, bolshevism was essentially a disease; and it was the more dangerous that it could spread to

the enormous countries leading up to the frontiers of India, disturbing Afghanistan, disturbing Persia, creating far to the south great agitation and unrest among the hundreds of millions of our Indian population.²⁴

On the other hand, nothing was more alien to British democracy, and to Western European democracy as a whole, than bolshevik "tyranny." Bolshevism was pestilent and, as the *Daily Telegraph* proclaimed on the eve of the Curzon ultimatum:

The infamy of Bolshevism had best be left to rot to pieces in isolation. It is a process which no action of our own government can hasten or retard; and why should its hands be fouled by any sort of contact with that uncleanness.²⁵

French conservative opinion had similar views of bolshevism, even if these were colored by the Gallic temper. A characteristic example appeared in the semiofficial newspaper *Le Temps*, which declared in August 1921:

Le monde civilisé doit se protéger contre cette barbarie renaissante. C'est le premier devoir de l'Etat et le premier devoir de chaque citoyen. C'est le devoir des pères et des mères de famille dont les enfants sont exposés à la contagion révolutionnaire. Il faut une hygiène morale à la France menacée du pire des fléaux.

British Tory politicians referred to the same key ideas: sentiment, civilization, honor, and often added Christianity. They thought of themselves as defending Western civilization against the "barbarity" of the "Asian" Bolsheviks; they felt they should fight for "the Roman heritage," "the West," and "the sacred rights of Democracy."²⁶ All of them agreed with the "firm and straight line" that had been taken in 1919 by President Wilson against "the present Soviet tyranny":

In view of this government, Wilson proclaimed, there cannot be any common ground upon which it can stand with a power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral

sense. There can be no mutual confidence or trust, no respect even, if pledges are to be given and agreements made with a cynical repudiation of their obligations already in the mind of one of the parties.²⁷

In the same way, British Conservatives such as George A. B. De-war thought that the idea of befriending the Bolsheviks was, in itself, “debasement”; he argued as Curzon did, and considered that Britain had “to adhere to such things as national honor,” for “there are a few great national questions which must be decided on other grounds than those of commerce and finance.” On moral grounds, they reproached both Labor and Liberal leaders with their desire to “traffic freely and speedily” with the Bolsheviks because “no matter what their crimes and plots may be, if we do not, we shall lose money, and other nations who do go in with them will make money at our expense.”²⁸

Thus Curzon felt he would be backed in his anti-Soviet move, and decided at the beginning of May 1923 to take a decisive step: that of sending an ultimatum to the bolshevik government with which Lloyd George “had almost danced a quadrille” a year before.

4. The Curzon Ultimatum and the Soviet War Scare (May 1923)

On 8 May 1923, the British representative in Moscow handed to the Narkomindel a strong, lengthy, and by then unexpected note of protest that recalled many recent (or less recent) Bolshevik activities: these were condemned as inhuman, unjust, and disruptive. The note declared that, unless the Soviet government within ten days undertook “to comply fully and unconditionally with the request” it contained, His Majesty’s government (HMG) would “consider themselves immediately free from the obligations of the Trade Agreement.”

The immediate motives for such an abrupt and resentful note were twofold: the execution of Msgr. Butkevich and the seizure of three British trawlers. In the first case, the injustice wrought by the Bolsheviks had apparently been followed by some insolence. Msgr. Butkevich, who was a Roman Catholic priest, was condemned to death on 26 March 1923, for what the Soviets alleged to be counter-revolutionary activities. Four days later, the British representative in Moscow, R. Hodgson, handed a note to the Narkomindel stating that “such an execution could not fail to produce throughout the civilized world a feeling of horror and indignation.” The next day (31 March), the head of the Western Department of the Narkomindel, Weinstein, replied that this intervention was an attempt “to protect spies and traitors in Russia”; he went on to give details of what had happened and what was still happening under British rule in Ireland, India, and

Egypt, and argued that the Soviet government could hardly "regard an appeal in the name of humanity and sacredness of life from the British government as convincing." Hodgson replied on the spot that he could not accept this insolent message. The next day—supposedly in the absence of Chicherin²⁹—the rather tactless Weinstein did not fail to retort that, in the future, it was hoped that the British government would refrain from attempts of any kind at interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Republic."³⁰

Curzon took this rather acid, if unimportant, correspondence as a pretext to start the prosecution. To the Weinstein notes he added the case of the execution of one British agent in 1920 and the imprisonment of another; the seizure of three British trawlers also found its place in the note.³¹ The relative insignificance of these British complaints made the accompanying demand stand out more clearly. This demand touched Bolshevik propaganda in the East, and was obviously the real reason for the ultimatum. The Soviets were accused of having violated the pledge given in the preamble of the British-Soviet Trade agreement by organizing propaganda in Persia, Afghanistan, and India. The note went as far as quoting extracts from telegrams and memoranda sent to Moscow by Soviet representatives in those countries. It demanded that these Soviet representatives (mainly Raskolnikov) should be "disowned and recalled."³² The tone of the British note was so abrupt, and the delay for the reply so short, that the *Daily Herald* immediately pronounced the fatal word of war. It claimed that

such a note sent by one Great Power to another would, before 1914, have meant war. Today, the only hope of avoiding a rupture of relations is that the Soviet government may display, in the face of provocation, a restraint which the tsar's Ministers would certainly never have shown.³³

Indeed, the restraint had to come from the Soviet government, who knew too well Curzon's aggressiveness. After the verbal clash a few months earlier at Lausanne between Curzon and Chicherin, and after the defeat of Soviet diplomacy on the question of the Straits, the Bolsheviks had some grounds to wonder how far Curzon intended to go on the path of war. They wondered what degree of premeditation was implied in such an ultimatum, as the Lausanne Conference had just left the Straits open to the military fleets of the Western Powers.

We know that, as early as 1923, Rakovski had warned his colleagues that the Lausanne Convention would be "one of these innumerable conventions that mark the termination of one war and the beginning of the preparation of the next one."³⁴ Isolation in the midst

of aggressive bourgeois states being the greatest fear of the Soviets, all the bolshevik leaders who had been connected with the defense of "the first proletarian state" at the time of the foreign intervention were haunted by the idea of a new onslaught.³⁵ In articles and pamphlets he wrote at the time, Rakovski said repeatedly that "the capitalist countries, which are preparing for a new war, are taking the necessary steps to keep open the ways through which it will be easier to fall on us."³⁶

Two days after the ultimatum, there was what Rakovski called "the illustration of the ultimatum."³⁷ The Soviet envoy in Italy, V. V. Vorovski, was shot dead in Lausanne, and two of his assistants (Ahrens and Divilkovski) were wounded at the same time by the same individual, a Swiss citizen called Conradi. Rakovski was most upset by the assassination of Vorovski whom he had known on the eve of the October Revolution, when they had published the *Vestnik russkoi revoliutsii* in Stockholm together with Radek and Ganetski.³⁸

It happened that, a few days before the ultimatum, French and British military leaders had been dispatched to inspect troops of several countries bordering on the Soviet frontiers. On 2 May, Marshal Foch arrived in Poland, where he inspected troops and attended military parades; he then went on to Czechoslovakia, while the chief of the Imperial Staff, Lord Cavan, was visiting military units in Poland. Moreover, a British military mission was supposed to arrive in Romania while Lord French was visiting Bessarabia. The Soviets immediately claimed that all these visits and parades had only one aim, i.e., war. Curzon, wrote Radek, had finally obtained complete control of British foreign policy. He had concluded his peace with Turkey

in order that he might have a free hand; then he sent an ultimatum to Soviet Russia. The man whose agents have surrounded the Soviet Union on all sides and organized all the hostile forces against it decided to demand from Russia that she abandon propaganda in the East. He decided to humiliate her at all costs in order to show the peoples in the East that it was enough to raise the whip and the unruly "rabble"—the Russian workers and peasants—would show the Soviet Union that he could unleash his dogs against it.

. . . ³⁹

The Soviet leaders did not fall on their knees, but, under the influence of Trotsky, decided they could not afford open warfare. While Chicherin felt quite defiant,⁴⁰ the leader of the Red Army declared soberly:

In the present tense situation in Europe, this would be a

life-and-death struggle; it would be a struggle which would last for months, perhaps for years, which would swallow up all the resources of the country, which would interrupt our economic and cultural work for years. That is why we say: "May this cup pass from us."⁴¹

There is no doubt that the ultimatum had a strong effect on the bolshevik leadership. The British representative in Petrograd could claim that, in spite of the cleverness of the Soviet government in disguising the blow from their "gullible flock," it had "momentarily brought the Bolsheviks to their senses," and "partly restored British prestige."⁴² The Soviets decided to pay compensation for the three trawlers, and even for the execution of the British agent. But they could not refrain from irony in their reply to Curzon's demand that they stop all propaganda activities in the East. The Soviet reply of 14 May argued that this last exaction "gave reason to suppose that, in the opinion of the British government, the Russian Republic ought in general to have no policy of its own, but everywhere to support British aspirations"; and "such an obligation," it concluded, "the Russian government has never assumed."⁴³ The antagonist aims of Britain and Soviet Russia in Central Asia and in the East made both bolshevik and British propoganda indispensable.

As we know, the Bolsheviks immediately thought that the Curzon ultimatum might lead to a new war if they refused to submit to its main conditions; they were not alone in thinking so, and the British Labor party was determined to support the first socialist state to the limit of its powers.⁴⁴

B. Toward British Recognition of the Soviet Government

At a mass meeting that gathered in Moscow on 13 May 1923 to protest the Curzon ultimatum, an appeal was made to Ramsay MacDonald and the British Labor party "begging them to do their utmost to prevent an irrevocable step."⁴⁵ When the Soviet reply to the ultimatum was discussed in the House of Commons on 15 May, MacDonald opened the debate with a detailed criticism of the government's policies. He centered his speech on the defense of the British-Soviet Agreement and proclaimed that "if the Trade Agreement is torn up, there is not the least doubt that a state of incipient war will have been created."⁴⁶

1. Labor and the Bolsheviks

If the Bolsheviks and the Labor party leaders seemed to agree, it was mainly because they thought that the danger of war was imminent. In fact, the relationship between these two trends of socialism

was not simple or smooth. British Labor felt in sympathy with the Soviets' aims inasmuch as the latter were building the first socialist country and were isolated. Both political parties knew that they had to walk part of the way together, for they shared opposition to the conservative forces of Europe.⁴⁷ In 1920, MacDonald had even written with calculated enthusiasm:

Labor is drawn to Lenin, not because it associates itself with all that Lenin does or stands for, but because it is fighting its battle, and because it is not deeply influenced by the accusations of tyranny. . . . The Russian revolution has been one of the greatest events in the history of the world, and the attacks that have been made upon it should rally to its defense everyone who cares for political liberty and freedom of thought.⁴⁸

On the other hand, the Labor party was radically adverse to bolshevik methods, and had always been careful enough to keep its distance from Moscow on political grounds, while advocating *de jure* recognition and the development of trade relations. To oppose his attitude to that of the Conservatives who were in power, MacDonald wrote in 1923:

A Labor government would recognize Russia without delay. This has been mixed up with bitter political and social prejudice. It is true that the Russian revolution has been marked by a ruthless dictatorship, by cruel repression, and by bloody events. . . . But as soon as the revolution is over, both wisdom and interest demand the resumption of responsible and normal relations. The community of states cannot decree that any important state shall be outlaw or pariah except at grave risk and heavy cost.⁴⁹

Thus, MacDonald flattered himself on his "sense of reality." What he wanted was "to return to calm common sense policies that take the world as it is and tackle its problems objectively." This was said with the obvious aim of fighting the systematic anti-Soviet attitude of Lord Curzon, whose "incorrigibly sentimental policy embalms some obsolete idea from the nineteenth century, and takes little account of the part which our relations with Russia must play for the future in the shaping of Imperial and foreign relations."⁵⁰ The leader of the Labor party had decided to end what he called "the pompous folly of standing aloof from the Russian government."⁵¹

If Labor leaders thought it necessary to state their political opposition to the Soviets, the latter did not fail to do the same. In a way, the Laborites were considered by the Bolsheviks as the worst enemies

of the working class, which they lulled into obedience and passivity by their reformist methods. For the Bolsheviks, the Laborites were "traitors" to the working class; they were the members of the Second International whom they had constantly ridiculed and bitterly fought since 1903. We know that, at that time the fear and detestation of "economism" and "reformism" had been the essential factor that had determined the nature of the breach at the Second Party Congress. Since the split of the Russian socialist movement, Lenin "always fostered an active intransigence in the Party and an ever mounting hostility both to Menshevism inside Russia and to Social-Democracy abroad."⁵² After October 1917, the former Mensheviks, or those who had been closer to the Mensheviks than to the Bolsheviks, were the harsher toward their former allies. Thus, Trotsky referred to MacDonald as "a Christian Menshevik," and proclaimed that it was impossible to expect from him "that on coming to power he would seize a broom and sweep the cockroaches from his monarchy."⁵³ As a close friend of Rakovski put it in his analysis of the Labor party:

It is a mixture of representatives of the bourgeoisie, of ideologists of the upper bourgeoisie and of the intelligentsia, and also of the workers' aristocracy . . . In the oldest capitalist country, [this party] represents the penetration of bourgeois ideology into the bosom of a part of the workers, and into the worker's movement of all the world.⁵⁴

Yet, in order to get some support in Great Britain, the Bolsheviks were ready to tone down their attacks for a while and stress the community of interest between Russian and British workers. At the time of the Curzon ultimatum, direct contacts between British Labor leaders and the Soviet government certainly helped to reach a peaceful and rapid settlement: in face of the onslaught of the die-hards, Bolsheviks and Laborites thought of themselves as "comrades-in-arms." Thus, in reply to a telegram urging Moscow to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the ultimatum of the Conservative government, MacDonald received two telegrams from Litvinov and Kamenev agreeing to conciliation and appealing to the Labor party to make every effort to avert irremediable steps by the British government.⁵⁵ Rakovski, for his part, sent an official note of protest to Curzon and took care to address a copy of it to MacDonald. In his capacity as head of the Predsovnarkom and Narkomindel for the Ukrainian SSR, he wanted

to draw the attention of the British government to the danger to which it exposes the economic relations between the Ukraine and Great Britain, which have recently been strengthened by the sending of Ukrainian corn to English ports, and

promise in the near future to expand in the interest . . . of both countries.⁵⁶

If this did not move Curzon very much, it had a direct effect on both the attitude and the policy of the British Left. On 24 May 1923, the General Council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) adopted the following resolution for communication to Stanley Baldwin, who had just been appointed prime minister:

The General Congress of the T.U.C. welcomes the conciliatory note of the Russian reply to the British government. . . . In view of the abnormal unemployment prevailing for a long period, the council, as representing the organized workers, protests against the adoption of any policy on the part of the government retarding the development of trading activities between this country and Russia. The Council calls upon the government to act, in further negotiations, in such a manner as will lead to a continuation and extension of the trading agreement, and the complete recognition of the Russian government.⁵⁷

The same day, the Labor party issued a similar statement to the press, and its impact on the government was certainly not negligible. A few days later, G. Lansbury and "some of his confreres" were invited to an "informal conference" by Ronald McNeill, the under-secretary for foreign affairs, and by J. D. Gregory, the head of the Northern Department. The two sides could hardly be expected to come to an understanding about Soviet Russia, and they did not even seem to be talking about the same thing. While the Foreign Office officials endeavored to explain to the Labor members that "there really was an active religious persecution going on in Russia" and stuck to the idea that they could give "irrefutable proof" of it,⁵⁸ Lansbury insisted that trade relations with the Soviets were absolutely vital to relieve unemployment, and that these relations would only develop favorably if the Soviet government were officially recognized.⁵⁹ MacDonald emphasized the same ideas in his criticism of Curzon's policy toward Russia:

This policy . . . which was a mixture of conflicting motives and thoroughly unsound political principles, had some emotional and short sighted support, but it was foredoomed to failure and had been very damaging to our interests. . . . When the refusal to recognize a people diplomatically carries with it a refusal to trade with them, the folly is all the more expensive, and in the end punishes those who would inflict chastisement more than the people chastised. . . .⁶⁰

The tide had now turned in favor of recognition of the Soviets: by the end of 1924, a cartoonist for *Izvestiya* was to picture Chicherin showered with notes of recognition. The Soviet diplomat who did most to assist the entry of the Soviet Union onto the stage of European political life was Rakovski.

2. Rakovski's Appointment as Soviet Representative in London (March–September 1923)

The circumstances of Rakovski's appointment as Soviet representative in London give an insight into the inner workings of the British government on the one hand, and of the Soviet leadership on the other. At the beginning of March 1923, and before the name of Rakovski was ever mentioned, Vorovski, and then Litvinov, were first proposed as Soviet representatives in London. For reasons we shall try to elucidate, Rakovski was finally sent to London and accepted as *persona grata*, but this was done against his own will and notwithstanding the fierce campaign waged by the British die-hards from July until September 1923 against his appointment.

a. The position of Soviet representative in London.

Since the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the British–Soviet Trade Agreement during the summer of 1920 and at the beginning of 1921, L. B. Krasin had been the regular Soviet envoy to Britain. With this appointment abroad, Krasin combined his work as commissar for foreign trade, and commuted regularly from Moscow to London.⁶¹ In the British capital, he had acquired the reputation of being more a businessman than a politician, and was appreciated as such in the City.

Krasin, however, had complained as early as September 1921 of the official position that the Foreign office granted him in London. As we know, Lord Curzon always refused to meet a representative of the Bolsheviks and did everything in his power to oppose the development of trade relations between the two countries. A year later, in the autumn of 1922, after the failure of the Genoa and Hague conferences, it was decided in Moscow that Krasin

should make a further effort to be received by one of the senior officials of the Foreign Office failing which the [Soviet] Commissariat for Foreign Affairs would prevent Mr. Hodgson seeing either Chicherin or Litvinov.⁶²

After the meeting Curzon had with Chicherin at Lausanne in December 1922, the Soviet and British government realized that any further discussion was impossible and that they had reached a dead end. J. D. Gregory considered that the result of the Lausanne conversation

“was in effect to render any further conversations between members of the [British] government and Soviet leaders purposeless.”⁶³ Precisely in the same spirit, Chicherin had himself cabled after the meeting that the general impression he had gathered was that “under Curzon, serious agreements with England will never be.”⁶⁴ This is, in fact, what happened: in January 1923, Krasin sent the following telegram to Moscow: “Practically, we have no political relations whatsoever with England for, as I foresaw, Bonar Law and the members of his cabinet do not show any desire to meet and negotiate.”⁶⁵

From this new angle, we see again that Curzon prepared the ground for his ultimatum immediately after the Lausanne Conference, and that he strove by all means to isolate the Soviet Republics. In February 1923, the Soviet government tried again to get closer to Great Britain. Litvinov, who was the most Anglophile personality of the Narkomindel, told Hodgson:

It is useless for Mr. Krasin to be in London, for he is not given access to persons with whom he can transact business of importance. He was recently at his post for three weeks during which he could not send a single telegram, since “he had nothing to telegraph about except the weather.”⁶⁶

A month later, the Soviet government decided to take a new step to try and improve British-Soviet relations. This was to appoint a permanent Soviet representative in London.

b. The appointment of a permanent Soviet representative (March-July 1923).

In the interview he had with R. Hodgson on 7 March 1923 (i.e., two months before the “Curzon ultimatum”), Chicherin stated that his government was “dissatisfied with the present working of the Soviet delegation in London.” He admitted that its activity was “chaotic,” and attributed the disorder “to the absence of a permanent responsible head.” To remedy this state of things, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs

proposed that Mr. Krasin, while remaining titular head of the post, should not return to London—or at all events should only return at rare intervals—and that Mr. Vorovsky should have equal rank with him, but should be the official who would actually carry on the work of the post.⁶⁷

Both Chicherin and Litvinov were anxious to have Vorovski in London. In particular, they wanted him to find out “whether the apparent tendency on the part of the British government to adopt

an anti-Soviet policy was definite and irrevocable."⁶⁸ At that time, Krasin himself wrote in a personal letter to his wife:

With my departure [from London] and Berzin's illness, the situation there is difficult. The appointment of Vorovski as representative in London has been discussed, while I would be altogether freed from this task. For the moment, it has been decided to let things stand as they did in the past. On the one hand, Vorovski is not very suitable, on the other, he is still needed in Italy . . . as for me, I would be glad to use the first pretext to leave London where both Bonar Law and Curzon have refused to receive me.⁶⁹

At this stage, the candidacy of Litvinov was proposed to the Foreign Office. On 15 March, a member of the Soviet trade delegation in London (Klyshko) came to the Foreign Office to make a "confidential inquiry." He told J. D. Gregory that

before putting forward an official application, they [the Soviet government] would like to ascertain whether the old objections to Litvinov still hold good.⁷⁰ If they do, an application will simply be put forward for Vorovski, but the Soviet government would prefer to send Litvinov.⁷¹

Curzon's reaction was immediate and indignant: he was "astonished at even Klyshko having the courage to propose Litvinov's return," and proclaimed that "of course we ought to refuse categorically."⁷² Under these circumstances, and as Vorovski was considered by the Foreign Office as "less offensive than most of his colleagues," the proposition to make of him the effective Soviet representative in London was accepted on 21 March.⁷³

When the Soviet government had already informed the Foreign Office of Vorovski's appointment, something quite unexpected happened. Vorovski refused to go to London. As W. Strang put it, with some amazement, in his minutes of 17 April 1923: "Vorovski has not appeared and it seems that he is unwilling to come."⁷⁴ The situation was quite revealing: at that time, we see that a prominent Bolshevik could still please himself whether or not he accepted a particular post. This is made particularly clear in the letter Litvinov wrote to Vorovski on 6 April 1923:

Your refusal to go to London has put me in a very difficult position. I continue to hope that the decision is not final. I quite understand the personal motives you bring forward—your reference to the climate, the illness of your wife. . . . I also understand your personal disinclination to leave Rome, where you have a more or less stable position, where

you are treated as the representative of a recognized state, for a place like London where the Right H. Lords will for a long time consider it beneath their dignity to enter into direct relations with our political representative, referring him to junior employees of the ministry. There is also a great deal in what you say in there being practically no diplomatic work to do in England, as to there being very little hope of a change in the present relations, and as to it being almost hopeless to expect to come to an understanding with England so long as the present reactionary government and Foreign Office sabotage continue. . . . I ask you to think over the question of your going to London. I repeat, at present we have no other candidate. . . . Krasin is remaining in Moscow. Berzin is too often ill and cannot be counted on. No other candidate knowing the language and knowing international politics can be moved by us to London at present. . . .⁷⁴

A month later, on 8 May, Lord Curzon sent his ultimatum to the Soviets. On 10 May, Vorovski was assassinated in Lausanne. In July, Rakovski was proposed and accepted at once as Soviet representative in London, something that no one expected, not even himself.

c. The problem of Rakovski's nomination to London (July-September 1923).

Rakovski's nomination to London was due to a combination of objective and subjective factors. To put British-Soviet relations on a new basis after the ultimatum of 8 May, the Soviet leadership had to send a really prominent and authoritative envoy whose difficult task would be to engineer a rapprochement between two countries that found themselves at loggerheads.

The Soviet side.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Narkomindel had, at that time, real difficulties in finding suitable representatives. Krasin himself admitted to J. D. Gregory that "they were entirely bankrupt in presentable representatives and said that this was their main weakness."⁷⁶ As a matter of fact, when Hodgson described the Bolsheviks as "being to a man conspirators, ex-convicts, and fugitives from justice who had spent their lives as outcasts," he was not altogether wrong. We saw that many Conservatives considered them as vulgar criminals, and this psychological obstacle was, for the Soviets, one of the most difficult to fight. Even such a Westernized aristocrat as Chicherin reminded Lord D'Abernon of

a rather amiable and agreeable man—not devoid of kindly feeling toward the world in general and toward rabbits in particular, provided they surrender their lives without too much fuss. . . . The fangs are there at the disposal of theoretical conceptions fanatically held. . . .⁷⁷

In fact, the Foreign Office considered that there could be “no harm in rejecting a succession of candidates,” as “all the bolshevik leaders are undesirable.”⁷⁸ Yet, many British officials had met Rakovski at Genoa, and had obviously been favorably impressed by his urbanity and apparent smoothness. In a way, they would have preferred to agree to the appointment of “an uncouth monster like Weinstein . . . as it would necessarily bring discredit on them.” Unfortunately, Gregory commented, “they are wise enough to have realized this,” and they chose Rakovski who was considered in London as “the only Communist leader besides Krasin who is in the least presentable.”⁷⁹ Moscow had few men at its disposal, and such outstanding diplomats as A. A. Ioffe were already in great demand for missions to countries where the Soviets hoped to obtain favorable treaties. He had recently been in Persia and then in Tokyo to try and settle the major differences that opposed the Soviet Republics to Japan. It was precisely at this stage that Stalin used the necessity of working for a British–Soviet rapprochement as a pretext to dismiss Rakovski from his position in the Soviet Federation and send him to London. At the same time, a close friend of Trotsky was removed from the center of power.

Since the Twelfth Party Congress of April 1923, at which Enukidze accused him of having “eclipsed in his ardor [to defend the nationalities] all the Caucasians taken together,” Rakovski had refused to retreat before Stalin and stuck to his position.⁸⁰ In mid-June, Rakovski was still opposing Stalin in the last discussions that led to the formation of the Soviet Union. Against Stalin’s “bureaucratic centralism,” we know that Rakovski opposed the concept of “democratic centralism.” The Foreign Office was well informed of the feud, and a secret report of the SIS noted that Rakovski’s “independent attitude in the Ukraine” was “causing anxiety in Moscow.” A few days later (June 25), the Soviet government was making a discreet enquiry in London “to ascertain privately” whether Rakovski’s appointment was acceptable.⁸¹ Western observers did not fail to make the link between Rakovski’s clash with Stalin and his “diplomatic exile.” Thus, when his biography was studied in the Foreign Office, British officials knew that some Moscow leaders wanted “to get him out of the way by sending him to London.”⁸² The head of the Northern Department wrote very much to the point:

Their chief reason in appointing Rakovski is to get rid of him, as under the new federative or absorptive scheme they want to submerge the Ukraine altogether and the real obstacle is Rakovski whose object in life is to be the Ukrainian Lenin. If the scheme of absorption is to succeed, he must be eclipsed.⁸³

In top Party circles, people understood perfectly well the meaning of Rakovski's nomination to London, and Krasin himself commented in a letter to his wife (3 July): "The appointment of Rakovski '*po raspadam*' is essentially caused by the desire to get rid of him in the Ukraine."⁸⁴

For the first time, communist leaders realized that Stalin could use appointments abroad as a covert form of administrative repression. It is, of course, nothing unusual for governments to select for foreign service prominent individuals whose opinions or personalities are liable to lead to friction at home. Even in Soviet Russia in 1921, nobody had thought it strange in communist circles that Krestinski, after his dismissal from the Party Secretariat at the Tenth Party Congress, should be sent on a mission to Germany. Yet, in Rakovski's case two years later, Party members clearly saw that it was not only because the head of the Soviet Ukraine had expounded and defended his views on the status of the nationalities within the Soviet Federation that he was dismissed from his post. It was more precisely because, by so doing, he was opposing the first steps Stalin was taking as the foremost political leader of the Soviet Union. Moreover, he had done this in the one field in which the commissar for nationalities, Joseph Stalin, could pride himself on being recognized as the Party theoretician and practitioner.

On the other hand, by dismissing Rakovski from a key position, Stalin was winning a first point in the struggle that opposed him to Trotsky. Thus, during the four years 1923-1927, which saw the feud between Trotsky and Stalin and the eventual victory of the latter, Rakovski was more or less eliminated from the most acute intra-Party strife. Trotsky was later to write on how Stalin had then "begun to emerge with increasing prominence as the organizer, the assigner of tasks, the dispenser of jobs, the trainer and master of Soviet bureaucracy."⁸⁵ It is clear that, already at that time, Trotsky could not prevent the departure of his friend to London. One may wonder if Trotsky effectively tried to prevent this departure. This if, of course, difficult to tell, as the question never crops up in their correspondence.

On the one hand, we know that Trotsky hardly backed his friend at the Twelfth Party Congress, during the discussions that concerned

the nationality question: to him this had always been a lost cause. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Trotsky then played a very important part in the determination of Soviet foreign policy. It was he who wrote the Soviet reply to the Curzon ultimatum, and who, at a heated session of the Politburo, insisted on Krasin's dismissal from his post in London when the latter refused, for three days, to hand the Soviet reply to the British government.⁸⁶ Indeed, the man who was still the leader of the Red Army wanted to reduce, as much as possible, the possibility of a break between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and work for a rapprochement between the two countries. He knew that his friend could be an excellent diplomat. But, at this stage of his struggle with Stalin, he cannot have welcomed Rakovski's removal.

Before sending Rakovski to London, the first secretary of the Party had to overcome the opposition of the Ukrainians and of Rakovski himself. Every Party member knew that, in the Ukraine, comrade Rakovski has gained immense prestige."⁸⁷ His popularity was so great that, when he came back to the Ukraine in 1926, "he was carried to the third floor of the house where he was to deliver a speech; there, the room was crammed with people to such a point that he had to stand on a table to deliver his speech."⁸⁸ In 1923, the Foreign Office knew that Rakovski's appointment had been "against the wishes of the Ukraine." A "special resolution" had to be passed by the Central Committee of the Ukraine to allow his departure.

Rakovski himself was absolutely outraged by Stalin's autocratic methods, and did not hesitate to reveal his resentment in an official interview he gave to *Izvestiya* on 1 August 1923. He declared that it was "with great regret" that he left the Ukraine where he had "worked at the head of the government for five years."⁸⁹ In 1929, while he was in exile in Astrakhan, he admitted to Louis Fischer: "I was made a diplomat in 1923 not because of my qualities, but because of my oppositionist tendencies." On 6 July, Rakovski's nomination as Soviet representative in London was reported in the *Times*; on the same day, the Second Session of the Central Executive Committee approved the formation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and of Union Commissariats. Rakovski *ipso facto* lost his post as foreign commissar of the Ukraine, but received a new post ten days later: he was appointed deputy commissar for foreign affairs of the Soviet Union, which made him the equal of Litvinov.⁹⁰ If the problem was solved, it was only on one side.

The English side.

As soon as Rakovski's appointment was announced in London, the conservative press, led by the *Morning Star*, started a bitter cam-

paigned against the Bolshevik representative designate. On 7 July, Rakovski was qualified as "one of the most bitter and implacable enemies of this country."⁹¹ The mildest accusation was that Rakovski was coming to Britain not to devote himself to the commercial side of his functions, but exclusively to political matters.

In mid-July, several questions were asked in Parliament that referred to Rakovski as to "one of the most notorious of the Bolshevik propagandists."⁹² Conservative MPs, such as Sir R. Richardson, tried to stir up Rakovski's past and enquired whether he was "the same individual who was expelled from France for his propagandist activities against the Allies during the war."⁹³ Rakovski was also accused of being determined to lead the disruptive forces of the Third International both in the British Empire and in Great Britain, which, as we know, was one of the major reasons for discord between the two countries. It was reported that, on 15 July, at a farewell meeting of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee at Karkov, Rakovski declared that

Great Britain is at present being reduced by the growth of Nationalist movements in her colonies to the status of Austro-Hungary, and the collapse and dismemberment of the British Empire is merely a question of time.⁹⁴

At the same meeting, he was said to have called on the Third International "to prepare to supplant the British colonial administration."⁹⁵ Rakovski was also charged with hatching a similar plot against Britain itself, and he was supposed to have openly proclaimed that "the effect of the revolutionizing of the British was proceeding apace," and that the primary object of his appointment in London was "to enable him to be better able to await the most favorable opportunity for the Third International to intervene in the internal affairs of Great Britain."⁹⁶ The accusations were indeed so serious and the reference to Rakovski's alleged speeches so precise that the Foreign Office officials were somewhat taken aback and felt they had overlooked an interesting case. The reaction of Sir Eyre Crowe, "but the Home Office told me we had no evidence against him," was characteristic in this respect.⁹⁷ On the other hand, defenders of the Soviets, such as Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy, enquired whether it was in accordance with the custom of Parliament for attacks to be made on the accredited representative of another government. To this, Foreign Office officials replied in its minutes that it was most unfortunate that such "lurid questions" should appear on the order paper "when the subject is the official representative of a foreign government to whose appointment we have formally agreed."⁹⁸

Yet, the strength of the campaign and of the arguments was too great to let Rakovski into the United Kingdom without further enquiry. On 2 August, Peters informed the Narkomindel that Rakovski's visa was suspended "until the matter was cleared up."⁹⁹ In Moscow, the official reaction was one of "astonishment." In party circles interested in the exile of a follower of Trotsky, the reaction was one of awkward consternation. From Moscow, Peters wrote to the Foreign Office:

The one topic of conversation here is the Rakovski incident, which has really seriously perturbed the Soviet government. I think they thoroughly realize the unfortunate position in which they have been placed.¹⁰⁰

Moscow's first move was to emphasize the importance attached to the choice made of Rakovski as the chief negotiator between Britain and Russia, and a member of the Narkomindel (Nurteva) reminded Peters that "Rakovski had been specially selected for London as befitted his negotiating abilities to promote the establishment of normal relations with Great Britain."¹⁰¹ Nurteva added that the Soviet government was "all the more perturbed by the recent evidences of a deliberately organized campaign against Rakovski," and concluded by expressing his conviction that His Majesty's Government "would not desire to create artificial difficulties."¹⁰² Chicherin was immediately asked by the Politburo to produce a memorandum showing that the accusations made against Rakovski were groundless, stressing Rakovski's personal qualities as a diplomat. In the aide-memoire he handed Peters on 9 August, Chicherin argued that the words ascribed to Rakovski by the *Morning Post* had never been pronounced by him. Moreover, the speech reproduced in the pamphlet *England and Russia* had been made at the height of the May crisis and showed no anti-British bias. The Soviet commissar for foreign affairs emphatically repudiated the allegation that had been made by Rakovski's pretended Anglophobia, and concluded on a significant note:

The nomination of one of the foremost political men of the Soviet Federation to a post in London after his serving as head of the Ukrainian government for five years in conjunction with the concessions made by the Soviet government during the Anglo-Russian crisis and with the Soviet government's consent to sign the Straits Convention is a strong evidence of the Soviet government's desire to develop political and economic relations with Great Britain.¹⁰³

Foreign Office officials were divided on the problem posed by Rakovski's nomination. Most of them, such as Ronald Lindsay, showed

a remarkable sense of realism. They were ready "to condone the business" because they considered that "a high priest cannot be blamed for resembling his Diety."¹⁰⁴ J. D. Gregory took a more aggressive stand, and advocated the refusal of Rakovski, arguing that the latter was "not a tradesman at all, but solely a politician . . . and as it turned out, a particularly anti-British one at that."¹⁰⁵ Yet, he perfectly understood that, if the Foreign Office rejected this particular Soviet envoy, it would have to "reject every other candidate." Lord Curzon's reaction to the dilemma was quite different. He considered, first of all, that his assistants started from the wrong premises. For him, the general question to know "whether all Communists may be expected to make offensive speeches" was "quite irrelevant" so long as they let Britain and the British Empire have none of them. He thought that the sole issue was to try and ascertain: (a) "whether this man is to be on good terms with us"; (b) "whether if any man had made the same kind of speeches we should accept him."¹⁰⁶

The first point was thus to check if the series of statements made by the *Morning Post* with extracts and allegations were true or not. In particular, the head of the Foreign Office was determined to know whether Rakovski had, in fact, made a speech during which he was supposed to have pointed to the banners with the words "Death of Curzon" and "We demand Curzon's blood."¹⁰⁷

Throughout the month of August, British agents in Britain, the Soviet Union, and France tried to gather the necessary material to reply to the enquiries of the secretary of state. In London, the Foreign Office had enquiries made of the *Morning Post* as to where they got their information and how reliable it was. Sir William Tyrell himself spoke to one of the directors of the newspaper, who told him he was hoping to receive the originals of the *Proletarian* in which Rakovski's speech was supposedly reported. A few days later, however, the *Morning Post* directors were obliged to admit that their staff in Berlin had enclosed, by inadvertence, a copy of *Communist*. By the middle of August, the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that the newspaper had, in effect, deceived them, as it could furnish no corroborative evidence to substantiate the accusations. On 23 August, they received a letter from Peters who, in the Soviet Union, had been shown the files of the two incriminated newspapers *Proletarian* and *Communist* for the period 11-25 July. Peters reported that he had found "no statements like those quoted by the *Morning Post*."¹⁰⁸ Already on 18 August, R. Lindsay had considered that, for the abuse committed, the newspaper had "to be brought to book"; he suggested sending for the foreign editor who was to be held responsible for leading the campaign. A fortnight later, he noted that,

as the latter "had still been unable to produce substantiation for his journal's statements, action had been taken."¹⁰⁹

On 10 August, the Soviet official agent in Britain, Jan Berzin, had sent a letter to the editor of the *Morning Post*, in which he claimed that "all the invented statements concerning the non-existent speech of Rakovski" were to be found in a Riga telegram of 28 July to *Posledniya novosty*, the well-known newspaper edited in Paris by Pavel Miliukov.¹¹⁰ The source for the Riga correspondent was "a small clique of people at Petrograd and Moscow of secret anti-Bolshevik tendencies and issuing bulletins."¹¹¹ Meanwhile in France, the agent of the British SIS had been through the relevant records of the Sûreté Générale, but could find no trace of the charges alleged by the British newspapers, and no special mention of anti-British trends in Rakovski's past activities and utterances.

Notwithstanding the obvious fact that "all the Soviet leaders have at one time or another made speeches attacking the British Empire," and that Rakovski's reputation was that of a "violent theoretical communist," Lord Curzon and the British government decided on fair play.¹¹² On 30 August, instructions were given to the Home Office to the effect that Rakovski was finally to be admitted to Great Britain and accorded the customary facilities on arrival. The same day, a telegram was sent to Lord D'Abernon in Berlin and to Peters in Moscow according to which Rakovski was to be granted a diplomatic visa when he applied for it.¹¹³ He was by this time in Berlin¹¹⁴ and felt no urge to precipitate his arrival in Britain, where he did not arrive before 30 September.¹¹⁵

There, he was to play a vital, if almost forgotten, part in engineering a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. In 1924, he was to speed up the official recognition of the country he represented by Britain in February 1924, and then by France in May of the same year. Through official conferences and personal negotiations, he was to try and solve the vexed question of tsarist Russia's debts which, from 1924 until 1927, remained closely linked with that of eventual credits to the Soviet Union.

Chapter 14

Rakovski as Ambassador to Great Britain

A. Rakovski and British-Soviet Relations (October 1923-August 1924)

Rakovski had to linger a whole month in London before being received at the Foreign Office. Just as he had turned his back on Krasin in 1921, Curzon now refused to meet Rakovski and ordered J. D. Gregory to receive him in his place. Already on 14 October, a long article had appeared in the *Observer* that attacked the "discourtesy of the Foreign Office." Its author, J. L. Garvin, wrote that the new Soviet representative had already revealed himself as "a man not only with the desire to understand the Western mind, but with a natural aptitude for such an understanding." He further considered that

while the City, impressed partly by the reports of a number of highly competent observers, partly by the success of the revival of the Russian export trade in grain, shows a distinct inclination to enlarge the scope of trade with Russia . . . important negotiations are suspended owing to the uncertainty of the British government's attitude.¹

For the editor of the *Observer*, the "snub" to Rakovski appeared as most detrimental to British interests, because such a negative policy seemed, in fact, "indistinguishable from a lack of policy." To this absence of determination, Garvin opposed what he described as "the remarkable firmness of purpose so characteristic of post-war France." The reaction corresponded only to the fear of being outstripped by France in trade relations with the Soviet Union. This was indeed an unbearable idea for all Liberals since the time of the Genoa Conference, and Garvin noted significantly on 7 October that

we ought to have given full recognition long ago. Instead of that, we have maintained the Bourbon etiquette until Mr. Chicherin has come to hate his fellow aristocrat Lord Curzon, and is naturally favoring the French who have changed their policy and are working as hard as they can to conclude an agreement with Moscow.²

1. Rakovski's First Interview at the Foreign Office (October 1923)

When Rakovski was at last received at the Foreign Office, on 31 October, he immediately realized that the tone used by Gregory on behalf of the secretary of state for foreign affairs was still that of an ultimatum mixed with deliberate insolence. In this first interview, Rakovski enquired about the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the settlement of outstanding questions and the conclusion of a general peace treaty. Gregory replied with some priggishness that

there was no reason to suppose that H.M.G. had departed from the attitude which they had consistently adopted, or that they did not stand today exactly where they stood at Genoa and at the Hague. Mr. Rakovski, he pointed out, must be perfectly acquainted with the obstacles standing in the way of improved relations, and should enquire in Moscow and not in London why it was that the question debated at various times in the course of the preceding year had slumbered since the Hague Conference. On Mr. Rakovski pressing again the question where H.M.G. stood in this matter, Gregory informed him that he could only reply by asking where the Soviet government stood.³

It was clear that Gregory was putting into practice the motto he had adopted in all his negotiations with the Soviets: "We non-plus them by polite aloofness."⁴ The tone of the conversation was already in danger of deteriorating when Rakovski launched the capital problem of debts and credits. For him, credits had to come first: they would set Russian production to work and allow the Soviets to pay in due course the debts of the tsarist government. But to start paying debts out of the meager resources of the Soviet government would simply mean to stifle it at its birth. For Gregory, on the contrary, debts had to be paid first, because only such a gesture could restore the climate of confidence that would entice the City to offer new credits to the Russians. Moreover, Gregory added, debts were only a part of the problem. The question of the restitution of the nationalized property of British subjects in Russia, or effective compensation for it, was equally important if not more so. Here was "a perfectly simple question" that "only required a quite straightforward "yes" or "no." Again, Rakovski was obliged to say that the problem was not so simple as it looked, and that the question of nationalized property was "as much tied up with Soviet requirements in the matter of credits as was that of the debts." The Soviet representative considered that

“all that was necessary was for H.M.G. to bless the proposal to give credits and they would be forthcoming.” Unless the Soviet government was assured of this, “public opinion in Russia would never allow it to enter into fresh engagements with Great Britain.” Gregory was absolutely infuriated by Rakovski’s logic, which appeared to him as incredibly hypocritical, and he put an end to the interview in a state of scandalized frenzy. He pointed out that Rakovski’s last argument was

palpable nonsense, as the opinion of the public in Russia was neither Communist nor anti-Communist, nor anything else. The public merely wanted to live, and, according to all the information available, was in no sense animated by a dislike or a distrust of Great Britain. Whatever the Soviet government might do or think, it was no use its appealing to public opinion. The conclusion evidently was that the governments were still in the vicious circle in which they had always been, and that the Soviet government was showing no real disposition to escape from it. Moreover, Mr. Rakovski was practically doing nothing more than to suggest a bargain, a thing particularly disliked in this country.⁵

This was quite an abrupt ending for an interview, the first and last that Rakovski had with a Foreign Office official until the coming to power of the Labour government three months later. Through Gregory, the British Conservative party had made it clear to the Soviet envoy that relations between the two countries would be kept barely alive for the sake of a part of British public opinion. In the memorandum he sent to Hodgson in Moscow, the inspirer of this policy, Lord Curzon, concluded on a significant note:

Mr. Rakovski . . . departed expressing the hope that there might be further opportunities of discussing these questions. He was, however, evidently disappointed at receiving so little encouragement.⁶

2. Rakovski and the British Left on the Eve of the Formation of the First Labour Government and of Its Recognition of the Soviet Union (August-December 1923)

In Britain at the turn of 1924, Labour leaders were as determined to help Rakovski engineer a genuine rapprochement between their country and the first Socialist state, as was the Conservative party to prevent such a rapprochement. Labour had taken a vivid interest in Rakovski’s mission and in his personality from the time when the *Morning Post* started its press campaign against the rep-

representative of the Soviets. The Labour party's secretary—Arthur Henderson—was putting into practice the idea he had repeatedly stressed to his colleagues, i.e., that “the Labour and Socialist parties must take every opportunity of bringing Russia once more into the comity of nations.”⁷ These words seemed to be directly borrowed from Lloyd George, and there was much in common between the conceptions that Liberal and Labour leaders had of a rapprochement between the two countries. The arguments were very similar: on the one hand, such a step would relieve unemployment at home and be profitable to British industry and commerce. On the other hand, trade might “tame” the Bolsheviks. Philip Snowden, for example, thought of recognition not only as an incentive to trade, but also as a device to compel the “throwing away of the last shreds of Bolshevism and Communist by which it is presently fettered.”⁸ On 16 August, Henderson had written to the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin to express his concern about the Foreign Office apparently putting every difficulty in the way of the Soviet government's representative at a time when a British delegation led by F. I. Baldwin (a cousin of the prime minister) was touring the Soviet Republics. This “hitch was most unfortunate,” as F. L. Baldwin soon confirmed that there was some hope of trade in Russia.⁹ In an interview he gave to the press, he declared frankly that Britain was in a better position to trade with that country than any other European nation, for it could “extend them credits.”¹⁰

The Labour party agreed with the idea of granting credits to the Soviets, and MacDonald promised to do so if he came to power. A Labour government, he wrote, would “take immediate steps to begin trade with Russia by direct consultations with Moscow.” Officially, in the existing state of political relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the British export credit schemes could be extended to Moscow, as they were extended, for example, to Austria. On 15 November 1923, the future under-secretary for foreign affairs of the MacDonald government, Arthur Ponsonby, closely linked the problem of the recognition of the Soviet government with that of credits.¹¹ In an article written at the end of October 1923 on the economic future of Russia, Rakovski also linked the problem of recognition with that of debts and credits. He showed that the then economic crisis that the Soviet Union was going through was primarily “a price crisis presenting many difficulties for a workers' and peasants' government.” As Lenin had done so often, Rakovski frankly admitted that the first reason for the crisis was the inefficiency and ignorance of the Soviet administrative apparatus:

We have not yet succeeded in organizing well our economic

apparatus and the control of our industry. Both our financial and administrative institutions stand in need of thorough reorganization. . . . The prices of our goods still bear the weight of excessive administrative machinery.¹²

Rakovski considered that the most detrimental factors were the absence of circulating capital for the Soviet industry, the absence of credits for the peasants, and the lack of opportunity for the state to conclude loans that would allow it to restore order in its finances. The natural results were that, lacking capital, industry was forced to sell dear, in the absence of loans the state was forced to increase taxes, and deprived of credits, the peasants were forced to curtail consumption. Thus, the Soviet government was unable to import necessary goods and indispensable machinery, while Britain kept its dangerous pools of unemployment. The conclusion of the Soviet representative was logical: two such economies had obvious complementary interests, and it was to the advantage of both countries to settle their outstanding political and economic divergences.

In London, many influential journalists and left-wing politicians proved extremely helpful in furthering the cause of British-Soviet rapprochement. Many of them, as we saw, considered themselves comrades-in-arms of the Soviets. Thus, editors of well-known periodicals—J. L. Garvin of the *Observer*, N. H. Brailsford of the *New Leader*, and E. D. Morel of the *London Foreign Affairs*—served many times as intermediaries between Rakovski and the Labour leaders. On 22 October, J. L. Garvin wrote to Rakovski: “You may rely on me firmly and always to do all in my power to promote good relations between our peoples. There will never be a happier and safer Europe until they agree.”¹³

Brailsford, A. Ponsonby, Charles Trevelyan, the Webbs, and others wrote pamphlets and prefaces on the same subject and seemed as unconditionally pro-Soviet. In November, Brailsford wrote a preface to a pamphlet by W. P. Coates in which he clearly showed that the cause of British-Soviet relations would only advance when a British negotiator sat down with the ambassador of the new Russia to consider “in a creative spirit” how best, for the common good of Russia and the West, her resources could be developed with British aid.¹⁴ In his view, “only when this positive aim inspires both sides, will the muddle of financial claims and counterclaims sink into relative unimportance, and find its solution as a detail in a bigger plan.”¹⁵

On 20 December, Brailsford, who had been in correspondence with Rakovski in 1913 during the Balkan Wars, came to see him to speak freely on a number of problems that still cast a dark shadow over the rapprochement. He told him of the bad impression that

religious persecutions made on such Labour leaders as Clynes, who was a Catholic. He stressed the fact that, among the events that had damaged the Russian reputation in the world of British Labour, the communist invasion of Georgia and the persecutions of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries stood out prominently. Thus, MacDonald had written an introductory note to two documents on the Georgian question, which was printed in the *Socialist Review* shortly before the Genoa Conference. There he stated that

it is the duty of the European governments in entering into negotiations with the Moscow government to see to it that the oppression of the Caucasus is not increased when the menace of attack is removed from Russia. Our government will not have done its duty if it does not insist upon an all-round settlement with Moscow and include the freeing of the Caucasian peoples from the Moscow armies in any agreement come to.¹⁶

In 1922, it was the "harsh and unjust treatment of the Russian Social-Revolutionary prisoners by the government of Russia" that was criticized at the annual conference of the Labour party.¹⁷ But, on the whole, as we shall see later, this kind of criticism was more characteristic of continental Socialists than of the British Labour party. As soon as the latter was to come to power after the general election of December 1923, Tom Shaw was commissioned by the Administrative Committee of the Labour and Socialist International to take up the question of the treatment of the Socialists in Russia with Rakovski. These conversations between members of the Labour party and the Soviet representative clearly show that MacDonald and his friends reckoned on the power of words and of direct intercourse to smooth difficulties. This was indeed one of the main tenets of their faith in humanity, and MacDonald declared in the program speech that he gave on 8 January in favor of the recognition of the Soviets:

I want to trade, I want negotiations. I want a settlement, a settlement from the coasts of Japan to the coasts of Ireland. If I have to protest against what is being done in Afghanistan . . . how can I protest unless I have channels to use for my protest? If I am going to say to this man, if I am going to say to any foreign country—"We are going to deal straight with you, we are going to treat fairly with you," how can this be done if I have to whisper to someone behind his back to go and tell somebody to tell somebody to tell somebody to tell somebody to tell Moscow?¹⁸

Such a declaration could only be welcomed by the Bolsheviks

who had proudly declared at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies in November 1917 that "the government abolished secret diplomacy and on its part expresses the firm intention of conducting all negotiations absolutely openly before the entire people."¹⁹ But since 1922, which saw the beginning of the NEP in foreign policy, the problem for the Bolsheviks was to find worthwhile interlocutors. Rakovski had clearly understood after his interview with Gregory that nothing could be done as long as the Conservatives were in power. But, on 21 January 1924, the Conservative government had to resign after the House of Commons had given a vote of no confidence. The new election gave the Liberals 158 seats, so that they held the balance between the Conservatives (258 seats) and Labour (191 seats). Lloyd George and his friends agreed to support a Labour ministry "for a few months at any rate, because there was no practical alternative for the moment." But Labour, they declared, "must behave itself."²⁰ Under these conditions, all the initiatives aiming at a real British-Soviet rapprochement might be thwarted, even if the Liberals did not refuse to back a move that they had been advocating since 1920.

In the light of the recent Labour victory, the Bolsheviks saw new vistas opening to their ambitions. Thus, Chicherin swiftly got in touch with his socialist "ally" MacDonald to declare in a show of rapture:

When I learned the results of the elections, my first thought was: if we could only work together with the British Labour party for the sake of universal settlement! . . . A great responsibility before history lies now upon us both. It is a unique opportunity. . . . "The elephant and the whale" striving together towards universal peace, what a sight!²¹

Chicherin was ready to concur with MacDonald that "personal confidence and direct intercourse without the fetters of officialism" would be "of the greatest help in the enormous task" that awaited them. Indeed, the Labour leader had thought it necessary to write a "personal word" to express the warmth of his feelings. In his letter of 1 February 1924 to Chicherin, he proclaimed the necessity for such a relationship, for "official communications are apt to appear cold and lifeless, and necessarily leave unexpressed the sentiments which underlie them."²² Both men were also pleased to note that, fortunately, they could rely on their "mutual friend Rakovski" who was the most active and efficient negotiator and spokesman. Indeed, Rakovski had established direct personal relations with the leader of the Labour party as soon as MacDonald had clearly stated his atti-

tude toward the recognition of Russia in his celebrated speech in the Albert Hall on 8 January. Three days later, Rakovski had written to his "dear MacDonald," whom he had known since the time of the prewar congresses of the Second International. In his note, the Soviet representative did not fail to emphasize his "joy" on seeing the desire of the Labour party "to make mutual confidence and equality the basis of relations between their country and Russia."²³ This word, "equality," was extremely important, for it meant that, if the Labour government considered the Moscow authorities as their equal, it could not but grant them "immediate and unconditional recognition." Only such a form of recognition, Rakovski argued, could "acquire that vast political significance which ought to sanctify a new page in the history of our countries."²⁴ To prove the good will of the Bolsheviks, he then proposed a thing that, two months before, had exasperated the head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office: that was to suggest a bargain. He now gave MacDonald "the formal assurance" that, if confidence were accorded to the Soviets, they would, in their turn, "reciprocate by an act of confidence."

As we see, Rakovski deduced many things from the word "equality." In the past, he had insisted again and again that it was impossible for the Soviets to deal with "bourgeois" governments, as the rules of the game were too different. "Bourgeois" diplomats could only scorn the Bolsheviks, and the latter often hated the former. Now, on the contrary, a new spirit might be created that would help to bring the two countries closer one to the other. At the same time, Rakovski did not hide the difficulties that stood in the way of an understanding. During his conversations with Brailsford, as in his letter to MacDonald, he noted that the British-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan, around which the Curzon ultimatum had largely revolved, still constituted a hindrance. He felt he had to give some verbal assurance, and declared that suspicion toward Russia was "absolutely unfounded." He then made a transparent reference to the eternal interests of Russia in that part of the world, saying that the causes of such incidents were to be sought "in the relations which existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain long before the Soviets came to power."

But this did not deter him from proposing a bargain that could not fail to surprise the Labour leaders: he offered Russian mediation in the British-Afghan conflict. When he had first proposed this possibility to Lord Curzon, the latter had been astounded and had replied on the spot that such a mediation was "inadmissible."²⁵ It was obvious that a Labour cabinet that had come to power under the conditions described had to watch over the British Empire with the same vigilance as a Conservative ministry. Thus, MacDonald and

Rakovski preferred to turn to economic problems to find subjects of agreement.

Already on 3 January, MacDonald had written to his friend E. C. Grenfell to ask what precise economic advantages they could get by recognizing the Soviet government immediately and unconditionally. MacDonald could not help thinking that "if, for example, recognition was not followed by the solution of the unsettled problems, this would have drastic consequences for the Labour government." He also asked Grenfell about the intentions of Moscow concerning the use of British capital by means of concessions (of forests, minerals, etc.) or of investments (e.g., in the railways). He wondered what had come out of the negotiations that Urquhard was having with the Soviets and wanted to know more about Soviet demands for credits. What guarantee would Moscow give? Did they expect a government guarantee or direct credits from the City? If necessary, and if Rakovski wished it, could he (Grenfell) go to Moscow on his behalf for information?²⁶ All these questions clearly show the delicate position of the Labour leader. Yet, at the first meeting of the cabinet, a vote was taken to fulfill the party pledge and recognize Russia.

3. The De Jure Recognition and the Appointment of Chargés d'Affaires (February 1924)

On 1 February 1924, that is ten days after the Labour government came to power, R. Hodgson was instructed to present an official declaration to Chicherin.²⁷ Recognition was unconditional despite Snowden's warnings; diplomatic relations were to be resumed, communist propaganda against Britain was to cease, and an invitation was extended to the Soviet government for a conference on outstanding difficulties. Three days later, MacDonald informed all his colleagues of the reasons that had led him to act so swiftly "without calling a special meeting to consider the question." Two motives had actuated him:

He had found that if he delayed matters to consult other powers it would involve a postponement of three months; he had learned that the representative Congress of the USSR dispersed on Saturday, 2 February.²⁸

In fact, MacDonald had been careful enough to inform Poincaré of the step he was taking in his letter of 26 January; both statesmen realized that, if they advocated different policies, they should try to be "frank without being hostile, and defend [their] countries' interests without being at enmity."²⁹ Each of them clung to his position, and if MacDonald "grieved to find so many unsettled points causing us trouble and concern," Poincaré answered in the same negative way,

saying that he "also deeply regretted that several questions of importance to our two countries have not been settled."³⁰ The French press had few illusions and, on the whole "commented in a detached manner on the recognition of the Soviet government."³¹

On the contrary, the British move was welcomed in Moscow with real satisfaction, and even with some relief. Since 1921, the Soviets had striven to obtain an acknowledged status in European diplomacy, and at last a great power had recognized them. The reaction of the congress was also typical. When Litvinov read a translation of the British note to the 1,500 delegates assembled in the big theater, it was approved "unanimously." The allusion to Comrade Chicherin as "Your Excellency" and the mention of "His Majesty's Government" evoked "a slight outburst of merriment among an unkempt minority," as Hodgson reported, "but this was immediately suppressed."³²

Thus, without asking from the Soviets any kind of assurance, MacDonald dealt with recognition "on its own merits," after he had come to the conclusion that "it would be a great mistake to mix up economic discussions" with such a question. This was his first step in diplomacy, and he stuck to the high ideals he had explained to Rakovski in the following words:

I should like to bring into diplomacy the same sense of moral fair play as animates the ordinary decent man in his private conduct. I should like to feel that you and I understand each other and respect each other so much, despite differences in our views, that we can cooperate to promote, not only common interests but that which is much higher and more important in a way, the widest international cooperation.³³

This letter shows us the importance the new British prime minister attached to direct contacts and to the personalities he had to deal with. Indeed, it is well known that one of the main rules of diplomacy is that "manner of execution is always a factor in diplomacy of no less importance than concept."³⁴ In one of his first letters to Chicherin, MacDonald stressed this fact with insistence. He argued convincingly that "the personality of the representatives which both governments were to send to each other" was a question on which, "in the interest of good relations, almost as much depends as the conclusion of concrete agreements." MacDonald did not hesitate to remind the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs that British opinion was still "sensitive," and asked him to be particularly careful in appointing a first Soviet chargé d'affaires in London. MacDonald's good will and naiveté were patent when he felt it necessary to tell Chicherin that they "ought . . . to be very careful at the outset and not make a false move."

Indeed, he was convinced that an immense amount of prejudice could be removed if the Soviets would send to Britain "someone who would at once command general confidence and popularity." He even went as far as advising his Russian colleague to "make a selection" from among the "people who had had personal ties with Britain or had been known in it for other than political interest."³⁵ As we can see, MacDonald considered that, in his being a Socialist, he could try to influence the choice of an ambassador, because he wanted him to have "a warm welcome in every quarter." Yet, his plans failed to materialize.

To begin with, the appointment of ambassadors was opposed by King George V, who could not forget that the Bolsheviks had murdered his cousin Tsar Nicholas II. Then, when he seemed to yield a few months later, the British-Soviet Conference on debts and credits was already showing that recognition had not changed either the methods or the aims of the Soviet government. Personal attacks were now leveled at MacDonald himself, whose good will and sympathy rapidly diminished. Thus, in a speech in Tbilisi, Trotsky spoke of the policy of the British prime minister as "menshevism in action." In Baku, a few days later, he proclaimed that it was impossible to expect from MacDonald, "the leader of the Second International, . . . that on coming to power he would seize a broom and sweep the cockroaches from his monarchy." Zinoviev also felt obliged to attack MacDonald,³⁶ who listened with too much attention to the demands of British shareholders, and thus protracted the London negotiations. Referring to an article that the *Times* had published on the activities of the Comintern, Zinoviev claimed that it merely showed that the shafts of the organization he headed had found their mark among "honorable hereditary lords." After accusing MacDonald of "infamy," after emphasizing the fact that the latter was going to "betray the workers," he went on to say of the bondholders:

Let them roar; their savage shrieks and howls give us the best satisfaction. They show that our international organization grows, that we really have become an International Communist Party, which will find the means to settle the bondholders once and for all, and at the same time smash those who, notwithstanding their proletarian origin, now manage King George's household.³⁷

The king was very upset when he read these lines. He thought it "outrageous" that, while the Soviet delegation was in London and was "being treated with every consideration by the government, such attacks should be made against H. M. Ministers."³⁸ As soon as Mac-

Donald learned of Zinoviev's speech and of the king's reaction, he sent Rakovski a letter of reproach, which gives the precise measure of his disappointment. He wrote, paraphrasing in part the king's words:

I have hitherto refrained from addressing any protest to you against the attacks upon H.M. Ministers which have so constantly been made by prominent members of the Soviet government and others. . . . I now note a recrudescence of vituperation on the part of Mr. Zinoviev which passes all bounds of decent political controversy. . . . I can therefore no longer refrain from expressing to you my surprise that while you and your delegation are receiving courtesy and consideration at the hands of H.M.'s Government, a member of the Politbureau should indulge in such virulent abuse of your hosts. . . . These incidents . . . are creating a feeling of resentment among all classes of H.M.'s subjects.³⁹

Under these conditions, ambassadors were not exchanged: Hodgson in Moscow, as Rakovski in London, remained mere *chargés d'affaires* until the end of their tenure.⁴⁰ The direct consequence of this "feeling of resentment" was that British-Soviet relations failed to develop as both sides had first thought they would. Yet the British-Soviet Conference shows us how the British and the Soviets tried hard to come to an agreement, notwithstanding tremendous difficulties.

4. The British-Soviet Conference (14 April-4 August 1924)

The conference officially opened in London on 14 April 1924 to negotiate a settlement of the issues outstanding between the two countries. The difficulties that lay ahead were exactly the same as at Genoa or the Hague, but circumstances were very different. Britain could now hope to come to some "Rapallo Agreement" with the Soviet Union, for MacDonald was drawn back neither by France nor by awkward members of his cabinet as Lloyd George had been at Genoa. Moreover, both he and Rakovski were determined to rely on "unofficial diplomacy" whenever the formal sessions of the conference failed to produce a satisfactory result. Indeed, both men thought it was vital to come to an agreement. In a letter dated 11 February, the British prime minister wrote to Rakovski that his "earnest desire and hope" was that the appointed commission should "produce the framework of an inclusive agreement between the two governments at the earliest possible moment."⁴³

The commission was soon divided into two committees, which would deal respectively with political and economic questions. The political committee was instructed to begin with a review of all the bilateral and multilateral treaties in force on 7 November 1917. It had

to frame for submission to the main commission broad recommendations as to which should be renewed, which should be abrogated, and what agreements, if any, should be substituted for those annulled. Last, this committee was required to draft "a general treaty of commerce and amity to take the place of the Trade Agreement." The economic committee was instructed to begin with discussion of the claims and counterclaims, but both sides knew from the start how difficult it would be to agree on the details of such claims.⁴⁴

When Rakovski answered MacDonald at the opening session of the conference, he refused to limit himself to these two basic problems, or rather, he took advantage of the publicity that would be given to his speech to broach much wider questions. This was precisely the technique of "revolutionary diplomacy" that had been that of Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk and, to a lesser degree, that of Chicherin at Genoa. But if the intentions were the same, Rakovski in London was careful to put the stress more on diplomacy than on revolution. He proclaimed that, although the present conversations were concerned with clarifying British-Soviet relations, he believed that their significance "reached far beyond the limits of the two countries." Thus, while he declared that the British and Soviet governments had adopted "as a starting point the principle of respecting the independence and sovereignty of the Eastern states," he emphasized the strength and vitality of the revolutionary factor in the East. He declared that the war had "awakened the national consciousness of the peoples of the East," and that "any attempt . . . to obstruct that legitimate consciousness would be not only a crime . . . but also a piece of folly, because such a policy is bound sooner or later to fail." He then dwelt on the question of disarmament, which "should be carried to the furthest possible limits" to switch to the League of Nations and to the "reorganization of Europe."⁴⁵

Rakovski's attitude was not a surprise for the members of the Foreign Office who were used to Soviet methods. In March 1924, V. A. Wellesley, who sat on the political committee of the conference, commented on this issue with cold realism. He considered that, the more latitude the British delegation gave the Soviet representatives, the wider the opportunities for propaganda and obstruction which they immediately exploited, and argued that

if we adopt a reasonably tolerant and conciliatory attitude, the less opportunity we give for extraneous irrelevances and political red herrings and the more strictly we limit the scope of the Conference to the purposes for which it is called . . . [the better].⁴⁶

After four months of negotiations, the same Wellesley had not changed his mind, and noted that the Russians were "by nature discursive, disputative, and unbusinesslike. They are past masters in the art of obscuring main issues to suit their own aims."⁴⁷ Such opinions clearly show us the absence of unity that was the lot of the British negotiators. Indeed, the willingness of the Labor ministry to come to an agreement was opposed not only by permanent officials of the Foreign Office. Since the first day of the negotiations, the top London bankers had made a public show of their refusal to give any sort of credits to the Soviets. Their memorandum was a businesslike document that indicated the essentials for the restoration of Russian credit in Great Britain. The conditions were:

1. That a recognition of debts, public and private, should be agreed upon acceptability to both countries
2. That an equitable arrangement for restitution of private property to foreigners should be made
3. That a proper Civil Code should be brought into effective operation, independent courts of law created, and the sanctity of private contract again firmly established
4. That the Russian government should definitely guarantee that, in the future, private property shall in all circumstances be free of danger of confiscation by the state
5. That bankers, industrialists, and traders in this country should be able to deal freely, without interference by government authorities
6. That the Russian government should abandon its propaganda against the institutions of other countries, and particularly against all those from whom they propose to request financial assistance.

The bankers felt able to say that, when these conditions would be complied with, "confidence in Russia will begin to be restored, and the flow of credit will recommence." But they added that the process would be "gradual," for "credit and confidence can be destroyed at a blow; they take years to restore."⁴⁸ Such a memorandum could only appear to the Soviets as a declaration of war. They were all the more disappointed because they had always hoped to see the rich bankers of Western Europe "scrambling for the Russian market."⁴⁹ In his comments to the press on the British bankers' memorandum that combined firmness of purpose with cold irony, Rakovski tried to discredit the bankers' methods. He declared that

although paragraph 6 . . . gives, as one of the chief conditions for restored confidence between the two countries, mutual non-interference with each other's home affairs, para-

graphs 3, 4, and 5 are an actual attempt to make us renounce the very foundations of the Soviet Socialist organization. The memorandum demands the re-establishment of private property. The memorandum demands the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. The memorandum demands a change of our code. Our answer to such an attempt is a categorical "never!"⁵⁰

As the bridge that led to private capital had broken down, Rakovski had to turn definitely toward the Labour government, and show them that his acceptance of a general treaty was necessarily dependent on the raising of a loan. The Soviet chargé d'affaires knew very well that the important man in the negotiations was A. Ponsonby, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, in whom MacDonald had the greatest confidence. Ponsonby and Rakovski had, in fact, struck up a friendship a few months before, and were always in contact before and after the official sessions of the conference.⁵¹ Their abundant correspondence is most revealing in this respect. Thus, on 29 May, at a time when many observers thought that the conference was going to reach a dead end, Rakovski wrote quite frankly to his new "friend" without bothering about propaganda:

As regards the loan, the British delegation hands us over to the City, but the City people on their part impose upon us new economic and political conditions which are unacceptable to us. . . . For us the keystone of the whole matter is to obtain the *real assistance* of H.M.G. on the question of a loan or of *real credits* in some form for the relief of Russia. This object would in our eyes and in the public opinion of our country afford justification for the sacrifices which we are prepared to make to effect liquidation of pre-war debts. I can affirm that the solution of this first problem would also facilitate the solution of the question of nationalized private property. In my view, the success of our negotiations on the question of pre-war debts and the loan will decide the success of the whole conference.⁵²

As at the Genoa and the Hague conferences, the question of claims and counterclaims was an incredible tangle. Now, roughly speaking, the British delegation was placing all its demands in three groups: the first group, including all state debts, various claims for bonds and obligations, and claims for nationalized properties, amounted to 2,450,000,000 gold rubles; the second group comprised war debts amounting to 5,373,000,000 gold rubles; the last group con-

sisted of the interest on all debts and amounted to 2,816,000,000 gold rubles. The British claims were thus 10,639,000,000 gold rubles in all.

The Soviet claims for the destruction caused by the intervention, for the gold seized by Kolchak and for losses in Transcaucasia, were said to exceed the British demands by 2 milliards, a claim the Foreign Office delegates to the conference found absolutely "fantastic" and that exasperated them.⁵³ Thus, O'Malley wrote in his memorandum on the "Soviet Claims against Great Britain" that the Bolsheviks were "importing the methods of [bazaar] horse copper into what was intended to be serious and businesslike international conference."⁵⁴ But the problem that proved the most difficult to solve was that of the nationalized properties. Indeed, the Labour government could always guarantee a loan if it wanted, and this was what happened in the end; claims and counterclaims could be annulled in the last resort, but the nationalized properties involved an important question of principle. The Bolsheviks claimed that

the revolution was fought in order to defeat the bourgeoisie . . . and it would be ridiculous to think that the workers, after suffering tremendous sacrifices and shedding their blood on so many fronts in the defense of their rights, should now, when building up their peaceful fabric, begin to return property rightfully seized by revolution.⁵⁵

After this failure to extract anything in the nature of admission of liability from the Russians, it was decided to bring them into direct contact with the bondholders, on the one hand, and into direct contact with the property owners, on the other hand, in the hope of their being able to come to terms on a purely businesslike basis and so exonerate the British negotiators from the impossible task of inducing the Russians to admit their liabilities.⁵⁶ This, however, also proved to be a failure within a few weeks. Another solution had to be found to prevent the blocking of the conference.

After many proposals, Rakovski envisaged two possibilities to try and meet the 115 claims, for a total of 600 million rubles, from British citizens whose properties had been nationalized. He first thought of differentiating between claimants as follows: (a) poor people who had lost everything, and who could be paid a proportion; (b) others who had lost a certain amount, but did not intend to return to Russia—these might receive some concessions; (c) the chief claimants who intended to return to Russia, and who could not be paid.

Rakovski absolutely refused a mixed commission for arbitration, as it would lay down principles of abstract, or, as he called it "theoretical" right, whereas they wanted "practical" right.

Ponsonby would not hear of such a solution: his Russian colleague "might be able to defend this purely arbitrary division of the claims," but he "certainly could not. It would be absolutely absurd." Rakovski then changed his ground and said that these claims were greatly exaggerated, and mentioned the figure of 439 million rubles as being nearer the mark. The second solution he proposed was simpler: the Soviet government "might agree to pay a lump sum to be distributed" by the British government "to those to whom concessions cannot be given, and continue negotiations with others." Should it be found possible to deal with any claimant by means of concessions, his name would be removed from the list of those receiving compensation. In any case, Rakovski went on, the attitude of his government toward the whole question "would be greatly modified once a loan were realized."⁵⁸

As we can see, the conference was mainly revolving by then around the basic problems of the nationalized properties and of loan. In effect, both sides soon agreed to put the Soviet counterclaims and the war debts into cold storage, so that the debts due from and to other countries were not prejudiced. By the end of July, the Labour government, under the influence of Ponsonby, began to consider guaranteeing a loan to the Soviets. It perfectly understood that the Russians were unable to meet their financial liabilities in any direction "unless the Russian machine could be set going again by financial assistance from outside, and that assistance could only be given by government intervention."⁵⁹ Hence, the emergence of the proposition that the only way out was to guarantee the Soviet Union a loan, the proceeds of which would be devoted (1) to meeting the first installments of numerous liabilities to Britain; (b) to financing orders for machinery, shipping, etc. to be placed in the United Kingdom.

The loan would amount to £30 million, and the Soviet delegation committed itself to spending in Great Britain no less than two-thirds of the money raised.⁶⁰ Thus, even if the Soviet Union were not to get the usual trade facilities and export credits, a solution was now in sight. Indeed, no one had forgotten throughout the negotiations "the P.M.'s instructions that the Russians should be given plenty of rope,"⁶¹ and that the Labour government had promised the opposition a statement before the summer recess (i.e., at the very beginning of August).⁶² Yet, after a plenary session which lasted twenty hours on 4 and 5 August, it was suddenly announced that negotiations had broken down. When the news reached them, a group of Labour members of Parliament offered to serve as intermediaries between the two delegations, refusing to believe that no solution could be reached.⁶³ They knew that progress had been slow, but that both sides had

made all efforts to reach an agreement. Phrase after phrase to which the Russians took exception had been amended with patience and ingenuity. The political treaties had been revised. The commercial treaty was drafted in its final shape. Yet the settlement had been shipwrecked on a single issue: on the eternal question of nationalized properties. The actual words to which objection was taken by the Soviet delegation were on "the amount and the method of payment of the compensation to be paid by the government of the Union in respect of claims preferred by British nationals, etc."⁶⁴

While they were ready to make exceptions to the Soviet degree on nationalization, they wished to retain the power to discriminate between various classes of property owners. This was precisely what Ponsonby considered "absurd," as we saw from the conversation which he had had with Rakovski on 2 June. As the head of the Soviet delegation stuck to his idea, Ponsonby proposed a series of new formulae. In the end, the alternative wording that proved acceptable to both sides was "an agreed settlement of property claims other than those directly settled by the government of the USSR."⁶⁶ When the cabinet finally decided on 30 July that it was ready "to recommend that Parliament guarantee a loan to be issued to the government of the USSR," Ponsonby immediately wrote in this significant letter to Rakovski:

May I impress on you the importance of the concession which has been made by the Cabinet. . . . I would urge you therefore to make your utmost endeavors to induce your government to take full advantage of the most favorable moment which is likely to occur for years to come and to persuade them to consent to an agreement which, in my opinion, will not only promote good will between our two countries but will be a substantial contribution towards European recovery.⁶⁷

Rakovski fully understood Ponsonby's arguments, and realized the magnitude of the concession. This, however, had only been granted because Rakovski had shown, for his part, that the Soviet government was ready to meet the British on some essential points. Thus, he had quarrelled with Krasin on the question of the status of the Soviet trading company in London. In the discussions relating to the commercial treaty, Rakovski had come across two major difficulties: the extraterritoriality of the Soviet *Torgpredstvo* and the problem of tax-free imports. To remedy these difficulties, he proposed to suppress the Soviet trading company as it existed and create in its place joint-stock companies that would not come under the control of the

Commissariat for Foreign Trade. As the head of this commissariat, L. B. Krasin was exasperated by what he saw as a direct attack on the monopoly of foreign trade, which he had always defended against its numerous critics within the Soviet leadership. He immediately wrote to the Narkomindel:

We must fight with the greatest energy against this free-trade deviation of Rakovski . . . who does not want to understand that the spreading of innumerable independent trading companies abroad, acting on the basis of foreign codes, would come in fact to nullify control over our foreign trade and abolish the monopoly.⁶⁸

A month later, Krasin wrote to his wife that he did not know how Rakovski would manage "to coordinate what he has promised [in London] with what Moscow can concede."⁶⁹ Krasin alluded here to a major concession that Rakovski extracted from his government, while failing to convince them on the question of the trading companies: this was the admission of certain liabilities with a view to restoring Russian credit in the City. Thus, when MacDonald signed the British-Soviet treaties on 8 August, the Soviet government had agreed to pay the prewar debts "inasmuch as they were contracted in foreign currency, and inasmuch as they were in the hands of British citizens before the conclusion of the trade agreement of March 1921." From this it followed that:

1. The Soviet government would pay nothing of the internal tsarist Russia's loans that might be in the hands of British citizens;
2. The Soviet government agreed to satisfy the other claims that were the consequence of the revolutionary events—for example, the claims concerning confiscated goods;
3. The Soviet government undertook to come to an agreement with the former proprietors and with the British government on the appropriate methods to satisfy the former proprietors of nationalized enterprises whose claims would be found to be just.⁷⁰

We can see that the Soviet government finally decided to make significant concessions to get British help. This was largely due to Rakovski's influence, as he did not hesitate to write, in contrast to the "revolutionary mood" of such Bolshevik leaders as Zinoviev:

I must remind you that every agreement between two powers is the result of some compromise, for an agreement cannot be signed if it does not correspond to the interests of both sides. In our case, this difficulty was even more considerable as we had to coordinate the interests of two states that possess different social organizations: a socialist state, and

a capitalist state. . . . You understand, of course, that the conclusion of such an agreement is unthinkable without concessions, but we have obliged ourselves to put precise limits to them: we could not conclude an agreement that would have imposed a heavy burden upon the workers' and peasants' masses.⁷¹

Rakovski's diplomatic skill was readily recognized in Moscow, where he was triumphantly received after signing the treaties with MacDonald. As at Genoa, Rakovski had known how to drive his point home and to convince both the British and the Soviets. On 20 August 1924, a whole article was devoted to his outstanding qualities as a diplomat and it was published on the front page of *Izvestiya*.⁷²

In London, both official and unofficial diplomacy had justified themselves, and Rakovski was determined to try and induce other countries to follow the path Britain had just taken. He turned next toward the country he knew best in Europe, that is France, where Poincaré's government seemed to be losing the favors of a volatile electorate.

B. Rakovski and Franco-Soviet Relations (1924)

1. The Soviet Union and France at the Turn of 1924

At the turn of 1924, many French politicians and businessmen realized that decisions affecting the whole future of the relations between their country and the Soviet Union must soon be taken, as the Bolsheviks had decided to play the card of recognition. As we saw, Great Britain was the first country to take this "bold" step. One of the arguments of both Liberal and Labor leaders had been that, if their country neglected to avail itself of the opportunity of determining the course of Russia's foreign policy while it was taking final shape, "France would assuredly seize it." France would once more "constitute herself the traditional friend of Russia."⁷⁴

In fact, France was wavering, while many countries followed into the wake of Great Britain: Italy recognized the Soviet Union on 7 February, Norway on 13 February, Austria on 31 July, Arabia on 6 August, Hungary on 5 September. Even France, which had always passed for the devoted champion of the émigré cause until the autumn of 1923, now seemed to be giving up her intransigent attitude toward the Bolsheviks. She was even making a bid to win Russia over to her continental policy. This change was heralded by the participation of Russia in the important Lyons Fair, organized on April 1923 by the city's major, Edouard Herriot.⁷⁵ The leader of the French Radical Socialist party had made direct contact with the Soviet leaders

during his trip to Russia in September 1922. As early as 1917, he had written a book on *L'Effort russe*, which was a sympathetic study of Russia's plight. In 1922, he warmly supported the Nansen mission that was fighting the famine, and, a year later, he endeavored to establish Franco-Russian cooperation at the Lausanne Conference. His attitude was not governed by any pro-Soviet inclination. On the contrary, he was induced by the NEP to believe that "communism is only a fiction now."⁷⁶ This was also what French industrialists thought when they urged their government to establish regular relations with Russia. Some of them even decided to go directly to Moscow to try to ascertain what were the prospects for trade.

At the end of May 1923, the representative of an important French oil syndicate—a Mr. Andriot—arrived in the Russian capital and, with the consent of the Chief Concession Committee, went to Baku for the purpose of investigating the possibilities for an oil concession. A French commercial mission followed in his wake a few weeks later. In an interview given to *Ekonomicheskaya zhizn'*, the chairman of the mission stated that the group represented by the delegation included important French industrialists and financiers representing the oil, metallurgical, chemical, and textile industries, besides the timber and grain trades. A company had been formed exclusively with French capital, and the precise object of the mission to Moscow was to negotiate for industrial mining and other concessions on behalf of the company.⁷⁷

In fact, the pro-Russian campaign started in the French press at the close of 1923 was certainly instigated by Poincaré. The French premier simply repeated the maneuver he had made on the eve of the Genoa Conference in 1922. This consisted in having a few articles written in the press, and in starting secret negotiations that would be immediately denied if they proved inconclusive. In this respect, it is important to remember that, whenever Britain stiffened its attitude toward the Soviets, the French government became more amenable to them and vice versa. Thus, on 10 May 1923, two days after the Curzon ultimatum, Poincaré had made a friendly gesture that was much noticed at the time: he had given permission to the Russian Red Cross to come to Marseilles and visit the Russian émigré soldiers who intended to return home.⁷⁸ Then, after the vociferous campaign in Britain against Rakovski during the summer of 1923 and the refusal of Curzon to meet the Soviet representative, Poincaré felt that he ought to take a step toward Moscow. On 22 December 1923, a long article by Jean Herbette in *Le Temps* dwelt on the need to improve Franco-Soviet relations. Its conciliatory tone made a great impression on the Moscow leaders, since it was through *Le Temps* that the Quai

d'Orsay made its own views known.⁷⁹ A few days later, in an interview he gave to *Izvestiya* on New Year's day, Chicherin reviewed various aspects of relations between France and Soviet Russia, and concluded in most revealing terms:

I consider it quite impossible that the French people should for long continue to oppose without reason its own economic and political interests, particularly when, on our side, we show the greatest readiness to meet French interests and to put an end to the present estrangement between us and France.⁸⁰

Chicherin had come to stress the idea of "estrangement" after analyzing the negative aspects of the relations between the two countries. He argued that the French government under Poincaré's leadership had not stopped working against the Soviet Union both in Poland and in the countries of the Little Entente: thus the Franco-Czechoslovak agreement then under negotiation (and duly signed in January 1924) was thought by the Soviets to be a continuation of the policy of the "cordon sanitaire." Further, the Soviet commissar emphasized the importance of two events that added to the difficulties in the way of a Franco-Soviet rapprochement. First, the French government was trying to sell the Russian ships that had been taken out of the Black Sea by the White "rebels," i.e., by Wrangel. Second, the French government had just helped to sanction the confiscation of Soviet goods, which had taken place in Marseille in March 1921.⁸¹ Now, in December 1923, the Seine tribunal had attributed these goods to the prerevolutionary owners, the White émigré brothers A. and M. Bunatian. Moreover, the two years' experience of trade with France had given very meager results: this, L. B. Krasin argued, was due to the lack of proper juridical basis in the relations between the two governments, as one refused to recognize the other.⁸²

Notwithstanding all these impediments, or rather to remedy them, Poincaré decided to answer Chicherin's call and to make contact with him as he had done in 1922, by way of "the eternal go-between" Beneš. On 3 January 1924, the Czechoslovak foreign minister announced most secretly to Iurenev, the Soviet representative in Prague, that the efforts he had made to bring France and Soviet Russia together had not been fruitless:

France, he said, is ready to enter into negotiations with Russia but puts a number of preliminary conditions to it. Poincaré asked the Soviet government to give answers on two points: (1) Were they ready to respect international agreements? (2) Do they agree in principle to recognize the

prewar debts (some 20 milliard francs)? The question of compensation for the losses endured by French citizens in Russia would also be on the agenda of the negotiations, but is of lesser importance. The first two questions have to be answered positively before the negotiations start.⁸³

Despite Poincaré's peremptory tone, the Soviets thought it important to reply positively. In their telegram of 11 January, they agreed to discuss both questions in direct negotiations with the French government and "saw no insurmountable obstacles that could prevent their satisfactory solution." Yet, as Rakovski had done when dealing with the imperious J. D. Gregory while the British Conservative government was still in power, they stressed that it was impossible to reply simply "yes" or "no" to such discussions: it was necessary to discuss them, and "this could only be done through direct representatives."⁸⁴ Thus, they refused to be kept at a distance by the French authorities, but knew by now how to express their discontent in a diplomatic manner.

When the conversations that had started in October 23 under the direction of the director of the Soviet State Bank (Scheinmann) were resumed in January, there was some hope of coming to an agreement. A month later, however, they petered out again when the Soviet representatives made *de jure* recognition a prerequisite to the settlement of the basic financial questions. As was his wont, Poincaré denied the fact that he had initiated the talks and at the beginning of March 1924, Chicherin asked the Moscow press to publish a communiqué whose tone was one of virtuous indignation:

The Soviet government has not only never refused direct negotiations with the French government,⁸⁴ but, on the contrary, insisted on them, when the foreign minister of one of the states maintaining *de facto* relations with the USSR [i.e., Czechoslovakia. F. C.] officially requested the Soviet government, in the name of Mr. Poincaré, to make a statement of its attitude on the question of debts, claims, and former treaties. The Soviet government requested this minister to transmit to the French government the proposal to enter into direct negotiations with the Soviet government on these and other questions, through representatives armed with full powers.⁸⁶

As we can see, the Soviets had as hard a time dealing with Poincaré as they had had with Curzon. At the beginning of 1924, Franco-Soviet relations were in a worse state than they had been for a long time. After the failure of this attempt to negotiate, Poincaré

took a new step that exasperated the Soviets, and Rakovski in particular: in March 1924, the French premier ratified the Paris Protocols, which assigned Bessarabia to Romania, and this single act touched off an exceedingly acrimonious exchange of telegrams between Chicherin and the French premier.⁸⁷ By then, there seemed to exist no relations at all between France and the Soviet Union, as the head of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Paris, Mr. Skobelev, had moved from Paris to London in February 1923.⁸⁸

In the review he wrote on the disastrous state of Franco-Soviet relations in May 1924, Rakovski made a very sharp attack on Poincaré's policy and on Poincaré himself. He recalled that

everywhere the Soviets are running across the intrigues of French diplomacy directed against them: in Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague, Belgrade, and London. When the French policy which aimed at preventing the recognition of the USSR in Europe was defeated, Poincaré found an ally in the person of Wise in the United States. The French press and the French government tried by all means to prevent the recognition of the USSR by England. In addition, France tried to take part in the Anglo-Soviet conversations with the object of transforming London into a second Genoa.⁸⁹

Rakovski was right in pronouncing this last sentence, and he could hardly be wrong in dwelling on Poincaré's hostility toward the Soviets. During the heated session that took place in the French Senate on 9 April 1924, de Monzie had addressed to the premier ten practical questions based on the feasibility of according the USSR *de jure* recognition.⁹⁰ Poincaré had admitted in a bitter and sarcastic speech that conversations had already taken place between his emissaries and the Soviets, but that the latter had "showed no sign of accepting any of the French offers made at Cannes, Genoa, and the Hague. . . . [He] desired an open-door trade policy concession for French firms," but noted that "the monopoly of foreign trade made commercial and credit transactions difficult."

Rakovski knew that Poincaré would block all negotiations while he remained in power, as the French premier constantly harked back to a time when the talks with the Soviets had notoriously failed and refused to take a step to meet them. But he also knew that general elections were to take place in France in a month's time and that Herriot and his followers, who were fighting for a rapprochement with the Soviets, might take power. This is the reason why Rakovski was careful to conclude his article by stating the main condition that his government would put before a foreign government prepared to

negotiate:

The future of Franco-Soviet relations depends entirely on the French government which, apparently, does not understand as yet the importance of establishing friendly ties with the peoples of the USSR, irrespective of the point of view which we hold on the question of private property.⁹¹

Rakovski had worked at the turn of 1924 to negotiate the recognition of the Soviet Union by Great Britain on the most advantageous terms for the country he represented, and now he was to act along the same lines in connection with France. His personal role was to be extremely important, and really made of him, as E. H. Carr rightfully notes, "the leading Soviet diplomat" in the 1920s.⁹²

2. French Recognition of the Soviet Government (28 October 1924)⁹³

On 11 May 1924, the general elections in France brought Edouard Herriot to power: this meant the victory of the Left bloc and the retreat of the National bloc, which had guided the destinies of France for most of the time since World War I. One of the main ideas of Herriot in matters of foreign policy was to reconcile France with the three major European countries, Germany, the Soviet Union, and also Great Britain.⁹⁴ One of his first moves on coming to power was to make contact with the Soviet representative in London, Rakovski, to prepare the ground for the *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Union by France. His arguments were the same as those that had urged MacDonald and the British Labour party to take the decisive step. It was impossible to keep outside the political orbit of Europe a nation of more than 110 million inhabitants. Socialists stressed the serious inconvenience of excluding from the European economic sphere a vast territory with inexhaustible resources at the very moment when the old continent was in need of all the raw materials it could get for its general consolidation and recuperation.

On 30 May, even before his cabinet was organized, Herriot wrote a letter to Rakovski in which he declared that he would be glad to meet him in London within a few weeks: indeed, the French premier eagerly desired to see his "Socialist colleague" Ramsay MacDonald to discuss with him the problem of European security.⁹⁵ Herriot called on Rakovski on the evening of 22 June, and focused the conversation on the issue of recognition. He first promised the return of the Russian fleet taken by Wrangel from the Black Sea and interned in Bizerte.⁹⁶ This was a significant proof of good will for, although the maintenance of the fleet cost money, the French government had always refused to give it back to the Soviets, and Romania had never

ceased to be grateful for that. On the question of recognition itself, Herriot did not give any formal assurance, as there were a number of definite obstacles to granting immediate and unconditional recognition. "The first obstacle," Herriot stated, "is our promise to the United States not to give a definitive answer without their agreement; the second obstacle is the need to obtain some guarantee for the small bondholders."⁹⁷

Rakovski then held out some promise of financial settlement, and thought that a mixed company of French creditors and former property holders should be formed to ask for concessions in Russia, even if the Soviet government were to refuse recognition of old debts.⁹⁸ At the end of the conversation, Herriot assured the Soviet representative that, if the Soviets agreed to give some formal assurance on the question of prewar debts, recognition would be granted at the end of July or the beginning of August 1924.

Yet a number of other obstacles delayed recognition until the autumn of that year. On the one hand, Herriot thought that the German question had to be settled first, and postponed all meetings with the Soviets. Yet, on 15 July, he telegraphed to Chicherin reaffirming his intention "to arrange for the resumption of normal relations" between the two countries but "only after the London Conference."⁹⁹ On the other hand, opposition to unconditional recognition of the Soviets in France came not only from the right-wing political parties. As Rakovski noted in the article he wrote in August 1924 on the state of Franco-Soviet relations, the French Socialist party was "not, on the whole, enthusiastic about the recognition" of the Bolsheviks. Indeed, the French Socialists were divided on this burning issue. Thus, Albert Thomas had been one of the first to congratulate his "dear friend" MacDonald on "the practical and rapid nature of [his] decision in the matter of the Soviet government."¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, such socialist leaders as Pierre Renaudel considered that, if "recognition should be effected without preliminary conditions," it did not mean that it could be done "without reservations."¹⁰¹ Indeed, his attitude toward the Bolsheviks lacked the particular confidence that had been one of the most important characteristics of the relationship that developed between British Labour leaders and the Soviets on the eve of British recognition. While demanding recognition, Renaudel proclaimed in the name of the French Socialist party that he had "no intention of abandoning the right to criticize the methods and tactics of the Soviet government in regard to what might be called the handling of its domestic socialism as well as in its conception of international relations." Renaudel did not hesitate to accuse the Bolsheviks of hypocrisy, and noted that "it would be easier if, on the question of

peace, bolshevik policy were more clearly defined, less insidious and inclined to stir up strife." He took as an example the fate of Georgia, whose Menshevik government had been expelled by the Red Army in February 1921 and had taken refuge in Paris.¹⁰² Hypocrisy seemed patent to him, for a treaty had been concluded on 7 May 1920, by which the Russian government recognized both the right of nations to self-determination and Georgia's individual right to independence. Military intervention to facilitate a political takeover was repugnant to the French Socialists.

When a journalist asked Rakovski what he thought of such reservations, he replied that they characterized the representatives of the Second International who were influenced by anti-Soviet émigré groups and proclaimed:

Georgia exists, progresses, and becomes stronger. Yet it is not a menshevik Georgia, but a Soviet Georgia. This change is a matter of internal policy and does not in the least concern foreign governments.¹⁰³

Such an argument was, of course, a fallacy, for it implied that all the former territories of the Russian Empire still naturally depended on the central Russian government. But Rakovski, who fought with such courage to defend the rights of the independent republics (mainly Georgia and the Ukraine) against Stalin's "bureaucratic centralism," now declared with an eagerness which seemed intended to convince himself that

at the present time, Georgia has an independent government. A Soviet government. I repeat, an independent government which is now linked by definite federal ties with our Soviet Union as are all the other Soviet republics. She can, at her own discretion, renounce them as provided in our Soviet constitution. I can assure you that nowadays Georgia has more Georgian characteristics, in the way of the development of its national institutions and its national culture than under the former menshevik government.

As we see, Rakovski seemed, from the outside, to approve entirely the official line he had bitterly criticized a year before. Although he refused to be "only a reflection of the general will, of general Party directives"¹⁰⁴ as a Sverdlov had always been for example, he was "guided by that military solidarity which dominated the Bolshevik leaders."¹⁰⁵ But we shall also see that, if Rakovski did not criticize the general Party line in the years 1924-1925, at the height of his involvement in diplomatic work, it was largely because he feared to read his own words reproduced by all the anti-Soviet journalists of

Western Europe. This could only weaken the first proletarian state. Yet in the period 1924–1925, one could easily guess that, if he was proud to be a Bolshevik and to act as such, his European education and his past as a Social Democrat differentiated him from most of the other bolshevik leaders. If he attacked Renaudel or Vandervelde, whom he had known very well when he was a member of the Second International, he considered that it was “their right” to resent bolshevik methods. As for him, his work as a Soviet diplomat and member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union was to prove them wrong.

In the same interview which he gave in London on 24 July, Rakovski was clever enough to show that recognition was not simply “a question of debts and private property,” and dwelt on the problem of French security, which was one of the main preoccupations of all French governments between the world wars. He argued that France would “find its much desired security only in Soviet Russia.” Now that it was going to abandon the Ruhr, France needed some real security against “the possibility of a military danger from German nationalism”: the Soviet Republic could act as a counterweight to “the growing nationalist movement in Germany.”¹⁰⁶ In itself, such an argument showed the progress that Soviet diplomacy had made on the chessboard of European politics. Until the Genoa Conference, two years before, the Bolsheviks had still feared an attack from the Western powers, as they always thought that this was the main preoccupation of bourgeois statesmen. Now, a Soviet representative could propose an alliance that certainly was reminiscent of prewar diplomacy and could not leave France entirely indifferent.

Although Herriot’s idea of French security was to get closer to Great Britain and to have less inimical relations with Germany, he thought it important to appoint a commission of five to draft the terms of recognition of the Soviet Union. This was done in September 1924, and the key figure in the impending Franco–Soviet negotiations was to be a close friend of Herriot and a long-time acquaintance of Rakovski: A. de Monzie, the Radical senator who had interpolated Poincaré on the Russian question a few months before. Rakovski had known de Monzie since 1900, when he was a medical practitioner in France and seriously thought of entering French political life. With this in mind, he had asked de Monzie, then a promising young barrister, to help him acquire French citizenship, which proved impossible on account of Rakovski’s past and present revolutionary activities.¹⁰⁷ In August 1923, de Monzie had made a trip to the Soviet Union, where he had visited not only the capitals, but also Nizhni–Novgorod and Serpukhov.¹⁰⁸ On his way back, he was more determined than

ever to fight for the recognition of a country without which, as he said, "European peace was impossible."¹⁰⁹ The French senator argued, as the British Liberals had done some time before, saying "We ought not to arrive too late, so that we may obtain from Russia what we can, now that Moscow is weak and friendless." After this invocation of French self-interest, he dwelt on considerations of security and on the balance of power in Europe, for it appeared to him, as to many French politicians, that a Franco-Russian rapport was "in the natural law of the European balance." This was a favorite argument of Rakovski and of Chicherin who could only approve of de Monzie's words: "We have the power and the duty to recall Russia to the Occident. In saving Wrangel and Pilsudsky, we thought we were saving Western civilization. We were only saving Poland."¹¹⁰

On the subject of debts, which seemed to many to be the main obstacle to immediate recognition, de Monzie referred to an earlier project of Gaudain de Vilain, that France avail herself of tsarist gold deposited during the war in Franco-Russian banks.¹¹¹

As time passed and Herriot showed no sign of extending recognition, the Russians became more intransigent and showed a pronounced hostility toward the use of the debt question as blackmail. The Soviets persisted in their stand that the resumption of diplomatic relations ought to be divorced from the debt question or, at least, not made contingent on the solution of the latter.¹¹² When Rakovski wrote to his "Cher sèateur et ami" that the Soviet government resented these waverings as much as the attacks on the part of the French press against immediate and unconditional recognition, de Monzie replied on 2 October

I thank you for thinking that I have not abandoned either my ideas or my sympathies in accepting the presidency of the commission charged to prepare the recognition of the Soviet Union. It is not in the mind of the Herriot government to use dilatory means in order to defer this recognition which has to the contrary to be defined. I am obliged to you for putting me on guard against the theses which the present polemics are using. But I think I may tell you . . . that our point of view is absolutely different from the one adopted by your opponents or political enemies. It seems important to me that there should not be, on the day after recognition, any surprise on one or the other side. It seems necessary to me to demarcate the field of policy in which has to be situated the act of recognition and that of the economic negotiations which have to follow.¹¹³

For a fortnight, de Monzie and Rakovski exchanged telegrams, letters, and telephone calls in an attempt to draft the two notes of recognition and to agree on terms. "To avoid any misunderstanding and delay," de Monzie asked Rakovski to meet him either at Dover or at Folkestone. Moreover, on 16 October, the Russian commission presided over by de Monzie reported in favor of unconditional recognition to be followed by negotiations about debts. Here again, as we see, both official and unofficial diplomacy was used, and the relationship between Rakovski, Herriot, and de Monzie soon came to recall that which had developed a few months before between our diplomat, Ponsonby, and MacDonald. Thanks largely to his personal skill, the Soviet representative obtained recognition on the most favorable conditions. When he met de Monzie at Dover in mid-October to discuss the final text of the French note, Rakovski obtained from his "friend" three major amendments:

1. The writing down of the word *de jure*, although the Quai d'Orsay and de Monzie himself thought it "inutile peut-être à la précision de notre pensée";
2. An indication that the resumption would be effected by an exchange of ambassadors;
3. The adaptation of the sentence that "worried" Rakovski on account of the Georgian problem and in which "there would be no more talks of third powers."¹¹⁴

Apart from these modifications of importance, the text of the French note of recognition had been based on and followed fairly closely the report of the de Monzie Commission, which itself betrayed very clearly the influence of the British example. Thus, the very first recommendation, viz., to recognize the Soviet government as the (*de jure*) rulers of all those territories of the former Russian Empire, which acknowledged its authority, was an exact copy of the British formula. But Rakovski had succeeded in persuading the French to go further than the British: instead of exchanging mere chargés d'affaires, the French note proposed "to open at once regular diplomatic relations with the government of the Soviet Union by the reciprocal appointment of ambassadors." For the Soviets, this was undoubtedly an improvement on the de Monzie report, which spoke of the French government nominating its ambassador to Moscow only if the negotiations that would follow recognition led to a satisfactory result.¹¹⁵ De Monzie and Rakovski also discussed the choice of ambassadors. A few days before recognition, on 16 October, de Monzie had made it clear to Rakovski that he did not want himself to be appointed ambassador in Moscow, as he preferred "to remain in Paris to conduct future negotiations."¹¹⁶ He then asked Rakovski whether the candidacy of

Jean Herbette was acceptable to the Soviet government. On the other side, Rakovski thought that, in view of the part he had just played in the recognition, and because of his personal knowledge of French political life, he would be appointed Soviet ambassador in Paris. He is indeed reported to have told the French ambassador that, if he were appointed in Paris, "his friendship with Mr. de Monzie, which goes back more than twenty-five years, will make agreement more easy to reach."¹¹⁷ He was not, however, to take up residence in the rue de Grenelle as Soviet representative until November 1925, apparently for two reasons: on 4 November 1924, Chicherin informed Brockdorff-Rantzau in confidence that Rakovski had been "passed over in view of his recent indiscretion in *Izvestiya*," in which he had stressed "the possibility of military danger from German nationalism."¹¹⁸ The second reason was that the Soviet government preferred to appoint the "businessman" Krasin, to emphasize the predominantly commercial character to be given to Franco-Soviet relations.

When recognition was extended to Moscow on 28 October, a great part of the French press made a show of scepticism. *Le Quotidien* simply reproduced on 30 October the careful words of de Monzie: "The era of impossibilities had ended; the era of difficulties now commences." The *Journal des débats* had not hesitated to proclaim a fortnight earlier: "With a candor that borders on cynicism . . . the French government recognizes the Soviet Union at a moment when other governments which have done so are disappointed and disgusted."

In the same way, *Figaro* warned on 30 October that the French ambassador in Moscow would be helpless while the Russians "could now use Paris as the headquarters of the Third International." This was a transparent allusion to the celebrated "Zinoviev letter," which had helped to defeat the British Labour party in the general elections of October 1924, and which came as a great shock to Herriot's government at the very moment when it was extending recognition to the Soviet Union.

Chapter 15

The Locarno Spirit (1925)

A. The Zinoviev Letter and the Fall of the Labor Government (October–November 1924)¹

On 8 October 1924, the Labour government suffered defeat in the House of Commons. Parliament was dissolved, and a general election was scheduled for 29 October. Two events had “perturbed the country a good deal and shattered the faith of a good many of the electors” that MacDonald’s government “could handle difficult situations with firmness and with some continuity of purpose.”² These two events were the signing of the British–Soviet treaties, and the so-called Campbell case.

After MacDonald had signed the treaties, the conservative press started a campaign against their ratification by Parliament, stressing as the *Daily Telegraph* did, their “uselessness,” or claiming with the *Morning Post* that British interests had been “betrayed.” Then the attack on MacDonald’s Russian policy switched to two cases of unequal importance, but which both involved charges of incitement to mutiny and revolution in Great Britain. Both cases had the greatest importance for British Labour: the first one brought their defeat in the House, while the second helped to defeat them in the country. On 25 July 1924, the *Workers’ Weekly*, edited by J. R. Campbell, published an appeal to the British forces that said:

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, definitely let it be known that neither in the class war nor in a military war will you turn your guns on your fellow workers, but will use your arms on the side of your own class. Refuse to fight for profits. Turn your weapons on your oppressors.³

A Crown prosecution was initiated against J. R. Campbell, but then, in the middle of August, counsel for the prosecution announced that “no evidence could be offered,” as the object of the article was “not to seduce men in the fighting forces from their allegiance, but was a comment on armed forces being used by the State for the suppression of industrial disputes.”⁴ When the attorney-general withdrew the prosecution, the suggestion that certain members of the

Labour party were intervening to cover "communist sedition" could only embarrass the Labor government and make bad propaganda for the British-Soviet treaties that had just been negotiated. There is no doubt that, in his article, Campbell was in fact obeying the injunction that had just been repeated at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, in July 1924, to carry on "persistent and regular propaganda and organization work in bourgeois armies."⁵ Under these conditions, the publication of a letter purportedly written by Zinoviev on the same topic and sent to the Central Committee of the British Communist party could only exasperate the Labor government, and add to the determination of the Conservatives to come back to power and put the Bolsheviks in their place. Indeed, the letter attributed to the head of the Comintern stated unmistakably in its address to the British Communist party:

From your last report it is evident that agitation and propaganda work in the Army is weak, in the Navy very little better. . . . It would be desirable to have cells in all units . . . and also in factories working on munitions and at military store depots. In the event of danger of war, with the aid of the latter and with the transport workers, it is possible to paralyze all the military preparations of the bourgeoisie and make a start in turning an Imperialist war into a class war.⁶

One can easily understand that MacDonald's reaction when he first read the letter on 14 October, while canvassing far from London, was one of embarrassment before British public opinion and before the permanent officials of the Foreign Office who had always been opposed, in their great majority, to his policy of friendship and openness toward the first "Workers' Republic." MacDonald replied the following day to the Foreign Office that "the greatest care would have to be taken in discovering whether the letter was authentic or not," and that, pending the investigation, the draft of a protest to the Soviet chargé d'affaires should be prepared. Then, on 22 October, a mysterious report appeared in the *Manchester Evening News* that the Zinoviev letter was already in the possession of the press, implying that the best thing to do for the Labor government was to publish it and not try to hide it.⁷ Somebody had obviously taken care to communicate the "letter" to the press, and somebody also contrived to have a stern note of protest sent to Rakovski. Indeed, as MacDonald explained a few days later, a rough draft of this note reached him on 23 October. He had "altered it and sent it back in an altered form, expecting it to come back to me again with proofs of authenticity, but that night it was published."⁸ MacDonald thought at first that

this had been done because of a misunderstanding in the way he had initialled the trial draft, but later revised his appreciation. Indeed, the note to Rakovski was signed by J. D. Gregory, the head of the Northern Department who had acted on his own authority without consulting either Lord Haldane, who represented the prime minister in the Foreign Office, or the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, A. Ponsonby. Such an omission was obviously deliberate, as Ponsonby "was actually sitting in on one of those days in conversation with Mr. Rakovski. Round about him in the office were responsible officials discussing the whole of the happenings connected with this business and never once did one whisper of it reach [his] ears."⁹ It is evident that, if Ponsonby had known of the existence of the "letter," he would have asked Rakovski for an explanation, the more so that, as the latter replied on 25 October, in his note to the Foreign Office:

It was agreed . . . that, in the interests of the strengthening of friendly relations between the two countries, both parties would endeavor to settle by direct conversations any incidents which might arise, resorting to the despatch of Notes only in the case of this friendly procedure failing to bring about a favorable result.¹⁰

Indeed, one may wonder at the haste with which Gregory sent his note to Rakovski, while he had not said a word on the matter to Ponsonby or to MacDonald himself at the proper time. It soon became known that the "Zinoviev letter" had been handed to the Foreign Office on 10 October, that is while the prime minister was still in London, which he left only on the 13th. Thus, we see that, while the letter was quite in the spirit of Zinoviev's usual declarations, it was "used," as MacDonald stated in Commons on 9 December 1924, "simply as an electioneering stunt . . . simply to create a certain panic in the minds of old ladies." It was "kept up," and then "handed out at the psychological moment, and from that you get a great panic and a big majority."¹¹ MacDonald came back to this idea in the private conversation he had with Rakovski at the very beginning of November. At that time, he considered that the "Zinoviev letter" had "urged about one million people who usually abstained from voting to cast their vote in favor of the Conservatives." He also added frankly that he would not have sent Gregory's note, "at least not as it stood," and that it was done "without his knowledge" (*pomimo nego*).¹²

Thus, if the "Zinoviev letter" was soon considered by the ex-prime minister as "a fraud perhaps unmatched in its cold calculation," it could appear to Rakovski as a "gross forgery." Indeed, the latter

had no difficulty in showing that the forgers had made two mistakes, one in the heading, and the other in the signature:

In circulars of the Communist International . . . it is never described as the "Third International"—for the simple reason that there has never been a first or a second Communist International. The signature is a similar clumsy forgery. Mr. Zinoviev is made to sign himself as the "President of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International," whereas actually he is and always signs himself as "President of the Executive Committee."¹³

The first objection made by Rakovski appears to be incorrect, for *Izvestiya* of 10 September 1924 bore the signature of "The Executive Committee of the Third Communist International," a formula that was not, however, as frequent as that mentioned by the Soviet Representative. But this is only a detail, for the "Zinoviev letter" really was a forgery. Rakovski himself believed it to be a Polish forgery, and de Monzie's secretary told him in confidence that this was the view of the Quai d'Orsay.¹⁴ The Soviets had immediate proofs of it, and Baldwin himself spoke in 1928, at a time when he was still prime minister, of a "gallant crowd" of forgers, and named Druzelkowski, Zhemchuzhinikov, Paciorkowski, and others among persons who had "a right to claim the honor" of forging the "letter."¹⁵

If everyone agreed on this point, no one denied that it also was a clever forgery. After writing that it was "indispensable to stir up the masses of the British proletariat," and "to bring into movement the army of unemployed proletarians," the forgers made a link between insurrection and British-Soviet relations that implied that Labour was only a toy in Bolshevik hands:

The proletariat of Great Britain, which pronounced its weighty word when danger threatened that the past negotiations would break down, and compelled the government of MacDonald to conclude the Treaty, must show the greatest energy in the further struggle for ratification and against the endeavors of British capitalists to compel Parliament to annul it.¹⁶

Repeated attacks by the Conservatives were intended to show, as Baldwin put it, that the Labour government had not enough "firmness" and "continuity of purpose" to remain in power, and continue to indulge in these intimate relations with such dangerous revolutionaries as the Bolsheviks. The Conservative government was brought to power on a powerful wave of hostility toward the Soviet Union, and the relations Rakovski was to have with the new secretary of state

for foreign affairs, Austen Chamberlain, were soon to recall the chilly reception he had got from Lord Curzon a year before.

Yet, by the end of 1924, the two major European countries had officially recognized the "Workers' Republic." There is no doubt that Rakovski's personal activities helped a great deal to quicken the tempo of recognition and to create a favorable climate, which could have led to more positive results had the general situation allowed. This is so true that such a cautious diplomat and historian as Ivan Maiski did not hide his personal admiration for Rakovski in the long conversation he had with the author in January 1967. He never referred to him as a "Trotskyist," as R. F. Karpova never failed to do, but, on the contrary, stressed his remarkable qualities not only as a diplomat, but also as a man. Rakovski was very popular because of his "democratic" ways, his kindness, and his urbanity. In the "London memoirs," which Maiski published in 1968, he refers himself many times to "our political representative" (*nash polpred*) without mentioning Rakovski by name, but pays him the following tribute:

Our ambassador enjoyed considerable respect in governmental circles, often met MacDonald to discuss things with him and with the under secretary of state for foreign affairs, Arthur Ponsonby, and had free access to all members of the [Labor] government.¹⁷

If Rakovski had been able to work in very close contact with MacDonald and his colleagues, the Foreign Office was to keep him at arm's length as soon as Baldwin's government came into office on 4 November 1924.

B. British-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Locarno Conference (November 1924-October 1925)

1. Baldwin's Government and the Soviet Union

The attitude of British Conservatives toward the Soviet government had always been one of hostility, and Baldwin's government naturally remained faithful to a policy that had helped them to come to power. Members of the cabinet, such as Lord Curzon (who was lord president), Winston Churchill (chancellor of the exchequer), and Sir William Joynson-Hicks (Home Office), had always made virulent attacks against the Bolsheviks, and could not but take an opposite stand to that of MacDonald and of his friends.¹⁸ Thus, a few days after the cabinet was formed, Churchill wrote a revealing letter to the new secretary of state for foreign affairs, Austen Chamberlain. In this letter, which is worth quoting at some length, Churchill goes as

far as advocating an immediate rupture with the Soviet government after giving a detailed analysis of the political situation and of the circumstances of the last election:

When millions have been so excited [on the Russian issue] during the election, it would be most dangerous to disappoint their reasonable expectations and to lead them to suppose that now we are all in office we have receded from the views we expressed during the campaign. Failure on the part of the government to respond to the mandate given them by the electors would immediately cause widespread dissatisfaction. . . . It is essential that action should follow a declaration of the authenticity of the Zinoviev letter. The question is what action. The more I reflect on the matter, the more sure I am that we should revoke the recognition of the Soviet Government. . . . We should strip a power which has violated its engagement of the diplomatic status it had sought and received at our hands. . . .¹⁹

Chamberlain, however, refused to see in a sudden rupture of relations with the Soviet government the "strong and sensible act" that his friend advocated. For his part, he attached great importance to such a gesture, but believed that any "precipitate action" that would amount "to handing Rakovski his passport and recalling" the British representative in Moscow could be harmful.²⁰ At least, it was "not a matter to be decided without grave thought." Chamberlain had his own idea about the way the Bolsheviks should be dealt with, as he was to make it clear to Churchill some time later. His policy was "not a hostile policy," but a policy of "aloofness"²¹: this word "aloofness" is indeed the one that was to be quoted by all the confidants of the Secretary of State, and it sums up the attitude of the British government from the end of 1924 until 1927.²² It was also the word that J. D. Gregory had used in September 1923 to explain one side of Curzon's policy.²³ The other side was, of course, a far more "active" policy that saw its climax in the celebrated ultimatum of May 1923. In the same way, Chamberlain first considered sending an ultimatum to the Soviets in October 1925, and finally broke diplomatic relations with them in May 1927.

As far as possible, Chamberlain had decided to "ignore" the Soviet Union, "to have as little to do" with it as was manageable; this meant that this country was to be progressively isolated, not with the intention of attacking it, as the Soviet leaders readily thought, but to try and teach them a lesson. If Lloyd George had tried to "tame the Bolsheviks through trade," if Curzon had tried to curb their will by

menacing them, Chamberlain was determined to put them back in their place, which was outside Western Europe. A secret memorandum of his conveys this idea remarkably well with all its implications:

It will be inexpedient to provoke a controversy with the Soviet government if it can be avoided, and the less attention we pay to them the more anxious they will be to come to terms with us. If we complain about any action, they feel that we are preoccupied with them and they are satisfied. If we make them the subject of our denunciations, they feel that we are afraid of them and they are pleased, but when we ignore them entirely, they are afraid, because it shows that we have no need of them and nothing to fear from them and that we can afford to leave them out of account.²⁴

A good example of this policy is the way Chamberlain treated Rakovski during the rare interviews he gave him. The two men only met four times, the first and the last time being formal meetings when Chamberlain came into office in November 1924 and when Rakovski was appointed Soviet ambassador to Paris a year later. In the first interview, the new secretary of state for foreign affairs took care to show Rakovski that, if MacDonald had made representations that dealt with the Zinoviev letter, he for his part considered that this letter was only "a fair specimen" of a "whole body of revolutionary propaganda" that would no longer be tolerated.²⁵ When he next saw Rakovski, on 6 January 1925, Chamberlain categorically refused "to argue the question of the authenticity of the Zinoviev letter." He added in a peremptory tone that he had "absolute proof of its authenticity," and that he was "not prepared to discuss it." The Soviet representative then tried to talk about trade relations between the two countries, but understood better than ever before from Chamberlain's reply that the development of trade relations depended, for a great part, on a political agreement between the two countries. Once he had said that "trade and especially the purchase of goods of British manufacture was much more restricted than [he] wished," he could only add that "this was a question of credit." These arguments had been repeated again and again, and the only way out was a policy of good will and mutual concessions, which neither the Bolsheviks nor the British Conservatives really believed in.²⁶ On the question of propaganda, Rakovski was in fact quite frank with Chamberlain. He admitted that

in the early years after the revolution they had no doubt indulged in a good deal of propaganda just because they were a revolutionary government and not very secure; but

they had now other means of defense. Such propaganda was no longer necessary to them.²⁷

Such a demonstration could hardly convince Chamberlain, even if it was partly true as the enquiries of the Foreign Office had shown on the eve of the Curzon ultimatum. The secretary of state was convinced that the Bolsheviks' aim was, as he suggested to Rakovski, "to encourage anti-British feeling in Eastern States, or even within the British Empire."²⁸ Such was indeed the main reason for the distrust of all British Conservative governments, for whom the question of trade with the Soviet Union was a matter of secondary importance as compared to the security of the British Empire. Chamberlain summed up his impressions when he told the Soviet representative that "unfortunately the policy adopted by his government did not enhance their credit."²⁹ As Rakovski knew this perfectly well, he had addressed himself directly to the City as soon as Labour had lost power.

2. The Failure of Trade Relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union

In a speech delivered on 16 December 1924 at a dinner given by the Trade Delegation of the USSR in London, Rakovski dwelt on the same problem of "mutual confidence." But instead of talking of political matters, he only stressed the fact that the Soviets were particularly proud of having "always carried out loyally and punctually all obligations incurred by them in their dealings with British industrial, commercial, and financial firms."³⁰ Of course, he thought that trade relations between the two countries were not sufficiently developed as compared to what they were before the revolution and his assistant, P. Rabinovitch, quoted the following figures issued by the Board of Trade.³¹

Year	Imports into GB from Russia/ USSR	Exports from GB into Russia/ USSR	Reexports from GB into Russia/ USSR
1913	£40,271,000	£18,103,000	£9,591,000
1921	£ 2,695,000	£ 2,181,000	£1,210,000
1922	£ 8,103,000	£ 3,641,000	£ 970,000
1923	£10,595,000	£ 2,492,000	£1,989,000
1924 (Jan.-Aug.)	£10,595,000	£ 9,672,000	£9,344,000
Total for the period 1921-24	£30,659,000	£ 9,672,000	£9,344,000

Rakovski also understood that there were a number of obstacles that would be difficult to remove, as he did not hesitate to tell the

British businessmen who listened to him. One of the first reproaches made to the Soviets, as far as trade was concerned, was that they utilized much of the means they obtained from the sale of their exports to Britain in purchasing reexport goods. Indeed, the City thought it "undersirable" that the chief trading operations of the Soviets in Britain should be "limited to the purchase of re-exports, whereby the only profit made by British merchants [was] the so-called trading profit."³² Rakovski clearly saw that it would be far more profitable to British businessmen were the Soviets to buy British manufactures, "as a result of which Britain would secure not only a trading, but also an industrial profit." In fact, the situation as it existed was not exactly advantageous to the Soviet government. Owing to their shortage of foreign currency, they were forced to limit themselves, in the main, to the purchase of raw materials instead of satisfying their own requirements.

British business circles considered that the greatest hindrance to the development of trade relations with the Soviet Union was the foreign trade monopoly. Already in 1923, an article published in the *Times Trade Supplement* had shown that "the obstacle to an expansion of trade with Russia [was] not the lack of *de jure* recognition but the Soviet Monopoly of Foreign Trade."³³ Its effect was said to be "crippling," but the Soviet leadership held it both as one of its major conquests and as one of the best means to safeguard these conquests. We know that there were many discussions among the Soviet leaders on this question, and that Krasin had a very hard time to maintain it.

The Monopoly of Foreign Trade, introduced in Russia by the decree of 22 April 1918, provides for the concentration of all foreign trade operations in the hands of the state. In the first years of the Soviet Republics, such a monopoly was absolutely necessary, as everything was nationalized. But when the NEP was introduced, a number of Soviet economists and politicians wondered if it was not an absurdity to keep such a rigid monopoly in the foreign trade sector, while the government "allowed a more or less complete liberty of trading" on the internal market.³⁴ Krasin considered that "the most dangerous moment" for the monopoly was the autumn of 1922, when Sokol'nikov, at the head of the Commissariat of Finance, wrote a note "on the regime of foreign trade." He advocated "a number of exceptions to the monopoly that were to be applied to certain frontiers and to certain goods." In Krasin's eyes the carrying out of such a plan would have meant "the ruin of the monopoly," for it was "the equivalent of a hole in a balloon."³⁵ Lenin, Trotsky, and Rakovski always backed Krasin's views, and only admitted limited reorganization to

prevent too great a rigidity of the system. Thus, on 13 March 1922, by a decision of the All-Russian Executive Committee, some state enterprises were given the right to conduct foreign trade independently on condition that their contracts would be presented for approval to the Foreign Trade Commissariat or its foreign trade representatives.

In his speech to the British industrialists, Rakovski took care to explain the real significance of the celebrated monopoly. Of course, its main justification was that

in a Socialist State, the central authority must control the chief branches of the national economy. Without such control, the State would be unable to direct the development of the economic life of the country in conformity with our fundamental law.

But the second justification for the monopoly was, as Rakovski admitted, the insufficiency of Soviet exports, their limited purchasing power, and their poverty: they had no money to buy abroad, and they were obliged to take the greatest care of their system of exchange with foreign countries. The Soviet representative did not try to hide the drawbacks of the monopoly from his guests. He knew that "trade is a living thing and [that] if it is conducted by officials there is a danger that it may become bureaucratic." He also bore in mind that the Soviets had "to give their trade machinery the necessary flexibility and business capability," the more so that they were dealing with countries in which trade is in the hands of private individuals. On the other hand, Rakovski did not forget to state one of the main advantages that foreign businessmen would find in the monopoly security. Indeed, since the state bore the responsibility for the trading operations of the Soviet economic organizations, British merchants buying from and selling to such organizations ran "no risk whatever."

Rakovski's last argument to try and convince his guests to trade more readily with the Soviet Union was the fact that, economically, the two countries "supplement one another," as Soviet exports to Britain consisted mainly of grain and raw products, which were essential to British industry.³⁶ There is no doubt that a considerable number of British merchants eagerly desired to trade with the Soviet Union and to sell their manufactured products. They knew that important orders had been placed in other countries of Western Europe, and only awaited the government's permission. In January 1924, for example, the Foreign Office was informed that the Soviet government had just bought armaments and war materials in France to the value of seven million gold rubles, and that negotiations were pending for

the delivery of a large quantity of machine guns.³⁷ A month later the Board of Trade learned that the Fokker works in Holland had received an order for 250 airplanes, the French Henriot works and the Italian firm Ansaldo in Turin had orders for "airplanes for study."³⁸ This could not leave the big British firm Vickers unmoved, and its directors had immediately asked permission from MacDonald's government to export their products, to which the latter had "no objection."³⁹ Thus, in March 1924, an official memorandum stated that the Foreign Office was "prepared to consider the issue of export licenses to the Soviet Union, but each case [would] be treated upon its merits": before a license could be granted, the government had to be satisfied "that the quantities are reasonable, that direct benefit to British industry will result, and that there is no specially disquieting feature in the political situation." But MacDonald and his colleagues stated that "in no case can there be any question of government assistance in financing the transaction."⁴⁰ This was indeed a reasonable solution, for the firms interested could trade freely, if "reasonably," with the Soviet authorities without interference from the British government. In April 1924, a contract for the supply of 600 machine guns to the Soviets was already signed. In July of the same year, Rakovski had written to Ponsonby to inform him that a commission was to be sent by the Commissariat of Foreign Trade "for the purpose of acquainting themselves with British airplanes," in which the Soviet government was "greatly interested."⁴¹ They were already in contact with the Napier works in London, which had agreed to sell the motors in question and which eventually did sell them.

As soon as the Conservative government came back to power, matters changed for the worse. A typical example is the case of the order for arms and ammunition to a value of £7,500,000, which the Soviet government had placed in September 1924. At the time, with MacDonald still in office, a member of the Northern Department noted on the report that

if we object to this contract we shall be placing difficulties in the way of employment of a considerable number of men over an extended period in an industry, and indeed in a firm [Vickers] which has had great difficulty in employing its skilled staff.⁴²

MacDonald did not object to the delivery, but considered that this was "a cabinet matter." Before a decision was taken, Labour was out of office, and Chamberlain took the opposite stand in full agreement with his colleagues. At the end of November 1924, a Foreign Office note stated that

after consideration of a Memorandum by the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs . . . the Cabinet agreed "that it would be inconsistent with the attitude towards Russia taken up by members of the government during the recent General Election to sanction the equipment of Soviet Russia with arms and amunition of British manufacture."⁴³

On 25 December, the Foreign Office made the point clear to the Board of Trade in a way that was to prove fatal to all further development of trade between Great Britain and Soviet Russia: "In reply to your letter of December 19th, Mr. Chamberlain holds that the intention of the Cabinet decision was to prohibit all exports to Russia at the present time."⁴⁴ The Soviet trade delegation immediately felt the result of this one-sided decision, and Rakovski soon complained personally to Chamberlain "that the attitude of the British government in matters of trade was obstructive."⁴⁵ Moreover, as the big London banks still refused to grant any long-term credits to the Soviets, Rakovski implied during the same conversation that "the hostile attitude taken up by English banks towards Russian trade" was due to the inimical attitude of the British Conservative government toward Moscow. To this it was easy to reply, as Chamberlain did, that "the British government had no control over British banks and did not inspire their policy." For the banks, he added, business was business, and their attitude was determined by purely business considerations. If they were unwilling to give the credits which Russia sought, it was "because the City of London would never be willing to lend fresh money to a State which repudiated the ordinary obligations of international law in respect to debts incurred by its predecessors."⁴⁶

3. Great Britain and the Soviet Union on the Eve of the Locarno Conference (April-July 1925)

If Chamberlain was determined to give the Soviet authorities a lesson, it was only because he put political problems much higher than economic questions, as Lord Curzon had done before him. If he "did not encourage the idea of entering upon fresh negotiations" on the subject of trade relations or of the treaties concluded by the Labour government and that the new cabinet refused to ratify, it was because of the constant "anti-British" activities, which he denounced to Rakovski with growing exasperation. Indeed, he saw "little use" in entering into such discussions so long as he was under the impression, from which he "could not at present escape, that the political obligations of the Trade Agreement were not being fulfilled." His main concern obviously was

that the influence of the Soviet government or of the Communist International, whose activities [he] could not dissociate from those of that government was continuously being employed in an unfriendly spirit to British interests.⁴⁷

In the conversations he had with the Soviet representative, Chamberlain referred not only to anti-British propaganda, but also to various hostile activities such as the selling of arms to Persian and Afghan rebels who were under the influence of "Communist agents." Thus, at the very end of 1923, Soviet Russia had handed over to the Afghans 2,000 rifles and four anti-aircraft guns they had bought in Britain. These were "the remainder of a consignment of arms promised by the Soviet government to Afghanistan."⁴⁸ This consignment, which apparently was considerable, also included field guns. Early in April 1924, the Foreign Office was informed that the Soviet mission was to deliver airplanes to the same country, that it was sending specialists in aerial navigation, and had undertaken the construction of an aerodrome. Other reports written from January to April for the same year showed that the Afghans were buying arms in various European countries, a thing that could only increase the suspicions of the British government. Thus, the Afghan minister in Rome bought, at this time, 1,000 British rifles, twenty machine guns, and 240,000 rounds of ammunition from the Italian government. These arms were transmitted to Afghanistan via Constantinople and Russia "in order to prevent the British from holding them."⁴⁹ A few months before, a secret report mentioned the fact that flying personnel from France or Germany were to proceed to Afghanistan via Russia. The funds for training and to defray expenses were sent to Paris from the Moscow Legation. Also at the end of 1923, a "well-known arms purchasing agent of Vienna" (Dorstein) had endeavored, apparently successfully, to purchase 250,000 rifles for transmission by Russia to Persia.

This feverish activity had followed the Curzon ultimatum and may have been caused by it. It was not limited to the two countries we have mentioned, but seemed to range from Turkey to China. When Chamberlain read of these actions that MacDonald had preferred to ignore, he was most disquieted by their extent and their importance. When he met Rakovski on 1 April 1925, he cited "as an instance of what [he] had to complain of," the activities of the Soviet ambassador in Peking, "who continually denounced his foreign colleagues and their policy, and incited the Chinese government to repudiate their treaties" with Great Britain and with other countries.⁵⁰

In fact, Bolshevik "anti-imperialist" activities were soon to worry French political leaders as much as their British colleagues. In a letter of 8 June 1925, which he sent to his friend W. Tyrrell, Chamberlain

emphasized the identical view that existed between Briand, who was then the French foreign minister, and himself. Both men had lunched the same day "at a quiet little restaurant on the borders of the lake" at Geneva where they "ran over several problems . . . besides much desultory conversation." One of these problems, apart from the central question of Germany's fate, concerned "Bolshevik activities." Chamberlain recalled that the Frenchman

thought that we should keep our eyes open. The Soviet government had given up the idea of a forcible revolution in Europe. Their policy was now to strike at the Western Powers through their colonies, fomenting Communism and disorder in Africa, in Turkey, and in the Far East. We must watch China and Turkey also, where he feared that Mustapha Kemal was not turning out to be the man he had thought him. . . . He does not contemplate any action by the governments, but he thinks it may be well that the police of our respective countries should be in close touch with one another.⁵¹

Briand's political analysis was absolutely right and proves that he had no illusions whatsoever about Bolshevik activities in the East, as well as in the West. He had probably read reports on Lenin's last articles, such as "Better Less but Better," in which the Bolshevik leader noted that the East "had entered finally into the revolutionary movement," and he was no doubt aware of Stalin's speech at the Twelfth Party Congress of April 1923, which had clearly linked the evolution of the East with that of the West:

Either we shall shake to its foundations the deep rear guard of imperialism—the eastern colonial and semi-colonial countries—revolutionize them, and thus hasten the downfall of imperialism, or we shall fail, and thus strengthen imperialism and weaken the force of our own movement. That is the question.⁵²

In the same way, Rakovski understood that, if Great Britain and France eagerly desired to come to an agreement with Germany, if "the Western Powers wanted to ensure in their own interest the maximum of tranquillity" in Europe, that was "in order to center all their attention on the East."⁵³

The meeting with Briand had only increased the suspicions of the British secretary of state for foreign affairs toward the Bolsheviks. Moreover, as the Bolsheviks extended their action in the East, feeling themselves snubbed and ignored in Europe, Chamberlain gradually came to reconsider the advice that Churchill had given him in

November 1924, that he should sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In a secret memorandum dated 24 July 1925, Chamberlain announced to Baldwin that "a great mass of information" had accumulated in the Foreign Office "proving the continuous hostile activities of Soviet Agencies against the British Empire, more particularly in the East."⁵⁴ This information was "of the most highly secret character," and the secretary of state did not even circulate it to ministers "lest any carelessness in the handling of the papers should endanger" the British sources of information. He considered that the "provocation offered" was now such that it had become intolerable. Yet, he still had a number of important reasons for not wishing to push things "to the point at which a rupture would be inevitable." The first reason was that such a rupture might have unfortunate repercussions in China, where it might "help the Soviets in their attempts to pose as the protectors of the Chinese."⁵⁵ The second reason was that it might have equally bad results in Germany, where the opponents of the pact policy used as one of their chief arguments against it that it was "at bottom a British plot to cause a breach between Germany and Russia in the interests of British policy." And, last, there were the possible effects on "the immediate industrial future" of Great Britain, which could not leave Baldwin's government indifferent. Thus, Chamberlain showed how "grave" a rupture with the Soviets would be. He thought that the three reasons he had given were still "probably sufficient" to justify and even to require a continuance of his attitude of chilly "aloofness." But he did not feel certain that it was right for him "to take the responsibility of recommending that continuance to the Cabinet" unless some other members of the cabinet shared with him the full information in possession at the Foreign Office.

We see how careful Chamberlain was, and this was matched only by Rakovski's caution since the British Conservatives had come to power. Since the beginning of 1925, he had realized that the time for a defensive diplomacy had come. Of course, there was "no danger of war against the Soviet Union," and he refused to frighten the Soviet masses by the idea that there could be "a capitalist block against Soviet Russia."⁵⁶ In his mind, the political leaders of eastern Europe still hoped to be able "to use the political isolation and the economic weakness" of the first socialist state to convert it into a colony to which various plans of control similar to the Dawes plan might be applied. Indeed, Rakovski came back to the idea which he and other Bolshevik leaders had developed at the time of the civil war: that, because of their opposite political and social system, the capitalist and the socialist orders could not coexist side by side, and

that, sooner or later, one was bound to destroy the other. In these conditions, Rakovski believed that the bourgeois governments were facing a problem they could never solve:

They realized the necessity of taking part in the economic restoration of the Soviet Union, but at the same time they felt that this work could only strengthen the hand of the Soviet government.⁵⁷

For its part, the Soviet Union had only one way: "to march toward victory." Until then, the general policy was "to depend on dissensions among capitalist states" and to make them scramble for the Russian market. In fact, Rakovski never thought, as he said many times on the eve of the Genoa Conference, that the Soviet economy could be reorganized by capitalist traders, engineers, or technicians. That was the reason why he had first opposed concessions to foreigners; the system of loans had always appeared to him as being much more interesting, for it maintained the full independence of Soviet principles. Now that Western Europe was again isolating the first socialist state, he proclaimed when he came back to Moscow for a few days in January 1925:

If you wish our foreign policy to be good, make this possible for us by consolidating the internal position of the Union; develop the productive powers of the country, raise the cultural level of the peasantry, create for our diplomacy a strong, unconquerable rear, and then that diplomacy may bring us something in 1925. . . .⁵⁸

As far as the policy of class struggle was concerned, Rakovski considered that the Soviet Union ought, of course, to continue to put its stake on the working class in the bourgeois countries of Western Europe. But he also argued that it had become necessary to adapt this policy "in such a way as to paralyze the attempt which was being made to turn against the Union the broad masses of the middle class."⁵⁹ Indeed, the Soviet representative in London had been the first to see how a considerable part of the British middle class had been frightened by the Bolshevik bogey into voting Conservative. In his view, all Soviet leaders, and especially those concerned with the activities of the Comintern, should refrain from "unwise language," which helped nothing and created the worst impression on the broad masses of Western Europe who knew nothing about the Soviet Union. Thus, Labour might come back to power, and a new policy of "compromise" could be envisaged: if this happened, the Soviet Union would again be given the most favorable conditions to develop its own economic strength.⁶⁰ For the moment, however, Briand and Cham-

berlain were determined to follow an active policy of appeasement, which would leave the Bolsheviks "outside the pale of civilization."⁶¹

In July 1925, after a hopeless discussion with Chamberlain, Rakovski tried to explain to the British public (and, in the first place, to the British middle class) the reasons for a "crisis" that he no longer denied. He thought that this crisis did not consist in the fact that there were disagreements, contradictions, and antagonisms between the two countries. In fact, he saw "nothing abnormal" in the fact that there were notable differences between two such powers as Great Britain and the Soviet Union, "which have different geographical positions, different social structures, and different political and economic interests." What he thought "abnormal," however, was the peculiar atmosphere in Britain, which "magnified" all questions and incidents "out of proportion," and "transformed them into a veritable *casus belli*."⁶² It was "abnormal" to see that, "instead of endeavoring to find some means of overcoming" such disagreements, "instead of trying to bring about a conciliation," as is the practice between countries in normal diplomatic relations, no real interchange of opinion was any longer possible between the two governments. This, Rakovski argued, might soon "bring about such a state of affairs as only exists between two countries at war."⁶³ Moreover, the most important questions—such as the questions of China and the pact—were "discussed and solved as though the Soviet Union were not in existence." This was precisely what Austen Chamberlain was striving for, as his private letters show us very clearly. Thus, in June 1925, he asked his friend W. Tyrrell to tell the foreign editor of the *Morning Post* "to cut Soviet Russia out of his discussions of the pact."⁶⁴ In Chamberlain's mind, the Locarno treaties had indeed little to do with the Soviet Union: he had "no idea of embarking on any . . . international campaign" directed precisely against the workers' republic, as he had already told Rakovski personally. He had taken care to make it clear to the Soviet representative as early as April 1925 that

if he was under the impression that [he, Chamberlain] had been engaged at Rome or Geneva in an effort to form an anti-Soviet union, as [he] had seen suggested in the Russian press, [he] might tell him at once that there was not a word of truth in that suggestion.⁶⁵

Of course, Rakovski and the Soviet government never thought that the Western Powers were planning war against them during their conversations at Locarno. Still, a pact that was signed without them was always, in their mind, signed against them, the more so if it sanctioned a "new united front of the imperialist powers," a thing

that now seemed even worse than the "cordon sanitaire." As the capitalist and the socialist orders could not exist side by side without interaction, such a "united front" could not be merely defensive; it had to be aggressive.⁶⁶

C. The Soviet Union and the Locarno Treaties (Autumn 1925)⁶⁷

By the Locarno Treaties, France and Germany voluntarily agreed "to put an end to a historic dispute that had lasted for centuries."⁶⁸ What struck Rakovski most was that Germany herself was the "formal initiator of the negotiations."⁶⁹ Indeed, the first proposal was made in December 1922 by the Cuno government, that is only a few months after the signing of the Rapallo Treaty. Already at that time, Germany was trying to maintain the balance between its Eastern and Western policies. Or, as Chamberlain put it: "England and Russia were fighting for the soul of Germany,"⁷⁰ These were two ways of explaining one of the main problems affecting European security.

When Germany first proposed to the French government to enter into a mutual pledge, in which Great Britain and Belgium would be included, not to resort to war against one another for one generation, Poincaré rejected it without real consideration.⁷¹ This was on the eve of the Ruhr occupation, and Germany was still considered the pariah of European political life that had dared to link its fate with the Soviet Republics, the other outcast. In two years' time, however, the political situation had changed a great deal, and France found itself in a far less advantageous position. It was again worried by the fact that Great Britain had not yet signed a specific guarantee of its Rhineland frontier. As France saw that Germany was recovering quite speedily from its defeats, it considered it essential to its security to come to an agreement with that country. Now that France could no longer indulge in provocation or repression, and before Germany became too strong, a compromise must be sought. At Versailles in 1919, this had been impossible for, as Chamberlain wrote to L. S. Amery, "France and Germany moved in a vicious circle: fear on the one side, threats on the other, leading to ever deeper and more embittered hostility."⁷² It was to help in breaking this vicious circle that Great Britain decided to act as mediator, for the chance to act was given by Germany's insistence on coming to an agreement. And this was

not an Alliance of the victors against vanquished Germany; it [was] the suggestion of a mutual pact between Germany and her late enemies to safeguard the territorial position of Germany's western frontier, to remove the fears of France and to bring Germany back into the comity of nations as

an equal, and, by averting the danger of war from Europe, to enable Europe to obtain the credits without which her economic and industrial state must go from bad to worse.

This was a clear hint as to the part which the United States could play as a "special kind of super arbitrator," which would settle all disputes cropping up between the contracting parties.⁷³ Rakovski even suggested that it was Houghton, the U. S. ambassador in Berlin, who had really inspired the Locarno policy. His argument was that the United States could not obtain a settlement of the colossal debt that Great Britain, France, Italy, the Little Entente, etc. owed her (more than 10 million dollars exclusive of interest) "if the European governmental machine did not work more or less smoothly."⁷⁴ In Rakovski's eyes, the fact that the capitalist powers could succeed in coming to an agreement based on good will was a bad omen. It meant that the workers' republic was again isolated in the midst of naturally hostile capitalist countries:

One must not close one's eyes to the fact that the new international grouping will still further increase the isolation of the Soviet State in the capitalist world. In general, the USSR, as a revolutionary state, is compelled to practice the policy of "super-isolation."⁷⁵

Yet, he proclaimed with the greatest determination that "isolation, which frightens other people, does not frighten us, for it is the present the Soviet power found in its cradle."⁷⁶ Now Rakovski was quite convinced that all the efforts which the Soviet government had made to be recognized by Western Europe were to end in failure. Such was his conclusion when he read the secret "memorandum" that Chamberlain was supposed to have written in May 1925. In this document, the British politician showed that Europe had been divided until then into three elements: victors, vanquished, and Russia. This was no longer to be true after the Locarno treaties. Germany and the other capitalist powers were to be put on an equal footing, while Russia remained "outside the pale of civilization." The "memorandum" made it clear that the Russian problem was then

rather an Asiatic than a European problem. Tomorrow, Russia, perhaps, will once more appear in the European balance of power. But for the time being she hangs like a storm cloud over the Eastern horizon of Europe. Russia is not a factor of stability in the definite sense. She is indeed the most threatening element, and a policy of security must be decided upon despite and perhaps just because of Russia.⁷⁷

If the first part of the "memorandum" sounded like Chamber-

lain's words, the last sentence certainly was a fake, but showed what the Soviets wanted to believe and to make others believe. It remains that the very fact that the capitalist powers had succeeded in coming to an agreement was considered by Rakovski as a major "defeat" for the Soviet diplomacy, for Locarno was "the reply to Rapallo." And Rakovski, who was considered as one of the "fathers" of the Rapallo Treaty, now came to think that it had not borne fruit. His disenchantment is easily to be seen in the following words:

The Rapallo Treaty, which was more of a symbol than anything else, did not seriously hinder Germany from going over to the other side of the barricades from time to time and acting against us together with our enemies.⁷⁸

If Rakovski was so disappointed, it was because Chicherin and himself had put "the strongest pressure on Germany to prevent her from coming to an arrangement with France or Great Britain and no less to prevent her from entering into the League."⁷⁹ Chicherin himself had decided to go to Berlin at the very end of September 1925. When he arrived there on 30 September, he was "bent on a great campaign against England." As D'Abernon wrote to Chamberlain:

His central idea—outside monetary preoccupations—was to demonstrate to Germany that she was being a cat's paw to us. If Germany signed the Western Pact, her relations with Russia would be so weakened that she would be a mere pawn in the Western combination. Since the menace of a German-Russian alliance would cease to exist, no one would listen to Germany's views or pay attention to her remonstrances.⁸⁰

Alternatively, Chicherin's scheme as regards France was to point out that "since Russia was no longer bound to Germany by the Rapallo engagement, a Franco-Russian alliance was possible." The main obstacle to it, which had previously existed, namely unfriendliness between Russia and Poland, had indeed been removed through Chicherin's conversation at Warsaw, where he had stopped on his way to the German capital.

The Polish foreign minister, Skrrynski, who was known for "favoring policies of international conciliation," had consulted Briand before receiving Chicherin.⁸¹ His French colleague had encouraged him to do so, saying that Poland "had every interest in getting on good terms with Russia if [it] could." Its situation between Russia and Germany was obviously dangerous, and its relations with Germany could only be facilitated and the prospects of the Locarno negotiations improved if Germany felt that there was no likelihood of Russia making trouble for Poland in the rear. Indeed, if Poland had nothing

to fear from Russia, it might help to dispel from the minds of the Germans their nightmare of a French army marching across Germany to the relief of Poland, an idea that, as Briand observed to Chamberlain, no Frenchman contemplated.⁸²

During his stay in Berlin, Chicherin concentrated his attacks on Great Britain, whose increasing influence appeared to him as "the danger to European politics."⁸³ His celebrated Anglophobia was now at work as it had been at Lausanne, that is every time he had to face Conservative British statesmen. He asserted that Russia had experience of the nefarious actions of Britain in all parts of the world. In every country in the East were found British agents, who "not only opposed the promulgation of Soviet doctrines, but intrigued with the reactionary elements in each country to bring about a great combination—almost a crusade against the Moscow government." His aim could then only be to organize an anti-British crusade, and, first of all, to prevent Germany from signing the Locarno Treaties.⁸⁴ There is little doubt that on arriving in Berlin, Chicherin was confident of being able to sow such distrust in the mind of the German government that the latter would find some plausible pretext to follow his advice. He was also confident that he would find the representatives of France sufficiently attracted by the conception of a Russian-Polish-French understanding to prevent them from pushing on with the necessary negotiations for the proposed Western pact.⁸⁵ The Russian diplomat forgot that the position of international politics had altered considerably since 1922.

One of the most evident changes was that Poincaré had been replaced in France by Briand, and this, as D'Abernon wrote to Chamberlain, "effected a vast reaction in German policy."⁸⁶ The other point was that, according even to the pro-Russian and "father" of Rapallo, Von Maltzan, "the necessity for Germany to rely on Russia was . . . considerably less" than three years ago. "No country could stand alone—the only possible recourse at that moment was Russia. That was why the Rapallo Treaty had been signed and why it was justified."⁸⁷ However, the German government knew that conversations with the Soviets would enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, and that the signing of a commercial treaty would have its advantages. Thus, Streseman decided on the spot to grant this last satisfaction to Chicherin. As the German economic expert Schlesinger reported to Brockdorff-Rantzau in Moscow: "The German-Russian trade ship" had, at last, "after a stormy voyage of many years," reached a "peaceful haven."⁸⁸

If the political advantages of the treaty had made Streseman decide to sign it, economic advantages were of no mean importance. The

German experts insisted on the fact that, their country having lost its colonies, "the industrial and commercial exploitations of Russia" was a "means of resuscitating its own trade." For its part, Soviet Russia was interested in the technical advances of the Germans; moreover, if the latter were not in a position to do much as regards finance, the Berlin banks had recently granted credits to Russia amounting to £5,000,000.⁸⁹ While he was in the German capital, Chicherin also tried to dissuade the Germans from joining the League of Nations, but all his arguments were used to no avail.⁹⁰

Indeed, if the British government agreed to guarantee the Franco-German frontier on the one side and the frontier between Germany and Belgium on the other, it refused to take on "fresh obligations in respect to any [other] boundaries."⁹¹ In obtaining additional security in the West, Chamberlain clearly realized that the danger of war in the East was not diminished for all that. Yet he absolutely refused to "be dragged into a quarrel about Poland,"⁹² and thought that the best guarantee of the German-Polish frontier would be Germany's entry into the League "with full acceptance by her of the obligations of Article 16" (which might involve action against the Soviet Union), but which was "the correlative of her enjoyment of rights under Article 9" (which opened up the possibility of a revision of the Versailles frontiers).⁹³ The League of Nations would then assume its role in the event of the arbitration treaties not being fulfilled.⁹⁴ As we see, Rakovski had some reasons to be pessimistic: all the efforts made by Soviet diplomacy since 1922 seemed to have been frustrated at Locarno, which organized a new grouping of the capitalist powers. His conclusion was that, in the future, these powers would continue to pull against each other in certain spheres,

but such questions as Communist propaganda, the Labour Movement, debts and nationalized private property, represent a common platform which will unite Germany with other capitalist states repeatedly against us.⁹⁵

As Germany then seemed to turn more willingly toward the West than toward the East, and as Chamberlain had made it clear to Rakovski that British-Soviet relations would be at a standstill as long as the Conservatives were in power, the Soviet government decided to try and come to an agreement with France. The most significant symbol of this new policy was the sending of Rakovski to Paris as Soviet ambassador.

Chapter 16

Christian Rakovski as Soviet Ambassador to France
(December 1925–October 1927)

When Rakovski was transferred from London to Paris in November 1925, a number of British newspapers considered this appointment as signaling the shifting of the Soviet diplomatic center from the British to the French capital. Thus, the *Daily Telegraph* saw “a good deal more” in this nomination than was generally believed. It was suspected that Rakovski would

pursue the policy of rapprochement with both France and Poland recently inaugurated by Mr. Chicherin. The hidden purpose of this policy is directed rather against the British Empire than against Germany. . . . It is to prevent Anglo-French solidarity on the Rhine from ever leading to the establishment of any similar understanding in Asia and North Africa.¹

From this it was clear that certain British politicians suffered from an obsession that any Soviet move was directed against the British Empire, exactly as the Soviets insisted on the permanent hostility of Great Britain whose only aim was, in their mind, to isolate the workers' republic. There is no doubt that Rakovski personally was eager to leave a country where he was condemned to permanent inaction because of Chamberlain's refusal “to enter into new negotiations” with him. He now suggested that France would hold the key to the political situation in Western Europe, and declared: “formerly the road led to Paris through London, now it leads to London through Paris.”² His personal bitterness is easily to be felt in the article he published in *Communist International* on “The Decline of the World's Shop,” i.e., the decline of Great Britain.³ He there reviewed the numerous crises experienced in the various branches of British industry, especially in the coal, engineering, and textile industries. He showed that the increase in the number of unemployed meant “a decrease of wages and a general deterioration in the condition of the working class,” indeed, a “physical degeneration of the British proletariat.” His conclusion was that Britain had “definitely lost her predominant position in the world market,” and that the British bourgeoisie would

prove incapable of solving the contradictions it had created, since the crisis through which Britain was passing was "not transitional but chronic." Under these conditions, the only solution the British bourgeoisie could find was to start a period of political reaction. This, in its turn, would incite the workers to rebel, and it was to prevent this eventuality, Rakovski argued, that the British government was endeavoring to sever relations with the Soviet Union: it hoped to isolate the British workers "from the Russian Communists, in whom they may find valuable moral and material support in the forthcoming struggles."⁴

As we can see, Rakovski considered that diplomatic and Comintern activities were complementary, and that one of the two had to become more prominent when the other had failed. In Britain, he thought that the time of class struggle had come, while diplomacy was still possible in France. Since the time when he had worked for the first Franco-Soviet rapprochement, when Lenin had sent him to Czechoslovakia to have a secret meeting with Poincaré's representatives in 1922, Rakovski together with Chicherin had recommended the formation of a continental bloc grouping the Soviet Union, France, and Germany, a block that obviously had an anti-British bias. When he had helped to speed up French recognition of the Soviet Union, Rakovski had thought he would be appointed to Paris. Krasin had been sent in his place to the French capital, but he did not seem to be the right man to understand the French psychology.⁵ By the autumn of 1925, the negotiations he was having with the French government on the problems of tsarist Russia's debts had reached an impasse, and, as he admitted in a private letter to his wife, "on the whole I am more and more losing a taste for diplomatic work." What Krasin disliked "in this ballet called the French political world" was "the atmosphere of constant intrigues."⁶ He was the first to think that "Rakovski might perhaps arrive at something," as in such a world only a "*smelyi delets* (daring businessman), not to say more, can do something . . . , for he will not hesitate to buy the good will of influential personalities."⁷ This was known to the Quai d'Orsay where, on account of his revolutionary past in France, and because of his numerous connections on the Left, he was "viewed with little favor." As Lord Crewe, then British ambassador in Paris, wrote to Chamberlain, French officials considered Rakovski "to present a far more formidable figure than his predecessor, M. Krasin."⁸ The head of the Quai d'Orsay, Berthelot, thought that the latter was "un bon bourgeois," but that he had been wrong "to go to M. de Monzie and to various people outside the government, instead of discussing directly with the Foreign Office and the Minister of Finance." As for Rakovski, he thought him rather

like Napoleon III as described by the Queen of Holland: "Tellement rusé qu'il ne faut pas croire le contraire de ce qu'il dit."⁹

Rakovski's appointment in Paris was made even more significant by the arrival of Chicherin, who had interviews in Paris with Briand and Berthelot in November and December.¹⁰ The discussions centered on British-Soviet relations and on the eternal question of Russian debts, two topics on which the French and the Russians could hardly agree. Berthelot, who reveled in quotations, cited the equivocal French proverb: "On peut se reconcilier quelquefois avec un ennemi, avec un ami jamais," which, as the Soviet commissar rather justifiably observed, was not an encouraging opening for the forthcoming negotiations. He departed "très peu content," leaving Rakovski to use all his diplomatic skill to try and reach an agreement with the French political leaders. His tactics were to be very supple, and he was to combine official and unofficial diplomacy with even more audacity than when he was in England.

A. Franco-Soviet Relations

It is generally agreed that Rakovski's arrival in Paris marked the beginning of an intensive Soviet campaign to improve Franco-Soviet relations, and to set on foot serious discussions of outstanding issues.¹¹ During the conversations that Chicherin and Rakovski had just had with Briand and Berthelot at the Quai d'Orsay, the procedure for the forthcoming negotiations had been agreed upon. It was decided that the conference should discuss the general problem of political relations and the possibility of concluding a commercial treaty, as well as questions of debts and credits. As had been the case in London during the British-Soviet conference, it was arranged that there should be four sections, to deal respectively with the political, juridical, financial, and economic aspects of the negotiations.¹² Although the conference was mainly to deal with economic questions, Rakovski thought that the importance of the political aspect should be evident to everybody.¹³ One should not forget that, in May 1924, he had proclaimed that the Soviets were "everywhere running across the intrigues of French diplomacy" in Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague, Belgrade, and London. This angry comment had been pronounced at a time when French antagonism to Moscow had found an expression that had been particularly resented by Rakovski: two months before, Poincaré had ratified the Paris protocol, which assigned Bessarabia to Romania.¹⁴

Now that he was in Paris, Rakovski was determined to try and "get rid of many causes of friction between France and the Union." When he realized that the French government was not ready to accept

the Soviet proposal of a Franco-Polish-Russian formal rapprochement, and that it was useless to revive the Bessarabian issue, he decided to work first for the development of trading relations between the two countries, and for an advantageous settlement of the problem of debts and credits.¹⁵

1. Trade Relations between France and the Soviet Union (1923-1924)

Before the October Revolution, trade between France and Russia had never been extremely important, especially if compared with trade between Russia and Germany which was six-and-a-half times more developed.¹⁶ Prewar trade between France and Russia even showed a balance in favor of the latter: Russians exports to France in 1913 were valued at 100,879,000 rubles, and exports from France to Russia for the same year only amounted to 56,990,000 rubles. At that time, Russian exports to France constituted 6.6 percent of her total exports, France coming fourth in this respect, after Germany, Great Britain, and Holland. When trade relations were resumed between France and Russia in 1922 and 1923, timber was the only article of export to France, with the exception of a small quantity of silk and combings. The value of export for these two years was very limited as it only amounted to 1,243,000 rubles at 1913 prices. In the period January-September 1924, Soviet export to France already amounted to 5,630,000 *puds*, which formed 30.1 percent of the total Soviet export by weight, but only 2.5 percent of the total value: the greatest part of these exports consisted of timber, seeds, and flax, but also fur, cocoons, and manganese.¹⁷ During the period 1922-1924, imports from France to the Soviet Union were valued at 3,024,000 rubles. The articles imported comprised foodstuffs, raw materials, semimanufactures, and manufactures, and were obviously different from the prewar imports from France where cosmetics and lace largely predominated: they now consisted of cereals, meal, chemicals, wool cork, and leather for 1923, and of cocoa beans, coffee, sugar, cork, chemicals, and dyes for 1924. Throughout 1925, French exports to the Soviet Union were to grow steadily as France bought an important quantity of fuel oil from the Soviet government.¹⁸ The development of trading relations between the two countries was however greatly hindered by the constant agitation of the French bondholders and creditors of Russia.

2. The Problem of Russian Oil.¹⁹

In February 1926, a deputy enquired about French interests in Russia in view of the recent purchase of Russian oil by his government.

The minister of the navy thought it necessary to appease Russia's creditors, and replied that the contract, "which was very advantageous, was not with the Soviet government, but with the Soviet Oil Syndicate." His argument was understood by everyone as having only a formal value. He went on to say that, no French oil companies having existed in Russia, the question of damaged interests did not arise in respect of owners of confiscated property, but only in respect of French investors in Russian companies, and they were safeguarded in the same way as all other foreign creditors of Russia. Moreover, other countries were buying from the Oil Syndicate, without prejudice to their claims to redress in respect of confiscations. Thus, the minister concluded, there was no reason why the French government should not buy Russian oil, "seeing that the Soviet government had not confiscated any French wells," and as the oil now purchased "could not therefore be said to belong to French nationals."²⁰ The question of Russian oil remained important throughout Rakovski's stay in Paris.

In February 1926, the question had cropped up when the Soviet delegation in Paris had made a counterproposal to the group of French banks that had offered to provide long-term credits for the Soviet government in return for a concession to extract petroleum in the Caucasus. The French group had in view the Baku and Grozni oilfields. The Soviet government, however, was ready to grant a concession for the working of oilfields elsewhere—namely on the Emba River in the Uralsk province. The oilfields were situated near the mouth of the Emba River, which flows into the Caspian Sea, and were worked before the war by a British company. They were rich enough, but they had the disadvantage of laying in very marshy and unhealthy country. There were more than 251 miles from the nearest railway, the Orenburg-Tashkent line, and very little labor was available. The French bankers quickly realized that much fresh capital would be required if they were to be worked at a profit. Moreover, apart from material difficulties in working the oilfields, the French group did not wish to trespass on the rights of the British company.²¹

3. Rakovski's Unofficial Diplomacy and Franco-Soviet Trade (1925-1926)

We see that Rakovski was using in Paris the technique of parallel negotiations with the French government and with French industrialists, thus creating some sort of bargaining power. When official negotiations dragged on or were at a standstill, he used all the connections he had in the French press to "create the illusion that foreign banks [were] becoming anxious to give credits to Russia."²³ Thus, in April 1926, it became known that a French group proposed to found

a Franco-Soviet consortium. The consortium would consist, on the one side, of the Soviet government, and, on the other, of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, which was supposed to be the moving spirit in the proposal. Certain other French banking houses were said to be associated with it, while the second category of members apparently consisted of French firms dealing in oil, grain, and other material (Companie française des pétroles, and Louis Dreyfus et Cie.). The proposal was based on the assumption that the French and Soviet governments would come to an agreement about the repayment of the Russian prewar debts to France and conclude a commercial treaty. In this case, the French group would undertake to grant the Soviet government credits for a sum to be determined and to make itself responsible for the annuities to be paid on account of the service of the debts under the terms of the agreement concluded by the two governments. In return, the Soviet government would undertake to export and place at the disposal of the consortium a certain annual quota of raw materials, such as petroleum, petroleum products, wheat, flax, various ores, and precious metals. These products would be dealt with by the consortium in the French and foreign markets. The proceeds of the sale would be used to secure the credits granted to the Soviet government and to provide for payment of the annuities of the debt. Besides the interest on credits, the consortium would receive a commission on the sales of the goods exported from Russia.²⁴

In Paris and in London, the major newspapers announced on 9 April that this proposal was *submitted* to the Soviet government.²⁵ In fact, it was Rakovski who had thought up the scheme and aired it in the press. The result, however, was perhaps not what he had expected. On the following day, 10 April, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas had the most categorical *démenti* published in *Le Temps*: for the third time, the French bank had to deny "fanciful negotiations between itself and the Soviet government," and proclaimed that it had never held conversations with the Soviet government on this subject. All these denials only hid the failure of discussions that had soon proved abortive, but which really took place. When they failed, Rakovski spread the rumor of their existence, which was of course immediately denied. This technique was repeatedly used by Rakovski and the Soviet government. Thus, at the beginning of April 1926, it was reported from Leningrad that a person acting for the five chief British banks was arranging credits for Russia for the exploitation of her timber resources. Immediate enquiries among the leading banks revealed that there was no foundation for this report.²⁶ A few months later, an obviously inspired article was published in *Le Nord industriel*.²⁷ The tone had already changed and was far less assertive.

The newspaper stated that Soviet Russia was anxious to develop her trade with France, but that she found difficulty in financing her purchases, as French industries were not prepared to give her credit, and not only was the discount rate very high, but the leading French banks would not give discounts for more than three months. It was again suggested, therefore, that a bank should be created in Paris for the purpose of facilitating exchanges between the two countries.²⁸

The newspaper revealed, however, that in spite of these difficulties, between 1 January 1925 and 30 March 1926, the value of Soviet purchases in France amounted to 14.5 million dollars. Machines, textile products, metals and chemical products represented 75 percent of the total. This was a clear hint to French businessmen and bankers, and a way to excite their appetite for the Russian market. They were "asked" to call at the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives of the USSR, which was represented in Paris by the company Centrosoyous-France. All necessary details were given about this company that had "carried out important transactions in France and Belgium" and that purchased "direct from manufacturers and merchants." From 1 October 1925 to July 1926, it had purchased on behalf of the cooperative societies and dispatched to Soviet Russia goods to the value of some 50 million francs. The total included piece goods to the value of £148,173 fancy goods to the value of £54,000, small agricultural tools, aluminum, and resins. During the same period Belgium sold piece goods to the value of £62,685. The average length of credit granted in respect of these transactions was five months, and the banking arrangements were made through the Cooperative Banks, on the one side, and through the Moscow Narodin Bank, on the other.²⁹

If trade between France and the Soviet Union was thus acquiring some importance in the years 1925-1926, it did not go further than day-to-day deals. Most French industrialists and bankers refused to run the risk of heavy losses again. Confidence had not been revived, as the minor part the French played in concessions within the USSR shows us clearly. By 1926, only one agreement had been signed for five years between the Leningrad Electric Trust and the French "Compagnie générale de télégraphie sans fil." But this only concerned the supply of material and it had been concluded in 1923. Throughout Rakovski's stay in Paris, and despite all his efforts,³⁰ only three provisional contracts were concluded: the most important concerned a monopoly of artificial silk production, which could have been granted to a big French firm for twenty-two years; another had to do with the "mass production of cycles and motorcycles"; the third envisaged the organization of firms that would have made photographic and cine-

matographic film.³¹ These agreements, however, were never ratified in Moscow, as the French government refused to give satisfaction to the Soviets on two points to which the latter attached the greatest psychological importance: the Bizerte fleet and Georgian representation in Paris.

4. Two Causes of Disagreement between France and the Soviet Union

Whenever Rakovski had an interview with Berthelot, Briand, or Poincaré during the two years he was in Paris, he did not fail to press vigorously for the return of the Bizerte fleet, which Herriot had promised him when he first met him in London in 1924.³² If this wish was granted, the Soviet representative offered to sell a very large proportion of the fleet at St. Nazaire to shipbreakers and to put two-thirds of the remainder into French yards and one-third into Italian yards to be reconditioned. At the moment, the Soviet government wanted to take into the Black Sea for propaganda purposes only one torpedo boat and one submarine.³³ Despite these reasonable proposals, the Russian fleet was not to be given back to the Soviet government, as certain elements in the French government urged that there was no reason why the fleet should be returned while the Russians refused to recognize their debts.

The second point at issue was the "Georgian Mission," headed in Paris by Chenkeli, who had representatives in several French provincial towns (Lyon in particular).³⁴ This mission had a semiofficial existence, and served as an "antidote" to the Soviet Embassy. On 15 June 1926, Rakovski sent a long memorandum to Briand in which he listed the nefarious actions of the "Georgian Mission," including the assassination of several Georgians in Paris who had come into contact with the Soviet representatives, and attacks on members of the Soviet Embassy. Rakovski indirectly accused the French government of complicity, for they allowed the existence of a "government" that, "apart from terrorist organizations represents nothing, and continues to enjoy diplomatic prerogatives, to be mentioned on the list of the diplomatic corps drawn up by the [French] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to attend official functions, and to carry on such administrative activities as the granting of passports and visas."³⁵ Since, however, the French Socialists strongly backed the Georgians, and the French government felt no particular urge to please the Soviets, no decision was taken before Rakovski left Paris. When the latter met Poincaré on 27 January 1927, for example, the French premier admitted that he had just met Chenkeli at an official dinner given by the president of the Republic, Gaston Doumergue. When Rakovski insisted that

this problem should be solved as quickly as possible and referred to the fact that MacDonald, i.e., "a menshevik minister," had agreed to solve the problem as soon as he recognized the Soviet government, Poincaré replied with a smile:

I would certainly not have acted as Herriot did; before recognizing you, I would have gone through all these vexed questions. Yet, as you were recognized without [preliminary] conditions, one must be logical to the end.³⁶

His conclusion was that the problem should be overcome, but that it had to be done "en douceur."³⁷ In fact, the solution was made entirely dependent on the solving of a more important question, namely that of the Russian debts. Exactly as in the case of the fleet, the French government considered that there was no reason why secondary questions should be resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviets if the latter still refused to pay the debts of the tsarist government. This brings us to the work of the Franco-Soviet Conference, which met for several months in 1926 and 1927.

B. The Franco-Soviet Conference (1926-1927)³⁸

1. On the Eve of the Conference

Rakovski was appointed in Paris in November 1925 to try to settle the biggest of the difficulties in the way of good relations between the Soviet Union and the major European countries: that of tsarist Russia's debts. As he had done when he was in Britain, he immediately set the tone of the forthcoming negotiations by proclaiming that, on the Soviet side, long-term credits and financial aid were regarded as "the key to the question of debts."³⁹ His arguments had not changed: such an arrangement corresponded not only to Soviet interests, "but also to the interests of the development of trading relations between France and the Soviet Union," as a great part of the credits would be used on the French market. Moreover, the Soviet government thought it necessary to advise the French delegation that, as it had above all to protect the "real interests of the peasant holders of canceled tsarist obligations," it should "not fight for the triumph of empty juridical formulae."⁴⁰ This meant that the French had better stick to concrete problems and not try to discuss the matter at a theoretical level, as the debts had been canceled once and for all in 1917.

In various interviews to the French press, Rakovski did not fail to recall that the Allied governments had exempted the successor states of Austria-Hungary from paying its war debts.⁴¹ He also recalled that, in 1905, all the Russian Socialist parties, and even the Cadet

party of Pavel Miliukov, had warned the European powers that they considered the granting of loans to the tsarist government as an act of enmity toward the Russian people, and that the future government of Russia would refuse to refund them. In the eyes of the workers and peasants of Russia, Rakovski added, the loans granted to the tsarist government never appeared as a means to improve the economy of Russia, but "as aid given to a government to remain in power, to keep up its bureaucratic apparatus, its police, its army, to build strategic ways and armament factories, to make war."⁴² He concluded by saying that these workers and peasants would never agree to refund the loans, unless they were given certain financial advantages in return. Thus, the question of debts and credits made a whole that the Soviet representative refused to divide, a position the French government never accepted. The French authorities were strongly backed on this point by the numerous groups of French creditors and property owners with claims against the Soviets. One of the most important of these was the Society for the Recovery of Private Debts in Russia, which was headed by the former French ambassador to Petrograd, J. Noulens, a notorious enemy of the Bolsheviks.

In a conversation he had with René Pinon (of the *Revue des deux mondes*) on the eve of the opening of the Franco-Soviet Conference, Noulens was quite explicit. He said he well knew it to be the opinion of the Quai d'Orsay that the negotiations could not succeed for the moment as the condition of any debt repayment by Russia was a loan. And, even if satisfactory guarantees could be given for such a loan, which they could not, France could not find the money. Noulens' opinion was that "the present negotiations would continue for a time without result, but that they would be useful in once more showing the Russians what were for them the conditions of a reconstruction loan." Noulens then came back to the idea that had been proposed by the French during the Genoa Conference: to resume negotiations through "an international consortium which would be rich enough to produce the money required." He even added that de Monzie, who was to preside over the Franco-Soviet Conference, was also an "internationalist" in this matter.⁴³ Government circles were skeptical about the impending negotiations, and Daladier, who was then minister of public instruction but considered "an authority to some extent on Russian questions," summed up the general impression by saying that "the delegates will go on talking indefinitely and will achieve nothing."⁴⁴

In Moscow, skepticism was certainly not as widespread as in Paris, but Trotsky refused to pin any "extraordinary hopes" on the negotiations his friend Rakovski was going to resume. He nevertheless

suggested that France should grant the Soviet Union a credit for 30 million rubles at 11 percent of which 7 percent would be treated as interest and the remaining 4 percent used in payment of the debts.⁴⁵ As far as the tactics of the Soviet delegation were concerned, there seemed to exist great differences of opinion between the Bolshevik leaders. The skeptics pointed out that, although Krasin had received from France firm promises that his proposals would be accepted and the Wrangel fleet returned, France had turned down the proposals⁴⁶ at the last minute, thanks to the influence of Downing Street.⁴⁷ In their eyes, new negotiations were pretty useless. On the contrary, the "moderates" suggested that the best thing was "to amend these proposals and to offer better terms to the French from a commercial point of view."⁴⁸ In the end, Rakovski was "able to convince Moscow" that he would get an agreement with France "without having to pay debts or give compensation," but, instead, "would offer every [political] support to France." He easily convinced his colleagues of "his intimacy with de Monzie and other French politicians," and pointed out that he had "already received the support of French politicians for an attack on British policy."⁴⁹ In summary, he tried to persuade his government that he could more efficiently use in Paris the method he had used when he was in London:⁵⁰ this was to rely for a great part on personal relationships and thus have direct access to governmental circles, and to make it clear that "agreement must be reached through political channels and not through commercial ones."⁵¹ If Rakovski thought that the methods had to be political, he was convinced that the interests involved were as much economic as political. We know that his pet scheme was a political rapprochement between France and the Soviet Union, and this he considered as the only solid basis for economic relations. While he was still in Moscow at the beginning of February 1926, he proclaimed that the success of the negotiations would mainly depend on the good will of the two delegations, and on their determination to come to a positive result. He declared that

The basis of the coming negotiations must be, not this or that question in dispute, such as the question of debts, but the indisputable interests which can be brought to fruition by both states.⁵²

Throughout these negotiations, Rakovski was to be helped by a strong delegation of experts and technical advisers, some twenty persons in all, among whom were Tomski, Pyatakov, and Preobrazhenski. The very importance of the delegation he had helped to select showed, as he stated, "the seriousness and significance" the Soviet government attached to the impending conversations. Once in Paris, however, he

proved by all his activities and by the decisions he took that it was he who commanded at every stage.⁵³

2. During the Conference

The Franco-Soviet Conference on debts can be divided into two phases of unequal importance. When it first met, from February until March 1926, Briand was at the head of the French government. He could not but remember that, as early as January 1922, he had agreed to meet the Russians and to negotiate with them. But this, as we saw, was the result of Lloyd George's influence, and many observers believed that, "at bottom his acquiescence was merely due to a cynical belief that nothing really concrete would result of it."⁵⁴ Briand had preferred on that occasion to resign rather than give the impression that he staked his political career on the Russian issue. Five years later, his attitude had not altered, but he was ready to resume negotiations to see if the Russians, for their part, had changed their minds. This was also what Nulens contemplated. When the conference gathered again in March 1927, after an interruption of several months, Poincaré had become president of the council and Briand foreign minister. This change, to which was added the considerable weight of the international situation, introduced a very different spirit into the negotiations. Thus, de Monzie, who was left to preside over the French delegation, could say one thing and Poincaré another, but the latter always had the last word. Under Briand, a practical solution might have been found, and this is what Rakovski readily understood.

a. The negotiations under Briand (February-July 1926).

In his "tactful" reply to Briand's speech of welcome at the first meeting of the conference (15 February 1926), the Soviet representative pleaded for a "purely practical" approach to the problem of debts and credits.⁵⁵ He hinted at the "considerable number of Frenchmen of all classes of society, and particularly the most modest," who would be interested in a settlement.⁵⁶ Throughout his speech, he emphasized the fact that "un état d'esprit réaliste" would greatly help both delegations and concluded in perfect French:

Attentifs, nous aussi, aux résultats plus qu'à la forme dans laquelle ils seront obtenus, nous pouvons vous assurer que nous sommes guidés par une même volonté d'aboutir. . . . Nos travaux doivent aboutir, parce que les deux parties y sont également intéressées.⁵⁷

While Briand was president of the council, a settlement might have been reached, especially as his finance minister, Joseph Caillaux,

admitted privately that "he would disregard the question of principle in dealing with the debts," and agreed with Rakovski "to try and get satisfaction on a practical basis for the French bondholders."⁵⁸ The main problem in his mind was that the Soviets always linked the question of debts with that of credits. For his part, he thought that "anything in the nature of credits to the Soviet Union was out of the question owing to the bad condition of French finances." Thus, when Rakovski started talking credits at the most important session he had with de Monzie, Briand, and Caillaux on 15 July 1926, the latter

began by waving his hands, saying that the Frenchman in the street will say that they [the Soviets] are taking their example from the tsarist government, and want to take money from the French to pay old debts.⁵⁹

Rakovski then repeated the proposal he had made during the official sessions of the conference. War debts had, of course, to be written off, as Russia had helped France to defeat Germany. As far as prewar debts were concerned, the Soviet government would pay sixty-two annuities averaging 40,000,000 gold francs each, the assumption being that the total debt would be reduced by 25 percent to correspond with the postwar reduction of Russian territory, that a partial moratorium would be granted so that full payments commenced only at the end of the third year, and, above all, that the credit problem would be satisfactorily solved.⁶⁰ In this connection, Caillaux thought that a solution could be found if the Soviets agreed "to give oil as a guarantee for credits."⁶¹ Rakovski was certainly pleased to see that the French foreign minister referred to a plan he had been the first to advocate in several interviews to the French press. He replied to Caillaux that the Soviet government was ready to grant concessions in accord with its legislation, but not at Gronzi or Baku. He added that he was having conversations with French firms on this subject, and that this could not be the object of a particular contract. What he proposed was to conclude an agreement with the French government for a regular delivery of oil. He would readily ask his government to deduct from its return the annual percentage and repayment, which they would have to pay for French credits. Then Rakovski thought it necessary to ask Caillaux if he would agree to set up a monopoly in the oil trade in France so that the Soviets might become "the supplier of the French government." Both Caillaux and Briand seemed to consider the question carefully and proclaimed that this would be a way to resist the growing demands of Standard Oil and of Shell, and "to be delivered from the dictatorship of English and American oil societies."⁶² Thereupon, both sides agreed to have further discussions

on the subject and to do away with the question of debts in the near future.

Two days later, however, the Briand-Caillaux government fell after a vote of no confidence, and Herriot was asked to form a new government. Rakovski's hopes ran high when he learned the news in Moscow, where he was attending an important plenary meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee. Indeed, one of Herriot's first steps had been to appoint his friend de Monzie finance minister.⁶³ The latter immediately telegraphed Rakovski that he was ready to ratify the draft agreement that had been arrived at on 16 July. After his meeting with Caillaux, the Soviet representative had agreed to a compromise on the subject of the annual repayment which his government would make for sixty-two years. He had first proposed 40,000,000 gold francs, while the French had asked 75,000,000: both sides had finally agreed on 60,000,000 gold francs, and de Monzie had decided to examine sympathetically the Russian demand for credits totalling \$225,000,000.⁶⁴

Again, a few days later, the uncertainty of French political life was to condemn the new proposal, and compromise all further negotiations. On 21 July, the new Herriot-de Monzie cabinet failed to obtain a majority, and the president of the republic (Gaston Doumergue) asked Poincaré to constitute a Council of Ministers that would satisfy the vast majority of French citizens and calm their fears of national bankruptcy. Poincaré asked five former presidents of council to form his government. Briand was appointed foreign minister, and Herriot minister of public instruction, but neither de Monzie nor Caillaux were given responsible positions: de Monzie was left to preside over the Franco-Soviet Conference, but Poincaré decided to determine personally the fate of the negotiations in his double quality as president of the council and finance minister. At that time, the evolution of the political situation in France as in the rest of Europe altered for the worse the atmosphere of the Franco-Soviet Conference.

b. The international situation (1926-1927).

As soon as Poincaré came to power, the Soviets understood that their position in Europe was to revert to what it had been on the eve of the Genoa Conference four years before. In 1926 as in 1922, Poincaré had succeeded Briand just when the latter seemed ready to come to an agreement, or at least to discuss with the Russians. In 1922, when the Soviet government had realized that Poincaré would block every progress of the conference, they had turned toward Germany and induced her to sign the celebrated Treaty of Rapallo. Now, in 1926, experience guided the Russians. When they saw that the Franco-

Soviet negotiations were at a standstill despite Rakovski's efforts, and that London continued its policy of "aloofness," they again turned toward Germany.

c. The German-Soviet Treaty (April 1926)

To influence the Germans, the Soviet government gave them a somewhat misleading account of the Franco-Soviet negotiations, stressing the possibility of an alliance between Moscow and Paris, which would, of course, imply a rapprochement between Warsaw and Moscow.⁶⁵ France, in alliance with Poland and the Soviet Union, would obviously dominate Europe, and squeeze Germany to a minor status. There is no doubt that the Germans, and Stresemann in particular, were alarmed by such a possibility, and preferred to keep the balance between East and West, while it was still possible. The Russo-German Treaty, made public on 24 April 1926, had distinct political and economic advantages. It relieved both Germans and Russians of the fears of isolation, as it contained a "mutual undertaking not to take part in an unprovoked attack by third powers against Russia or Germany."⁶⁶ On the other hand, Germany agreed to grant the Soviet government a loan of 300,000,000 gold marks, which was to guarantee its predominance on the Russian market.⁶⁷ The Soviets were extremely satisfied with this diplomatic success, but they feared a reaction from the West. Thus, Rakovski in a statement to the French press, denied that the treaty was in any sense "a reply to the Locarno Pact,"⁶⁸ while Stresemann tactfully described it "as complementary to Locarno," an expression that still provoked some anxiety in Moscow.⁶⁹

d. Toward the rupture of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union (April 1926-May 1927)

Chamberlain reacted with great moderation to the German-Soviet Treaty. He was satisfied that the Germans had kept him informed throughout the negotiations, and that these had led to a treaty that contained "nothing incompatible with the covenant of the League or with the Locarno obligations," and excluded in particular "an unrestricted neutrality clause."⁷⁰ The British foreign secretary considered that the best way of dealing with the new situation (which in fact contained little unexpected) was "by further cooperation with Germany on the lines of Locarno, thus proving to her that her real interests were best served by facing west and not east."⁷¹ At the same time, Chamberlain conceded that Germany could serve as "the natural link between Russia and Europe," as she could "gradually give to Russian policy a Western orientation, which would be the basis of

cooperation between Russia and other European powers.”⁷²

Such cooperation, however, was to be made impossible by the deterioration of British-Soviet relations, which, within a year's time, ended in the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries and in the war scare of 1927. The British government's action came as a surprise to many European politicians, and indeed was totally unexpected in 1926. At that time, the Soviets were making efforts to persuade the British government to resume negotiations,⁷³ while close collaborators of the foreign secretary, such as Sir W. Tyrrell, claimed that the policy of aloofness was “coupled with a readiness to listen to any Russian proposals,” in the hope that such a supple policy would “force the Russians, some time or other, to come out into the open.”⁷⁴ The same Tyrrell claimed in February 1926 to have ample evidence that Soviet propaganda in China, Afghanistan, and Persia “was failing in its object.” He knew that “huge sums of money” were being spent by the Russians in its pursuit, but thought that lack of funds would “eventually compel Moscow either to alter its policy or sterilize Russia.”⁷⁵ Thus, while the most moderate British observers refused to overemphasize the importance of Soviet activities against the British Empire, the British representative in Moscow, Sir R. Hodgson, asked in May 1926 for a change of policy toward Russia. He argued along well-known lines that, so long as Russia remained “outside a rearranged Europe,” she would be an antagonist to it and “a center of intrigues directed to safeguarding her own position against what she believes to be a conspiracy against her.”⁷⁶ He thought that, as industrialization was “the watchword of Soviet Russia today,” a unique opportunity was offered to British industry. London might reconsider the extension of export credits to Russia “in the light of the favorable experiences of foreign firms dealing with the Soviet government during the last few years,” and because it was obviously “undesirable that British trade should be placed in a disadvantageous position in the Russian market” at a time when Germany was extending new credits to Moscow.⁷⁷ Hodgson was convinced that the Soviet government was now inclined “to adopt a reasonable attitude” for several reasons, namely, the very difficult economic period the country was traversing, the failure of the Soviet government's Asiatic policy, and the imminent breakdown of the Paris negotiations on debts. His letter, however, was written after the miners' strike had started in Britain, and he realized that, in the face of these recent events, his arguments “lose much of their appositeness.”

This was certainly the view of many members of the British government when they learned that the Soviet trade unions were sending considerable sums of money to the workers on strike.⁷⁸ They

also feared, as Rakovski wrote in an analysis of the situation, that the Soviets might "succeed in finding a common language with the English working class, concluding an agreement and outlining a common line of action, if not on all questions, at least on some of them." Rakovski considered that this crisis had "redoubled the hatred" bourgeois statesmen felt for the Soviets, and that this hatred had grown even more because of the events in the East.⁷⁹ The protracted civil war in China, and demonstrations of Chinese hostility to foreigners, in which communist influence was not lacking, were another cause of exasperation for British Conservatives in general, and for the British government in particular.⁸⁰ In December 1926, the French governor-general of Indochina, who was particularly well-informed of events happening on the other side of the border, admitted to Sir Charles Mendl that the Canton army had thirty-nine divisions, and that their strength had been "doubled in the last six months." He believed that

they were not only subsidized by Moscow but had several hundred Bolshevik officers in the Canton Army, and arms and munitions were supplied monthly both by land and by sea from Moscow. . . . He said that the policy of the powers not pulling together was suicidal, for if they were not careful, within a short time they would be faced by an irresistible union of Soviets and a Bolshevized China.⁸¹

The British Conservative government rapidly drew its conclusions from the many reports it had in its possession, the more so that British businessmen had suffered considerable losses from the strikes that paralyzed foreign factories in China. In December 1926, the head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office wrote a special memorandum that weighed the pros and cons of a breach with the Soviets. His main argument in favor of a rupture was

the indisputable fact that the Soviets to all intents and purposes—short of direct armed conflict—were at war with the British Empire . . . whether by interference in the strikes at home or by fomenting the anti-British forces in China.⁸²

Gregory went on to say that the "Olympian attitude" the British government had hitherto maintained was now "liable to be misinterpreted . . . and viewed with skepticism, not only in Russia, but largely throughout the East." He thought that the gain to British trade in Europe from such relations as they had with Russia under existing conditions was "probably counter-balanced by the loss [they] suffered through Bolshevik action in China." Of course, he could not ignore the fact that other countries, and particularly the

United States, might "step in unexpectedly" where the British had failed to tread. Indeed, the Soviet government was making U. S. recognition one of its main objectives, and Rakovski was "clamoring to go to America to attempt it."⁸³ But the British diplomat put his confidence in the fact that the U. S. government was still reluctant to grant recognition, as it was an excellent trump in all discussions with Moscow. Thus, if the British government chose to teach the Russians a lesson, the best method was to rely on "the effect of a sudden and unexpected violence" that would "cause a panic in the Bolshevik camp." Gregory recalled that this tactic had been fruitfully adopted by Curzon in 1923, and by Chamberlain in 1925, and that the Russians had conceded British demands almost on the spot in 1923. In his eyes, this had been due to the fact that, being Orientals, the Russians were always impressed by "a display of force." He finally proposed to perfect the technique that had been used twice before and wrote:

If the rupture is to be a successful coup, the Bolsheviks must not be allowed to argue about it. No ultimatum, no controversy that will never come to an end. Nor is it of the slightest use to found our charge on documents—the authenticity of which, as we know, can be disputed until doomsday—though their *ex post facto* production may serve a subsidiary purpose.⁸⁴

This was precisely what was done on May 12, 1927, when police raided the building of Arcos (the joint stock company that carried on trade between Great Britain and the Soviet Union), and raided, at the same time, the trade delegation of the USSR, which was housed in the same premises. The pretext for the search was that a particular document was supposed to be improperly in the possession of an employee in the building.⁸⁵ This was in fact quite immaterial, and the purpose of the raid was to prepare public opinion for the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on 24 May. The prime minister felt obliged to declare that the rupture did "not in any way mean or imply war against Russia." In his mind, the most it appeared to mean was that the British government did "not intend to have further political dealings with Moscow."⁸⁶ On 12 May 1927, the Home secretary had followed the advice Chamberlain had given him as early as May 1925: "No breach unless we are forced to it, and no pinpricks on our part. But if there is a real cause and a first-class case, strike and strike hard."⁸⁷

c. The French reaction to the international situation and the problem of the Franco-Soviet Conference (March-October

1927).

The French government certainly was less surprised by the rupture of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union than they had been by the conclusion of the German-Soviet treaty a year before. Baldwin's decision led Great Britain in a direction that Poincaré had favored whenever he was in power. The rupture came as a relief to Poincaré, exasperated as he was by the German-Soviet rapprochement.

It is well known that Poincaré had never approved of the Locarno policy that Briand—"ce farceur"—had supported in 1925 in an effort to draw France and Germany closer together.⁸⁸ When Poincaré returned to power, there were rumors that "he spoke frequently against Locarno" in the Presidential Council, but that "on each occasion Briand took a detached air and paid no attention," for a majority of ministers always backed him up on foreign policy.⁸⁹ Under these conditions, the German-Soviet treaty was as bitter a pill to swallow for Briand as for Poincaré, and his reaction was to refer Rakovski to the president of the council as a sure means of blocking further negotiations between France and the Soviet Union.⁹⁰

Rebus sic standibus, one can easily understand why the Franco-Soviet Conference gathered only once in 1927 (on 19 March). The British-Soviet rupture had made Rakovski more tractable. He and de Monzie had already come to an agreement on the question of the debts (we know that the Soviet delegation had agreed to pay sixty-two annuities of 60,000,000 gold francs each). At the beginning of May 1927, Rakovski announced that he saw no further objection to the French demand for most-favored-nation treatment. But the French premier was adamant and reverted to questions of principle. Thus, de Monzie had to write to Rakovski on 26 July 1927:

We cannot leave out of consideration other phases of the question which belong to the fundamental elements of the general problem: the regulation of the inter-State debt, the settlement of the losses sustained by our citizens in the Soviet Union, an economic convention which must provide our enterprises and translations with a guarantee without which development is scarcely conceivable.⁹¹

The president of the French delegation readily admitted in the same letter that "some of these problems [had] never been discussed together" at the session of the conference, and added a personal note that read: "For the time being, we must appreciate and welcome the success achieved in the settlement of the debts."⁹² Indeed, the French delegation had agreed, for its part, to recommend the granting

of a loan of \$120,000,000 (instead of the \$225,000,000) to the Soviet government, so that an agreement seemed possible.⁹³

In fact, one may wonder if either the French or the Soviet government wanted a settlement to be reached: de Monzie and Rakovski had certainly agreed after many months of discussion, but their views were not necessarily shared by their respective governments. Poincaré never abandoned his idea that the loss of nationalized properties had to be compensated (a thing Rakovski always refused to consider, as it was contrary to the Soviet constitution), while many Soviet leaders clung to Zinoviev's axiom that not a farthing must be given back to the capitalists. Moreover, Rakovski's personal position within the Russian Communist party was seriously weakened by the fact that he belonged to the Trotskyist opposition, and his advice had already far less weight than before. He was soon to find himself in a most uncomfortable situation, as he was to become the target of the combined attacks by all those who refused to come to an agreement with the Bolsheviks, at a time when his own government failed to support him.

C. The End of Rakovski's Activities as a Diplomat (August-December 1927)

The second half of the year 1927 was for Rakovski one of the most hectic periods of his life, a period that marked the end of his activities not only as a diplomat, but as a member of the Russian Communist party and of the Comintern.⁹⁴ Ten years before, he had turned all his hopes toward the Russian Revolution and had sworn allegiance to Lenin, who had admitted him into the ranks of the Bolshevik party and had asked him, together with Trotsky and Zinoviev, to be one of the founding members of the institution whose aim it was to spread revolution throughout the world. During these ten years, five were passed under the respected leadership of Lenin, who had given Rakovski one of the most responsible positions within the Soviet Federation: the political leadership of the Ukraine throughout the civil war and during the first phase of peaceful reconstruction that followed. The next five years saw Rakovski's constant opposition to Stalin's idea of "socialism in one country," and to methods he denounced with growing wrath as "bureaucratic centralism" in 1923,⁹⁵ and as "social facism" in 1927 on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution.⁹⁶ Rakovski's distrust of Stalin changed into hatred as the first defeat of the opposition drew near: and he was never to forget that Stalin had knifed him in the back while he was in Paris negotiating with the French government.

Rakovski's recall from Paris is linked with his activities as an

oppositionist. Of course we know that, during the 1920s, Stalin chose "to send the oppositionists in particular as ambassadors abroad."⁹⁷ Rakovski had been sent to Britain in 1923 for this reason more than for any other, exactly as L. B. Kamenev was sent to Mussolini's Italy in 1926. Rakovski's belief was that Stalin had instructed Chicherin to back the Soviet representative in Paris as little as possible. In fact, as we shall see, the general secretary found himself in an awkward position when the ambassador started proclaiming more loudly than ever before his solidarity with the opposition.

At the beginning of August 1927, Rakovski went back to Moscow to attend the sessions of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist party. He added his signature to a declaration drawn up by Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, which stated the views of the opposition on many important points. This declaration contained a paragraph calling for the "defeat of all the bourgeois states that carry on war against the Soviet Union," and declaring that "every honest proletarian in the capitalist countries must look actively for the defeat of his government," and, in particular, that "all soldiers of foreign countries who do not desire to help their slavemasters" must desert to the Red Army.⁹⁸ This proclamation corresponded precisely to the views Rakovski had always held on the international character of the proletarian revolution. But it also had a very actual connotation, as Rakovski had opposed Stalin on two major points at the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925), and as he was to repeat his attack two years later at the Fifteenth Party Congress. His first point was that no "consolidation," no "extension of the breathing space" was apparent, at a time when Great Britain was breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, at a time when France was looking for a pretext to sever these relations, when Voikov—the Soviet representative in Poland—was assassinated, when "the impetuous and rapid development of the Chinese revolution" was repeatedly crushed by counter-revolutionary forces. In the face of all this evidence, Rakovski argued, Stalin's formulation of the question of foreign policy—"peaceful co-existence between the USSR and capitalist countries"—was "fundamentally wrong."⁹⁹ He considered that the general secretary failed to realize the consequences of this heretical formulation. On the one hand, "the Soviet Union had ceased to represent an ideological danger for the capitalist states";¹⁰⁰ on the other, the foreign workers had lost their faith in the workers' republic. Thus, no observer of the political situation could fail to notice "the passivity, the indifference" of the British proletariat since the last incident with the British government.¹⁰¹ In fact, Rakovski thought that this was not an inci-

dent, but another proof that the two orders of society—capitalism and socialism—could no more coexist in 1927 than they could in 1919. In his eyes, all the recent mistakes came from the fact that Stalin, Rykov, and Chicherin were known abroad for leading the “moderate” Soviet group, which reckoned that “Russia must first develop its economy, and that it is possible to normalize relations with the capitalist countries which possess the most important financial resources of the world.”¹⁰² Most important, this moderate group believed “in the necessity of rejecting the theory of world revolution, at least for the time being.” Rakovski, who had proclaimed in December 1917 that all the enslaved people could turn their eyes toward the victorious Russian Revolution, which would help them make their own revolution, could not but believe that the workers of the whole world would be utterly disillusioned by the betrayal of the Stalinists.

Yet, if we look at the situation from another angle, we see that it was not as clear-cut as it seems at first sight. If Rakovski accused Stalin of being too lenient in theory toward the bourgeois governments of Western Europe, one must not forget that, in practice, “the Politburo was always obliged to restrain” his representative in Paris.¹⁰³ Stalin himself, who favored an agreement with France in 1927, and who would have been only too pleased to detach Rakovski from the opposition, declared at a session of the CEC on 28 September 1927:

Let not the opposition claim that our agreement with France costs, or may cost too much. There is in Paris the oppositionist Rakovski. True enough, among all the oppositionists he is the one who executes best the directives of the Politburo. But whenever he takes an initiative, he always proposes to give more, to pay more. . . . It has always been like this. It can be proved from documents. . . .¹⁰⁴

Trotsky, who listened to this speech,¹⁰⁵ immediately wrote to his friend. He asked him in particular to remember that his role had become an issue in the struggle within the Party. We now understand better why Rakovski’s actions in Paris were scrutinized by both Stalin and Trotsky with so much attention. In September 1927, Rakovski was quite close to Stalin on the problem of the debt settlement to which he attached a great importance. But he revealed the secret ideas of the Bolsheviks on this question when he finally claimed, in November 1927, that it had always been clear that “no one in the Politburo ever intended to recognize the debts.”¹⁰⁶ The directive of the Politburo was only “to come to an agreement with France at any cost . . . if the international situation deteriorated.”¹⁰⁷

Thus, although Rakovski wished to go back to Moscow to sup-

port Trotsky against the general secretary, he had serious reasons for remaining in Paris. On the other hand, if Stalin was satisfied to know that one of the leading oppositionists was "in exile," he was quite reluctant to defend him when the French authorities decided that an ambassador's role was not precisely to incite French troops to mutiny.

This involved situation could only end tragically for Rakovski. When the French government learned that he had signed an appeal that claimed that "every honest proletarian in the capitalist countries must look actively for the defeat of his government," Poincaré and Briand advocated two different lines of action. Briand would have preferred to act as Mussolini had done when he was told that L. B. Kamenev had signed the opposition's manifesto: that was to consider the statement as a matter of inner-party controversy, and disregard the real aims of the opposition. On 4 September, Briand even instructed Herbette to tell Chicherin that the French government was satisfied by the explanation they were given, and that "the incident may be considered closed."¹⁰⁸ Poincaré, however, took a very different view of the matter, as it touched questions of principles, and as he had a personal grudge against Rakovski. Realizing in April that the French premier was blocking negotiations at a time when an agreement seemed at hand, Rakovski had not hesitated to have the contents of the actual debt settlement between French and Soviet delegations published in the French press.¹⁰⁹ His secret aim was to influence all the little French bondholders (who were legion) to vote against Poincaré in the coming general election. The French politician never forgave Rakovski, and only waited for a good pretext to have him recalled. He knew that he would always be backed by the French industrialists, whose properties had been confiscated and by the big bondholders, who thought that time was on their side. Moreover, Poincaré was perfectly aware of the fact that the oil magnates were eager to work against Rakovski, as the latter had invited the French government to start negotiations on the permanent delivery of Russian oil to France.¹¹⁰

Under these conditions, Rakovski's recall was only a matter of days. Poincaré considered that the action taken by his foreign minister on the matter of the opposition's manifesto was far too lenient, and an extremely violent press campaign was immediately launched against the Soviet representative. It soon developed into a campaign for the severance of all diplomatic relations with the Soviet government.¹¹¹ As the campaign did not abate for a whole month, Stalin decided that it was better to have Rakovski back in Moscow, and to sacrifice an ambassador in order to save the embassy.

Chapter 17

The Last Official Struggle (October-December 1927)

In March 1938, when he was tried and sentenced as "the leader of the Trotskyist network in the USSR,"¹ Rakovski told the panel of judges that he had stayed at the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, in October 1927, as was his habit every time he returned to Moscow from London or Paris. Usually it was to look up his old comrade, Ambassador Krestinski, and hear about the situation in Germany, but this time his visit had another purpose. Kamenev, back from Rome, had let him know that he was in Berlin, and they arranged, all three of them, to meet on the eve of the conference of the Central Committee, prior to the Fifteenth Party Congress. They intended to weigh their chances and evolve tactics for the so-called United Opposition, of which, with Trotsky and Zinoviev, they were leading members.

A. Return to Moscow via Berlin

The United Opposition came into being in July 1926, due to Trotsky's and Zinoviev's supporters closing ranks to oppose more effectively the Party's *apparat* controlled by Stalin and Bukharin. For over a year, the opposition included people who had become famous during the civil war (Antonov-Ovseenko, Lachevich and Muratov, Ivan Smirnov and Smilga), famous journalists such as Radek, distinguished economists like Preobrazhenski and Piatakov, or well-known diplomats such as Rakovski, Ioffe, and Krestinski. The opposition's program was roughly outlined by Trotsky a year earlier². First of all, ways had to be found to restore democracy within the Party, that is say, give members the opportunity to state their opinions and eventually have them accepted. The opposition members standing to the left of the governing faction, wanted to uphold the cause of the working class against rich peasants and the middle class that had emerged from the NEP and the bureaucracy. In the field of the economy, they insisted on an increase in wages, on allowing poor peasants to not pay taxes, and, on the other hand, they wanted a proportional tax to be instituted to recover the wealth appropriated by the Kulaks. They also demanded that the decisions of the Fourteenth Party Congress

be carried out and an increase in the speed of industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. In the field of foreign policy, the opposition stressed the need to delay as much as possible the "impending crusade" of the capitalist countries against the USSR, by means of negotiations with the bourgeois governments and in supporting revolutionary movements to the utmost, whether in the East or West.

When they met in Berlin, Rakovski, Kamenev, and Krestinski were not concerned about the opposition's basic objectives, but rather about the means at their disposal for the struggle to come. Kamenev and Rakovski thought the time had come to put their cards on the table—that is, resort to direct action, including street demonstrations, printing, and distributing tracts and declarations. They had to make public the fact that they were prevented from expressing their opinions. It was now urgent for them to resume their mass campaign, and show how Stalin and his supporters had changed the dictatorship of the proletariat into the rule by a handful of men, and to warn the people that they were ruining the country and bringing about the failure of the Revolution. They would proudly leave a Party that no longer respected "Lenin's teachings" rather than be shamefully expelled from it. Krestinski held the opposite view: only within the Party's ranks could they effectively fight for their ideas. If they left it, even in a blaze of publicity, they would lose any influence they might hope to exert on the apparatus, and their credibility with the masses.³ They should rather "work slowly, gradually, but tirelessly, within the Party and the Soviet apparatus to recover the trust of the popular masses and influence them." As Krestinski wrote one month later in a letter to Trotsky explaining his desertion, he was "absolutely convinced that the Opposition's tactics were intrinsically wrong and would cause enormous damage to the ends it was trying to achieve."⁴

Krestinski thought this tactical error could end "tragically for the Opposition.," as he was fully aware of Trotsky's and Zinoviev's failure, throughout 1926, in their repeated attempts to address factory workers in Moscow or Leningrad and criticize the Party leaders. Of course, Stalin knew better than anyone how to neutralize Party cells as well as Party and government bodies; he was an expert on sending a command chosen from his supporters, ready to boo and heckle public speakers until they gave up; he could dispatch people as he pleased. However, there were other reasons to explain the Opposition's frequent failures. It was cut off from ordinary people as much as the country's leaders, but in addition it seemed set to go against the tide and unwilling to allow for limits to men's endurance. Stalin,

on the other hand, was aware of the Russian people's weariness and of their longing for peace. In 1927, there was no point in mentioning "internal democracy" since the Russians had no experience with it, and the bolsheviks had always proved extremely intolerant. Did Trotsky imagine that people had forgotten the way he had suppressed the rebellion of the Kronstadt sailors, the way he had fought all opposition within the Party, or the way he tried to run the work force on military lines after his campaign to deny any independence to the trade unions?⁵ In 1927, the Russians did not want to hear about going back to the army and fighting in faraway places, in the cause of hollow-sounding "proletarian solidarity." They did not want anything to do with "permanent revolution" if it meant revolution "going on forever." Stalin therefore found it easy to denounce Trotsky's "heroic posturing," accusing him of not being concerned with "real men, but idealized beings that he had to admit that the poor reasons Stalin used, his cheap analogies, his coarse abuse repeated ad nauseum were more effective than the Opposition's analyses.⁷ This is what Rakovski realized when he tried to address the Central Committee a few days after arriving in Moscow.

On 23 October 1927 in the evening, Rakovski was appalled to hear that his comrades had yielded to the pressure exerted by the Party's general secretary over several months, and that Trotsky and Zinoviev had been dismissed from the Party. In a speech in which he exposed the people behind this farce, he pointed out the "miserable" and "threadbare" arguments used in this affair by people who had chosen to prevent their opponents from expressing their views, by throwing *inkpots* into their faces, after exhausting their provisions of *leather-bound books*.⁸ The attitude of the majority looked *stilted and bureaucratic, as the only argument it used was a constant repetition of the two expelled leaders disobeying Party discipline . . . in spite of repeated warnings*. In his opinion, the leadership had forgotten the main thing, that is "the Party, proletariat, Soviet power and the Komintern were not there for the benefit of statutes, but statutes were there to help the proletariat's revolutionary vanguard to reach its class objectives."⁹

Rakovski felt indignant when he saw that Bukharin had allowed an hour-long denunciation of a *plot*, supposed to have been instigated by an ex-officer of Wrangel's army (as we shall see below), when most of the discussions centered on the question of Trotsky's and Zinoviev's administrative status. The audience could only come to the conclusion that the Party leadership wanted to examine both an affair of counterrevolution and the administrative position of some of the Opposition's leaders. This in itself had recourse to an amalgam

intended to discredit those who were no longer in a majority, in an attempt to prove that Stalin was right when he spoke of "a united front stretching from Chamberlain to Trotsky." In fact, Menzhinski, head of the GPU, and Stalin had already made up their minds and acted accordingly.

On the night of 12–13 September 1927, GPU agents "uncovered" a "clandestine printing press" which had served to produce antimajority tracts, and recently had been used for printing the Opposition's program before the Fifteenth Party Congress, due to take place in December. The GPU immediately spread a rumor about the press being run by an ex-Wrangel officer.¹⁰ In an attempt to ward off this shameful slander, Preobrazhenski, Mrachkovski, and Serebriakov declared themselves to be behind this printing operation; they were immediately expelled from the Party. An enquiry carried out by Opposition members soon proved that the ex-Wrangel officer was also a GPU agent, whose mission was to keep an eye on them and, at the right moment, compromise them. Stalin confirmed this assumption when he declared with characteristic bombast: "What is wrong with an ex-Wrangel officer helping the Soviet Government to expose countrevolutionary plots? Who can say that the Soviet authorities are not entitled to win over to their cause ex-officers and with their cooperation unmask counterrevolutionary organizations?"¹¹

In words as well as deeds, Stalin proved that he would use all possible means to overcome the Opposition; he would present them as enemies of the people, enemies of the Revolution. He also succeeded in pinning them with their backs to the wall.

On 17 October, on the occasion of celebrations for the Central Committee's jubilee, Trotsky and Zinoviev were given good reasons to think that the masses were ready to follow them, or at least listen to them sympathetically. As they were standing apart from the official platform, a group of workers recognized them and greeted them as heartily as ever. The two leaders saw in this a sign of popularity, and thought that Kamenev was right when he told Trotsky: "If only Zinoviev and yourself stood on a platform together, the Party would know who the real members of the Central Committee are."¹² Of course, the Opposition knew better than anyone else that "the start of a struggle for power was out of the question," as Trotsky said it later. They only knew that their duty as Bolsheviks was to point out the Party's errors, even if it meant upsetting old associates.¹³ Opposition leaders had become used to frequent consultations between themselves, and to decide on the tactics their sympathizers would employ in the next few weeks, which were bound to be decisive. An eyewitness left a portrait of Rakovski perfectly in keeping with Trot-

sky's description: "The moral balance of this man is so exceptional that he shows the same ease of manner in the most varied circumstances and with most of the different social groups."

"I met Rakovski at Preobrazhenski's," Pierre Nelville wrote.

There was an atmosphere of simple friendship in the little room where Preobrazhenski lived with his companion, Pauline, unlike any other in those days. Rakovski, who had no official responsibility, came to chat with such kindness and modest intelligence as made him stand out among other leaders. . . .¹⁴

Rakovski wore "a fine Western morning suit over a Russian shirt." This morning suit was all he had left of his days as an ambassador. As he jokingly explained to the French comrades he met at Preobrazhenski's, the rule in Soviet Russia was to take away from the diplomats, on their return, all they could have acquired in the course of their stay abroad, except their clothes. "I would have preferred somewhere to live," he went on with a smile, but I was expelled from the Narkomindel with my morning suit. The French banished me from Paris for signing an Opposition proclamation. Stalin banished me from the Narkomindel for signing the same proclamation. But in both cases, I was allowed to keep my morning suit."¹⁵

Although Rakovski joked about his fate in front of his "foreign" comrades, he could not confide in them how anxious he was, nor could he tell them of his sorrow when he saw how far the Bolsheviks were from the triumphant days of the October Revolution. Only a few days later, in front of Ukrainian workers who had gathered for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Soviet rise to power, he would use the term "social fascism."

B. The Ukrainian Adventure (Early November 1927)

After their acclaim on 17 October the Opposition leaders decided to take to the street to make Party members wake up to the dangers that were facing the revolution. They were agreed on the need to "appeal to the masses" and organize several demonstrations for 7 November, quite separate from the official marches. They chose this way of celebrating the tenth anniversary as a means "to assert themselves and mark their distance." Slogans to be written on the banners would be: "Strike the kulak, NEPman, and bureaucrat," "Down the opportunism," "Put into practice Lenin's testament," "Save Bolshevik unity."¹⁶

The opposition would direct its efforts to the RSFSR's three major cities, which happened to be the "fief" of its three most famous

leaders. Trotsky was to lead the movement in Moscow, Zinoviev in Leningrad, and Rakovski in Karkov.

As the Party leadership had expected this "desperate gesture" by Trotsky and Zinoviev, it was not surprised to learn that Rakovski had decided to leave for the Ukraine. The latter had just turned down Stalin's offer to go to Geneva to replace Litvinov at the head of the Soviet delegation to the conference on disarmament.¹⁷ From then on, he wanted to give himself fully to his comrades' fight against the general secretary's tyrannical rule. Just as Zinoviev hoped to form a new group of his followers, in the town where he had been the "boss" since the days of the Revolution, so Rakovski hoped to gather opposition members around him in the Ukraine, where he had worked to establish the Bolshevik regime and restore the ruined country. Besides, Rakovski had good reasons to think that his energetic attitude, when he was chairman of the Peoples' Commissars Council for five years, had earned him the respect of most of the Ukrainian Communists.

Had he not recognized the need for the Ukraine being really independent? Had he not given substance to this idea by increasing his government's prerogatives, whether at home or in foreign policy? Had he not opposed the stifling power of the central administration in the person of its general secretary, Josef Stalin, at the Twelfth Party Congress? Rakovski was the man who had been acclaimed by the Ukrainians when he came back to Karkov in 1924, at a time when he was still a member of the Ukrainian Communist party's Central Committee and of its Politburo.

On that occasion, as noted above, he was literally mobbed: He was "hoisted to the third floor of a house where he was to deliver a speech, and they helped him climb onto a table, since he could not stand anywhere else because of the crowds."¹⁸ As Boris Suvarin put it, he was still considered as the *khozyajn*,¹⁹ the "boss," an extremely popular man.²⁰ Rakovski thought he could gain a following in the Ukraine because, although Zinoviev's and Kamenev's allies were rare in the area, Trotsky had many sympathizers "traditionally loyal," as Kaganovich had to admit.²¹

The permanent head of the United Opposition in the Ukraine was none other than Yuri Kotsiubynsky (son of the famous writer), whom Rakovski had appointed in 1922 to lead the Ukrainian Soviet delegation in Vienna. It was also well known that the regions around Kiev and Odessa were on the side of the opposition. Rakovski was well aware of the fact; therefore, counting on their support, he headed straight for the cities he had to "conquer." First there was Karkov, the capital, and also towns that were fast becoming industrialized, like Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe (previously Aleksandrovsk) in

the Dniepr Basin.

On 5 November, Rakovski was invited by the Karkov soviet to take part in the extraordinary session to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution.²² As soon as he started addressing the assembly to present the arguments of the opposition, the house split into two parts of unequal size. Some wanted to hear the ex-Ukrainian leader develop a different point of view from the one constantly drilled into them. Those who were dissatisfied with the new atmosphere in the Party were few, however, and Kaganovich had taken care to fill the rows of seats with the largest possible number of majority sympathizers, who were only interested in heckling, booing, stamping their feet, and abusing the speaker without listening to a single sentence. In the face of these rude demonstrations (there were many new Party members, young men among them), Rakovski appealed to foreign delegates, some of whom were Social democrats and nonpolitical observers, who seemed more worth addressing than the so-called Bolsheviki. He told them while striding off the platform in anger: "You can see how representatives of the working class are allowed to speak in our country; this is social fascism."²³

In the following days, when he tried to speak to factory workers, (especially those at the General Electrical Plant in Karkov, where 4,000 had gathered) the same scenes occurred. He soon realized that Stalin's men would move their thugs from one factory to the next, and be let loose at the right moment. So he decided to go to smaller towns where he hoped workers' cells would not be intimidated in this way.

On 9 November, he arrived in Dniepropetrovsk. There he was welcomed with more warmth than in Karkov, and organized a number of meetings where he was attentively listened to. But when he attended a party conference in the Kaïdaks district, the organizers refused to let him read the report he had in hand to reply to official speeches.²⁴ When he tried to ask questions toward the end of the evening, he was brutally interrupted, and told not to make trouble. Undaunted, Rakovski left for Zaporozhe, where he took part in a meeting of the party cell of the Communard factory. He managed to deliver a speech longer than had been the case elsewhere, and explained his views on the "October teachings." However, Rakovski understood that the workers assembled there did not approve, or were not at liberty to approve, what he said. When he asked them to give their opinion on a motion he had just drafted, nine voted in favor of the opposition, out of 300 taking part.²⁵

As Rakovski seemed ready to carry on with his "subversive" activities, the Ukrainian Politburo decided to regain control of the situa-

tion by mobilizing all those in favor of the majority line and by asking every party cell in the factories, kolkhozes, and state institutions to call meetings of militants where the opposition's evil designs would be attacked. In November, almost a thousand such meetings took place, with over 100,000 people attending.²⁶ A month later, Kaganovich was pleased to declare at the Fifteenth Party Congress that 12,000 people had stood up in favor of the present leadership during these "discussions," while only 270 had declared themselves "against." Overall, out of 100,000 people, only 446 had voted against, and 227 had abstained.²⁷ (Of course, only the Stalinists' response is involved in these statistics.)

Rakovski knew by then that Kaganovich would obey Stalin blindly, and had the means for neutralizing every move of his. Besides, the fact that Rakovski was well known actually did much harm, since he could not go anywhere without attracting notice. He then realized that the struggle would be long and difficult, since the population did not respond to his expectations. In mid-November, a disciple of Zinoviev, Vuiovich, offered to help him.²⁸ His mission was to set up an "opposition center," which would primarily try to increase influence on masses. On 16 November, Rakovski received a telegram announcing that his old comrade and close friend, Adolf Ioffe, had committed suicide. He left the Ukraine in a hurry to attend the funeral.

Ioffe had committed suicide not only because he was run down by his constant struggle against tuberculosis and bouts of polyneuritis, but also—and perhaps mainly—because Stalin had driven him to despair. On the one hand, he had refused to grant him a visa to go abroad on the specious pretext that the treatment would be a strain on the Party's finances; on the other hand, he had struck him a terrible blow with the news that Zinoviev and Trotsky had been expelled from the Party on 14 November, and that Rakovski, Kamenev, Smilga, and Evdokimov had been dismissed from the Central Committee on the same day, for "counterrevolutionary activities."

Ioffe could not accept the indifference with which these Stalinist decisions had been accepted by communist members. In the letter he wrote to Trotsky just before his death, he described the wonderful ideal that had inspired him all his life on behalf of the working class, and the whole people. "More than thirty years ago," he wrote, "I came to the conclusion that life has no meaning except insofar as it is used in the service of the Absolute, and to us Mankind is the Absolute. Working for a limited objective, since any other is limited, has no sense."²⁹

Thus, illness and anxiety for the future of the Party made him take his own life. On his deathbed, he found the courage to write to

Trotsky, whom he regarded from the start as his teacher, and pointed out his weakness, which had also been the opposition's weakness:

I have long been convinced that you did not have enough of Lenin's strength of character, inflexible and ruthless as he was, not enough of Lenin's ability to stand alone, to make his way by himself on the path he believed was the right one.³⁰

Rakovski, as much as Trotsky, was deeply impressed by their comrade's last commendation, and his words must have helped them to stand up to Stalin, refusing to yield to his threats and attacks for as long as possible.

Ioffe's funeral was the last public demonstration made by the opposition. On 19 November, a long cortege wound its way through Moscow to the Novodevichi Cemetery, with Trotsky in the first row with Rakovski on one arm and Ioffe's widow on the other.³¹ In the crowd behind the coffin could be seen representatives of the Central Committee and the Narkomindel, mixed with members of the opposition and their supporters. Among those were Ivan Smirnov, Victor Serge, Pierre Naville, and a few journalists such as Louis Fischer. After a short scuffle at the cemetery gates, the mounted police allowed the cortege through, and soon it crowded round the pit. Two young Red Army soldiers stood on either side of the tomb, and one of the delegates of the Narkomindel said "a few short official words in memory of the deceased." Then Rakovski uttered the first friendly parting words, "in that urbane voice of his." After this, Trotsky made a speech: in his opinion, Ioffe, by his suicide, meant to challenge the Stalinist leadership for the last time in the belief that his gesture would carry more weight with party members than would a melancholy mind in a sickly body.

A few days later, another blow fell on the opposition. Zinoviev and Kamenev came out in favor of making concessions to the majority, since to their mind "this internecine struggle could only lead to the setting up of two rival parties, which schism would represent the greatest danger to Lenin's cause." On 10 December, the United Opposition was definitely dissolved, when the two repentant leaders asked their partners to "be brave enough to surrender." The latter could only see in this another proof of the "political cowardice" that was usual with Zinoviev, so they decided once again to stand firm. Since Trotsky was no longer allowed to take part in party congresses, Rakovski became the opposition representative at the Fifteenth Party Congress, which had just started.

1. Spokesman for the Hard Core at the Fifteenth Communist

Party Congress

On the morning of 5 December, Rakovski addressed the delegates who had gathered in the Kremlin; it was to be the last of his public speeches. Rykov allowed him to speak, but within an hour brought his speech to an end, in view of the enraged "Stalinists" like Kaganovich, Postychev, Voroshilov, and Rudzutak, who were supported by Bukharin, Skrypnik, Kossior, Riutin, Felix Kohn, and many others. Ironically, Rykov and Bukharin were to be tried and sentenced to death ten years later, while Rakovski would be sentenced to "only" twenty years imprisonment in the same trial.

Rakovski focused his plea on the perils he saw facing the Soviet Union. It could easily be engulfed in war, since the Central Committee and the Politburo together were weak enough to give way to every ultimatum of the capitalist countries. "Comrades," he declared, "when we were expelled from Peking, when we were challenged in London, and abused in Paris, would it not, in other circumstances, have been enough to raise a revolutionary response?"³²

He went on to defend himself against the accusation of being "exotic," which had been leveled at him a few weeks earlier. In a speech made in Karkov, he had made mention of the "capitalist siege and the constant provocations" the USSR was being subjected to. He had listed several measures that could be taken to put an end to the difficulties encountered by the first socialist country. This had led to someone asking him whether war was likely to break out. Rakovski answered that this was not out of the question, and he repeated it as the Fifteenth Party Congress: the Bolsheviki, he said proudly, are committed to setting up a revolutionary proletarian government, not a sect "à la Tolstoy."³³

Rakovski thought the Central Committee, under Stalin's leadership was going to repeat the basic error it had made two years earlier, at the time of the Fourteenth Congress, that is believing that they could count on the famous *peredyshka*, a truce that could evolve into "peaceful coexistence" between the USSR and the capitalist countries.³⁴ He was sure that the repeated rebuffs suffered by the Soviet Union in China, Britain, France, and Poland after the Locarno treaties were a portent of anything but a truce. In 1927, Rakovski thought that only a "revolutionary war," of the kind Bukharin and the "left-wing Communists" wanted to wage in 1917, a war similar to the one he had tried to start in Rumania in 1918 and later in 1919 would guarantee the triumph of socialism. Only a "holy war" waged on behalf of the working class both in towns and the countryside would reduce the pressure that was "stifling" the first proletarian state and

allow it to win over the large industrialized European countries, later their colonies, and in the end the whole world to the socialist cause.

In fact, the USSR was not ready to face up to such heavy responsibilities. It was not a simple matter of giving a *tolchok* to the bourgeois governments, as they thought in the years 1918-1919, to enable workers in capitalist countries to get rid of their rulers. Rakovski had to admit that the chances of a revolutionary flare-up were growing smaller and smaller, because of the attitude of increasing "apathy" and "indifference of the popular masses toward revolutionary ideas, and their lack of concern for the ideal defended by the Soviet Union." He thought this was mostly the fault of the Stalinist leadership, whose "tame" and indecisive stance in its encounters with capitalist governments had made the class struggle less rather than more violent in recent years. He drew an immediate consequence from this: a new situation had been created, and he thought it a tragic one. For the first time since October 1917, the first workers' state was no longer an ideological threat to capitalist governments. In these circumstances, bourgeois tactics would be simple; they would merely "support the right-wing deviationists in the Party, to isolate the Soviet Union's world proletariat."³⁵

In support of his assertions, Rakovski, in spite of general pandemonium and the abuse he received, quoted some of the bourgeois newspapers, which all tended to prove *a contrario* that the opposition alone held high the revolutionary flame. The *New York Times*, for example, argued that "not to destroy the opposition meant preserving the explosive charge which lies under the capitalist world." The *Temps* of 8 November considered that "Russia could only be saved by the utter destruction of the proletariat's dictatorship." Otto Bauer's newspaper, *Arbeiter Zeitung*, agreed with the upper-middle-class *Kölnische Zeitung*, that "the Opposition's criticism has undoubtedly made Stalin's task more difficult and prevented him following a more realistic path for the economy and in home policies."³⁶ Last, the journal of the London Research Business Institute declared in unambiguous terms:

From the events occurring at the moment in the Soviet Union, we come to the conclusion that the country's fate hinges on the combined action of two radically opposed forces. On the one hand, rigid communism is still trying to save the ideals and precepts of the 1917 bolshevik revolution . . . while on the other, life's harsh realities force all Communists, apart from the most fanatic, to adopt the principles on which Western civilization is based.³⁷

Rakovski in quoting these excerpts, wanted to show how even Western journalists saw that Stalin and his supporters were obviously giving up the revolutionary creed that had so frightened Europe at the end of World War I. "In his polite voice" he accused them of counterrevolutionary activities (quite literally), since they amounted to blatant connivance with bourgeois methods, mentality, and principles at the expense of the international working class and of the first socialist state.

The general secretary's men could not bear any more of these "slanders"; as they had run out of arguments, they made sure that Stalin would not be heard above the din, hurling abuse and invectives at him. After shouting that Rakovski and his quotations were a "walking bourgeois gazette," someone insinuated that Trotsky may have started collaborating with the above-mentioned press. Rudzutak openly called opposition members "spies," and a man by the name of Mandelshtam asserted that the Trotskyists were all "traitors" bought by the enemy. He asked Rakovski point blank: "Have you not, by any chance, received money to create a second party?" At this juncture, someone interrupted the speaker once more and shouted what had obviously been rehearsed before: "Leave the Party and there will be an end of it. Let all Mensheviks leave the podium! It is no place for them! Down with them!"³⁸

After sarcastically telling Rakovski that he should speak into the microphone if he wanted to be heard, Rykov asked the audience whether they should allow him to speak or not. Someone shouted again: "Down with him! Expel him!" At this moment, the curtain fell on Rakovski's public life as a militant. The final period of his life was starting: exile. A few days after Trotsky's exit, he was forced to leave the decision center of "socialist" Russia, in which, ten years earlier, he had put all his hope.

C. Declarations of the "Oppositionists" before Their Going into Exile (January 1928)

Following on the congress 1,500 "Trotskyists" were expelled from the Party, among them Rakovski, Radek, Kasparov, Drobnis, Leshevich, Muralov, Piatakov Rafail, Sapronov, Smilga, Sosnovski, and other outstanding leaders.³⁹

The first three of those were asked by the others to "negotiate" the conditions of their "administrative exile" with Sergei Ordzhonikidze, the Control Commission chairman, who led the enquiry against the opposition. In these early days, Rakovski, Radek, and Kasparov were treated by Ordzhonikidze as equals, as Stalin still observed the rules of civil behavior because he was afraid of causing a

scandal among Komintern members and Western European Communist parties if they were to hear of such well-known Bolsheviks being sent into exile *en masse*. The three opposition representatives were asked to discuss with their "guardian angel" their future place of work and what they intended doing. They declared themselves willing to accept

even the most humble type of work, if it could be of use to the Soviet Republic, insofar as . . . would be taken into account, even partly, their professional skills, their state of health and other considerations which usually carry weight with the Party.⁴⁰

This is the reason why the three parliament members protested against Ordzhonikidze's suggestion for sending Trotsky to Astrakhan—on the grounds that he could not resist malaria attacks—nor the hot and humid climate of the region. They refused to have Rakovski departed to the southern Urals on the same grounds. A few days later, the situation changed unexpectedly; Stalin reacted strongly when he heard of Trotsky refusing to accept an "invitation" from the GPU. He then asked Kossior (secretary of the Central Committee at the time) to remind the Trotskyists that they were liable under article 58 of the penal code, directed at "any propaganda or agitation aimed at upsetting, harming, or weakening Soviet power, or involving isolated counterrevolutionary declarations." Kossior also told the accused that "the Central Committee could not leave the exiles' families in possession of their apartments and could not ensure what kind of work they would have in their provincial places of residence."⁴¹

As a last protest, before leaving Moscow, the rebels drafted a full analysis of the situation, to be sent to the "Presidium of the Komintern's Executive Committee and the committees of all national Parties within the Komintern." They still hoped foreign Communists would become less lethargic if they appealed to their conscience as militants, and if there was a detailed description of the abuses by the Stalinist leadership, and above all the fundamental errors it had made, according to them, in the area of doctrine. The "Trotskyists" recalled in the first paragraph how they had been forced to infringe the rules they had themselves helped to lay, and had so far always respected, because some people tried to prevent them from "making their views known to the Party and Komintern." They could say with certainty that, under Lenin, such a wish from the minority would have been taken for granted. They strongly resented the Stalinist leadership facing national Parties with *faits accomplis*, since these Parties could only approve decisions made earlier. By this declara-

tion, the opposition intended to expose the series of recent events and make clear which causes had brought about which effects, so that the reasons for the "momentary" success of bureaucrats over "genuine" revolutionaries would be understood.

According to them, Stalin and his faction greatly harmed the revolution, since they were bent on stifling all initiatives, replacing "revolutionary leaders" with "docile officials." "Stalinists could only harm the movement beyond repair," in developing the "anti-Marxist" theory of socialism in one country, "which was invented in 1925." This theory directly led to "the Soviet Union being cut off from the history of the international proletarian revolution." It was true that after 1922, "serious defeats" had occurred on the revolutionary front: in Bulgaria and Germany in 1923, Estonia in 1924, Britain in 1926, China and Austria in 1927. The Trotskyists admitted that these victories by capitalism made stabilization possible, and "international bourgeois positions were, for a time, strengthened." This in turn marked "an increase in pressure on the USSR, slowing down the building of socialism and a revival of our own bourgeois class"; this "national bourgeois apparatus," now influences "numerous elements of the Soviet State apparatus" and through them stifles the "party's left wing."

The opposition considered that the part they had to play had real "historical meaning." They represented the "genuine Leninist tendency," as opposed to the Stalinists who were "hailed" by the bourgeois press, since they were gradually giving up any idea of subversion they ever had at the time of the October Revolution. Finally, Trotsky's supporters predicted that "this reaction of the Thermidor kind, would bring about another tilt to the left." Did not the October Revolution start after years of the darkest reaction, following the abortive attempt of 1905? The proletariat, gradually deprived of any responsible position in the Soviet Union, whether in politics, economics, or cultural affairs, would recover its ascendancy over those who were at the moment fettering it with chains. The present economic crisis in the Soviet Union, as evidenced in the decline of industrial output, lack of supplies, and the constant threat of budget deficit, could only, if their opinion, make people aware of what had to be done.⁴²

As we can see, Trotsky and his friends did not mince their words in criticizing the Soviet system as it was operated by Stalinist bureaucrats. It is easy to understand how, in the circumstances, the latter refused point blank to reinstate those members of the opposition afraid of a schism in "Lenin's Party." Stalin did not allow the others to reconsider their utterances, and sent them into exile

straightaway. Trotsky's departure was set for 16 January by the GPU. Early in the afternoon, a large crowd assembled at the gates of the station where the ex-Red Army leader was to embark for Central Asia. Some sympathizers forcibly climbed on the train he would be traveling on, while others threatened to lie across the rails, shouting above the hullabaloo that their leader would not be allowed to leave. Rakovski, who was a spectator to this mass display, rejoiced at seeing that the opposition was not isolated in its fight. However, after hours of waiting, as Trotsky was nowhere in sight, Rakovski decided to go to his friend's apartment, and found him still there. Apparently, the GPU had changed Trotsky's departure to 18 January to avoid an open clash with the crowd.⁴³

The police obviously wanted to shortcircuit the opponents. On 17 January, GPU men burst into Trotsky's flat and bundled him into a moving train. Rakovski, arriving for a farewell visit, was half an hour late.

He later wrote to Trotsky:

In the sitting room there was a cluster of comrades [mainly women] among whom stood Muralov, alone. "Who is comrade Rakovski?" someone said. "I am. What do you want?" "Follow me." I was taken down the corridor, and into a small room, but before entering I was ordered to face the door and "put my hands up" and I was searched. What were they after? Arms? Pamphlets?

I was released at five, but Nicholas Ivanovich [Muralov] was detained until the small hours and subjected to the same treatment. . . . "They have become mad," I told myself, and was filled with a feeling, not of antagonism, but of shame about our comrades.⁴⁴

Kind, "gentle" Rakovski, although he was a staunch politician and a "Marxist through and through," as Trotsky put it, could not imagine then, in 1928, that the accusations of traitor and spy leveled at him at the Fifteenth Congress would be used again, ten years later, and given monstrous proportions to bring about the downfall of all the old Bolsheviks.

Chapter 18

Exile to Astrakhan (January–Fall 1928)

When Rakovski left Moscow, he was able to take all his files with him, as Trotsky had done. They were kept in a large trunk, which was to follow him everywhere; in it were his personal papers as chairman of the Ukrainian People's Commissars Council, his papers as ambassador, the secret protocols of both conferences on the reparations, which he had chaired in London and Moscow, as well as many letters from most Soviet leaders, ranging from Lenin to Chicherin.¹

During his stay in Astrakham (almost a year), he wrote to Trotsky, at least once a month lengthy letters both very personal (on everyday life and its difficulties, matters of health, and his philosophy of life) and rich in political analyses. He was the only person who could send Trotsky such letters, since there was a bond of deep esteem and even admiration between them. During his trial in 1938, Rakovski explained the reasons for their enduring friendship in the following words, which also reveal his sense of honor and personal courage: "I am older than Trotsky, both in years and political career, and I probably have as much political experience as him."²

Rakovski had complete confidence in his old friend's judgment, but he was used to giving him his personal opinion on the current political situation, just as he would on the general trend of history, sharing the fruit of his patient reflection. This is precisely what Trotsky valued; both of them, in these difficult times, found it important to have loyal friends to turn to. This thought helped Rakovski a great deal, especially at the time of his exile to Siberia. He knew that as long as he lived, as long as he could hold a pen and talk, Trotsky would carry on with the fight he had taken up in 1927. Victor Serge aptly said:

More than his lucid thought process, more than his vigorous style, it was his unquestioned staunchness and reliability, which made Trotsky an ideal leader in these days of ideological weariness, since by his very existence, although he was not free, he gave us ground for hope in mankind.³

Although he tried to appear to his political friends as the indomitable leader, Trotsky was deeply shaken by the Stalinist victory,

and his frequent attacks of malaria sapped his strength. To dispel his gloom, Rakovski advised his friend to adopt the same intellectual regimen as his own. He wrote in his first letter in exile, "I think you should choose a subject to study, this is important. . . . It will make you see things in a new light and give a sense of direction to your reading."⁴

As for Rakovski, he decided to take up an old topic of interest that he had never had time to study seriously, Saint-Simon and the Utopians. Already, in an article he wrote in 1925 on "The League of Nations and the USSR," he had mentioned "the great French Utopian who contributed so much to Marxism." In 1928, taking advantage of his enforced leisure, he set out to write a sizable study of the subject, first of all trying to "analyze the historical background, its political events, ideological movements and economic conditions," as he wrote to Trotsky.⁵

We have here an example of the effect Rakovski's philosophy of life had on his daily discipline. We should also mention how serene he was throughout his banishment. The stoicism he displayed was largely due to of his distancing himself from adverse circumstances, a quality Trotsky was totally devoid of. Rakovski proved particularly calm when he was taken away from Moscow by the GPU. He kept cool enough to choose the books he would need for his intellectual pursuits. He took the collected works of Dickens (in English, as he told Trotsky), several of the Russian authors "whom he did not know well" (for example Babel's *Red Cavalry*, very controversial in 1927), and also Ovid and *Don Quixote*.⁶ These few examples are enough to show a wide range of interests, but also give an idea of his deepest feelings. By celebrating his land of exile, the Latin poet reminded Rakovski "of his native Dobrudja and the steppes." As for *Don Quixote*, he told Trotsky, "I always reread him in circumstances such as these and enjoy it very much." He was perhaps humorously comparing their situation in the opposition and the attitude of the knight errant fighting windmills. "As you can see," he went on with practical sense:

I try to combine business with pleasure, so that my enforced leisure at Astrakhan will be useful. I have an enormous longing for work, I would even say that I work fiercely [*avec ardeur*, in his words]. . . . But I also see the truth of Saint-Simon's remarks when he complained that his brain had lost its elasticity [*maléabilité*]. He was hardly over forty when he wrote this—what should I say about my own brain's elasticity? There is no doubt that age has an effect on people's memory as much as on their imagination. . . .⁷

Rakovski kept his mind fully extended indeed, and went on doing mental exercises as though playing on a musical instrument. He also kept up with current affairs, at home and abroad, receiving copies of *Humanité* and buying some German papers on the spot, which he passed on to Trotsky who was without any in Alma Ata. Besides, Rakovski regularly went to the cinema, almost three times a week, and from time to time to the theater. In fact, he soon gave that up "to avoid attracting too much notice."⁸ We must remember that only a few months earlier, official newspapers contained long articles on French-Soviet negotiations and the outstanding part Ambassador Rakovski was playing in Paris. His photograph often appeared in Soviet publications right up to 1927, and a cartoon showed him as the classical Bolshevik hero fighting on his own against excited bourgeois. Victor Serge wrote in his memoirs that "local authorities were greatly perturbed by the arrival of ex-army leaders, people's commissars, associates and friends of Lenin, carrying official certificates of their deportee status. They felt inferior to the newcomers and embarrassed."⁹

In 1928, no one believed the schism to be serious. In the past, the Bolsheviks had often been divided, but they had always made it up in the end, and those "of marked ability" usually were reinstated among party members. One remembered the disagreement of Zinoviev and Kamenev with Lenin in 1918, the fight of left-wing Communists against Lenin in 1918, the working class opposition of 1921, finally the "democratic centralism" to which Rakovski belonged. This is why Radek frightened GPU bosses in Tomsk (where he had been banished) with these words: "Wait until I have submitted to Central Committee's demands, and I will show you what I can do."¹⁰

Rakovski was much less flamboyant than Radek, but nonetheless people knew him wherever he went, in the intermission of a play or on the street when he did his shopping, and soon they begged him to intercede for them with those "at the top." Before renting a room in the center of town, he lived in a hotel; at the time, he wrote to Trotsky in March 1928:

I have not had a moment's peace, though the porter tried to keep away all callers; there are invalids, unemployed, foreigners [who ask how to get a passport] . . . even a *Potemkin* sailor who said he knew me at Constanța; like all the others, in the end he asked for money. I gave him a ruble; he further asked for twenty kopeks—to pay for a shirt. In reality, as the hotel manager later told me, one ruble twenty kopeks is the price of a bottle of vodka.¹²

This first period of exile was comparatively comfortable in the material sense and otherwise. It was rather like the term of banishment suffered periodically by close advisers of the tsars. This, at any rate, must have been the impression many of the Astrakhan inhabitants received. From 1 February, that is, less than a week after arriving, Rakovski was appointed as "economic expert" to the Planning Commission of the Astrakhan region, with a "third-class maximum salary" of 180 rubles.¹³

Every day, he had to attend the commission's meetings, and his advice was taken into consideration by the people in power. Ironically, his first assignment was to do with "a matter of great importance for the area": its economic independence vis-à-vis the Saratov region and its Planning Commission which was trying to assert its supremacy. Early on in his stay, he started to immerse himself with characteristic enthusiasm in old and new publications on the subject, statistics, and scientific research that could help him "to form an opinion" and later offer some solutions. On 3 March he told Trotsky, by the way, of his report on the "repartition into districts" (*o raionirovani*), which had so impressed the Party's regional secretary that he sent it immediately to Moscow, where the General Planning Commission happened to be discussing the problem of dividing the territories to the south of the Volga.¹⁴

At the commission's meetings, which he meticulously attended, Rakovski was the wise man who had to give his opinion on all the main issues. As he could not forget that, "on the whole," he was a doctor, he pondered the means to fight one of the most destructive evils in society, alcoholism.¹⁵ In his opinion, "the plague of bureaucracy, unemployment, and alcoholism were the three minefields which would shatter the building of socialism, if nothing was done to put an end to them."¹⁶ The three problems were of course connected, and he soon realized that it was necessary to develop more than fishing, which was the main industry in the area, "the other sectors of the economy," which were still very backward.¹⁷ Another way of fighting social evils was to expand education, produce textbooks for ordinary people (suitable at every level), and fight the malaria that affected the whole population—laying it flat several times a year.

In this respect, Rakovski did not remain idle and he could write to Trotsky at the end of March that "he was going to suggest to the local authorities a new means of combating malaria"; similarly, he had suggested to Lenin, in 1921, the growing of maize in the Soviet Union. He heard that in South America (especially in the Amazon delta, which resembled the mouth of the Volga) they were breeding fish that would eat mosquito larvae. After making enquiries on

the spot, he learned that "such fish had been imported, but no one really knew whether any had survived."¹⁸ As he went on with his enquiry, he read about a link between the level of cattle breeding and the incidence of endemic fevers: as the former decreased, the latter increased. Therefore, he urged the Planning Commission to use all available means to build up cattle breeding in the Astrakhan region, since it had been reduced by half (at least in the case of sheep) since the end of the war.

As in the past when he was chairman of the People's Commissars Council in the Ukraine, Rakovski looked into the problem of hospitals and public health, since "leprosy, plague, cholera, and tuberculosis" were still frequent in the area, not to mention, as he wrote to Trotsky, rabid dogs in huge numbers.

To face up to all these duties with a clear mind, the "exile" took up a sport that had always appealed to him, but that he had not been able to practice for a long time, duck shooting and pigeon shooting, very popular in Astrakhan. (He asked his friends in Moscow to send him a gun.)²⁰

Not content with all these activities, and as if to give another proof of his adaptability, Christian started writing his memoirs. He jotted down the most striking incidents of his forty years as a militant, in the course of which he had met the most outstanding figures of the European socialist movement and taken an active part in its development. As was seen above, in 1922, on the death of Jules Guesde, Lenin asked Rakovski to write an article on the French Marxist. In 1928, it was Trotsky's turn to ask his friend to think of writing his memoirs.

Late in March, Rakovski got down to this, "drawing exclusively on his personal experience." He described his meetings with Plekhanov, Zasulich, the Liebknechts (Wilhelm and Karl), Rosa Luxemburg, Jules Guesde, Jaurès, and Lenin, giving an account of the numerous political discussions he had with them. On the subject of Plekhanov, he had already finished a first draft covering more than 150 pages of a standard exercise book, but he revised it after the publication of Plekhanov's letters, together with the writings of the group called Labor's Freedom. On the subject of Jaurès he had written in 1916 "a thick manuscript in Romanian" in which he related their meeting in the south of France and the journey to London they made in 1913; he also recorded the opinions of Jaurès on politics, literature and art. As for Jules Guesde, he wanted to describe the man and the revolutionary as he knew him after 1892. According to his timetable, the series of "profiles" could be finished by July.²²

Rakovski also meant to add to these first jottings a detailed anal-

ysis of the six international socialist congresses that he had attended—in Zurich in 1893, London three years later, Paris in 1900, Amsterdam in 1904, Stuttgart in 1907, and Copenhagen in 1910. He thought the main difficulty would be “to describe these events in the light of our present ideology, but also in their historical perspective.” He had to express the psychological subtleties of those days, since all this undoubtedly was grounded in the past. As he wrote to Trotsky vividly: “Today a Komsomol member knows Liebknecht only in relation to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the way a high school boy knows Aristotle in relation to the laws of the universe.”²³

Besides all this, Rakovski started drafting an account of “some of his life’s events.” At this time, he finished the account of his revolutionary activities in Romania, making up two chapters. The first one was entitled “From the Black Sea to the Danube,” the other, “My Third Expulsion from Romania in 1911.” Later, when he was sent to Barnaul in 1930, he wrote a whole book on the part he played as chairman of the Ukrainian Republic People’s Commissars Council during the civil war.

One would assume that as he was remembering the past, Rakovski would be unconcerned about the existing political conflicts. Nothing of the sort. The countless letters he sent to his Trotskyist comrades, who had also been banished, are a proof of it. He wrote to Radek, Preobrazhenski, Muralov, Belobodorov, Sosnovski, Serebriakov, Kasparov, Smilga, Rafael, and many others.²³

In June 1924, Trotsky had written to L. B. Krasin that he thought “one could expect future relations between England and the United States to deteriorate sharply, because of the effect the United States has on the international market.”²⁵ Instead of using theoretical arguments of the orthodox Marxist type, Krasin preferred to draw on his experience as a politician and answered realistically, using psychological arguments that this was a very unlikely development. “You have no idea,” he wrote, “how provincial Americans can be in international politics. A long time will elapse before they dare to make a break with England.”²⁶

In 1928, Trotsky sounded Rakovski on the subject and received a long letter in reply, dated 29 February. Rakovski agreed with his comrade on the need to pay attention to the matter, for “this animosity would play a vital part in the revolution to be.” He had himself written two articles in 1925 (intentionally published in the *Communist International*); in them he argued that the United States, “which had turned into gold all the bloodshed during World War I,” was now trying to subjugate the whole of Europe economically.²⁷ He added:

It is easy to foresee, in these circumstances, that England

will sooner or later form a coalition against this pushy Dollar Republic, as happened early in the century with the Hohenzollern Empire which was rapidly expanding.²⁸

Rakovski thought Great Britain would gradually become aware of the serious threat posed by the unstoppable U. S. economy. Not only had it "finally lost its dominant position on the world market," but it had been overtaken by its own colonies and by enterprising U. S. businessmen in the Dominions.²⁹ He observed that the two countries were still competing with each other, whether for markets or raw materials.

He remarked on the "desperate haste the British showed in defending their African territories, Egypt, the Cape, the ex-German colonies, which they regarded as their last outposts" to help them protect their interests.³⁰ These feelings originated in the fact that U. S. capital was being invested on both sides of Africa, East and West, Abyssinia and Liberia. Of course, before the war, U. S. capital had found its way into South America, China, and Japan, but it now poured into Germany, France, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, and even the British Empire. The United States had an 80 percent share of the Canadian trade, and Australia had for a long time ordered most of its imports from U. S. firms—in order to obtain financial loans in return, to help develop its industry, and to shake off the British yoke. In any case, as he wrote to Trotsky, this Anglo-American rivalry went back a long way, as can be seen in a disciple of Saint-Simon writing in 1833:

Whatever the present naval strength of England, I cannot imagine it not being overtaken some day by the ships of this huge island which, suspended from the Pole, divides the ocean into two. . . . The American Navy will grow to such an extent that it will be in relation to the English Navy, what the latter was once, compared to the Dutch Navy.³²

The British, when they are "among themselves" he added, wonder what future to expect for their country, and come to the same conclusion. "Great Britain can expect the same fate as Holland" was the opinion of Sir William Tyrrell, whom Rakovski regarded as "the most intelligent of the British diplomats he had come across."³³

Should they take it for granted then that the war would break out between Great Britain and the United States? No. Rakovski thought they would see "England submitting to America," and losing its supremacy on the seas and the world financial places. But he still thought "the revolutionary content" of the U. S.-British rivalry remained unchanged. In his opinion, the most immediate prospects

were for a war in the Balkans or in Italy where "40 million people were crammed into a narrow territory with hardly any raw materials and where industry would have to look to foreign markets."³⁴ Another possible conflict was beginning to appear between "the United States and Japan in respect to China."

It is obvious that Rakovski saw the world balance of power only through the crystal of Marxist doctrine. He was very close to Trotsky in this respect, while Lenin and Krasin were more "realistic." On the other hand, there is no doubt that Rakovski hoped for war to break out among capitalist countries to allow the popular forces to use this opportunity and topple bourgeois governments.

As was seen above, in an open letter sent to the Komintern's Presidium in January 1928, the opposition was strongly critical of the direction taken by the Stalinist leadership with regard to revolutionary tactics. They condemned as "anti-Marxist" the celebrated theory of "socialism in one country," since it could only lead to "cutting the Soviet Union from the world proletarian revolution." In his correspondence with Trotsky, Rakovski brought up the matter several times, as he believed that the future of the first workers' state depended closely on the international revolutionary movement and vice versa. The mistakes that were made in building socialism in our country, he wrote, "will be bound to affect Komintern policies, and in turn, erroneous Komintern political decisions will affect the policies of our Party and our government."³⁵

Just as Radek thought, in 1923, that revolution had no chance in Germany,³⁶ so Rakovski considered that the communist uprising in Bulgaria, in September of the same year, which had been encouraged by Moscow, was a "senseless adventure."³⁷ He saw in these errors "the purest product of bureaucratic imaginations," which had been going against the tide when they incited the Germans and Bulgarians to rise. Chinese Communists, on the other hand, had been allowed to be massacred in 1927 because they had been given no support in a full-fledged insurrection. In conclusion, he said, all this weighs heavily against the Komintern executive, helping only those who are trying to tighten the screw against the Soviet Union.³⁸

Reflecting on the causes of these miscalculations, as was his custom, Rakovski thought he could trace them in the Party management changing from one of internal democracy to despotism, in all but name. Any opinion that differed even slightly from the one expressed by the secretary general was declared a heresy.

Both in his letters to Trotsky and in the one he sent to Valentinov on 6 August 1928, Rakovski stressed the fact that the opposition existed only because of "the wrong methods used in Party manage-

ment," which forced a "fraction of them to fight" for addressing ordinary militants.³⁹ The ruling clique had in a practice "wiped out all the guarantees," which were a *sine qua non* condition of "the existence of the Communist party as the Party of the working class."⁴⁰

As Rakovski tried to understand why the ruling body of the first workers' state had become so monstrously distorted, he discovered "the specific difficulties encountered by any new ruling class, after it has seized power and has to show whether it is capable of exercising it." He called these difficulties "the professional risks of power."⁴¹

He did not mean by this "objective difficulties" arising from historical circumstances, that is, the revolutionary state being surrounded by enemy powers and under pressure at home from counterrevolutionary forces. Rather, he had in mind dangers facing the Soviet government from *within*, since it was the first revolutionary government to last long enough to put its principles into practice. The position of this government was completely new: it no longer represented a class involved in struggle for power; it no longer enjoyed "the cohesion and unity which usually characterize a class on the offensive." So the impulse for action switched from grassroots militants and their revolutionary spearhead, "which has emerged from the mass and remains an intrinsic part of it," to the ruling apparatus. This is when bureaucracy came into its own, gradually making individual action impossible. When a social class seizes power, Rakovski wrote, "one of its component parts becomes an instrument of government," which means that personal interests and cliques come into play again.⁴²

In his letter to Valentinov, he rightly pointed out the constant change occurring within the revolutionary class. Since capitalist hoarding is forbidden by the ruling party, in the socialist state "different strata appear, according to the jobs people are given, and later these divisions become social prerogatives."⁴³ It was only a matter of time for a bourgeois class to emerge, both in the political and moral sense, and Sosnovski was right to make a parallel between the "harem-automobile" factor and the new "ideological" symbol of Soviet bureaucrats. Another consequence of this "dependence" and intoxication of being in power lay in the fact that jobs, "once in the hands of the whole Party, the whole class," had gradually turned into attributes of power, that is, a privilege exclusively reserved for an ever smaller number of people. The current threat to the cohesion of the working class, then, was extremely serious, as it was leading straight to reaction. A simile occurred to Rakovski, as it had to all other members of the opposition, that of Thermidor. "The political reaction which set in even before Thermidor," he wrote to Valentinov,

“ensured that *power fell both formally and in reality to the hands of an increasingly limited number of people*. First out of necessity, later by law, the popular masses became excluded from government positions.”

When he analyzed the causes of the decline of the Jacobin party,⁴⁵ Rakovski could not help pondering the decline of the Bolshevik party showing the worst symptoms of “a break between the Party leadership and the Party itself,” now considered as a mere appendage of the apparatus; hence, there occurred a “break between the Party and the working class, together with a loosening of bonds among Party members.”⁴⁶ The bureaucracy of the state and the Party had won the battle and could assert itself “as a new social stratum.”⁴⁷

In this respect, the Stalinist leadership had completely failed in its appointed task. Not only did it “squander the revolutionary capital left at Lenin’s death” by sending all people capable of criticism far away and replacing them with “zealous officials,” but it had betrayed the fundamental interests of the working class.⁴⁸ On the one hand, the new leaders excluded it from running the country and shaping Party policies, on the other, since the people were not allowed to gain experience in building socialism, “the leaders failed to prepare it to take over the Party apparatus.”⁴⁹ Instead of patiently “educating the working class politically, so that it would be capable of taking over government bodies, the Party [and] trade unions, and keep them under control,” the leadership stifled any initiative and encouraged a burgeoning bureaucracy, even more intrusive and sure of its prerogatives and of its rights. We were hoping, he said bitterly, that the Party leaders

would create a new apparatus, chosen among workers and peasants, new trade unions, really proletarian, and a new code of conduct in everyday life. It must be recognized, in unambiguous terms, that the Party apparatus has failed. It has proved utterly incompetent in this dual work of conservation and education. It is bankrupt and insolvent.⁴⁹

Rakovski agonized over the reasons and in what circumstances “this bureaucratic degeneracy” had led the Party apparatus astray, and eroded the sense of purpose of its members. Indeed, one was not dealing with isolated cases or individual failures on the part of this or that comrade. It amounted to the apparatus evolving into a bureaucratic caste that signaled the complete transformation of Soviet society, that is, the ruling class above all—or the working class.

Here Rakovski was in agreement with Valentinov’s *Meditations on the People*, and went even further. They both saw a fundamen-

tal problem in the fact of "collapse of the work ethic in the laboring classes" and "growing indifference to the fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the Soviet state." He explained it by the proletariat giving up its share of decision making. There was no doubt, in fact, that soldiers' and workers' councils had in 1917 "a full life" in Trotsky's words; so they were then autonomous and responsible.⁵⁰ The Russian people organized itself and brought about the tsarist government's downfall, and later that of Kerenski's, because it knew how to safeguard its interests. It was also able to bring the revolutionary movement to the remotest parts of the decaying empire, providing both soldiers and officers for this task. Unfortunately, after this enormous effort, the people felt the need to heal its wounds and stop the fight; peasants wanted to go back to their fields and workers to resume their work in factories. They all wanted to go home, to live.

While Rakovski understood this, he had realized by 1921, when he was Predsovnarkom of the Ukrainian Republic, the problems posed by soldiers' reinsertion into civilian life. This is why, at the Sixth Ukrainian Congress, he had put out the slogan: "Let us end this wave of demobilization". The Red Army had to preserve some of its fighting power to defend the Ukraine against potential invaders. Demobilized men had to be at hand to protect Soviet power after their return in their villages. In reality, "moral and physical weariness" was so great among the masses that they soon stopped taking part in public life, although they had achieved power in their own right.⁵¹

So, taking advantage of waning enthusiasm in the proletariat—the revolutionary vanguard, the Bolshevik party, after leading the right, now took hold of most of the levers of command in the entire country. In this context, the leaders went seriously wrong in not protecting themselves from the professional risks of power. They had grown used to power and become intoxicated, and now they were shamefully betraying the most legitimate interests of the working class. The vanguard was revolutionary only in name; this is why it attached such importance to the material symbols of its achievements, "countless and the best of their kind." Through "statistical doctoring," mistakes were being hidden under a torrent of figures.⁵²

In his letter to Valentinov, Rakovski finally quoted the proverb "Organs change with their functions" to explain clearly the reasons for change in the Bolshevik party and in the society of contemporary Soviet Russia. He did not try to hide his disappointment at the transformation of Soviet society since the heyday of October 1917. It had not been radically altered as the Stalinists claimed; instead, it showed signs of "inbreeding."⁵³

In 1917, Rakovski, like all Marxists, thought that "the fall of the regime must lead to the liberation of the *proletariat as a whole*." This idea was an important part of communist doctrine in those days, but he had to admit that, since then, no "liberation, no improvement of proletarian life" had occurred in the first socialist country. After explaining this failure by the state of interdependence existing between the defective revolutionary vanguard and the popular masses, which had grown more and more resigned, he showed what had happened to the working class in the Soviet Union. A definition had first to be given to the term "working class" to clear the "metaphysical fog" obscuring it.⁵⁴

There was no problem as far as the Stalinists were concerned, since the working class was the same as the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the Bolshevik party, which represented it. On the other hand, we saw earlier how Rakovski emphasized, together with all members of the opposition, the complete break that had occurred between the Party under Stalin's iron hand and the popular masses. This break led to a deep change "in the physical constitution of the working class." Rakovski could not make a detailed analysis of this evolution in the limits of a letter, although he revealed so many of his most intimate thoughts in it. He merely stated the problems facing them, pointing out the areas of uncertainty. They should try to find out, he said,

What is the proportion of our industrial workers who were recruited after the Revolution, as opposed to those who were already in the work force? What is the proportion of those who were involved in the revolutionary movement in the old days, those who took part in strikes, were deported, jailed, fought in the war or served in the Red Army? What is the proportion of industrial workers who are permanently employed? How many of them work only occasionally? What is the proportion of half-proletarian, half-peasant industrial workers . . . etc?⁵⁵

Since his deportation to a place far from Moscow and the large industrial centers, he had come across a kind of people he had been unaware of so far, at least at close quarters. He now realized that there was no Soviet proletariat, but a myriad of them, and one had "to delve into the deepest recesses" of the Soviet people. Next to the proletariat and "half-proletarian" masses, he found "strata which have hardly ever been mentioned" by the Party hierarchy. There were the unemployed and also "masses of paupers, reduced to begging" who, thanks to "the ludicrous subsidies granted by the state," were

walking an uncertain line between poverty, theft, and prostitution as in the best days of capitalism. There were "areas in the Soviet regime which we did not even guess at . . . they make you feel as if you had just stumbled on an abyss."⁵⁷

Exile was an eye-opener to Rakovski, who now saw many of the sores of Soviet Russia, and could understand the remark made by Baboeuf when he came out of the Abbey prison: "It is more difficult to educate the people in the love of freedom than to win it for the people."⁵⁸ The French revolutionary had wondered what had happened to the Parisian people, to all the brave men who had lived through the uprising. Rakovski asked the same question, and must have thought that history was repeating itself.

Aware of the bitterness of Baboeuf, Rakovski avoided being vainly resentful. Through the long years of exile, he clung to the hope that, because of opposition action, the Party would awaken to its errors, and that the people would be educated. However, although he strongly believed that Trotskyists were the only force of "proletarian pressure," he refused to hold any illusions. He preferred to determine exactly where their weaknesses lay. First of all, it was obvious that this "proletarian pressure was not sufficient to keep the opposition inside the Party"; moreover, it had not "succeeded in changing Party policies." Yet he agreed with Trotsky, who thought that some insurrections had, through their very failure, played "a significant part in revolution." In his opinion, the Paris Commune had served to ensure the existence of a republican government in France, while the December 1905 uprising in Moscow "opened the way to the constitutional reform in Russia." But the effect of these "defeats of conquest" was short-lived if it were not to be "buttressed by a new wave of revolutionary fire."⁵⁹ To encourage this fresh onslaught, Rakovski and other Trotskyist supporters began to pinpoint a number of resolutions that can be called a "program of the opposition in exile."

Rakovski believed that the first measure true Bolsheviks should take to prepare the people to assume the leadership was to launch a direct assault on bureaucracy. He thought it was urgent "to cut down the number and functions of Party leaders, and dismiss three quarters of the apparatus."⁶⁰ As for the remaining quarter, it would have jobs with strictly limited objectives, well defined beforehand. Party members should also be given the rights that had recently been trampled underfoot, and obtain firm guarantees against despotism, in its Stalinist form. They could attack effectively "the shameless demagogues" who had silenced any criticism, and the "ideological poverty" of Party officials would be breached⁶¹ Once these fundamental reforms had taken place, the Soviet social system would be reappraised, so that

the economy of the first workers' state could make for true socialism.

When he wrote to Trotsky at the end of May 1928, he listed the main steps to take in this endeavor. In agriculture, he fully agreed with Preobrazhenski's ideas on the kulak's isolation from the rest of the peasantry, and on the need for speedy collectivization and the setting up of model farms. These were the only means at the government's disposal for supplying sufficient quantities of grain for the population. However, Rakovski added, this policy could never be applied without "active participation from the poor peasants, without [their] support."⁶² This was a subject he knew well, since in 1919 he was the first to set up the celebrated *kombedy* (committees of poor peasants) in the Ukraine, which allowed him to spread the cause of revolution in the Ukrainian countryside by driving a wedge among the peasants.

Rakovski thought any attempt at collectivizing agriculture that would not be supported by the enrollment of poor peasants would remain "without political foundations."⁶³ He also thought it necessary, before this process was started, to make sure of favorable economic conditions by speeding up industrialization. He was broaching an idea dear to Trotsky, based on Lenin's teachings: "The material basis of socialism can only be heavy mechanical industry, which will allow [us] to reorganize agriculture."⁶⁴

According to Rakovski, it was essential to apply these decisions immediately, to avoid Party leaders having to take administrative measures as drastic as any of the wartime ones. They would have "not only to empty the kulak's barn, but also to shake the contents of the peasant's sack, and, since he hardly has anything, they would endanger the sowing campaign and also the link between proletariat and peasantry."⁶⁵

When one reads the memoranda Rakovski sent at the time, (some of which caused a stir not only in the opposition but at the highest levels of the Party hierarchy), it is clear that he never had any doubt about "Lenin's party."⁶⁶ In 1928, he thought the Party had gone astray only after the death of its leader, and his dearest wish was to rejoin party ranks when Leninist principles would be observed once more. It should be remembered that, at the end of 1927, just after the Fifteenth Congress, Rakovski had signed a declaration with Smilga, Muralov, and Radek, stating his willingness to submit to the supreme authority represented by the congress and to put an end to strife.⁶⁷ Once again, in spite of his violent criticism of the Party, in May 1928, he asked all opposition members to sign a declaration in these terms:

From our places of enforced residence, we still take a keen interest in the progress made by the Party and the Komintern.

We are ready to support fully and unreservedly any measure which could help to clean up the Party and the Komintern without weakening their foundations in the slightest. . . . However, we deem it our duty as Communists to declare that the decisions [which have been taken so far by the Party and Komintern] fall short of what is needed, and that they will fail if the Party does not draw all the conclusions following on the sad experience of the last four months.⁶⁸

These earnest words show the distance Rakovski had traveled in the ten years since he joined the Bolshevik party. Although some Party members never regarded this internationalist, this Social Democrat, as a genuine Bolshevik, by 1928, he could not imagine playing any part in public life independently of the Party. In this sense, he really was Lenin's disciple; he must have agreed with the words Krestinski wrote to Trotsky in December 1927:

There cannot be any future for opposition members except in sustained, gradual and constant work, carried out within the Party and Soviet apparatus, so as to regain the confidence of the masses and exert an influence on them.⁶⁹

This guiding principle helps to explain why, after six years of increasing hardship as a deportee, Rakovski finally aligned with the majority line forced by Stalin on the Party, and why he accepted the trampling on his personal dignity, in 1936 and again in 1938, when he denounced in extravagant terms a political family and a friendship that he held dearest deep down. With each passing year, Rakovski came to recognize the soundness of the theory Piatakov expounded to Volski in 1928:

A true Bolshevik immerses his personality in the collective that is the "Party," so that he forces himself to give up his own convictions, to adopt the Party's honestly as his own. This is the criterion for recognizing a genuine Bolshevik. He would find it impossible to live outside the Party's ranks and he would have no hesitation in stating that black is white and vice versa, if the Party demanded it. To be at one with the great Party, he will give himself entirely to it, he will abdicate any individuality, to such an extent that not a single atom of his personality can exist outside the Party.⁷⁰

Yet, many years of persecution, isolation, and doubt, as well as a very special historical context, were needed to wear down, at least on the surface, Rakovski's deep sense of tolerance, which made of him, as Lenin said, a true European.⁷¹ He was indeed a man whose urbane disposition made him alien to anything vaguely resembling partisan

fanaticism. One should bear in mind, at this point, the violent clash that made him oppose Lenin, after 1902, on the latter's views on the revolutionary Party and movement. In those days, he was convinced that the root of the evil lay in the way Lenin was running the Bolshevik party, his dictatorial methods, his amoral stance, and his spite toward the "revolutionary impulse" of the masses. In 1928, Rakovski felt equally indignant about Stalin and his men—despotic, amoral, spiteful toward the people—but he did not attack the Party itself. In his opinion, Lenin's Party had been distorted by the methods used by a few individuals. There was nothing fundamental in the phenomenon. This was probably the main weakness of his position and the origin of the internal contradiction, which in the end caused his downfall. In reality, although his view of bolshevism changed under the impact of his everyday experience of life, his spiritual heritage and culture "inspired him with an ideal of tolerance and belief in progress which properly belonged to the days of Enlightenment."⁷² He was still deeply attached to his old philosophy of life, as an analysis of the consequence of this dichotomy will show.

Chapter 19

The Years of Last Resistance (1929–1933)

A. The “Turn to the Left” of Stalin and the Disassociation by the Trotskyist Opposition (Summer 1929)

In the spring of 1928, the centrist leadership under Stalin decided to apply some of the policies advocated by the Trotskyist opposition since 1927. The wheat shortages of the winter of 1928 forced Stalin to launch an energetic campaign against the rich peasants, who were fueling the crisis by hoarding large amounts of wheat to use later for a huge profit. He started his war on the kulaks in February, but it was not until May that it imparted to the Party a significant shift to the left. This was when Stalin solemnly addressed the country to proclaim that, in order to solve the problems facing it, “it was necessary to change from individual peasant farms to collective farming.”¹ He also warned that “there should be no slowing down of the growth of heavy industry,” and light industry (mainly intended for the “peasant market”) should form the “basis of industry as a whole.”

As he publicly moved away from the right wing of the Party led by Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomski (head of Soviet trade unions), the opposition on the left thought Stalin had come to agree, at least in part, with the ideas they had championed, which had made him expel them from the Party. In these spring days of 1928, the whole Trotsky group was given to wild hopes; Preobrazhenski went as far as to say that “the objective laws” of historical development had at last forced the central leadership to understand all the implications of the left-wing opposition’s program. Even Trotsky had to admit that Stalin was undoubtedly moving closer to the policies he had always resisted, and that he was not distancing himself from the right; members of the Trotskyist group were advised to give “conditional support” to Stalin.² At this point Kamenev urged Trotsky to take another step toward reconciliation with the leadership, and Radek pleaded for it also. Under the circumstances, many of the opposition wondered whether they had been justified in making such an open break with the Party. After calling Stalin “a champion of the kulaks,” Leonid Serebriakov³ sent Rakovski a telegram in the middle of July, which clearly showed their feelings: “I think the new direction taken by the

Central Committee on all main issues is the right one, and it is now time to raise the question of our joining the Party again.”⁴

Rakovski's letter to Trotsky informing him of this development contained the two “clear and imperative” guidelines that he was going to follow in the future; they should “stand up for their opinions” and “ask for readmission to the Party when an opportunity arose.” For the time being, Rakovski felt they must not give way to wild enthusiasm under the impact of this “left turnabout.”⁵ He thought that only later would they be able to assess whether this sharp change in Stalin's policies had been caused by history's “inescapable laws,” or rather by Stalin's wish to compromise their right wing and eliminate it. Like Bukharin, Rakovski was inclined to think that the man at the head of the Party apparatus could “switch political theories to fit the need for getting rid of someone at such and such a time.”⁶ This is why, like Trotsky, he rejected the possibility of the left making a tactical alliance with the center because it would only help the latter to bring the right down and also discredit the ideas they had been fighting for. Rakovski scathingly replied to Smilga, Smirnov, Radek, Safarov, and all those who were ready to surrender for fear that “it would all happen without us.”⁷

It is unavoidable that some of us will have to leave those who have not thought out our policies, those who dream of a quiet life, those who claim they want to take part in “glorious struggles.” This selection can only benefit the opposition and make it more close knit. Only those members will be left who do not regard the program as “à la carte” dishes from which to pick and choose. The program remains the expression of Leninism at war, and only if it is applied in its entirety can the Party and the proletariat's homeland escape from the dead end into which they were led by the centrist leadership.⁸

Instead of finding comfort or reassurance in Stalin's maneuvers, Rakovski saw in them another proof of his total lack of principles, or his willingness to use any device to retain an iron grip on the Party. As for him, he refused to stray from the path he had chosen when he went to Astrakhan and he kept true to his motto: “Do your duty whatever the consequences.”⁹

The news of Trotsky's and his family's arrest, on 20 January 1929, followed by their expulsion from the Soviet Union a few days later, only confirmed Rakovski's fears.¹⁰ He remained the only person with enough courage and experience to lead the left-wing opposition in the inauspicious days ahead.

B. The Leader of the Trotskyist Opposition in the USSR

On the eve of the Sixteenth Party Conference to be held in Moscow in April 1929, Rakovski drew up a "balance sheet." The "unconditional" side was left with only a few personal friends of Trotsky's capable of becoming leaders, such as Sosnovski (the *Pravda* journalist who had become popular after his attacks on bureaucracy and the "new Soviet nobility") or Solntsev, a young economist who had joined the opposition as early as 1923 (he was barely twenty) and who died of exhaustion in January 1936 in the course of a hunger strike to protest against another sentence without trial.¹¹

In his report to the Central Committee on the occasion of the Sixteenth Party Conference, Rakovski attacked the official press for making allegations about the left-wing opposition. The latter was reported to deny "any possibility of building socialism in present-day circumstances."¹² Rakovski rejected this as slander, since "our program is based on the need of increasing the pace of building it." The Stalinists only showed that "they had no faith in the proletariat and did not believe activists capable of class consciousness and revolutionary fervor." Obviously, their aim was to turn the proletariat "into silent hermits, who would only be allowed to speak to repeat the slogans of centrist leaders."¹³

1. The Expulsion of Trotsky from the Soviet Union—January 1929

When he realized that Stalin had taken another turn, this time to the right, Rakovski came to the logical conclusion that "the opposition could expect increasingly violent persecution." Thousands of activists accused of being trotskyists would be arrested, jailed, and sent into exile, or thrown into solitary confinement because they would pass as "enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Soviet power." It is clear that Rakovski felt deep pessimism as he saw the consequences of this campaign of violence against the members of Lenin's party. Stalin had twisted the arms of Politburo's members to have Trotsky forcibly removed from the Soviet Union, although he had been the "war companion closest to Lenin, the leader of the October Revolution and organizer of the Red Army."¹⁴ Stalin knew that, as long as he remained in the Soviet Union, Trotsky would stand as the ideological leader of the opposition that would attract ever more members.¹⁵ So he chose to send him into exile in a bourgeois country (Turkey as it happened) to discredit him with the masses, which would see in him an ally of the bourgeoisie. In reality, Rakovski said, it was Stalin "who appealed to a bourgeois-nationalist government, to keep

such a staunch and honest Bolshevik as Trotsky away from Soviet territory.”¹⁶

2. Rakovski's Illness: Relegation to Saratov (1929)

Rakovski was determined to go on fighting to the bitter end, at least as far as his health would allow him. He was feeling the effect of the less than salubrious climate of Astrakhan, and was ailing early in the spring and again late in the autumn of 1928. In April he sent a brief telegram to Trotsky and his family. “How are you? I have been laid low for three weeks by an attack of malaria.”¹⁷ Lev Davydovich (Trotsky) replied, “We are all right. You must leave Astrakhan at all cost. Best love.” Since Rakovski was unable to write back, Trotsky sent another telegram a few days later: “How do you feel? Not hearing from you, we worry about you. With love, Lev, Natalia.”¹⁸ Alexandra Rakovskaia, who was under severe strain after the recent political events and her husband's deportation, left her work and her two daughters in Moscow to spend two months with her husband. In the middle of May she wrote to Natalia Trotskaia, giving her some details on their life and her day-to-day concerns. She mentioned “speculation” that was rife in Astrakhan as everywhere: “a hen costing one ruble fifty when bought in the market square, but had to be paid [at] two ruble fifty when delivered to your house. . . .” She added:

since we have a very limited budget allowance because of keeping two houses, here and in Moscow, I have to watch every small increase in cost. I feel horribly tired with it all and fed up with repetitive housekeeping. My reward comes in the form of repeated thanks from Christian [Rakovski] who is quite a gourmet. He deserves a little pampering because he works day and night. I sometimes listen when he dictates his book and I think he will publish something rather interesting on Saint-Simon. . . . I wish Christian had gone to Kislovodsk,¹⁹ he looks very tired. . . . I do not know how to manage it. I so loathe asking for favors that I am not sure this time whether I am entitled to such a slip [sic].²⁰

Through the whole summer of 1928, Alexandra tried to obtain her husband's transfer to another town, but she met with endless difficulties before she could talk to “Party dignitaries,” or rather their representatives, in the provinces. Early in September, she finally managed to meet one called Samsonov, and the following conversation took place, showing the kind of harassment opposition members had to endure:

—“The refusal of a leave of absence [for your husband] comes from the Central Committee, which is not concerned with the health problems of people who are not Party members.”

—“This has nothing to do with Rakovski’s health; all I ask is no interference with his going for treatment to Kislovodsk at his own expense.”

—“Rakovski is not entitled to move out of a limited area, even for his health. He should get treatment from means available in his assigned place of residence.”

—“This is monstrous.”

—“It was a decision taken by the Komintern Congress. You may have read its resolutions. . . .²¹

Later Rakovski wrote to Trotsky with an outline of this “interview” and his wife’s parting remark that “it was a shame to put pressure on revolutionaries, fully conscious of their duty, to make them betray their opinions, under threat of illness and even death.” She went on to express her regrets at “having wasted so much time in discussion with a man who was only carrying out orders, and even if he had an opinion of his own, would not dare to express it, for fear of contradicting these orders.”²²

In the end, Alexandra was advised to apply directly to one of the most influential members of the GPU, Iagoda, but this had no effect.²³ Yet, toward the end of the year, Krestinski decided to seek Kaganovich’s help; he mentioned their past friendship and promised to use his influence with Rakovski to steer him back into the Party’s mainstream, following the example of many of his old revolutionary comrades.²⁴ When Rakovski was allowed to move from Astrakhan to Saratov, he refused to shake hands with the friends who had urged him to join the “renegades.” He thought the five-year plan had been drawn in answer to the “opposition’s sting in blows,” but that only part of the opposition’s program had been carried out in practice. Once more he emphasized “the connection between all parts of the manifesto” in an open letter to the Central Committee members, adding:

You have taken new and important measures in the field of industrialization. But these measures will not bring you any nearer to the goal, if, first, you do not alter your premises and, secondly, you refuse to carry out drastic reforms regarding the Party, the trade unions, and the soviets. If you sincerely intend to follow this path, you must take the opposition back into the Party.²⁵

In Saratov, Rakovski resumed his writing activities, although

several "manuscripts" got past the border (using the services of old friends and supporters who happened to go abroad on official trips), most of his missives and circular letters as leader of the opposition were held up by the security services and never reached their destination.²⁶

Up to 1929, Trotsky's supporters had been able to correspond comparatively freely. Party leaders wanted to be *au fait* with exchanges of opinion between members of the opposition; knowing their feelings, hopes, and weaknesses, they could exert a disruptive influence on them when the time came.²⁷ After Trotsky was expelled, letters passing between them were increasingly scrutinized, and the living conditions of most opposition members took a turn for the worse. While Rakovski was in Saratov, however, he led a life remarkably free from administrative troubles and material difficulties, as this helped the rulers to know exactly what he thought and what he wrote to the opposition.

When Louis Fischer went to Saratov in April 1929 to see Rakovski and interview him on his experience as Soviet ambassador and on Soviet foreign policy, he found him living in the "best hotel" in town.²⁸ True enough, in those days, this was far from luxurious. Yet, the mere fact that a foreign journalist was allowed to get in touch with a member of the opposition in exile was another sign of the Party leadership's wish to accommodate Rakovski. Fischer drew several lessons from his stay on the banks of the Volga. First of all, he was struck by the respectful attitude of all the people around Rakovski. He was known wherever he went and, in spite of his status as an exile, was greeted hat in hand; "the political criminal" seemed to be "the most celebrated and respected guest in Saratov."²⁹ The American journalist was also amazed to see the fire and zest Rakovski put into his work. All day, he either wrote, dictated, held discussions with other exiles, or talked to young people to explain the opposition's arguments. At night, about midnight, he would ask Fischer to come in and would talk until two or three in the morning about the foreign policy of the first workers' state and the part he played in it after 1917. Our witness wrote later:

Rakovski had a wonderful memory, and if he could not remember something, he would look for documents to recreate it. He rummaged in suitcases and trunks for them, and if he could not find what he wanted, he went to the room next door, awakened his wife and asked where such and such file was. Rather than leaving him in the lurch, she would put on a dressing gown and come in, looking sleepy, but with a smile on her face. She would drop a remark on men's

shortcomings and start looking for the document.³⁰

As a journalist who was aware of all "the rules of the game," Fischer never asked Rakovski anything concerning the internal life of the Bolshevik party. He knew that all Bolsheviks refused to talk of such matters with a noncommunist foreigner. Although one day Rakovski broke the law. One afternoon, the hotel manager brought in a telegram being "visibly delighted to have an excuse to see the great man."³¹ After reading it, Rakovski turned pale and uttered these disparaging words:

This is a message from Radek, Smilga, and Belobodorov. They have chosen to make peace with Stalin, confess their errors and go back to Moscow. They want me to join them. Never. I will not leave Trotsky. I think highly of him as a man and I approve of his political views. Stalin betrayed the revolution.³²

These strong words show how determined Rakovski was in standing by Trotsky. He was, after all, the man who once told Kamenev that Stalin was "the gravedigger of the revolution," to which the other replied earnestly: "He will never forgive you."

Stalin's hatred of Trotsky was soon to affect Rakovski, who was still within his reach. But Stalin knew exactly how and when to strike for best effect, and he did not show his anger yet. He preferred to allow Rakovski to talk and write for a while longer, so that his thoughts would become well known, and their influence on the Party and his group could be gauged. In the 1929-1930 period, Rakovski's writings circulated underground within the political spheres, but never reached the masses.³³ As Trotsky wrote in his diaries: "The first people to read Rakovski's circular letters were members of the group in power around Stalin." There were also references in the official press to some unpublished writings of Rakovski's. These appeared as "slanted quotations, heavily distorted," always accompanied by "violent personal attacks." It seemed to Trotsky that this was proof of "each of Rakovski's blows hitting home."³⁴

On 22 August 1929, Rakovski sent the Party's Central Committee and the Comintern Executive a declaration signed also by two other opposition members (Vladimir Kosior and Akudzhava).³⁵ The situation was analyzed in comparatively sober words, which made the "extreme Left" (Maurice Paz and his wife) call the authors "defeatists," to be strongly rebuked by Trotsky.³⁶ In fact, Rakovski was using the same arguments as in the recent past, but enlarging them. He insisted on the fact that "the struggle for fulfilling the five-year plan was, next to the civil war, the most significant of the battles

entered into by the Communist party, in an attack by the proletariat and poor peasants against capitalism which was rearing its head." Yet, in his opinion, the five-year plan could not be seen as "a fundamental stage in the development of the class struggle" through the mere strengthening of the proletariat's dictatorship. It was essential to give the people and all Party members full guarantees that the fulfillment of the plan would mean a genuine "intertwining of the proletariat and poor peasantry, under the leadership of the Communist party."³⁷

This enormous effort, carried out in joyful cooperation, would drive away the specter of a break between the Party and popular masses, on the one hand, and between workers and peasants, on the other. As for the fear expressed by some people that "this rapprochement would lead to peasant alliances of the kind imagined by the SRs," it sprang from a "misunderstanding." The left SRs, just like their right wing, suggested organizing the whole peasantry, not only poor peasants.³⁸ Besides, Rakovski added, "the Ukrainian experience proves this to be a fallacy."³⁹ From the autumn of 1929, Rakovski understood that the few illusions he had been harboring, when Stalin started realizing the reforms advocated by the Left, were groundless. The head of the Soviet bureaucracy was distorting the Trotskyist aims in the field of home affairs, because he was using constraint to achieve them. There was a mad rush forward by the Party leadership, which pushed things much too far in the space of a few months, only to make a sharp turnabout later. After the "turn to the left," there occurred, in Trotskyist parlance, a "half-swing to the right." A few figures are good examples of the way Stalin, in trying to cut the ground from under the feet of the opposition, nearly caused the downfall of the first workers' state because of the coercive methods he used as an expedient.

Although, in October 1929, only 4.1 percent peasant families worked in collective farms or kolkhozes, six months later, in March 1930, there were 58.1 percent, most of them without tractors or machines.⁴⁰ But on 2 March, seeing the unprecedented havoc wreaked in the countryside, Stalin denounced some of the abuses in his famous article entitled, "The Dizzy Heights of Success." He put all the blame on the grass roots reformers who had been too zealous. Since the 15 March decree allowed peasants to leave kolkhozes, there occurred another mass exodus, so that three months later, in June 1930, only 23.6 percent peasant families remained on collective farms. In the Ukrainian "black earth" regions where 82 percent peasants had joined the kolkhozes in March, only 18 percent of them were left in May. However, seeing this disastrous decline and oncoming famine,

the leadership took exceptional measures, allowing tax exemptions for collective farmers, as well as giving them credit and machine tools, while individual peasants were heavily taxed. So, within a few months, the latter had to return to the collective farms, which in 1932 included 61.5 percent of the peasant population.

One can easily understand the tragedy of well-to-do and average peasants, as this was enforced by poor peasants and young industrial workers sent to the rural front with promises of the advent of the millenium and victory over the past years of exploitation by kulaks and merciless individualists.⁴¹ Under the circumstances, the "Russian countryside soon became hell" as "collectivization turned from a military campaign to full civil war." Driven to despair, peasants killed their cattle, destroyed their implements, and burned crops. Rebel villages were ringed with machine guns, and soldiers received orders to shoot at random at crowds of peasants.⁴² After the kulaks had been deprived of anything they owned (and so many average, even poor, peasants were described as rich because of envy, old disputes, and denunciations), Stalin hit on the idea of "liquidating them as a class" by sending trainloads of them to Siberia.⁴³ The consequence of this campaign of collectivization, first applied "at top speed," later partly abandoned and then to be resumed, were catastrophic for the peoples of the Soviet Union, especially the Ukrainians. Official figures reveal that between 1929 and 1934, 50 percent of horses (19 million), 40 percent of cattle (11 million), 55 percent of pigs, and 66 percent of sheep disappeared.⁴⁴ Some ten million people were deported to Siberia, and 25 million families that had been pushed into kolkhozes were left with no machine tools and no cadres. Famine soon loomed; this was to cause the death of several million people.

The Stalinist leaders were to use such expedients and ransacked the countryside to back up the mad pace of industrialization. In four years the number of industrial workers doubled, to reach nearly 23 million in 1932. All the old industrial centers were reorganized, and new ones were created in the area of Dnieproges and Stalinsk, in the Urals and Kuznetsk. In four years, according to official records, coal and iron production doubled, electrical power was multiplied by five, a chemical industry was created, and new lines of communication laid.⁴⁵ In the course of the first five-year plan, the balance sheet of industrialization in the USSR was impressive, and Trotsky was the first to praise it. It was proof of this "obvious fact" that the proletarian revolution alone "had made it possible for a backward country to achieve, in less than twenty years, results which had no equivalent in history."⁴⁶ But he knew full well the price to be paid for it.

On 4 October 1929, on the eve of Stalin's offensive against the countryside, Rakovski thought it his duty to warn the Party leaders of the dangers of "drastic collectivization," which would find peasant masses unprepared "both economically and psychologically." He also informed the Central Committee that "excessive administrative measures in the countryside would have serious political consequences."⁴⁷ This declaration, which shows Rakovski's insight, was enough to drive Stalin to paroxysms of rage, and he ordered the prophet of doom to be exiled to Barnaul, in Siberia, with his wife.

3. Rakovski Exiled to Barnaul; the Theses of April 1930

In February 1930, while Rakovski was already cut off, being 200 kilometers south of Novosibirsk in the Altai region (with such a harsh climate that the temperature falls to 45°C below in winter), the GPU decided to scatter all the Trotskyists staying in the area as exiles. So, Rakovski went on fighting in total isolation and difficult living conditions. He had to do his writing in secret, since house searches were more and more frequent. In February, when all the manuscripts they could find had been confiscated (political declarations and notes Rakovski had just written on his role as head of the Ukrainian government during the civil war), the GPU man leading the search party turned to Rakovski and told him sternly, "You are holding us back!" When this was reported to Trotsky, he marveled at the spirit of a man who, alone in exile with no secretary or even a typewriter, could "hold back" the Party leadership and the whole country.⁴⁸

In the first winter Rakovski spent in Barnaul, he felt his strength ebb away quite dramatically; within a few months, he had five heart attacks, and was left prostrate.⁴⁹ A rumor soon spread among European Socialists that he had died, and Anatole de Monzie, who had already written to Rakovski in 1928, asked the new Soviet ambassador in Paris for information in March 1930.⁵⁰ He sent a private letter enquiring after his old friend's health and wondering whether it would be possible for Rakovski to come to France for treatment. This was in vain, but as we shall see below, he did all he could to help Rakovski a few years later.

While lying helpless in bed, Rakovski pondered the situation of a state whose leaders, although still claiming to be socialist, were straying ever further from what he had hoped for. In April 1930, he summoned all his energy to draw up a lengthy analysis, which might be useful later as a "basis for discussion," although he was doubtful on this point. He wrote it in the style of an official declaration, in the name of the whole "Bolshevik-Leninist opposition," to be signed jointly with V. Kosior, N. Muralov, and V. Kasparov. As usual, he

sent it to "the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission of the RCP (b), and all Party members," who were going to elect their delegates to the Sixteenth Congress.⁵¹

As a matter of fact Rakovski had few illusions. He meant to address "future" activists, above the heads of present Party members. He knew full well that the Stalinist leadership would make the coming congress "the most insignificant of congresses," that is to say, the first one without discussions, with no dissenting voices.⁵² He wrote at the time in disgust:

It is difficult to tell who has lost more sense of dignity, either those who bow humbly under a hail of whistling and excesses, in the hope that better days will follow abuses, or those who in the same hope utter abuses, knowing that the opponent must yield.⁵³

Rakovski exclaimed angrily:

The Party cannot accept its rights being trampled on! . . .
The rank and file must demand all the points contained in the Party program to be submitted for general debate. . . .
It is high time to do away with closet politics!⁵⁴

He now realized that he was crying in the wilderness, and that elections for the congress, like the actual votes taken during the congress, would be nothing but "the usual bureaucratic count."⁵⁵ He was a man who, unlike most of the Bolsheviks, still believed in the revolutionary power of the masses, but he could only watch "the political indifference of the people" grow. His anxiety increased at the sight of the apparatus expanding with official blessing in the face of general apathy. He wrote these bitter words:

All the political acumen of the center and the center right leadership goes into stifling any attempt at political independence in the masses, any sense of human dignity and pride, to encourage and promote the absolute rule of the apparatus.

In this context, he remembered an enquiry by the workers' and peasants' inspectors in a sovkhov called "ortzvod" (in the region of the lower Volga), showing that a pattern of society was emerging there that had more to do with "feudal domains than sovkhovs." Even *Pravda* mentioned this statement by an agricultural worker: "We are the workers of *pomieshchiki*."⁵⁶ In a country like Russia, where the most gigantic of all revolutions had taken place, one could hear poor peasants or middle peasants say: "The rulers have decided so, we cannot do anything about it."⁵⁷ Rakovski was now quite sure that

the proletariat's dictatorship had changed into "systematic pressure in the country and despotic rule in factories." He felt it his duty to expose the current moral bankruptcy of the first workers' state: "From a proletarian state with bureaucratic distortions, as Lenin used to call our political system, we are drifting into a bureaucratic state with traces of proletarian communism."⁵⁸

In his opinion, there was no denying that Bolsheviks had failed, in spite of brave words of "inflated optimism," because all aspects of political life were affected. After limiting the scope of their revolutionary ambition to one country and slamming the door in the face of the international workers' movement, the Stalinist leadership had monopolized power. Isolated as it was, since all forms of opposition had been crushed, it had unduly accelerated the pace of rural collectivization, which meant the countryside lay in ruins and that now the campaign for industrialization was so rapid that it reached the breaking point. The Soviet state was only socialist in name.

In October 1929, Rakovski was the first to admit that the doctrine of the Sixteenth Party Conference of collectivization and industrialization was right "in principle." Unfortunately, the bureaucratic and despotic methods of the Stalinist leadership monstrously distorted the application of the program. Rakovski regarded the slogan of "total collectivization," whether within the space of fifteen years or one year, as "complete deviation from socialism," leading to "straight economic nonsense," and added, "we are Marxists, and we know that a new form of ownership can spring from new relations of production. But these new relations *have not yet appeared.*"⁵⁹

As Rakovski pointed out in his analysis, there were less than 50,000 tractors in the Soviet Union. Moreover, most of those tractors belonged to sovkhozes, and could not altogether service more than 5 percent of the available land. It was obvious, therefore, that only by setting up a "highly technical base" would kolkhozes be saved from crumbling (they were already seen by middle peasants as traps)⁶⁰ and famine be avoided among peasants.⁶¹ Rakovski could see another danger looming for the new collective farms. Kulaks had just put forward this exhortation: "Join kolkhozes to blow them up from within."⁶² Rakovski yielded to the temptation of amalgam and concluded:

When officials forced middle peasants to enroll in kolkhozes they acted "under the kulaks' influence" as it is admitted in the official press. Insofar as the leadership is now in the hands of officials, it unwittingly cooperates with the kulaks.⁶³

It seemed to the opposition leader that Stalinist policies were en-

dangering the very existence of the first workers' state. As he stated in April 1930, when the collectivization crisis reached its height, the campaign had "lamentably and noisily crashed down." He could foresee the failure of the "extreme Left's adventure of total collectivization," leading to another extreme solution, "agricultural capitalism." The only conclusion was that total socialism was only useful to open the way to total capitalism.⁶⁴

Although Rakovski's conclusions were just as extreme as the measures taken by the Stalinist leaders, the accuracy of his remarks on the disastrous consequences they had on living conditions and morale among the peoples of the Soviet Union is obvious. He observed the rise in the cost of living, as well as a tremendous increase in indirect taxation that meant a drop in real income for workers. The 1930 budget allowed for a new rise in tax on tobacco, matches, sugar, clothes, vodka, beer, etc. Rakovski also pointed out an increase in the workers' share of the state's deficit, "which shares they could not sell for five years." He did not forget either that the increase in "voluntary" gifts for the building of kolkhozes meant a change from a five-day week to six days in many regions. Some factories in the Urals likewise changed from a working day of eight hours to ten hours.⁶⁵ "Scandalous abuses" were uncovered with increasing frequency, which revealed the extent and seriousness of the disease.

On the other hand, while the working class in towns and villages was subjected to enormous demands in productivity, in ever worsening conditions, the fundamental problem of the socialist cadres was being ignored. For good reason, as Rakovski explained, "the matter of cadres is linked to that of political control over the masses, their political degree of maturity, and working-class democracy inside the Party."⁶⁶

In those days Rakovski kept emphasizing the fact that the popular masses were denied all initiative in public life. Like all other opposition members, he saw economic disorder, bureaucratic stupidity, and arbitrary rule as one side of the coin, while the other was "abase-ment, despair and loss of any right for the laboring masses."⁶⁷ As he had done in 1923, at the Twelfth Party Congress, he stressed again the mischief caused by "centralist bureaucracy" to national politics in general. From the early days, Rakovski's ambition was to make of the Soviet Union an example for all nations. Now he was ashamed of Stalinist policies, especially in the field of national minorities, a matter of great interest to him since his days in the Balkans. The reason why the articles written by Lenin on the problem of nationalities were kept "hidden from the Party" was precisely, he said, because they are in total contradiction to the policies adopted by the people now in

power. "The strategy of the Party leadership in the matter of nationalities," Rakovski concluded, "remains as the old type: opportunism and naked power clothed in clumsy phraseology."

Its characteristics are loss of identity for national republics, their status of complete dependence, and reliance on central government. The establishment of a stronger bureaucracy means that a new type is being trained, who can easily pass from a communist position to one with responsibility for three different republics. From the bureaucrat's point of view, the problem of nationalities is like everything else, one of administrative convenience.⁶⁸

The errors made by the Stalinist leadership in the area of home affairs were reflected in the Kominern, since the leaders of national parties took their cue from the "bosses" in Moscow. Such a situation would lead to "the communist Internationale disintegrating," as even then "preparing the ground for revolution" was nothing more than "empty rhetorics."⁶⁹

After adding up all the mistakes and errors accumulated by Stalin and his partners, Rakovski and his group suggested several measures of great importance to their thinking. They all tried to solve the fundamental problem of "workers' democracy." Without it, any attempt at improving the system would inevitably bring new distortions; only by "revolutionary control of the masses" could "the apparatus be made to serve the masses." The main remedies were, according to him:

Abolishing the function of general secretary and limiting the work of the party secretary to a purely technical level, while all political responsibilities would rest on the Politburo as a whole; extending to all elected Party organizations the system governing the elections to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, that is to say, secret voting; considerably reducing the apparatus in order to redirect resulting savings into sovkhoses and kolkhoses,⁷⁰ and into industry.⁷¹

Opposition members also asked for a revision of the five-year plan, its pace and choices, for collective contracts to improve working and living conditions for workers. They wanted a fixed number of working hours, a link between nominal salaries and budget increases, and a restoration of trade union action. As regards Party policies toward the rural areas, they demanded official renunciation of total collectivization, an interruption of the mass campaign against kulaks, and of their being systematically expelled from the countryside.⁷²

It is clear that the opposition's basic aim was to "reestablish trusting relations" between the Party and the majority of the population. If the suggested measures were not applied, Rakovski was pessimistic about the future of the Bolshevik party, which would decline rapidly, and with it the first workers' state. In this case, his own doctrine on the evil of bureaucracy would be fully vindicated. The Soviet Union would have a "large governing class" that would become more and more subdivided, multiplying itself "by way of favoritism and direct or indirect appointments (internal promotion and fictitious voting system)." A new class would emerge (no longer a caste), which would be supported by a novel form of private property, the "exercise of state power." It would then be literally true that, as Marx wrote in *Critique of the Law* by Hegel, bureaucracy "owns the state as if it were private property."⁷³

When Rakovski published this "Declaration of the Bolshevik-Leninist Opposition" in the periodical of the Young Trotskyists, *Class Struggle*, L. D. Trotsky commented that developments in the Soviet Union were subject to a "lucid interpretation which can hardly be improved."⁷⁴ The document indeed can be seen as Rakovski's political testament. In this last piece of writing (no other manuscript of his passed censorship nor escaped the GPU) he drew all the logical consequences of his analysis, showing the political experience he had acquired through a lifetime of devotion to the Marxist cause.⁷⁵

As soon as Stalin heard of the latest manifesto from the Trotskyist opposition leader, he took drastic steps to prevent him from sowing doubt in people's minds about the validity of official declarations. Henceforth, Rakovski fell into oblivion. All the comrades he had managed to get in touch with to prepare the April statement were sent even farther away from him. He was also threatened with losing his employment and livelihood.

At the time, Rakovski was working as a petty official with the Barnaul Planning Commission, but there were few witnesses to report on the difficulties of his everyday life. Yet, some American mining prospectors met him once in his remote place of exile; he had been asked to act as an interpreter, as he obviously was the only person within hundreds of miles who spoke English. Louis Fischer related:

Before leaving they gave him a one-dollar tip. However neither the harsh Siberian life nor his humiliating situation had broken Rakovski. He was made of the stuff of past exiles under the tsarist regime who spent years and years in the wilderness and died rather than renouncing their principles.⁷⁶

In his April 1930 manifesto, Rakovski had reasserted more strongly than ever his determination to carry on with his fight. Of course, he knew full well that part of the opposition had been “undermined” by the people in power. Some of them, he said not without exaggeration, “had lost their revolutionary fire because of bureaucratic pettiness and harassment.” The others had “shamefully renounced their communist principles . . . by rallying behind the deceptive slogans issued by the centrist party on industrialization and collectivization.” He thought they had all lost their right to be trusted by the Party and working class ever again. As for him, he declared proudly and confidently in the manner of a true political leader: “No amount of persecution or coaxing can prevent members of the opposition still loyal to Leninist principles to do their duty toward the Party and revolution.”⁷⁷

Rakovski did not speak in this way lightly. He was taking an oath to fight until victory or death. What were his plans for the years to come? One can only hazard a guess. It seems that in 1931, he had made up his mind to change his tactics and to stop attacking Stalin directly, since any “provocation” could be used as an excuse for the latter to silence him forever. On the other hand, Rakovski was perhaps hoping to be allowed to go to a spa for treatment, either in the USSR or abroad. (The leadership might use the opportunity to banish him from Soviet territory, as happened with Trotsky two years before.) Anyhow, in July 1932, he was allowed to go to a warmer region on the edge of Lake Shirlo for health reasons.⁷⁸

From then on, there are no records of his whereabouts. There is a possibility that on this occasion, or during another trip that he may have made a few months later (in the course of an expedition in the Altai Mountains, rich with relics of a civilization dating back to the early Christian era), he tried to cross the border into Mongolia. As Peter Frank, who was Trotsky’s secretary during his stay at Prinkipo reported:

We knew that [Rakovski] attempted to leave the Soviet Union, that he was caught and wounded in the event. (When I say we knew, I must add that I was with Trotsky when he heard the news, towards the end of 1932 or first half of 1933.)⁷⁹

As soon as Stalin had Rakovski captured, he decided to punish him by deporting him even farther away, from Central Asia to the Far North. The province of Yakutsk was his assigned place of residence, which was highly unsuitable with its long winter months, for a person with a weak heart, who would have to endure temperatures between 34°C and 50°C below. The news was made official on 18 March

1933, and the following Reuters report appeared in London: "The Soviet government denies the allegation of Rakovski having committed suicide. Rakovski practices as a medical doctor in the province of Yakutsk."⁸⁰ Stalin had found it necessary to put an end to the rumors that circulated in Western Europe as to the opposition leader's death occurring in the USSR. A Trotskyist publication, *Truth*, issued an appeal in January 1932, "SOS for Rakovski," which said: "We hear that Rakovski's health has sharply deteriorated, his life is in danger." In the 25 September 1932 issue, Miliukov's newspaper, *Poslednia novosti*, reported the same news, which was taken up and enlarged in March 1933, by the *Peuple de Bruzelles*. The editorial, under the headline "Christian Rakovski, former ambassador of the Soviet Union i Paris, is dead," declared:

Christian Rakovski has just taken his last breathe in a Moscow clinic, where he was rushed from his exile in Siberia. His health, undermined by a lifetime of relentless work, did not allow him to resist the harsh Siberian climate⁸¹

There followed a precise and detailed biography written in the warmest terms, probably inspired by French Trotskyists.

In reality, Rakovski had survived his injuries, but perhaps the fact that he unsuccessfully tried to escape had given rise to reports of his suicide and death. In his exile in Jakutsk he may have done some medical work, although he had hardly practiced as a doctor until then (in 1899, when doing his military service in Romania, and a few months in 1903 in the small village of Beaulieu-sur-Loire).⁸² In any case, it is likely that through the GPU Stalin ordered Rakovski to give up all political activities under threat of being tried and sentenced for subversive and counterrevolutionary agitation. Meanwhile, as Trotsky remarked, the iron grip was to tighten gradually around Rakovski and his wife, until life became unbearable. Two years later, in February 1934, a telegram was going to "cause a stir" in Moscow and among European Socialists, announcing his return to the majority Party line. Let us now try to understand the reasons that made the staunch revolutionary "surrender to Stalin" and submit to his will.

Chapter 20

Adherence to the "Party Line" (1934-1937)

A. Rakovski, Stalin, and Hitler (1934)

The situation in the Soviet Union in 1934 remains shrouded in mystery. First, there was a semblance of appeasement at the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress, but the year ended with the assassination of Kirov, which Stalin used as a pretext for a new wave of attacks against Lenin's old companions, who were only members of the opposition in name.

On the eve of the Seventeenth Congress, the general spirit tended to reconciliation. Some aspects of the five-year plan had proved successful because it gave new impetus to revolutionary fervor and mobilized the young generation by presenting it with a battlefield worthy of the civil war. However, the battle to reach the plan's requirements had taken its toll, and the drastic changes affecting rural life as well as industry had often been achieved with bloodshed and violence. This basic factor was linked with another one, equally important. In the summer and autumn of 1933, unlike previous years, crops were "exceptionally abundant," and this helped to free the country from the infernal cycle of famine and material exhaustion. In the circumstances a "moderate" faction emerged in the Politburo and the Party, represented by Kalinin, Voroshilov, Rudzutak, and, above all, Kirov.¹

Sergei Kirov, who took over from Zinoviev in the Politburo, as political leader of the Leningrad district, was known for his firm support of the "majority line" advocated by Stalin.² In the new climate of early 1934, Kirov was brave enough to ask for "an end to terror in the country and in the Party." According to Bukharin, he came to the conclusion that the days of destruction that were unavoidable for weeding out all the allies of the smallholders were at an end; the economic situation on collective farms was better and seemed safe in the future. This represented a firm basis on which to build, and as the economy improved, the majority of the population would increasingly side with the government, and the number of "enemies from within" would decrease. It was now for the Party to gather the forces that would support it during the next stage of economic development, and in so doing, widen the basis of the foundations on which

Soviet power rested. Kirov, therefore, ardently pleaded for reconciliation with those Party members who at the time of the first five-year plan had joined the opposition, but who could now be persuaded to cooperate on new terms, since the "destructive" stage was over.³

Kirov's point of view, strongly supported by Gorki, was attractive to many Party leaders.⁴ Early in the summer of 1933, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and a number of old opposition leaders were reinstated. As they had asked through Rakovski's and Radek's messages of January 1928, ex-opposition members were allowed to choose their field of action, and their qualification were taken into consideration. So, there was an atmosphere of good will and a new spirit of friendship when Lenin's old comrades returned to their desks, to such an extent that Stalin could declare: "We have to admit that the Party has never been so united."⁵

A sign of the times was the participation of the ex-left-wing opposition leaders to the Seventeenth Party Congress, as well as those of the right-wing opposition. So Zinoviev and Kamenev, Preobrazhenski, Piatakov, and Radek, on the one hand, and Bukharin, Rykov and Tolski on the other were invited to take part in the debates, without exposing themselves to the usual mockery and abuses.⁶ On 23 February, when the reconciliation congress came to an end, and just before the second five-year plan began, Rakovski sent a telegram to the Central Committee. Some saw in it a "surrender"; it was in fact a decision to return to the Party, for the sake of socialism, rather than a humiliating defeat. The telegram shows Rakovski, the unbending opposition leader, looking beyond humdrum political contingencies, and ready to sacrifice a few principles, seemingly unimportant for a time, compared to what was at stake, and we know that he gave as much importance to the internal situation of the first workers' state as to the international situation. This is why he wrote to Trotsky in July 1928:

I fully understand and share your point of view, "No home policy can succeed without a correct and consistent line as regards the international proletarian revolution. . . without the right and considered decisions in the field of international politics. . . ." Otherwise what will happen is that *ceci tuera cela*.⁶ Capitalism will stifle us and the historic role of proletarian dictatorship in Russia [will come to an end.]⁷

In the telegram Rakovski sent to the Central Committee five years later, again he took up this fundamental idea, which puts his laying down of arms in the right perspective. As he saw fascism sweeping through several European countries, especially in Germany,

he wrote:

In view of the international reaction gaining ground in an assault primarily directed against the October Revolution, my previous disagreements with the Party have become meaningless. I see it as the duty of a Bolshevik Communist to align himself fully and without reservation with the majority line."⁸

The permanent correspondent of *Le Temps* in Moscow understood the significance of Rakovski's telegram when he wrote this balanced appreciation:

This gesture, because of Rakovski's innate pride, can be taken as an act of solidarity rather than submission, but it represents a success for the present Party leadership, since Rakovski is the last of the group around Trotsky to be reconciled with Stalin's policies.⁹

It should be remarked that Trotsky, when he heard the news, did not utter a single word of disapproval toward his old fighting associate. Since 1929, not one issue of the *Opposition Bulletin* had appeared without an item on Rakovski or a mention of his name, and now even this staunchest of allies was deserting Trotsky. The thought filled him "with enormous sadness" and utter weariness.¹⁰ Trotsky entered in his diary in exile, "Rakovski was practically the last contact I still had with the old generation of revolutionaries. After his surrender, I have no one left. . . ." ¹¹

Trotsky felt comparatively isolated throughout the following months. To young French Trotskyists "he mentioned Rakovski as the last fighting companion, now lost forever, of his own generation."¹² He knew, in Pierre Naville's words, that the "young comrades" who were siding with him were not of a kind to become his favorite partners in conversation. He said that, for a long time, he had "not been able to exchange ideas or discuss problems with someone else, though [he] badly needed it."¹³ From 1934, the two men followed opposite paths, but never became "strangers" to each other.

In Moscow, Rakovski was "greeted by Kaganovich in person"; the latter expressed the satisfaction of the Politburo and the Central Committee in seeing him come back to the Party.¹⁴ Like other left-wingers, Rakovski was given suitable employment, but which kept him from making a political stand in public. Bukharin, the ex-right-wing opposition leader, had recently been appointed as editor of *Isvestiya*, the main government newspaper,¹⁵ and had agreed to an ex-left-winger joining the staff, (Lev Sosnovski who bowed to Stalin at the same time as Rakovski).¹⁶ As for Rakovski, after two months of treat-

ment and a rest cure in a spa, he was appointed as vice-commissar for public health in May 1936.¹⁷ His task was to supervise all scientific research institutes connected with the Commissariat for Health, so he was perhaps in a position to put some of his ideas into practice—for instance, the one he had developed on malaria when he was in exile in Astrakhan in 1928.¹⁸

Several Western journalists were able to meet Rakovski at the time, either in his office or in the French Embassy, which he liked to visit.¹⁹ Courteous as ever, he stood out among many of his Soviet colleagues because he spoke French fluently and was a very distinguished and knowledgeable person. He seemed to know the French political scene perfectly (whether the Right or the Left), but he refused to be drawn into anything but the briefest discussion of his country's policies. He seemed more interested in talking about the past and what he remembered of it.²⁰

In September 1934, he was put in charge of a delegation of the Soviet Red Cross going to Japan for an international conference of the Red Cross Associations.²¹ This was the last foreign trip he would ever make. Ironically, this journey was to be used as a pretext for the most shameful accusation. He would be tried and sentenced as a spy (like so many of the old guard), less than four years later.

As we know, Kirov's death on 1 December 1934 marked a crucial stage in the Stalinist fight for power. The murder of the first secretary of the Leningrad district, done certainly on Stalin's orders, as N. S. Krushev's revelations seemed to confirm, was used as a pretext for the most ruthless wave of killings.²² Most of the political leaders and top activists of the Lenin period, of the October Revolution and the days that followed the civil war, were wiped out. Kirov's assassination was a useful device for Stalin to issue a fresh call for "class watchfulness," in the name of which he would annihilate all enemies of the majority line, that is to say his personal enemies first of all. There is no doubt that the general secretary made no distinction between private and public conflicts, and that he never forgave those who, at one time or another, had humiliated him. He had the dreadful gift of putting himself in the shoes of the people he wanted to get rid of and probably thought: "If I were they, I would kill him [Stalin]." It is enough to remember his hatred of Trotsky (who had called him "the gravedigger of the revolution") and his persecution of Bukharin (who regarded him as "Genghis Khan," capable of anything). Let us not forget the way he demanded the death of Riutin, a man who after organizing commandos against the Trotskyist opposition in the Party cells, turned against Stalin and in 1932 depicted the general secretary as "the evil spirit of the Russian Revolution, who under the influence

of a vindictive mind and lust for power, drove the Revolution to the abyss"; Riutin went so far as to say that "unless Stalin be excluded from the Party leadership, there will be no improvement in the Party or the country."²³

When Stalin heard about these statements (from 1932-1933 onwards the general secretary ran his own parallel secret services),²⁴ he asked for Riutin and all his accomplices to be executed, but the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, the Central Committee, and the Politburo refused to "take into account Stalin's demands" and to pass death sentences "in the case of opposition movements within the Party."²⁵ In the Politburo, as well as the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Stalin was up against Kirov, who was at the time supported "with varying degrees of firmness" by Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, Kosior, Kalinin, and Rudzutak. Kirov, who was going to be chosen at the Seventeenth Congress as one of the four central Committee secretaries, had a reputation for being "a gifted and experienced organizer, a disciplined person, who knew how to choose efficient people."²⁶ The first secretary of the Leningrad district, who had been repeatedly urged to settle in Moscow in order to apply the reforms he was advocating, was soon to be an obstacle to Stalin in his reaching for absolute personal power. As stated above, Kirov detected, contrary to Stalin, a "relaxation of the class struggle in the country, not another outburst of it." He thought that "the policy of general suspicion and universal terror should be abandoned and replaced by one 'based on trust and persuasion.'²⁷ In this context there was an attempt at "appeasing the muzhiks," by using softer methods to enforce collectivization. This is also why opposition members who undertook to refrain from "antiparty" activities were allowed to go back to Moscow. The ill-famed GPU was replaced by the NKVD (which was deprived of the right to pass death sentences), and Bukharin could describe himself, together with Gorki, at the Writers' Congress in August 1934, as the "advocate of proletarian humanism," opposed to barbarian fascism.²⁸ As B. Nikolaevski rightly pointed out, the Seventeenth Congress asked for a drastic revision of Soviet foreign policy, that is to say, the one Stalin had forced on the Party since 1929. From January 1934, the latter understood that he had to side with the West European democracies to resist the Nazi danger, instead of trying to destroy European republics by supporting fascist organizations and military factions in their bid for power, which the cooperation of large industrialists would turn into victories. This is when Bukharin became editor of *Izvestiya*, since he seemed the man best suited to combat nazism, and Rakovski consented to return to Moscow to be reinstated to the Party, as he did

not want to weaken the leadership with his criticism and unwittingly bring water to Hitler's mill.

On 1 December 1934, Sergei Kirov was assassinated. Yezhov immediately replaced him as secretary of the Central Committee, to become the organizer of the horrendous purges of the years of 1936–1938, which swallowed up 60 percent of the Seventeenth Congress' delegates, over half a million Communists in responsible positions and at least ten million non-Communists.²⁹ In 1932 Stalin had already asked for Riutin's death on the grounds that he had uttered "a call for criminal action." Riutin had undoubtedly tried to unseat Stalin, who was soon to be in an uncomfortable position with the Seventeenth Congress refusing "to confirm him in his functions as general secretary," as was the custom since the Thirteenth Party Congress (the first to be held after Lenin's death in May 1924).³⁰ Stalin probably had this in mind when he declared: "The comrades, not content with criticism and passive resistance, threatened to start a rebellion against the Central Committee. We were even in danger of being shot at, so we had to treat them harshly."³¹

In the first half of 1935 Stalin had several drastic measures passed, in theory to "defeat terrorism." Possession of a knife or offensive weapon or carrying a firearm were punishable by five years' imprisonment. Criminal sentences (including death sentences) were extended to children twelve years old; spying and illegal emigration were to be punishable by death; furthermore, adult family members would from then on be regarded as accomplices and be liable to two to five years imprisonment, while their possessions would be confiscated. A set of circulars were sent out on 17 October 1935 from the office of cadres, asking for a report to be drawn on the number of "Communists having been denounced as Zinovievists, Trotskyists, double-faced elements and foreigners."³² The descent into hell had started, and a tragic end was awaiting countless people.

Chapter 21

The Trial and the End

One of the reasons why Stalin had to bring in terror was, probably, because of a new attitude of defiance among young people in the Soviet Union. Although unorganized, the movement was widespread, and whether they belonged to the Communist party or were apolitical, many youths rose against party tyranny, as symbolized by its general secretary.

As the archives of the Smolensk district reveal, Stalin was hated by many activists at the time, as they realized that one man's folly was responsible for unprecedented sins. Students had slashed up his portrait, crying: "The Party is ashamed of your lies."¹ A sixteen-year-old boy had no qualms in saying: "They killed Kirov, let them kill Stalin now."² Stalin thought these young people were hoping to bring the regime down and install a pluralist system after asking Lenin's old companions to regain the upper hand in the leadership, so there was no time to lose. A Smolensk carpenter had declared, with the men in his brigade agreeing with him:

We must allow for several political parties in our country, as in bourgeois countries; they will sort out the mistakes of the Communist party. There are still many people being exploited in our land; communist leaders and engineers employ servants and exploit them. Zinoviev and Kamenev, other Trotskyists will not and must not be shot, for they are old Bolsheviks.³

However, it should be emphasized that, contrary to the young generation, the old revolutionaries like Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov, or Rakovski were only concerned with preserving party unity. As they saw war looming, they remained fiercely "neutral" and rejected "Clemenceau's theory," which had been supported by Trotsky in 1927. They had been humiliated and subjected to foul treatment, but Stalin could now do whatever he pleased with them. The publication on 12 June 1936 of the new Soviet constitution, "the most democratic in the world" and a "monument to Stalinist wisdom" (in fact it had been written mainly by Bukharin), could still make an impression, but it was soon dispelled when, on 14 August of the same

year, the news of another trial of old Bolsheviks, with Zinoviev among them, appeared in large print in all Soviet newspapers.

From this time onward, life became almost unbearable for a large number of Party leaders, for engineers, for factory managers, for army officers, and generally for all Communists who had ever shown signs of an independent mind. A climate of suspicion, denunciations, and constant fear began to oppress all the main cities and soon spread everywhere in the country.

These dreadful years of *yezhevshchina* (from 1936 to 1938) are known through many remarkable accounts, like the short story written by Lydia Chukovskaia (*The Deserted House*),⁴ Evgenia Ginzburg (*Vertigo*),⁵ Vasilii Grossman's novel (*Nothing Is Forever*),⁶ or Anna Akhamtova's poem of poignant beauty entitled "Requiem."⁷ Lazurkina, an old activist, a Party member since 1902, gives a glimpse of it:

Stalin did untold harm, not only because many of the best among us died, but arbitrary rule became the norm, guiltless people were jailed . . . fear was everywhere. Slanders were flying around, people did not trust one another, there were cases of groundless self-accusation. We were given lists of names and forced to add our signatures, against promises of being released; if not, they threatened us with being killed.⁸

Lenin's old companions had no illusions as to Stalin's real character, nor about the methods he was ready to use to prevent another Kirov trying to turn the Party leaders against him, mostly the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, and also the Congress. In reality, as Rakovski said during his trial, the old Bolsheviks knew they had no "political future." Some, like Radek and Bukharin, showed amazing powers of adaptation. The latter was a man of "tremendous vitality" with a temperament that "allowed him to live from day to day," as an eyewitness relates; this is what, "through curious complacency and constant self-mockery, seemed to make him almost happy." Bukharin went on being the *enfant terrible* (Lenin used to call him the "Party's darling"). Did this attitude rest on wisdom, training, or was he only naive? He certainly had lost none of his fighting spirit, and he could still parry the deadliest blow and hit as hard as ever. He wore no gloves, but he seemed "to enjoy every minute of the contest."⁹

It was the opposite for Rakovski. He had been deeply affected by his experience in exile and something was broken deep down. After his latest disappointment since his return to Moscow, he could not recover his balance. When he came back from Japan, it was to go

to the hospital for cardiovascular trouble again. He was laid up for nearly four months, and later was subjected to increasing pressure throughout 1935 and again in 1936. Trotsky was right when he said that Rakovski and his associates were reduced to "having no way out but total submission and prostration."¹⁰ Stalin and his group were adept at alternating physical hardship (for example, refusing a person suffering from a weak heart the medicine he needed) and moral torture (for example, imprisonment or deportation for the wife and children of a "suspect"). They also knew how to persuade them of the usefulness of a "last sacrifice" for the Party, by giving them the wrong sense of values under the effects of long days of interrogation, threats, and blackmail. This is probably why Rakovski signed a statement, later published on the front page of *Pravda* on 22 August 1936 at a time of the "first Moscow trial:"

It is with a feeling of deep indignation and anger against shameless, despicable murderers, that we all read the report of the High Court of the USSR dated 15 August.¹¹ In addition to this general feeling, I personally feel the bitterest shame for my past membership in the opposition movement, whose leaders have turned out to be criminal and murderous counterrevolutionaries.¹²

From this time on, Rakovski never left the vicious circle of public confession, induced by his erroneous sense of guilt, his desire to prove himself innocent, and his wish to serve the Party as long as possible and in whatever circumstances. Like many other "suspects," he was feverishly looking for something to cling to, to recover his past beliefs, being desperately afraid of having spent so many years working for the cause of the people in vain. "Of course," he said at his trial, "my past can be reduced to nothing, and it will be wiped out by my unfortunate actions, but as to my personal motives, no one can attack them."¹³

To protect the past that was so dear to him, Rakovski was induced to confess the most unlikely mistakes, like all other old Bolsheviks who submitted to a public trial (the others were shot after a pretense of trial *in camera*.) Léon Blum was not exaggerating when he spoke of "exhibitionist repentance," in the manner of the Mensheviks who had been tried in 1931. "They confessed their crimes effusively and with ostentation, as if they were taking pleasure in public confession."¹⁴ As suspects were brought to the fore and returned to oblivion, only to be exhibited again, their self-professed guilt grew to monstrous proportions, matching the depth of their despair. One can only say that the Moscow trials in the 1930s were born one from the

other (exactly as the Czechoslovak trials in the 1950s). Rakovski's case confirms this.

As was seen above, at the time of the "first Moscow trial, the pressure on Rakovski was strong enough for him to confess his "shame" in belonging to and later heading the Trotskyist opposition in the USSR. There was no emergency exit for him, since the Stalinist leadership proved determined to annihilate its old opponents. Rakovski knew that his turn would come, but he was perhaps trying to gain time because he wanted to spare his family, especially his daughter, Helen and his niece, Lilian.¹⁵ A few months after his first "confession," the NKVD seized him again, as mercilessly as a cat playing with a mouse. It seems that in December 1936, Louis Fischer told Ignatius Reiss (who was head of the Soviet secret services in the West), that Rakovski had just been interrogated, after his apartment had been searched.¹⁶ Reiss wrote this in his notebook: "Police descend on Rakovski. 18 hours without food nor rest. His wife tried to prepare some tea for him, but was refused permission in case she put poison in his drink."¹⁷

It is likely, as Trotsky suggested, that Rakovski tried to commit suicide, preferring instant death to ignominious persecution, as Tomski had just done and many other would do later.¹⁸ The NKVD was trying to silence Rakovski, on the eve of the "second Moscow trial," which took place in January 1927, and ended with the condemnation of, among others, Piatakov, Radek, Drobnis, and Muralov, his friend and old comrade. Bukharin and Rykov were probably arrested at that time, since they came under attack in *Pravda* on 20 January, less than a month before Ordzhonikidze committed suicide.¹⁹ Rakovski spent the next months trembling for himself and his family, as well as the future of socialism and of the first workers' state. Drobnis had mentioned his name in his public statement, which was as good as an official sentence. He declared that Rakovski knew about the "Trotskyist center" (of which he was a member) and was fully aware of "Trotsky's instructions on terrorism and sabotage." Drobnis further pointed out to Muralov that, in his telegram expressing his admission of guilt, Rakovski had failed to allude to the "Trotsky center."²⁰

As the permanent correspondent to *Le Temps* observed then, Drobnis' short statement caused "quite a stir in the courtroom." Everyone understood the consequences of these serious allegations, and seeing an old colleague who had been with Rakovski in the Ukraine being used as witness for the prosecution was painful.²¹ This eyewitness wrote about the sickening effect of hearing "spontaneous or induced" revelations, seeing "this sad spectacle of a few true revolutionaries being thrown together with ignoble *agents provocateurs* . . . while a

handful of ex-aristocrats watch this settling of accounts among Bolsheviks with secret amusement.”²² After months of nervous tension and the hideous news of his old comrades’ condemnation, Rakovski was arrested too, probably in the winter of 1937.

As Annie Kriegel points out in her analysis of the trials, this long period of waiting was part of the “softening” intended to disrupt “normal forms of social life,” family ties, friendships, and political relationships.²³ After experiencing deep insecurity, worse than anything a professional revolutionary had endured so far, the victim’s reaction of being arrested was “a feeling of relief, if not of actual pleasure.” After breaking all the links the man had established with the outside world, the system had to make his despair more intense, his sense of guilt more oppressive, for the apparatus needed one last service from him, the condemnation of everything he had ever fought for, his groveling in the mud, for the great glory of the gracious leader of the great Soviet Union.

For eight months Rakovski firmly rejected all cooperation with his torturers; he denied being guilty and refused to accuse Trotsky or praise Stalin. Yet, after the eighth month of mental cruelty and lack of medical care, he was made to “confess.”

It is well known that in the Stalinist trials, the two lines of enquiry, one for the accused and the other for the prosecution, were usually separate. In the legal proceedings, the NKVD agents intervened to channel information between the two lines, in accordance with a given situation (that of the victim), and to fit the overall process (the size and precise aim of the trial).²⁴ The two enquiries remained apart as long as they were not “activated and brought together under an impulse generated by guilt.”²⁵ Suddenly, after they became familiar with the victim’s psychological makeup, the NKVD men found the spring to activate. They knew full well that the analyses of the situation Rakovski had written while in exile tended to prove that the first proletarian state was socialist in name only, the proletariat’s dictatorship having become no more than the dictatorship of a new class, the bureaucracy, under the Party’s general secretary. They had not forgotten that Rakovski was in full agreement with Trotsky, who thought they would be fully justified in taking the risk to bring down the present leaders in the event of a serious threat to the country. On the other hand, Rakovski’s return to Moscow signified the wish to preserve party unity and the country’s defenses in the face of outside danger. Therefore, the solution was to confront him brutally with the progress achieved by fascism and how the countries engaged in building socialism were in great danger of being smothered by it in the future, if this was not the case already. They could demonstrate

to him that he had been helping the Fascists to undermine the Soviet Union by his divisive criticism and subversive actions. He may in fact have been "subjectively innocent," but could no doubt be regarded as "objectively guilty." The only way he could assist socialism now was to acknowledge his wrongdoings in public, to condemn all things "Trotskyist" and himself, thus setting an example. Rakovski clearly went through these actions at his public trial:

It is a fact that imprisonment and isolation drive people to reexamine their values. But I remember and will never forget as long as I live how I was finally brought to admit my faults. One day, under examination, in the summer, I heard of the start of the Japanese attack against China and the Chinese people, and I heard also of Germany's and Italy's naked aggression against the Spanish people. . . .

I heard of the frantic preparations of the fascist states for starting a world war. *What usually becomes known to the reader every day in small installments through telegrams, was delivered to me as a huge blow in massive quantity. I was literally prostrate* [author's italics]. My entire past rose to my mind . . . with it also my responsibility appeared clearly. I saw that I had taken part in these things and was responsible for them, that my treasonable actions had been helping the cause of the invaders.²⁶

After this admission of "objectively" aiding the enemy, Rakovski was very close indeed—it only needed one more step—to admitting his own aggression, treason, and sabotage, going far back into the past. To take this step was quite easy for the men under accusation at the Moscow trials, since for years they had been influenced by the "amoral" Bolshevik doctrine. It should be borne in mind that these men for years had been leaders of the same extremist party from which they were now excluded. They were also guilty of fanaticism and intolerance; in their day, they had condemned all political groupings that could not or would not lose their identity, ranging from the Liberals to the Kadets, and from the Anarchists to the SRs. After the civil war, Rakovski was one of the first to organize a number of trials in the course of which "Mensheviks" were tried and sentenced, in the name of the future of socialism. He tried then to be more Bolshevik than the Bolsheviks, as he was convinced that Lenin was right in saying, "Who is not with us, is against us." Now the roles were reversed, and as if he had a split personality, he assumed the character of a saboteur who had dared to go against the Party and the majority line. Even Trotsky had stated in 1924:

None of us is willing nor able to question the will of the Party. In the end, the Party is always right. . . . One cannot be right except with the Party and through it, since history knows no other way to follow reason.²⁷

As Zamiatin wrote in his novel *We*, the Bolsheviks were related to the Christians, men who knew how great the church "in one flock" could be, who were aware that "humility is a virtue and pride a vice," and that while "we" is godly, "me" comes from the devil.²⁸ This is what Rakovski stressed at his trial, when he recognized that he had helped the enemies of the Soviet Union and of socialism, and fully regretted it.

This is when I examined myself. . . . I joined the workers' movement in my youth, and where did I get? I reached a stage when my actions made the vilest enterprises easier; I prepared the way for the fascist enemy who was ready to destroy democratic culture, civilization, and all the achievements of the working class and of the people.

This is why I decided to speak out, why I gave in and overcame the shame arising from vanity, and any anxiety I could feel for my own fate, a feeling unworthy of a man who was once a member of the revolutionary movement. Resentment and ambition became foreign to me. I was sure that from then on my duty was to help fight the aggressors, to give myself up wholly and without reservation; this is when I told my interrogator that on the following day I would make a full confession.²⁹

In this confession, he mentioned the fact that other people had followed the same path, evolving from soldiers in the cause of labor's emancipation to "criminals."³⁰ On 3 March 1938 when he entered the courtroom "looking much thinner and older, with his face half-hidden behind a long beard which made him unrecognizable," he was in a group of twenty facing the court.³¹ Among them were the ex-leaders of the right-wing opposition, Bukharin and Rykov; an ex-party secretary who was once ambassador in Berlin and deputy commissar for foreign affairs, N. Krestinski; the former NKVD head, Yogoda; Grinko, Chernov, and Rosengolz, former people's commissars; several members of the Central Committee (Khodzhaev, Ikramov, and Zelenski); top officials and lastly, three famous doctors (one of whom, Pletniev, had attended Rakovski). This was the last "cartload," since it was to be the last big public trial of the 1930s, embracing members of all tendencies in the opposition. It is known as the "trial of the bloc of right-wingers and Trotskyists." Rakovski stood out among the ac-

cused as the most European, the most individualistic, and also the most critical, having challenged the Party's general secretary longer than anyone. In him were embodied the spirit of independence, personal pride, and willpower that Stalin had opposed since Lenin's death and that he was finally going to defeat.

Clearly, Stalin had adopted the most brutal and barbaric features of Lenin's philosophy, that is to say "his ability to see only one side of a question," "to reduce life's intricacies to their simplest elements."³² On the contrary, Rakovski in spite of his eagerness to act as a bolshevik through and through, was known for his gift of "seeing more than one side of a problem."³³ Like all professional revolutionaries, he returned to his attitude of rebellion and opposition on the day he was denied all responsibility of public life. Until 1917, he remained first and foremost a rebel who stood against established order because he regarded it as unfair and arbitrary. He reacted in the same way when Stalin tried to impose himself as head of the Party apparatus, as he was still at heart a Social Democrat of the pre-1914 kind—more liberal, more tolerant, finally more "enlightened" than most of the Bolsheviks. However, the general secretary at this point, with his insight into people's psychology and ability to detect an opponent's weakness, discovered the internal contradiction that was tearing apart Rakovski, the Social Democrat, the internationalist who had tried to become a Bolshevik. He gave his opinion on this to the delegates who had assembled for the Fifteenth Congress:

What is party democracy? If you mean the freedom of four or five intellectuals, divorced from the revolution, to hold endless discussion, to have their own newspaper, etc. . . . then we do not need democracy, because it serves a tiny minority which opposes the will of the vast majority.³⁴

There is no doubt that Rakovski was deeply troubled when he heard of the advance of fascism in Europe, because he was aware of his not being a "replica" of the ideal Bolshevik. It so happened that the Bolshevik version was the only form of socialism to have achieved power in the world, and it had done so in a country representing one-sixth of the planet, in an enormous territory that now remained the only fortress capable of resisting the rise of "international reaction." In 1917, Rakovski had given in to the evidence that the Russian revolution was successful; had given up his old theories and adopted Leninist principles. In 1934 too factual evidence spoke loudest; he sacrificed his principles and returned to the Party to help the first socialist state as far as he was able to. To bring Rakovski down, therefore, the only thing was to force him to admit that, in between

the times of reconciliation, he had had no qualms in going against the Party, that is to say, against the first socialist state, and ultimately socialism itself. One had only to recall the years when he obstinately refused to bend his will to the Party and obey *perinde ac cadaver*. . . . This is exactly what happened, and Rakovski's statement at the trial showed a mixture of contrition and pride in his past:

[I have been until today] a Trotskyist activist, a close personal friend of Trotsky (the prosecution has established that our friendship is of thirty-four years standing), a man who for many years has led an open struggle against the Party leadership, when many had already returned to the Party [maybe not always in good faith]. . . .

Citizen judges, how could I have turned against my Party, and in the end become a criminal? What were we, we Trotskyists, in the Party? We were what can be called a foreign body in the Party's living tissue. Trotsky joined the Bolshevik party only a few months before the October Revolution, his ideology was shaped by his struggle against the Bolshevik doctrine. I joined the Party toward the end of 1917, after belonging for a quarter of a century and more to the Second International . . . although I was part of the left wing, I was not immune to opportunism . . .³⁵

This last sentence clearly shows Rakovski's tactics, visible in all the statements he made at his public trial. In order to express what was dearest to him, in order to leaf through the "sinless pages" of his life in front of representatives of the world press and diplomacy, he was willing to accuse himself of all possible crimes and to pass from "credible lines" to fantastic aberrations, in the hope that they would show it all to be false.³⁶ Rakovski did not make a scene like Krestinski, who dared to deny *in toto* the statements he made under interrogation, and to claim his innocence in public.³⁷ He did not resort to biting irony, as Bukharin did, with Vyshinski (an old Menshevik himself) acting as prosecutor, when he denounced the "medieval inquisitorial methods" used against them.

Bukharin firmly rejected all charges of spying that Vyshinski was trying to pin on him during the trial. When the prosecutor asked him whether, one way or the other, he had not been in touch with the Austrian, U. S., or Japanese police, he indignantly replied: "I was jailed in several foreign fortresses and even in Russia. These are the only cases of my entertaining relations with the police."³⁸

Rakovski, on the other hand, confessed to anything he was asked on the subject. The old story of his dealings with the German gen-

eral staff during World War I was resuscitated for the occasion and was used to put pressure on him. The prosecution used the simple expedient of reversing the roles and forced Rakovski to say that when he was ambassador in London, he was blackmailed and persuaded to work for the Secret Service to avoid exposure. This is what Rakovski finally replied to the prosecutor, who asked him to describe the way he had been "recruited": "Armstrong [an Englishman who knew him] told me: 'We feel warmly towards you and wish to warn you that you are facing danger.' He pulled a piece of paper out of his pocket and gave it to me."

Vyshinski: "What was on the this paper?"

Rakovski: "It was a typewritten letter with a forged signature bearing my name."

V: "Forged, did you say?"

R: "Forged."

V: "What was the address on the letter?"

R: "It did not have a name . . . it was clear from the contents that it was intended for the German government."

V: "For German intelligence?"

R: "That is possible."

V: "What did the letter say?"

R: "It can be summed up this way: You will find enclosed a list of commercial firms and editorial boards of Romanian newspapers, which have to be won over to the German cause if Romania is to enter the war as an ally of Germany."

V: "What does this mean?"

R: "It means there were relations between myself and the German intelligence service or some similar German organization."

V: "That you helped Germany in recruiting Romanian citizens in Romania to support Germany?"

R: "That is correct."³⁹

Rakovski went even further in his "confession," since he admitted also to being recruited by Japanese intelligence services, when he made a journey to the Land of the Rising Sun in 1934, as head of the Soviet Red Cross delegation, (this is the reason why Trotsky claimed that Rakovski had been sent to Tokyo to expose him for spying later). To make it look more credible, there was a rehearsal of the answers to be given by the accused (as was the case with all the others who spoke in public after agreeing to a certain amount of cooperation with the prosecution).⁴⁰

When Rakovski had gone to Tokyo, Piatakov entrusted him with a letter to Yurenev, which seemed harmless enough on the surface. In reality, Piatakov had written in invisible ink that it was imperative to

find a way of using the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan to raise funds for Trotskyist propaganda. Piatakov also wrote that some powers were critical of Yurenev's behavior, as he gave precedence to British interests. Last, Piatakov warned Yurenev of some governments having taken steps to make contact with Rakovski—who, in spite of his illness and his position of no political importance as head of public health, could still prove useful.

At the headquarters of the Japanese Red Cross, Rakovski was introduced to a prominent Japanese personality (whose name he revealed when the trial was held *in camera*), who told him that Japan's interests and that of his associates in the USSR were identical. Rather puzzled, Rakovski related the incident to Yurenev who, showing him Piatakov's letter, with the lines written in invisible ink now clearly visible, apparently told him: "The die is cast, now there is no going back" ⁴¹

From the charges brought against him, it appears that Rakovski would have been recruited as a spy every time he stayed abroad, in Great Britain, Japan, and, of course, in France! He stated that in 1927, he was engaged in "negotiations with some French capitalists of right-wing leanings" whose aims were also hostile to the Soviet Union. ⁴² Not content with this, he "confessed" that Trotsky had told him in strict confidence that he was criminally involved with the British Secret Service since 1926. The ex-leader of the Red Army was supposed to have told him in December 1927 had that he asked to be sent to Alma Ata in exile (rather than Astrakhan) not for health reasons, but to be able to escape more easily by crossing the Chinese border on foot. Rakovski then asked him how he would manage to "make his way from western China, through deserts and mountains, without a penny," only to be told "the intelligence services will help me." ⁴³

This piece of nonsense is really amazing, since, as it happened, Stalin himself did the work of the British intelligence and helped Trotsky across the border, that is to say, he had him expelled from the Soviet Union in 1929. Actually, the prosecutor was not afraid of factual contradictions: for example, Krestinski stated (at the end of a scenario that had been prepared beforehand) that he had met Trotsky in Italy on 10 October 1933, while the latter was at the time traveling from Saint-Palais to Bagnères-de-Bigorre, a spa for medical treatment. ⁴⁴

In the same way, Piatakov was made to say that he left Berlin by air for Oslo in 1935, when no one had flown to Norway at the time, and the circumstances of Trotsky's stay would not have allowed him to keep secret such a visit. ⁴⁵

During his "confession" Rakovski gave a list of people he had been in touch with while abroad. He related how, at the time of Laval's trip to Moscow in May 1935, he met his old friend, Emile Buré, chief editor of *Ordre*, among journalists traveling with the French minister. Rakovski was supposed to have warned him that a French-Soviet rapprochement would be highly dangerous, especially if it was going to restore the prewar network of alliances, as it could start a preventive war on the part of Germany. Emile Buré remained unconvinced, apparently, and replied that "in the face of rising German militarism, France must not stay isolated." As for the "French capitalists" with whom he was supposed to have entered into criminal relations, Rakovski named a deputy from the Nord departement, Nicolle, and Louis Dreyfus, who was once a minister. He was supposed to have asked them how far French capital "would accept supporting the opposition in the event of it attempting a coup in Russia." He was allegedly told that French industrialists and financiers would demand highly advantageous terms in the Soviet Union."⁴⁶

Moreover, after his return to Moscow, Rakovski was supposed to have met Lady Muriel Paget, a philanthropist, who looked after needy British subjects abroad. She would have been instrumental in bringing him back to the Secret Service since (after all) she "helped to have his appointment as ambassador to London approved." As soon as these allegations became known in Paris and London, they were denied in strongly worded declarations from all sides.⁴⁷

As evidenced by the account of eyewitnesses, Rakovski made these utterances in a highly emotional state, which was "shared by the audience," but he found enough energy to complement his "most infamous statements" with words intended to negate them. Thus, he declared suddenly, to expose the *agents provocateurs* infiltrated among the accused:

I have confessed my crimes. What difference would it make if I revealed here, in front of the whole assembly, that I discovered most of my crimes, the 'most shattering right wing and Trotskyist crimes' here, in the courtroom, and that I met some of the people implicated in them for the first time here?⁴⁸

To refute the accusations that he seemed to admit, Rakovski tried throughout to join in the same sentence both a denial and a confirmation of the official line. When Vyshinski asked him whether he had waited eight months "to follow Trotsky's orders and tactics," he replied "to follow old revolutionary tactics and carry out counter-revolutionary practices."⁴⁹ When the prosecutor told him that he had

fought against the Party leadership in order to seize power himself, he answered angrily: "Citizen prosecutor, if I told you that we wanted to seize power in order to give it to the Fascists, it would make us not only criminals, which we are, but fools as well. . . ." ⁵⁰

Rakovski also indicated his determination not to cooperate, by using "political terms" that were unacceptable to Vyshinski. On 5 March in the morning, he spoke about the "opposition":

V: "What opposition? When did it take place?"

R: "It was about the middle of 1935, when Laval came to Moscow."

V: "What opposition do you mean?"

R: "I mean the right-wing and Trotskyist opposition."

V: "Is this an opposition? Rather counterrevolutionary bandits."

R: "Citizen prosecutor, I apologize, but this term has long been . . ."

V: "On the whole, you allow yourself to use expressions which do not suggest that you stand in the dock as a member of a counterrevolutionary organization of bandits, spies, deviationists and traitors. . . . You are requested to keep to facts as regards the treasonable crimes you have committed, without bringing in philosophical considerations and other things which are quite out of place in the courtroom."

It is true that on several occasions Rakovski tried to place opposition action in its historical context, to justify it by implication, but each time Vyshinski interrupted him.

R: "History tells us . . ."

V: "Leave history alone." ⁵¹

Yet, finally he escaped the prosecutor's vigilance and put himself firmly in this perspective, using the device of mental reservation before resuming the course of his statement. He put his reasoning in the mouths of "bourgeois" historians (which allowed him to carry his demonstration to its logical conclusion). Thus, he showed that the Russian revolution, because it was restricted to one country, and cut off from the international workers' movement, was being asphyxiated by an increasingly overbearing bureaucracy and degenerating into a bourgeois revolution.

It could not be otherwise since this bureaucracy, having secured power for itself as if it were "its private property," was now murdering the members of the Trotskyist opposition, that is to say representatives of the "proletarian left:"

People are content to repeat the empty, the vulgar bourgeois explanation to the effect that revolutions end up devouring their own children. The October Revolution, they say, could not escape the law of history. This is a ridiculous analysis

without any foundations. Bourgeois revolutions came to, excuse me for using theoretical arguments, but they illustrate the point, bourgeois revolutions ended up devouring their own children, since, after they had achieved victory, they had to eliminate their allies within the people, their left-wing revolutionary allies. . . .⁵²

At this point, Rakovski resumed his relation of events and admitted to "stabbing the revolution in the back," but he had done so after a "period" of loyal service to the revolution.⁵³ He still hoped that no one would believe this far-fetched list of crimes from a man who had held such important positions and fully deserved his heavy responsibilities. This is why he put strong emphasis on his past before being brutally interrupted by Vyshinski. When he mentioned their use of the "old revolutionary methods," the prosecutor burst out with: "What possible connection can you have with revolutionary methods? You only have the word left, but this is another story."

R: "But it cannot be denied that in the past I belonged. . . ."

V: "You were not arrested then, but today. . . ."

When Rakovski insisted on bringing out fragments of his past, Vyshinski heaped abuses on him. Rakovski had declared in a book written in 1925, *Bessarabia and Romania*,

All my life I have been totally opposed to Romanian landlords and propertied classes; they used me as a target in the worst days of peasant and worker struggle for emancipation. They had me jailed several times and I was able to reflect on the "blessings of bourgeois political parties."⁵⁴

During his trial in the Soviet Union, he took up this idea again, and mentioned the "blessings" of what he called, perhaps with irony, "proletarian reprisals." When Vyshinski asked him to describe his social origins and how he made a living, he replied: "I was the son of a wealthy man."

V: "Who was he? Where did his wealth come from? Was he an industrialist or a landlord?"

R: "My father was a landlord."

V: "A landlord?"

R: "Yes."

V: "Did he have a factory?"

R: "He did not have one."

V: "A commercial concern?"

R: "He was not engaged in trade."

V: "What did he do then?"

R: "My father died in 1903."

V: "I have nothing against your father's activities; you are the one who mentioned him. What I am asking is, what did you live on?"

R: "I lived off the income of my father's farms."

V: "So you were a large landowner?"

R: "Yes."

V: "So, not only your father was a large landlord, but you were also an exploiter, a . . ."

R: "Yes, of course, I was an exploiter. In reality, I lived off the profit I made, and profit means added value, as it is well known."

V: "So, this added value ended up in your pocket."

R: "That is so, it ended up in my pocket."

V: "Very well, I wanted to establish exactly where your income came from."

R: "But I want to point out how this income was used."

V: "This is another matter."⁵⁵

This is how Rakovski, the professional revolutionary, who had been changed into a "professional capitalist" at the hands of Stalinist bureaucrats, was not allowed to say that in 1900 he gave Lenin part of the capital needed to launch his first revolutionary newspaper, *Iskra*. He was not given a chance either to claim that he provided many Russian, Bulgarian, and Romanian social democratic publications with money accrued from added value on his farms.

Rakovski was forced to acknowledge that he was guilty of the most heinous crimes, but he also had to disavow his whole past, even the days so dear to him, when he could not imagine that he would be so closely connected with the first "socialist" state. This realization was a fresh blow to him. His voice choking with emotion, he bravely stated at his last public appearance:

The reason I confessed is not that I was afraid of judges. My conscience, my own judge, compelled me to. For many years, I gave my life to the workers' movement and I thought it was my duty through my confession, to help in the fight against fascism. . . .

When he read Rakovski's declarations, Trotsky, the man who was called "our gang's ataman" by Rakovski, did not blame his old comrade in any way. As early as January 1938, when Trotsky heard that Drobniš had tried to implicate Rakovski, he spoke warmly of their long-lasting friendship "stretching for over thirty years." He was saddened by the "really tragic" fate of a man who "was the closest to him among all those on trial."⁵⁶ When Rakovski in the end "confessed" his crimes, when he accused Trotsky of spying, when he declared himself "sorry" not to see him in the dock, the latter did

not have the heart to condemn a friend who had been broken by a prolonged period of resistance. He showed his understanding of the situation in these optimistic words:

When, at the age of seventy, Galileo was caught also in the meshes of the Holy Inquisition, he was forced to denounce Copernicus' system—but this did not stop the earth turning round the sun.⁵⁷

A final circumstance must be mentioned, which shows how much Rakovski was admired everywhere in Europe. As soon as the news of his trial became known, protesting voices were heard. On 5 March, the Union of Bulgarian Lawyers sent a telegram to the Soviet minister in Sofia, asking him to be kind enough to "convey to Moscow our wish that the accused be allowed to defend themselves, including the two Bulgars among them" (sic) Rakovski and Kazakov.⁵⁸ The day before, Emile Vandervelde published a lengthy analysis of the Moscow trial, in which he wrote perceptively:

We have a choice. . . . Either, however unlikely it may be, it will be proved that, apart from the one Stalin, all the USSR leaders are or have been a bunch of traitors, spies, Fascists, sold to the enemy and foreign agents. In this case, what is left of the spirit of the Russian revolution?⁵⁹

Or, and this is the hypothesis we should prefer, the people who are being hauled in front of the revolutionary tribunal, considering that there is no evidence against them, apart from their own admission, obtained through who know what means, have not committed or premeditated the crimes they have been accused of, and something awful will happen, they will lose their lives after losing their dignity. . . .⁶⁰

To support his assertions, he referred to the character of an activist whom he had always respected in spite of their political differences:

When a man such as Rakovski stands accused, a man I have known for a quarter of a century, a man who has been so far only blamed for his excess of revolutionary enthusiasm, a man I can still hear say, as Soviet ambassador in Paris: "As for us, Bolsheviks, we are like a religious congregation, we obey *perinde ac cadaver*. . . ." I will never believe, nor will I be brought to believe, even were he to confess ten times, or a hundred times, that he is a monster, a murderer, a venal spy, and a traitor to his lifelong convictions. I wonder what torture he had to endure to become the sick, dejected, and

demoralized being, the pitiful human puppet they dragged to the bar of the Moscow tribunal.⁶¹

Even if Vandervelde underestimated Rakovski's strength for lack of reliable information on his testimony, he was not wrong about the future. In his closing speech, Vyshinski violently pleaded for capital punishment: "Our people requires these bloodthirsty dogs to be executed, only then, under our great Stalin's guidance, can it resume its joyful march toward communism."⁶²

While the audience greeted these concluding words with a prolonged burst of applause, the accused "remained motionless, as if petrified."⁶³ One wonders what was on Rakovski's mind then. On 11 March as the correspondent to *Le Temps* remarked, it was generally thought that Rakovski would not be spared capital punishment, any more than Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinski, Rosengoltz, or Yagoda.⁶⁴ The following day, however, to everyone's surprise, Vyshinski asked for all the accused to be executed, apart from Besonov (a diplomat) and Rakovski. After portraying Rakovski during the trial as one of the leaders and one of the most prominent members of the underground Trotskyist organization in the USSR,⁶⁵ he declared suddenly in his last speech that Rakovski "had only been a go-between."⁶⁶

This turnabout, which makes nonsense of the whole picture painstakingly built by Vyshinski over months of interrogations (but he was not averse to one more or less contradiction), came as a result of another gesture in support of Rakovski that seems to have been decisive. According to Professor Luciani, Anatole de Monzie had entreated the French government to use its influence with Stalin. As a matter of fact, Jean Payart, a minister at the French Embassy, went to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Litvinov received him. Stalin may have chosen to "spare" Rakovski for political reasons, and had him sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment (instead of the twenty-five Vyshinski had asked for).⁶⁷

Subsequently, Rakovski vanished into the gloom of camp life, where he was exposed to all kinds of miseries and abuses, as he was detained with common criminals who despised political prisoners and liked nothing better than humiliating them if they had a chance.

It is probable that Rakovski lived for another three years. He was probably shot on Stalin's orders, in October 1941 near Orib, together with Maria Spiridonova. It is common knowledge that in the emergency that followed the German invasion, the Soviet leader dispatched all the members of the old guard who had not committed suicide or been executed at the time of the trials. He seemed to fear that they would be freed by the populace, to be put in charge of the first socialist state as it entered one of the most difficult times of its history.⁶⁸

Chapter 22

Conclusion

In his political biography of Metternich written in 1905, Rakovski made a comment that gives the key to his whole life:

In the soul of every man a fundamental idea can be found, an anchor laid deep inside him, connected with all his thoughts and actions by a strong chain of causality.¹

Rakovski was probably interested in Metternich because everything in the man, his ideas and feelings, was in complete contrast to his own. He seemed to have molded himself by opposing the Austrian statesman, who in his opinion, lacked "the Titan energy" that according to Goethe, in his conversations with Eckermann, "is behind all great historic figures in their relentless work, the fire that kindles new desires in their souls and sets new goals for which to strive."²

Rakovski was filled with a fire that was never to leave him in the fifty years of his life as a "professional revolutionary." He was also endowed with the "noble ambition" lacking in Metternich: an "appetite for glory" that he was proud of, as it revealed "high purposes" and a genuine belief in "principles." The answer by Rakovski to Kaganovich shows this clearly. As he was asked in 1928 to give up his fight for his ideas and return to the Stalinist majority, he said "Why, as I am growing old, should I spoil the story of my life . . .?"³

From childhood, Rakovski had felt driven to help human progress toward new social patterns, in the name of the Marxist doctrine he had adopted completely "to the marrow of his bones." Throughout his life, he carried out "honestly, loyally, and selflessly"⁴ his "duty as a soldier fighting for labor's emancipation," as he claimed at his trial in 1938.⁵ He chose as his aim in life to help the class struggle in order to change society for the benefit of the underprivileged.

Unlike Metternich, who remained a "conservative" all his life not through any logical thought process, but because of his "total lack of enthusiasm" and his "lazy intellect," Rakovski became a socialist because "he believed in man," and was filled with vital and generous optimism.⁶ He had no wish to "conserve" what was established; he wanted to "create" new relations of equality between men, a new world in size and spirit.

To achieve this he sacrificed everything early in his life: he gave up his wealth, social position, the comfort of a doctor's life, and never renounced his principles until he was broken in body and spirit by the "inquisition." At the age of fifteen, he was denied access to all Bulgarian schools for organizing a demonstration against the authorities; forty years later, he chose to give up his official functions and go into exile rather than sacrifice his political convictions.

Yet, Rakovski was not a man to cling obstinately to his ideas if he believed they were false. This is why he aligned himself with Lenin in December 1917, after fighting him for years, because he then believed that the Russian revolution had proved in the most conclusive manner that the new theory was right. He thought that "only a fool never changes his mind."⁷

His fine perceptiveness and his staunch political beliefs, make Rakovski stand out among leading European Socialists, whether in Bulgaria, Romania, or the Soviet Union, as a member of the Second International and founding member of the Communist International together with Lenin and Trotsky. In the field of theory, the indefatigable propagandist should not be forgotten, as he contributed much to the debate on national minorities (in the Balkans and in the USSR) on the peasantry, the Red Army, and the decay of Stalinist bureaucracy.

As an intellectual and a man of action, he will be remembered as one of the most attractive of the European Socialists of the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth.⁸ His "noble soul," in Trotsky's words, his sense of humor, combined with the earnestness of his oral and political convictions, add up to a philosophy of life "rich in the ideals of tolerance and progress inherited from the Enlightenment."⁹ His place in history is assured as an important leader and theoretician of the socialist movement, since he never contented himself with being a mere rank-and-file man. His independent spirit, his intellect, and personal magnetism allowed him to assert himself in front of the leaders whom he was to associate with or sometimes oppose, like Jaurès, Guesde, Trotsky, Lenin, and above all, Stalin.

Rakovski's "tragic fate" probably lies in the fact that his classical education, ranging over most European countries, provided him with few defenses in a system increasingly run with primitive brutality under the effect of Stalin's complicated personality.¹⁰

Footnotes

Chapter 1

- ¹ On his childhood see his autobiography in *Deyateli SSSR i Oktyabr'skoi Revolioutsii, Entsiklopedicheski slovar' rousskogo bibliograficheskogo Institouta "Granat."* French translation by G. Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie: *Les bolchéviks par eux-mêmes*, (Paris, Maspero, 1969), pp. 343-361.
- ² See Hans Kohn: *Pan-Slavism, its History and Ideology*, 2nd ed., (Vintage Library, 1960), p. 356 (notes).
- ³ On Robert's College, see René Ristelhueber: *Histoire des peuples balkaniques*, (Paris, Fayard, 1950), p. 170; C. E. Black, "The Influence of Western Political Thought in Bulgaria, 1850-1885," *American Historical Review*, no. 48, April 1943, pp. 507-520; R. H. Davison: "Westernized Education in Ottoman Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, summer 1961, pp. 289-301.
- ⁴ Such details may be found in Trotsky's brief biography of Rakovski located in Houghton Library, Harvard University.
- ⁵ Georges Hutza (1802-1839), who assumed the name of Iouri Ivanovitch Vénélin, published in 1829 the first work of importance on the history of Bulgaria. See Hans Kohn: *Pan-Slavism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.
- ⁶ See J. Kanapa: *Bulgarie d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 1953); P. Paraf: *Bulgarie* (Paris, 1961); W.-K. Weiss-Bartenstein: *Bulgarien, Land und Leute* (Leipzig, 1913); *Istoriya Bolgarii* (Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Moscow), vol. I, 1954; vol. II, 1955; Derjavine N. S.: *Istoriya Bolgarii*, (Moscow), 1945-48; *Istoriya Na Bulgariya* (Bulgarska Akademiya na Naukike, Sofia, 1955); on Mamartchev, see also, Mercia Macdermott: *A History of Bulgaria (1393-1885)* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1962), pp. 112-115.
- ⁷ Macdermott: *A History of Bulgaria*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁸ Georgi Sava Rakovski was the maternal uncle of Rakovski. This surname was derived from the village of Rakovo where his father was born.
- ⁹ For a detailed biography, see Andrei Tsvetkov: *G. S. Rakovski* (Sofia, 1949).
- ¹⁰ Macdermott: *A History of Bulgaria*, pp. 120, 133, 136.

- ¹¹ Christian Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹² Macdermott: *A History of Bulgaria*, pp. 191-194.
- ¹³ See especially, Rakovski: "La question d'Orient et les puissances," *Revue de la Paix*, Paris, November 1908; Rakovski: "Vers l'Entente balkanique," *Revue de la Paix*, December 1908; Rakovski: "Entre deux larrons: la Russie, L'Autriche et la Serbie," *Revue de la Paix*, April 1909.
- ¹⁴ See Rakovski: *Roussiya na Istok. Istoriko islioudvanie na rousskata politika na Istok i tchastno v Bolgariya, po ofitsialni, ofitsiosni rousski i drougi chujdi istichnitsi*, (Varna, 1898), p. 253; also, Charles Jelavich: *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia* (Berkeley, 1958).
- ¹⁵ *Izvestiya*, 29 November 1917, contains his letter "to the socialist government of the Russian republic."
- ¹⁶ Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ G. Haupt: "Naissance du socialisme par la critique: La Roumanie," in *Le Mouvement Social*, April-June 1967, no. 59, p. 43 ff.
- ²² *Ibid.*
- ²³ K. Karoutsinet V. Kovatchev: *Karl Marks i Fridrikh Engels na bolgarski: bibliografiya* (Sofia, 1961), pp. 12-13, 47; on Dabev, see *Kratka bolgarska entsiklopediya* (Sofia, 1964), vol. 2, p. 97.
- ²⁴ G. Bakalov: *Izbrani proizvedenia*, T. IV (Sofia, 1964), pp. 179-186; on G. Bakalov, see *Entsiklopeditcheski stovar' v dvoukh tomakh* (Moscow, 1963), vol. 1, p. 89.
- ²⁵ R. Ristelhueber: *Histoire des peuples balkaniques*, pp. 151-154.
- ²⁶ See Jules V éran: "Les années d'apprentissage d'un Ambassadeur des Soviets. Rakovski," in *La Vie des Peuples*, Paris, January 1925, no. 57, p. 1.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ C. Diamandy: "Le Congrès international des étudiants socialistes," *Ere Nouvelle*, March 1894, pp. 421-431.
- ²⁹ S. Novok: "Stoudentski spomeni ot Jeneva" (1884-1894 gg.), *Istoritcheski Pregled*, vol. XII, no. 4, 1946, pp. 82-83.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ On this subject, see G. Bakalov: "Communication" to *Letopis Marksisma*, vol. I, 1926, *loc. cit.*
- ³² Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*

- ³³ *Notes by Rakovski on Trotsky, Trotsky Archives*, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
- ³⁴ Hugh Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, (Methuen & Co., London, 1964 ed.), p. 68; see, also, B. D. Wolfe: *Three Who Made a Revolution. A Biographical History* (Pelican, 1966), p. 192 ff.
- ³⁵ For a portrait of Vera Zasulich, see Isaac Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed, Trotsky*, vol. I (O.U.P., 1954), p. 60 ff.
- ³⁶ On Plekhanov, see S. H. Baron: *Plekhanov, the Father of Russian Marxism* (London, 1963).
- ³⁷ On Lunacharski, see Pierre Broué: *Le parti bolchévique* (Paris, 1963), no. 16, p. 580; also, Sheila Fitzpatrick: *The Commissariat for Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 1971).
- ³⁸ A. V. Lunacharski: *Revolutionary Silhouettes*, intro. and trans. by M. Glenny (London, 1967), p.87.
- ³⁹ Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*; on Rosa Luxemburg, see P. Nettl: *Rosa Luxemburg*, 2 vols. (London and O.U.P., 1966); P. Fröhlich: *Rosa Luxemburg* (Paris, Maspéro, 1965).
- ⁴⁰ See C. Diamendy's article in *l'Ere Nouvelle*, March 1984, pp. 421-431.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴² See Jean Roux: *Précis historique et théorique de marxisme-leninisme* (Laffont, Paris, 1969), pp. 96-97.
- ⁴³ Jean-Jaurès: *Les étudiants socialistes, La Petite République*, 13 May 1893.
- ⁴⁴ Rakovski, *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴⁵ M. Rebérioux: "Jaurès et les étudiants parisiens au printemps de 1883," *Bulletin de la Société d'études jaurésiennes*, no. 30, July-September 1968, pp. 10-12; see, also, J. Maitron: *Le Mouvement social*, January-March 1964, pp. 3-26 and A. Zévaès: *Notes et souvenirs d'un militant*, p. 94.
- ⁴⁶ Cited by Madeleine Rebérioux in *Jaurès et les étudiants parisiens*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴⁷ Novok: "Stoudenti spomeni ot Jeneva," *op. cit.*, p. 87.
- ⁴⁸ A. Balabanoff: *My Life as a Rebel* (London, 1938), p. 78.
- ⁴⁸ *La Dépêche de Toulouse*: 27 December 1893, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴⁹ Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁰ Diamendy: *Le Congrès international des étudiants socialistes*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵¹ See A. de Monzie: "Christian Rakovski ou comment on se retrouve," in *Destins hors série* (Paris, 1927), p. 28.
- ⁵² Rakovski: *Autobiography*, pp. 346-347.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*

- 54 *Ibid.*
- 55 *Ibid.*
- 56 G. Bakalov: "Communication" in *Letopis marksisma*, I, 1926.
- 57 *Ibid.*
- 58 D. Blagoev: *Prinos kŭm istoriata na Sotsializma v Bŭlgariia* (Sofia, 1949). On Blagoev, see G.N. Karev: *Blagoev v Petersburg* (Sofia, 1969) and Th. Dan: *The Origins of Bolshevism*, *op. cit.*, p. 186. On the social-democratic movement in Bulgaria, see M. Pundeff: "Marxism in Bulgaria before 1891," *Slavic Review*, vol. 30, no. 3, September 1971, pp. 523-550 and J. A. Rothschild: *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development* (Columbia U.P. and Oxford U.P., 1959).
- 59 Y. Sakazov: *Yubileine Sbornik* (Sofia, 1930), p. 28.
- 60 Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- 61 Bakalov: "Communication," in *Letopis marksisma*, *loc. cit.*
- 62 Novok: "Stoudentski spomeni ot Jeneva," *loc. cit.*
- 63 Bakalov: "Nouvelle communication," in *Letopis marksisma*, book II, no. XII, 1930, pp. 149-150.
- 64 Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- 65 J.-P. Nettel: *Rosa Luxembourg*, p.84.
- 66 Rakovski: *Autobiography*, p. 346.
- 67 *Ibid.*
- 68 Letter from Rakovski to Trotsky, 25 March 1928, *Trotsky Archives*, *loc. cit.*
- 69 Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- 70 N. Berdyaev: *Les sources et le sens du communisme russe* (Galimard, Coll. Idées, 1963), p. 181 ff.; J. H. L. Keep: *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia* (Oxford, 1963); Walkin Jacob: *The Rise of Democracy in Pre-revolutionary Russia* (London., 1963); L.H. Haimson: *The Russian Marxist and the Origins of Bolshevism* (Harvard, 1955); R. Kindersley: *The First Russian Revisionists* (Oxford, 1962); Theodore Dan: *The Origins of Bolshevism*, ed. and transl. by J. Carmichael (London 1964).
- 71 Rakovski: *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*
- 72 L. H. Haimson: *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* (Harvard, 1955); Dan: *The Origins of Bolshevism*, p. 167 ff.
- 73 Lunarchaski: *Revolutionary Silhouettes*, p. 85.
- 74 A. Compère-Morel: *Jules Guesde. Le socialisme fait homme (1845-1922)* (Paris, A. Quillet, 1937); C. Willard: *Les Guédistes* (Paris, Editions sociales, 1965).
- 75 Rakovski: "Joul Ged i kommounism," *Kommounistitcheski Internatsional*, 192, no. 23, pp. 6305-6326.

- ⁷⁶ See Jules Véran, "Les années d'apprentissage d'un ambassadeur des Soviets, Rakovski," *La Vie des Peuples*, January, 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁷⁷ Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, pp. 81-82.
- ⁷⁸ See *Predislovie - Etiologiya prestouprsti i vyrojdaemosti* (Moscow, 1927).
- ⁷⁹ Jules Véran: *loc. cit.*
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- ⁵³ Rakovski, "The Soul of Victory," p. 61.
- ⁵⁴ *Kommounistitcheski Internatsional*, vol. II, no. 12, 20 July 1920, col. 2172-2187.
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- ⁶⁰ Clara Zetkin: *Reminiscences of Lenin* (London, 1929), p. 20.
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- ²⁰ Rakovski, "An Old Comrade's Memories," *New Leader*, 25 January 1924: pp. 4–5.
- ²¹ Rakovski, *Nakanune Genui*, *op. cit.* p. 32.
- ²² Lenin, Letter to G. V. Chicherin, *Sobr. Soch.* vol. 44, p. 705.
- ²³ Rakovski, *Nakanune Genui*, *op. cit.* p. 31.
- ²⁴ For detailed analyses of the German–Soviet relations, see E. H. Carr: *Soviet–German Relations between the Two World Wars (1919–1939)* (Baltimore, 1951); and also his book *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. III, pp. 305–382; G. Freund: *Unholy Alliance: Russian–German Relations from the Treaty of Brest–Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin* (London, 1957); K. Rosenbaum: *Community of Fate. German–Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1922–1928* (Syracuse U.P., 1965); for a characteristic Soviet view of the problem, cf. I. V. Rosenko: *Sovetsko–germanskije otnosheniya (1921–22 gg.)* (Leningrad, 1965), who does not even mention the name of Rakovski.
- ²⁵ *The Times*, 10 January 1922, leader on "The Penetration of Russia. German Trust Formed."
- ²⁶ *The Times*: "The Penetration of Russia. German Trust Formed," *loc. cit.*
- ²⁷ Telegram from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon: 16 January 1922, F.O. 371/8185.
- ²⁸ Telegram from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon: 23 January 1922, F.O. 371/8185.
- ²⁹ Telegram from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon: 23 January 1922, F.O. 371/8185.
- ³⁰ Letter from Sir Basil Thomson to Sir Robert Vansittart, 20 February 1922, N/1846/646/38, F.O. 371/8185.
- ³¹ Quoted in the report by E. F. Wise: "Note on the Question of *de Jure* Recognition of Russia," 25 March 1922 (LL.G.P., F/149/7/3).
- ³² Lloyd George's letter to Austen Chamberlain of 22 March 1922 (LL.G.P., F/7/5/4).
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ The telegram was signed by J. Clynes, Ben Turner, Tom Shaw, Lansbury, Brailsford, N. Angell, Bertrand Russell, and others (LL.G.P. F/97/1/1). It was first published in *Pravda* on 11 January 1922, and was recently reprinted in *Proletarskaya solidarnost'*

- trudyashchikysya v bor'be za mir, 1917-1924* (Moscow, 1958), p. 319.
- ³⁵ Letter from Lloyd George to Austen Chamberlain, 22 March 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ³⁶ Letter from the Prime Minister (Capetown) to Lloyd George: 5 July 1922 (LL.G.P. F/45/9/58).
- ³⁷ Chicherin's report to the All-Russian CEC, 27 January 1922 (F.O. 371/8185).
- ³⁸ In a telegram of 8 January 1922 that he sent to Briand, the French ambassador in Berlin, Charles Laurent, summed up the impression that a part of the German press gathered after the opening of the Cannes Conference: "D'abord la Russie, ensuite l'Allemagne," (quoted in G. Suarez, *Briand: 1918-1923*, vol. V, p. 366 (Paris: Plon, 1914).
- ³⁹ E. F. Wise: "The Importance of Russia in the European Reconstruction," 23 March 1922 (LL.G.P. F/149/2/11).
- ⁴⁰ Letter from Lloyd George to Austen Chamberlain: 24 March 1922 (LL.G.P. F/7/5/23).
- ⁴¹ Highly Confidential Memorandum by J. D. Gregory: "The Soviet Government and Genoa," 12 February 1922, F.O. 371/8189.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*
- ⁴³ *The Times*: 3 January 1922.
- ⁴⁴ Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 93(21): 16 December 1921 (LL.G.P. F/7/5/22).
- ⁴⁵ Cf. Telegramma Ofitsyal'nogo predstavatelya RSFSR v Velikobritanii Narodnomu komissaru inostrannykh del RSFSR G. V. Chicherinu, 17 December 1921, *DVP (Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki)*, vol. IV, pp. 579-582.
- ⁴⁶ *Lord Curzon Private Papers*, F.O. 800/156: Private letter from Lord Hardinge to Lord Curzon, Paris, 4 April 1921.
- ⁴⁷ Private letter from Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir Robert Horne, 9 June 1920 (LL.G.P. F/27/6/36).
- ⁴⁸ Cf. Telegramma Ofitsyal'nogo predstavatelya RSFSR v Velikobritanii Narodnomu komissaru inostrannykh del RSFSR G. V. Chicherinu, 17 December 1921, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴⁹ *British White Paper*, "Resolutions Adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January 1922, as the basis of the Genoa Conference," Cmd. 1621, London, 1922.
- ⁵⁰ The heads of most European states were invited, with those of Japan and of the United States of America: the latter country, however, refused to participate in the conference. Poincaré in France delegated his foreign minister, Barthou, and Lenin did not come on security grounds. The Soviet delegation was to be

headed by G. V. Chicherin; Rakovski, Litvinov, Krasin, and Ioffe were the most important members, and V. V. Vorovski was its secretary.

- ⁵¹ *British White Paper*, "Resolutions Adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January 1922, as the basis of the Genoa Conference," *loc. cit.*; cf. also *The Times*, 7 January 1922.
- ⁵² Report by Chicherin to the All-Russian CEC, 27 January 1922, *loc. cit.*.
- ⁵³ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 January 1922.
- ⁵⁴ Cf. the report by E. F. Wise on "The Question of *De Jure* Recognition of Russia," 25 March 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁵ Letter from Lloyd George to Austen Chamberlain, 24 March 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁶ Cf. G. Suarez: *Briand*, *loc. cit.* vol. 5, pp. 314–352.
- ⁵⁷ Confidential report by a U. S. journalist (initialed C.C.R.) of his private conversations with President Millerand (17 May 1922), M. Clemenceau (17 May), and M. Poincaré (18 May); memorandum to Lloyd George (LL.G.P. F/5/8/14).
- ⁵⁸ Private letter from Lloyd George to Lord Derby, 18 February 1922 (LL.G.P. 14/3/49); see, also, the book by J. Bardoux: *Lloyd George et la France* (Paris, 1923), p. 453.
- ⁵⁹ Confidential report of a U.S. journalist of his private conversation with Poincaré (18 May 1922), *loc. cit.*
- ⁶⁰ *Revue des deux mondes*, 15 July 1921.
- ⁶¹ Confidential report of a U. S. journalist of his private conversation with Poincaré (18 May 1922), *loc. cit.*
- ⁶² *Humanité*, 24 July 1921, reprinted in *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSR*, vol. IV, pp. 233–241; also in G. V. Chicherin: *Stat'i po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 185–195.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁴ B. de Jouvenel; *D'une guerre à l'autre*, vol. I (*De Versailles à Locarno*), (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1940), pp. 140–141.
- ⁶⁵ Quoted in Trough: *op. cit.* vol. II. (1921–1923) (Moscow, 1967), p. 268.
- ⁶⁶ *TS.P.A. I.M.L.*: f. 2, op. I, ed khr. 24731: quoted in Trough: *op. cit.* pp. 267–268; also Lenin: *Sobr. Soch.* vol. 54, pp. 98–99 and 589.
- ⁶⁷ Confidential telegram from Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Lord Curzon, 24 December, 1921, F.O. 371/8147.
- ⁶⁸ Cf. the long note sent on this issue by the French government of Georges Leygues to the British government: 25 November 1920; quoted in B. de Jouvenel, *D'une guerre à l'autre*, vol. I, *op. cit.* pp. 138–139.

- ⁶⁹ *Le Temps*; 6 January 1922.
- ⁷⁰ Lenin: *Sobr. Soch.* vol. 54, pp. 133, 600.
- ⁷¹ We mentioned earlier that Rakovski wrote a big study of the Third Republic in France under the pseudonym of Insarov: *Sovremennaya Frantsiya. Istoriya tret'ei respubliki* (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. viii, 460.
- ⁷² J. D. Gregory: Highly Confidential Memorandum on "The Soviet Government and Genoa," 12 February 1922, *loc. cit.*.
- ⁷³ Lenin: *Leninskii sbornik*, vol. XX (Moscow, 1932), p. 169.
- ⁷⁴ Lenin, "Proekt direktivy zamestiteliou predsdatelya i vsem chlenam genouezskoi delegatsii," *Sobr. Soch.*, vol. 44, pp. 374–376 and 584.
- ⁷⁵ Lenin, Letter of 22 January 1922 to all the members of the Politburo, *Sobr. Soch.*, vol. 54, pp. 133–135 and 600.
- ⁷⁶ The British ambassador in Berlin, Lord D'Abernon, makes it clear in his memoirs that "the most influential" of the three was Rakovski, whom he reported to have "great authority with Lenin": *An Ambassador of Peace*, London MXMXXIX, vol. I, pp. 261–262.
- ⁷⁷ Reports by Special Branch NSY: N 6053/550/38 and 6036/550/38, 29 June and 3 July 1923, F.O. 371/8185.
- ⁷⁸ For an official and skillful survey of Soviet diplomacy, see C. Rakovsky: "The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1926): pp. 574–584.
- ⁷⁹ *The Times*, 10 January 1922.
- ⁸⁰ Lenin: "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution," Report to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, 13 November 1922 (English ed.) *Works*, vol. 33, p. 422).
- ⁸¹ *Petrogradskaya Pravda*: 31 December 1921 (quoted in I. A. Rosenko: *Sovetsko-germanskije otnosheniya, 1921–1922 gg. op. cit.* p. 55).
- ⁸² Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ⁸³ G. Freund: *Unholy Alliance: Russian–German relations, op. cit.* p. 108.
- ⁸⁴ Telegram No. 676 from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon, 16 January 1922, F.O. 371/8185.
- ⁸⁵ Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ⁸⁶ D'Abernon: *An Ambassador of Peace, op. cit.* vol. I, pp. 261–262.
- ⁸⁷ Telegram from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon, 16 January 1922, *loc. cit.*.
- ⁸⁸ Rakovski: *Angliya i Rossiya*, (Karkov: Ukrainskoe izdatel'stvo, 1923), p. 20.

- ⁸⁹ Rakovski's speech at Sebastopol: *Wireless News*, 16 April 1921, quoted in A. L. P. Dennis: *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*, *op. cit.* p. 377.
- ⁹⁰ Reports by Special Branch NSY: N 6053/550/38 and 6036/550/38, June 29 and July 3, 1923, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹¹ Letter from Lloyd George to Lord Derby: 18 February 1922 (LL.G.P. F/14/5/39).
- ⁹² D'Abernon: *An Ambassador of Peace*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹³ D'Abernon: *An Ambassador of Peace*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹⁴ Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ⁹⁵ Letter from Chicherin to Lenin, 18 February 1922; comments by Lenin on 20 February in a letter to Molotov; cf. Trough: *op. cit.* pp. 292-293; and Lenin, *Sobr. Soch.* vol. 54, pp. 176, 615-616.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁷ Cf. Foreign Office memorandum of 13 February 1922 (N. 124): F.O. 371/8185.
- ⁹⁸ *Le Temps*: 4 April 1922.
- ⁹⁹ Quoted in a telegram from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon: 2nd April 1922, F.O. 371/8187.
- ¹⁰⁰ For a Soviet view of the question, cf. S. Mikhailova-Shtern: "Malaya antanta i Genuya," *Vestnik N.K.I.D.*, No. 4-5, 1922, pp. 55-59.
- ¹⁰¹ Cf. the conversation the Czechoslovak minister in London had at the Foreign Office on 21 January 1922 (N 654/646/38), F.O. 371/8185.
- ¹⁰² See Beneš' letter and memorandum to Lloyd George, 22 February 1922: "General Principles for the Organization of the Genoa Conference" (LL.G.P. P/49/9/3); See the *Times*, 12 May 1922 (10a).
- ¹⁰³ For a Soviet analysis of the British-French disagreements, see A. Sukhotin: "Anglo-frantsuzskie otnosheniya nakanune Genui," *Vestnik N.K.I.D.*, No. 4-5, April-May 1922, pp. 47-54.
- ¹⁰⁴ Letter of 21 April 1922 from Paul Cambon to his son, in Paul Cambon, *Correspondence*, vol. III (1870-1923) pp. 38-39; cf., also, Litvinov's telegram of 9 April 1922 to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *D.V.P.*, vol. V, p. 191.
- ¹⁰⁵ Letter of 8 January from Paul Cambon to his son, in *Correspondence*, vol. III, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰⁶ Memorandum by Sir Edward Grigg to Lloyd George: 4 April 1922 (LL.G.P. F/86/2/1).
- ¹⁰⁷ Minute by Sir Eyre Crowe: 30 March 1922, F.O. 371/8187.
- ¹⁰⁸ For Soviet considerations on the U. S. attitude toward Genoa, cf.: A. Ya. Kantorovich: "Amerika i Genuya," *Vestnik N.K.I.D.*, No. 4-5, April-May 1922, pp. 33-47; and V. F. Lopatin: *Proval*

antisovetskikh planov S. Sh. A. Genuya i Gaaga, 1922 (Moscow, 1963).

- ¹⁰⁹ For a French view: Celtus: *La France à Gênes. Un Programme français de reconstruction économique de l'Europe* (Paris, 1922); J. Seydoux: *La Russie et la Conférence de Gênes* (Paris, 1932); R. Breitscheid: "Les résultats de la Conférence de Gênes," *Vie des Peuples* (May-August 1922): pp. 851-852; Degouy: "Après Washington et après Gênes," *Revue des deux mondes*, (1 June 1922): pp. 639-667; L. Dumont-Wilden: "La Conférence de Gênes," *Revue bleue* (1922): pp. 116-224; Actor: "Gênes, l'Allemagne et la Russie," *Vie des peuples* (1922): pp. 926-941; *Revue politique et parlementaire* (April 1922): pp. 157-167, (1 May 1922): pp. 299-314; X. : "Les grands jours de Gênes," *Revue des deux mondes* (1 May 1922): pp. 199-211; for analyses from the British point of view, cf. John Saxon Mills: *Genoa* (New York, 1922); and Wilson Harris: "The Genoa Conference," *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, vol. I, No. 5 (September 1922): pp. 150-158; cf., also, the American contribution of A. Carry Coolidge (K.): "Russia after Genoa and the Hague," *Foreign Affairs* (15 September 1922): pp. 133-156; the German point of view is clearly stated by Rathenau in his book: *Cannes und Genua* (Berlin, 1922), transl. in Moscow in 1923; for recent East German articles cf., *Rapall'skii dogovor; materyaly nauchnoi sessii posvyashchennoi 40-letiu Rapall'skogo dogvora*, 25-28 April 1962 g., (Moscow, 1963); and a more objective contribution by W. von Blücher: *Deutschland weznach Rapallo* (Weisbaden, 1951).
- Soviet Analyses are innumerable: see mainly A. A. Ioffe: *Genuezskaya konferentsiya* (Moscow, 1922), p. 62, and *Ot Genui do Gaagi. Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1923), p. 44; A. Kurella: *Uroki Genui i Gaagi* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927), p. 48; Liubimov i Erlikh: *Genuezskaya konferentsiya. Vospominaniya uchastnikov* (Moscow, 1963); Preobrazhensky: *Itogi Genuezskoi konferentsii i khozya istvennye perspektivy Evropy* (Moscow, 1922); K. Radek: *Genua: Die Einheitsfront des Proletariats und die Kommunistische Internationale* (Hamburg, 1922); Rakovski: *Nakanune Genui*, *op. cit.*; Saprionov: *Genuezskaya konferentsiya. Vpechatleniya* (1922); I. L. Chikava: *Krakh antisovetskoi politiki zapadnikh gosudarstv na genuezskoi i gaagskoi konferentsiyakh* (Kand. dissertatsiya, Tbilisi, 1960); G. G. Alakhverdov: "Leninskaya politika mirnogo sosushchestvovaniya v period genuezskoi konferentsii 1922 g.," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (1963): no. 10, pp. 41-56; C. Vygodsky: "Leninskaya diplomatiya i Genuya," *Neva* (1965), no. 1, pp. 163-

- 168; A. A. Ioffe: "Genuezkaya konferentsiya," *Kommunist Internatsional* (1922): no. 21, pp. 5661-5670; A. Los': "Genuezkaya konferentsiya," *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, no. 6, (June 1962): pp. 69-74; N. Liubimov, "Lenin i Genuya. Rapallo," *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, no. 4 (1967): pp. 4-6; M. Pavlovich, "Genuezkaya konferentsiya," *Krasnaya Nov'* (March-April 1922): no. 6, pp. 304-316; K. Radek, "Genuezkaya i gaagskaya konferentsii," *Krasnaya Nov'* (September-October 1922), no. 9, pp. 210-237; N. Rubinstein, "Nakanune genuezskoi konferentsii, 1921-1922 gg.," *Istoriik-Marksist* (1941): no. 2, pp. 22-48; and *Voprosy istorii* (1946), no. 2-3, pp. 30-32; Ya. E. Rudzutak, "Doklad o genuezskoi konferentsii," *Istoriicheskii arkhiv AN SSSR* (March-April 1962): no. 2, pp. 80-95.
- ¹¹⁰ Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ¹¹¹ Cf. Louis Fischer's private papers, and the *Times*, 5 June 1922.
- ¹¹² Letter from J. D. Gregory to M. W. Lampson, 14 April 1922, F.O 371/8187.
- ¹¹³ A. A. Ioffe, *Ot Genui do Gaagi* (Petrograd-Moscow) p. 21.
- ¹¹⁴ Memorandum by O. T. Rayner (29 June 1923) on the impressions that Sir Sidney Chapman gathered of Rakovski during the Genoa Conference, F.O. 371/9355.
- ¹¹⁵ Ioffe: *Ot Genui do Gaagi*, *loc. cit.*; cf., also, the article that a member of the Portuguese Socialist movement, later official of the Comintern (Edmundo Peluso) wrote on "Rakovski-diplomat," *Izvestiya*, 20 August 1924. This article was unique in the history of Soviet diplomacy in the 1920s and proves the particular esteem in which Rakovski was held at that time.
- ¹¹⁶ Memorandum by O. T. Rayner, 29 July 1923, *loc. cit.*
- ¹¹⁷ Cf. I. A. Kashkin: *Kheminguei* (Hemingway), in *Prometei*, 1966, no. 1, *Molodaya gvardiya*, pp. 104-109.
- ¹¹⁸ The personal impression of the head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office (J. D. Gregory) who went with Lloyd George to Genoa is characteristic in this respect. He wrote in his letter to M. W. Lampson: "You never saw anything like the appearance of the Bolsheviks. There were two who came to the plenary session, who looked for all the world as though they had stepped out of a Drury Lane Pantomime—real melodramatic cut-throats from the "Babes in the Wood"! Chicherin looks the degenerate he is, and of course except for himself and Krasin I fancy they are all Jews. It is very unpleasant to reflect that the main interest here is centered on the future relations between them and ourselves," 14 April 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹¹⁹ Saxon-Mills: *The Genoa Conference*, *op. cit.* p. 87; cf., also,

the article by Renzo: "Impressions de Gênes," *La Vie des peuples*, which gives a detailed portrait of "l'obligeant Rakovski": "Il a des cheveux noirs, l'air un peu levantin. Il parle français, Il s'est efforcé de nous prouver que le régime russe ne diffère guère des régimes d'Occident. Il est très aimable et nous offre des cigarettes." He also recalled that, when a journalist asked Rakovski what he thought of the Versailles Treaty, the latter replied ironically: "Le traité de Versailles. . . Je ne connais pas," *La Vie des peuples* (10 May 1922). Max Eastman, who attended the conference as a journalist, remembered how Rakovski relished these meetings with the press: "He would listen long to the questions which he quietly compiled into a list. He then turned his answers into lectures on European history and international politics": (Eastman, *Love and Revolution* (New York, 1964), p. 294.

- ¹²⁰ J. Saxon-Mills: *The Genoa Conference*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹²¹ I. Politich, "Kalendar. Russkaya delegatsiya i Genuya," *Mezh-dunarodnaya Zhizn'* (August 1922).
- ¹²² N. N. Liubimov, "Les réclamations de la Russie aux états responsables de l'intervention et du blocus," *Matériaux et documents sur l'intervention, le blocus et les dommages causés par eux à la Russie*, vol. IV, (1922).
- ¹²³ Cf. "Memorandum soumis le 24 avril 1922 par M. Rakovski au comité des experts," and "Procès-verbal de la séance": *Documents diplomatiques, Conférence économique internationale de Gênes* (Paris, 1922), pp. 78 ff.
- ¹²⁴ J. Saxon-Mills: *The Genoa Conference*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹²⁵ Cf. Lenin: *Sobr. Soch.*, vol. 43, p. 168; and L. B. Krasin: "The Future of Soviet Trade Relations," *Russian Information and Review* (29 March 1924): pp. 199-216; see, also, R. F. Karpova: *L. B. Krasin, sovetskii diplomat* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 130-131; *L'information* (2 May 1922).
- ¹²⁶ Rakovski, Memorandum submitted to the president of the Financial Commission, 5 May 1922, F.O. 371/8190.
- ¹²⁷ Rakovski, *op. cit.*
- ¹²⁸ Rakovski, *loc. cit.*
- ¹²⁹ Secret conversation between the British prime minister and the Soviet delegation, 20 April 1922, 5:30 p.m. Cabinet Papers (CAB) 31/5/S.G.II.
- ¹³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹³¹ Secret conversation between Lloyd George and Barthou, 11 April 1922, CAB 31/5/S.G.I.

- ¹³² Memorandum on the Genoa Conference, 29 April 1922, F.O. 371/8189.
- ¹³³ Various studies see the treaty in a different light: M. Z. Rawita-Gawronsky: "L'accord de Rapallo," *La Vie des peuples* (May-August 1922): pp. 842-843; L. Kochan: "The Russian Road to Rapallo," *Soviet Studies* (October 1950): vol. II. no. 2, pp. 109 ff.; N. Semashko: "Pochemu oni vzbesilis," *Izvestiya*, 28 April 1922, p. 1; "Dvukhletie rapall'skogo dogovora" (Interv'iu Chicherina i Brokdorf-Rantstau), *Mezhdunarodnaya Letopis'*, no. 4 (1925), pp. 67-69; N. Rubinstein: "Rapall'skii dogovor," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 5 (1941): pp. 25-34; and V. P. Ierusalimski, "40-letie rapall'skogo dogovora," *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, no. 4 (1962): pp. 187-190; see, also, "Dokumenty iz nemetskikh arkhivov, 1920-1926 gg.," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. I (1957): pp. 183-191.
- ¹³⁴ Final draft of the Fontainebleau Memorandum: "Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before They Finally Draft Their Terms," by David Lloyd George; cf. Appendix I in M. Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement* (New York, 1966), pp. 189-196.
- ¹³⁵ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, op. cit. vol. I, p. 323.
- ¹³⁶ Telegram from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon, 16 January 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹³⁷ Telegram from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon, 23 January 1922, F. O. 371/8185.
- ¹³⁸ Letter from the director of intelligence at Scotland yard, Sir Basil Thomson, to Sir Robert Vansittart, 20 February 1922, N/1846/646/38, F.O. 371/8185.
- ¹³⁹ D'Abernon: *An Ambassador of Peace*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁴⁰ Foreign Office memorandum of 23 April 1922: F.O. 371/8189.
- ¹⁴¹ Foreign Office memorandum of 23 April 1922: F.O. 371/8189. Rathenau said the same to Lloyd George in their secret conversation of 19 April 1922: "When they came to Genoa the Russo-German Agreement was ready and could have been signed in Berlin before they left. They had felt, however, that they must go to Genoa with a free hand." Both sides had decided "to resume the negotiations at Genoa" (S.G. 8, CAB 31/5).
- ¹⁴² Chicherin's letter from Genoa to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MID) in Moscow, 10 April 1922, *D.V.P.* vol. V, p. 207.
- ¹⁴³ Secret conversation between Lloyd George and the German delegation, 19 April 1922, 12:00 noon, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴⁵ Notes by A. von Maltzan, "On the Events Leading to the Signing of the German-Soviet Treaty from Tuesday, 11 March 1922, until Monday, 17 April 1922," F.O. 371/8188.

- ¹⁴⁶ Chicherin's letter from Genoa to MID (Moscow), 10 April 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁴⁷ Secret conversation between Lloyd George and the German delegation, 19 April 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁴⁸ Secret conversation between Lloyd George and Rathenau: 19 April 1922, 8:00 p.m., CAB 31/5/S.G. 9.
- ¹⁴⁹ Maltzan's notes: Saturday, 15 April 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁵⁰ Confidential letter from the British Legation in Riga to the Foreign Office, 1 May 1922, F.O. 371/8190.
- ¹⁵¹ Maltzan's notes, Wednesday, 12 April 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁵² G. Freund: *Unholy Alliance. Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin* (London, 1957), p. 117, who quotes W. F. Rheinbaden's article: "Deutsche Ostpolitik in Locarno," *Aussempolitik*, (Stuttgart, January 1953), vol. IV, no. 1, p. 36. Rheinbaden claims that this account of Rapallo is based on private correspondence with Maltzan; cf., also, H. Kessler, *Walter Rathenau* (London, 1929), pp. 319-359; see, also, L. Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs*, vol. I, pp. 339 et seq.; and G. F. Kennan: *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Mentor Books, 1960), pp. 201 ff.
- ¹⁵³ Litvinov's telegram of 17 April 1922 to MID (Moscow), *D.V.P.* vol. V, p. 226.
- ¹⁵⁴ For the precise text of this clause, see *Arkhivy vneshnei politiki SSSR*, f. 0165-a, p. 101, d. 4, 1. 85, quoted in full in *Rapall'skii dogovor i 40-letiu rapall'skogo dogovora*, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
- ¹⁵⁵ Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
- ¹⁵⁶ Secret conversation between Lloyd George and the German delegation: 4 May 1922, CAB 31/5, S.G. 25.
- ¹⁵⁷ Cf. Lenin's commentaries: 24 April 1922: *Sobr. soch.* vol. 45, pp. 164-165 and pp. 537-539; and *Leninskii sbornik*, XXXVI, pp. 475-476; also his telegram to Chicherin on 2 May: *Sobr. soch.* vol. 45, pp. 172 and 541-542.
- ¹⁵⁸ Lenin's telegram to Chicherin: 30 April 1922, *Sobr. soch.* vol. 45, pp. 171, 540, 676.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Izvestiya*, 25 April 1922.
- ¹⁶⁰ Private letter from J. D. Gregory to M. W. Lampson, 14 April 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁶¹ Poincaré's conversation with the U. S. journalist, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁶² *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶³ Confidential letter from Lord D'Abernon to Lord Curzon: 26 April 1922, F.O. 371/8189. For Trotsky's denial of a military convention, see *Izvestiya*, 18 May 1922.

- ¹⁶⁴ Cf. Very secret letter from General Bingham (Berlin) to War Office: 20 April 1922, F.O. 371/8188; private letter from Addison (Berlin) to Sir Eyre Crowe: 1 May 1922, F.O. 371/8190; also his letter to Sir William Tyrrell of 9 May 1922, F.O. 371/8191; and the Memorandum by General J. H. Morgan of 25 May 1922, F.O. 371/8191.
- ¹⁶⁵ Cf. Secret reports from Latvia (FR/4) of 10 April, from Norway (N/O) of 20 April, and from Brussels (BL.A.A.) of 20 April 1922, F.O. 371/8187.
- ¹⁶⁶ The word is twice repeated in D'Abernon's Memorandum of 29 April: F.O. 371/8190.
- ¹⁶⁷ This telegram had come in reaction to the article that appeared in *Le Matin* of 19 April, which reproduced a statement by Maltzan that made it clear "Lord D'Abernon knew of the text of the treaty a fortnight before it was signed" (cf. telegram of 19 April from Lord Hardinge, Paris, F.O. 371/8187).
- ¹⁶⁸ Notes by D'Abernon to Lord Curzon on the "Secret Report on German-Soviet Negotiations in Berlin on the Eve of the Genoa Conference," 29 April 1922, F.O. 371/8190.
- ¹⁶⁹ Correspondence of Utmost Importance (K.N.4, Mail. Exp. N. 205/I). Very Secret. Litvinov to the acting people's commissar for foreign affairs: "Total of the first days," 17 April 1922 (LL.G.P. F/26/1/30).
- ¹⁷⁰ Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ¹⁷¹ Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *op. cit.* p. 31.
- ¹⁷² Steklov: "Russia is Coming back," *Izvestiya*, 7 December 1922; for Soviet analyses of the Conference, see G. V. Chicherin: "Lozanskaya konferentsiya i mirovoe polozhenie," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 2 (1923): pp. 3-6; Vel'tman (M. Pavlovich): "Lozanskaya konferentsiya," *Novyi vostok*, no. 3 (1923): pp. 3-34; and the two articles by P. Kitaigorodski: "Finansovo-ekonomicheskie voprosy na Lozanskoj konferentsii," *Krasnaya nov'*, no. 15 (August-September 1923): pp. 317-323, and "Vopros o kapitulatsiyakh na Lozanskoj konferentsii," *Novyi vostok*, no. 5 (1924): pp. 114-124. For a more objective analysis, cf. A. J. Toynbee, "The East after Lausanne," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 2 (15 September 1923): pp. 84-99. For the French point of view, see J. Stuart: "Echec de la conférence de Lausanne," *La Vie des peuples*, no. 42 (October 1923): pp. 425-429.
- ¹⁷³ Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *op. cit.* p. 27.
- ¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- ¹⁷⁵ For two Soviet studies, see N. Popov: "Turtsiya i Lozanskaya konferentsiya," *Kommunisticheskaya revoliutsiya*, no. 15 (39) (15

- December 1922): pp. 57-67; and H. Shturmer: "Turtsiya posle Lozanny," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 2-3 (1924): pp. 25-46. For a French analysis, see "Les relations russo-turques depuis l'avènement du bolchevisme," *Revue du monde musulman*, no. 52 (1922): pp. 181-206.
- ¹⁷⁶ "Relations between the Soviet Government with Angora," Note by the Eastern Department, May 1922, F.O. 371/8193.
- ¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷⁸ "Le Bolchevisme et l'islam," *Revue du monde musulman*, vol. 52 (1922): p. 206.
- ¹⁷⁹ Dennis: *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
- ¹⁸⁰ "Relations between the Soviet Government and Angora," *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁸¹ Lenin: letter to Molotov, 24 February 1922, *Sobr. Soch.* T 54, pp. 181-182.
- ¹⁸² "Relations between the Soviet Government and Angora," *loc. cit.*; see, also, D'Abernon, *An Ambassador of Peace*, vol. II, p. 113.
- ¹⁸³ Cf. the conversation which General Weygand had with Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 108.
- ¹⁸⁴ Juanakas sinas (Riga), 13 February 1923, quoted in Dennis, *op. cit.* p. 228.
- ¹⁸⁵ Klyuchnikov and Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaya politika*, vol. III (Moscow, 1928), pp.201-202.
- ¹⁸⁶ Secret report on Rakovski's activities: 29 June 1923, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁸⁷ Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *op. cit.* p. 35.
- ¹⁸⁸ Cf. Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ¹⁸⁹ D'Abernon, *An Ambassador of Peace*, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 166.
- ¹⁹⁰ Letter from the president of the "Ukrainian National Committee" to Poincaré, attached to SIS Report of 21 November 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁹¹ Rakovski was to be the representative of the Ukrainian SSR at the Lausanne Conference. The head of the Soviet delegation was G. V. Chicherin.
- ¹⁹² Cf. "Beseda s deputatom frantsuzskogo parlamenta Errio," *Izvestiya*, September 1922, and the editorial "Rossiya i Frantsiya," *Izvestiya*, 24 September 1922.
- ¹⁹³ Lenin: Interview given to Michael Farbman: 27 October 1922, *Works*, vol. 33, pp. 383-384.
- ¹⁹⁴ In his diary, Lord D'Abernon concludes his account of the conversation between Curzon and Poincaré with the following words: "There were extremely disagreeable moments, but the final result appears to have been satisfactory . . . the French have been more or less overpowered there, and have tactically acquiesced in a

- policy they dislike." (*op. cit.* vol. II, pp. 147–148: notes of 25 and 29 December 1922). The Soviet press also developed this topic at great length, cf. the articles by A. Lozovsky (S. A. Dritso), "Lozanna i Rur," *Pravda*, 16 February 1924, and "Lozanna, Rur i nasha taktika," *Molodaya gvardiya*, no. 2 (9) (1923): pp. 261–295.
- ¹⁹⁵ Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *op. cit.* p. 33.
- ¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- ¹⁹⁷ V. V. Vorovsky, *Stat'i i materyaly po voprosam vneshnei politiki* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 211–212.
- For analyses of the Lausanne Conference, see H. N. Howard: *The Partition of Turkey. A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923* (Norman, Okla., 1931); J. T. Shotwell, *Turkey and the Straits. A Short History* (New York, 1940); and M. Papukchieva: *La politique de la Russie à l'égard des détroits* (Lausanne, 1944); for the Soviet viewpoint, cf. A. Lozovski: *Lozanna, Rur i ugroza voyny* (Moscow, 1923); V. A. Dranov: *Chernomorskie proliivy; mezhdunarodno-provovoi rezhim* (Moscow, 1948).
- ¹⁹⁸ Telegram from Lord Curzon (Lausanne) to F.O. on his private conversation with Chicherin: 17 December 1922, N. 11110/3/38, F.O. 371/8147.
- ¹⁹⁹ Secret telegram from Lord Curzon (Lausanne) to F.O.: 5 December 1922, C.O. 730/29.
- ²⁰⁰ Secret telegram from Lord Curzon (Lausanne) to F.O.: 5 December 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ²⁰¹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰² As late as 1926, Churchill wrote in a private letter to A. Chamberlain about "this xenophobe Turkish government which humiliated us so much at Lausanne" (4 May 1926, A. Chamberlain's private papers: F.O. 800/259).
- ²⁰³ "Russia and Lausanne," *Russian Information and Review* (24 February 1923): p. 330.
- ²⁰⁴ Telegram from Curzon (Lausanne) to F.O. on his private conversation with Chicherin, 17 December 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ²⁰⁵ *British Blue Book. Lausanne Conference on Near East Affairs, 1922–1923*. Records of the Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (London, 1923), Cmd. 1914, p. 139. For the traditional Russian viewpoint, cf. Miliukov: "Neitralizatsiya Dardanelli i Bosfora," *Voprosy mirovoi voyny* (Petrograd, 1915).
- ²⁰⁶ Rakovski, "Lozanskaya konferentsiya," *loc. cit.*
- ²⁰⁷ *Russian Information and Review* (24 February 1923). For the memorandum on the Eastern problem issued by the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne Conference, see *RIR* (6 January 1923):

- pp. 211-215. This official memorandum was signed by both Chicherin and Rakovski.
- ²⁰⁸ Annual Report of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 1923, (Moscow, 1924), quoted by Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 411.
- ²⁰⁹ Rakovski, "Lozanskaya konferentsiya," *loc. cit.*
- ²¹⁰ Louis Fischer's private papers. The convention was, nevertheless, signed by the Soviet representative in Italy (Jordanski) on 14 August 1923 at the Palazzo Chili in Rome. Yet, because of the opposition of many leading Bolsheviks to the contents of the treaty, there was never to be a ratification (cf. *Istoriya diplomatii*, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 323).
- ²¹¹ Rakovski, "Lozanskaya konferentsiya," *loc. cit.*; cf. his pamphlet *Angliya i Rossiya*, p. 23 ff.
- ²¹² Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *loc. cit.*
- ²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- ²¹⁴ The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, Cmd. 1814, *op. cit.* p. 149.
- ²¹⁵ Telegram from Lord Curzon: 17 December 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ²¹⁶ Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
- ²¹⁷ Quoted by Louis Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs*, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 414.
- ²¹⁸ K. Radek: "Lord Curzon and the Soviet Union," *Labour Monthly*, vol. 7, no. 5 (May 1925): pp. 270-274.

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- ¹ Cf. Report by Kalinin to the All-Russian CEC, 12 May 1922, *Russian Information and Review* (15 June 1922); pp. 412-413; *The League of Nations Report on the Ukraine* (December 1922), N. 113/3/12/38, F.O. 371/8151; Major Dunlop's report on his mission to the Ukraine (11 March 1922), F.O. 371/8165, "The Ukrainian Soviet Republic," *Russian Information and Review* (24 January 1925).
- ² "Nansen in the Ukraine," *Russian Information and Review* (10 February 1923); cf. also "Villages of the Ukraine," *Russian Information and Review* (28 April 1923); and report by M. Ivanov, President of the Ukrainian Red Cross (22 December 1922) N. 11 313/12/38, F.O. 371/8151.
- ³ H. H. Fischer: *The Famine in Soviet Russia* (New York, 1927), pp. 248-350 (quoted by P. Fedenko in his article: "Mykola Skrypnyk: His National Policy, Conviction, and Rehabilitation," *Ukrainian Review* (Munich, 1957): no. 5, pp. 56-72.

- ⁴ *L'Ukraine soviétiste. Quatre années de guerre et de blocus, op. cit.* pp. 15–16.
- ⁵ “Nota privatel’stva USSR pravitel’stvu Frantsii,” *Izvestiya*, 3 June 1921; cf. also *D.V.P.*, vol. IV, pp. 147–148.
- ⁶ D’Abernon: *An Ambassador of Peace, op. cit.* vol. II, p. 108.
- ⁷ Secret notes of conversations between Sir Maurice Hankey and Sir Cecil Hurst, and M. Seydoux and Fromageot, M. Seydoux’s room at the Hotel Savoia, Genoa, Tuesday, 25 April 1922, 10 a.m.: CAB 31/5 S.G. 15.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹ “The Donets Coal Industry,” *Russian Information and Review*, (27 October 1923).
- ¹⁰ “Franco–Ukrainian Trade Collaboration,” Report from Paris by Eric Phipps, 22 December 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ¹¹ Cf. Krasin’s interview on Franco–Soviet relations: *Izvestiya*, 20 January 1924, and *D.V.P.*, vol. VII, p. 700.
- ¹² Secret notes of conversations between Sir M. Hankey and Sir Cecil Hurst, and MM. Seydoux and Framageot, 25 April 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ¹³ Letter from Eric Phipps to the Foreign Office, 19 December 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ¹⁴ L. Perlin: “Les Concessions en URSS,” *Europe nouvelle*, (19 June 1926): pp. 851–853.
- ¹⁵ “Foreign Concessions in the USSR: A Review of Existing Agreements,” *The Soviet Union Review* (10 January 1925): pp. 32–34.
- ¹⁶ “Military and Economic Cooperation between Germany and the Ukraine”: Report from the British Consulate in Czernowitz, 7 September 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ¹⁷ Letter from R. Hodgson (Moscow) to the Foreign Office, F.O. 371/8182.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ *Izvestiya*, 13 August 1922.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ “Sabotage of the Rapallo Treaty. The Government Breaks off Negotiations with Litvinov,” *Rote Fahne*, no. 249 of 31 May 1922; see, also, F.O 371/8192.
- ²² “Chicherin in Berlin”: *Lokal Anzeiger*, no. 254, 1 June 1922; see also F.O. 371/8192.
- ²³ *Lokal Anzeiger*, 1 June 1922.
- ²⁴ Cf. “World Rivalry for Concessions,” *Manchester Guardian*, 4 January 1924; L. Perlin: “Les Concessions en URSS,” *Europe nouvelle, loc. cit.*; “Foreign Concessions in the USSR. A Review of Existing Agreements,” *The Soviet Union Review, loc. cit.*

- ²⁵ For more details, see "Krupp Concession," *RIR*, 10 February 1923, p. 300.
- ²⁶ "World Rivalry for Concessions," *Manchester Guardian*, *loc. cit.*
- ²⁷ "Krupp Concession," *RIR*, 8 September 1923, p. 154.
- ²⁸ "Interview with Rakovski," in Major C. Dunlop's report to Lord Curzon on the British Mission to the Ukraine, 27 January 1922, F.O. 371/8165. For Rakovski's general views on agriculture, see his pamphlet: *Komitety nezamozhnykh selyan i N.E.P.* (Karkov, 1923).
- ²⁹ "Interview with Rakovski," *loc. cit.*
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ Interview between Major Dunlop and M. Bron: 19 January 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ³² Confidential Report on the Ukraine N 2914/55/38 by Major Dunlop to Lord Curzon, 8 March 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ³³ "Establishment of an Anglo-Ukrainian Commercial Bank": Report sent by the Department of Overseas Trade to the Foreign Office, N 10056/55/38, No. 6070/F.R., 8 November 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ³⁴ Letter from N. S. Reyntiens of the Department of Overseas Trade to the Foreign Office, 19 October 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ Cf. Letter from Edgar G. Gubbins (London Wall Buildings) to Foreign Office, 30 October 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ³⁷ Minute by M. P. Roberts (Northern Department, F.O.) 12 December 1922 on the file, "Ukrainian-British Trade Collaboration," *loc. cit.*
- ³⁸ The capital of the company was £10,000, which had been deposited in a British bank earlier in 1922 (see letter from the British Commercial Secretary in Berlin to F.O., 26 October 1922, F.O. 371/8165).
- ³⁹ Major Dunlop's report on the Ukraine, 8 March 1922, F.O. 371/8165.
- ⁴⁰ *The Times*: Saturday, 4 August 1923 (7b).
- ⁴¹ "Italian Concession in the USSR," *RIR*, 15 November 1924.
- ⁴² Letter from Eric Phipps to the Foreign Office, 19 December 1922, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴³ *Izvestiya*, 13 August 1922.
- ⁴⁴ *Russian Information and Review*, 30 December 1922.
- ⁴⁵ *Russian Information and Review*, 6 January 1923.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 17 February 1923, p. 307.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ *Russian Information and Review*, 6 January 1923.
- ⁴⁹ *Russian Information and Review*, 24 March 1923.

- ⁵⁰ *Kratkaya literaturnaya entsiklopediya*, vol. III, cols. 372–373.
- ⁵¹ Rakovski: *Dvenadtsatyi S'ezd R.K.P.(b)*, *Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1968), p. 577.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 582. As Enukidze put it in his speech to the Twelfth Congress, "Comrade Rakovski has eclipsed by his ardor [in defense of the nationalities] all the Caucasians taken together" (*Stenograficheskii otchet*, *op. cit.* p.585).
- ⁵³ Rakovski, *Knyaz' Metternikh* (1905), *op. cit.* p. 6.
- ⁵⁴ Stalin, "Oktyabr'skii perevorot i natsional'nyi vopros," *Pravda*, 6 and 19 November 1918; and *Sobr. Soch.*, vol. IV, pp. 164–166.
- ⁵⁵ Lenin: Address to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, 22 November 1919, *Works*, vol. 30, p. 160.
- ⁵⁶ Lenin, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁸ Rakovski, "Lenin i Marks," *Molodaya gvardiya*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁰ Lenin, "Better Fewer but Better," 2 March 1923, *Works*, vol. 33, p. 500.
- ⁶¹ Stalin, *Dvenadtsatyi S'iezd R.K.P.(b)*, *op. cit.*, p. 480.
- ⁶² Rakovski: preface to the second edition of the book he wrote with Trotsky, *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii* (Moscow–Petrograd, April 1923).
- ⁶³ Rakovski, *Dvenadtsatyi S'ezd R.K.P.(b)*, *op. cit.* p. 576.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 577–578.
- ⁶⁵ Rakovski, *Dvenadtsatyi S'ezd R.K.P.(b)*, *op. cit.*, p. 579.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 579.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 580.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 576.
- ⁶⁹ Rakovski: *SSSR: novyi etap v sovetskom soiuznom stroitel'stve*, (Karkov, 1923), p. 12.
- ⁷⁰ Lenin: *Notes*, 31 December 1922 (*Trotsky Archives*), quoted by R. Pipes in *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism* (Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 276.
- ⁷¹ Lenin, *Notes*, 31 December 1922, *op. cit.*, p. 277.
- ⁷² Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, (New York, 1942), pp. 134 and 142 (quoted in Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 278).
- ⁷³ Rakovski, *Dvenadtsatyi S'ezd R.K.P.(b)*, *op. cit.*, p. 576.
- ⁷⁴ Rakovski, *SSSR: novyi etap v sovetskom soiuznom stroitel'stve*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
- ⁷⁵ Trotsky's notes on Rakovski, *Trotsky Archives*.
- ⁷⁶ Trotsky, *Stalin, an Appraisal of the Man and His Influence*, ed. and transl. by Charles Malamuth (London, 1947), p. 384.

⁷⁷ *Desyat' let sovetskoi diplomatii, op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁷⁸ Trotsky's notes on Rakovski, *loc. cit.*

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- ¹ D'Abernon: *op. cit.*, 11 February 1923, vol. II, p. 171.
- ² *Manchester Guardian*: 22 February 1923.
- ³ Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya, loc. cit.*
- ⁴ Secret telegram from Kamenev (London) to Chicherin (Moscow) N. 568, 30 August 1920 (LL.G.P. N. 59, Folder I, Box 106).
- ⁵ For three collections of these telegrams, cf. Appendixes A and B to the Secret Memorandum: "Breaches on the part of the Russian Soviet Government's Delegation. . . ." (September 1920), LL.G.P. F/203/I/5; Very Secret Memorandum by Lord Curzon: "Kamenev and Krasin," 2 September 1920 (LL.G.P. F/203/I/3); Very Secret Memorandum by Lord Curzon: "Krasin and Klyshko," 16 September 1920 (LL.G.P. F/203/I/14).
- ⁶ Note by W. Churchill on the intercepted telegram sent by Krasin (London) to Chicherin (Moscow), most secret, 30 December 1920; circulated to the Cabinet on 4 January 1921; annotated by Churchill on 5 January 1921 (LL.G.P. F/203/I/11).
- ⁷ Very Secret Memorandum by Lord Curzon: "Krasin and Klyshko," *loc. cit.*
- ⁸ Very Secret Memorandum by Lord Curzon: "Kamenev and Krasin," *loc. cit.* For Churchill's support of Curzon's memoranda, cf. his own Secret Memorandum to the Cabinet: "Krasin and Klyshko," 21 September 1920 (LL.G.P. N. 127, Folder I, Box 106).
- ⁹ Very Secret Memorandum by Lord Curzon: "Kamenev and Krasin," *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰ Memorandum by R. A. Leeper: "Anti-British Activities of the Soviet government," 18 May 1922, F.O. 371/8193.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² For a general analysis, see G. Durocq: "Le bolchévisme en Perse," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, No. 51, 1922.
- ¹³ Biography of Theodore Rothstein compiled by the Foreign Office at the beginning of 1924, F.O. 371/10508.
- ¹⁴ Secret Intelligence Information: Report compiled by the British military attaché at Teheran and transmitted to the Foreign Office by Sir Percy Loraine, 8 March 1922, Colonial Office, Iraq 730/28.
- ¹⁵ Minute on *ibid.*
- ¹⁶ See the interesting article by Raskolnikov himself: "Rossiya i Afghanistan," *Novyi vostok*, no. 4 (1923): pp. 12-49.

- 17 Raskolnikov, "Rossiya i Afghanistan," *op. cit.* The other minute expressed a similar opinion: "This is a compilation of reports received in the past six months of Russian intrigues and propaganda. . . . They are, as I feared, rather meager."
- 18 Curzon's minute, 30 May 1922, *ibid.*
- 19 Letter from Vickers to the Admiralty: 18 April 1923, N. 3724/3253/38, F.O. 371/9251.
- 20 Letter from the Admiralty to the Foreign Office: N.M./C.P. 22695/23, 11 April 1923, F.O. 371/9251.
- 21 Curzon's minute on *ibid.*
- 22 Foreign Office answer to the Admiralty: N. 3479/3253/38, 25 April 1923.
- 23 Letter from R. Hodgson (Moscow) to Lord Curzon: N. 7893/13/38, 14 August 1922, F.O. 371/8150.
- 24 *Manchester Guardian*, 5 January 1920.
- 25 *Daily Telegraph*, 26 April 1923.
- 26 Cf. L. Dumont-Wilden: "Rome ou Moscou," *Revue bleue* (1924): p. 812 ff.; also, his: "La lutte contre le bolchévisme et la défense de l'occident," *Revue bleue* (1927): p. 274 ff.; and his famous article on "Le Bolchévisme et l'héritage romain," *Revue des deux mondes*, (15 April 1924): pp. 752-769.
- 27 Quoted in George A. B. Dewar, "Britain's Recognition of the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. III, no. 2 (15 December 1924): pp. 313-320.
- 28 Dewar, "Britain's Recognition of the Soviets," *loc. cit.*
- 29 E. H. Carr: *The Interregnum (1923-1924)*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
- 30 *British White Rock*. Correspondence between HMG and the Soviet government respecting the relations between the two governments (London, 1923), Cmd. 1869.
- 31 For a detailed exposé of the Soviet viewpoint, see *Russian Information and Review* (28 April 1923): p. 451.
- 32 *British White Book*, *loc. cit.*
- 33 *Daily Herald*, 10 May 1923.
- 34 Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *loc. cit.*
- 35 Cf. *Russian Information and Review* (6 January 1923).
- 36 Rakovski, *Angliya i Rossiya*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 "Tov. Kh. G. Rakovski o tovarische Vorovskom," *Izvestiya*, 15 May 1922, p. 2; and *Angliya i Rossiya*, *loc. cit.*
- 39 Radek, "Lord Curzon and the Soviet Union," *op. cit.*, p. 272.
- 40 Chicherin concluded his reply to the Curzon ultimatum with the words: "We firmly await our enemy before our threshold, and we

- believe that he will not have the courage to attack." (Cf. *Anglo-sovetskie otnosheniya, 1917-1927* (Moscow, 1927), pp. 40-47.
- ⁴¹ Trotsky, *Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiya*, vol. III (Moscow, 1925), p. 87.
- ⁴² Confidential memorandum by Mr. Preston (Petrograd), N. 6942/3198/38, 15 August 1923, F.O. 371/9370.
- ⁴³ *Anglo-sovetskie otnosheniya, 1917-1927, loc. cit.*
- ⁴⁴ See, for example, the *Daily Herald*, 10 May 1923.
- ⁴⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, 14 May 1923.
- ⁴⁶ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5 ser., vol. 164, col. 294.
- ⁴⁷ For a detailed analysis, see S. R. Graubard: *British Labour and the Russian Revolution (1917-1924)* (Harvard and Oxford U.P., 1956).
- ⁴⁸ Ramsay MacDonald: *Parliament and Revolution* (New York, 1920), p. 21.
- ⁴⁹ R. MacDonald: *The Foreign Policy of the Labour Party* (London, 1923), pp. 43-45.
- ⁵⁰ J. L. Garvin: *The Observer*, 20 May 1923.
- ⁵¹ R. MacDonald: *The Times*, 9 January 1924.
- ⁵² Cf. L. Shapiro: "Lenin After Fifty Years," in *Lenin, the Man, the Theorist, the Leader, a Reappraisal*, ed. L. Shapiro and P. Reddaway (London, 1967), pp. 15-17.
- ⁵³ Quoted in Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, vol. II, pp. 474-475.
- ⁵⁴ M. A. Rafail: *Proidyonnyi etap. Rabochee pravitel'stvo Anglii i anglo-sovetskii dogovor* (Moscow, 1924), pp. 1 and 12.
- ⁵⁵ *Izvestiya*, 13 May 1923; and *D.V.P.*: vol. VI, p. 303. The telegrams are kept in the library of the British Labour party (Transport House); see also G. A. Ritter: *The British Labour Movement and Its Policy towards Russia from the First Russian Revolution until the Treaty of Locarno* (Oxford, B. Litt. thesis, 1958), p. 245.
- ⁵⁶ "Nota pravitel'stva SSSR pravitel'stvu Velikobritanii" (15 May 1923), *D.V.P.* vol. VI, p. 312.
- ⁵⁷ Quoted in W. P. and Z. Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations* (London, 1944), pp. 121-122.
- ⁵⁸ Cf. Gregory's letter to Austen Chamberlain, 20 May 1925, F.O. 371/9357. As Gregory put it with condescension: "To many of these benighted Labour rank and File, the Foreign Office genuinely is a den of reaction, a home of mystery in which every conceivable plot against Labour is hatched."

- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.* A. Henderson: *Labour and Foreign Affairs* (publ. of the Labour party, 1922); see, also, the pamphlets prepared for socialist and Labour speakers, e.g., W. P. Coates: *Present Position of Anglo-Russian Relations* (November 1923), preface by H. N. Brailsford; and *Russian Trade and British Markets*, reprinted from the *Russian Information and Review*, (24 November 1923); also W. P. Coates, *Export Credit Schemes and Anglo-Russian Trade* (November 1923), preface by A. Ponsonby. The three pamphlets were issued by the National Hands Off Russia Committee.
- ⁶⁰ R. MacDonald: *The Foreign Policy of the Labour Party*, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46.
- ⁶¹ For information on Krasin, see R. F. Karpova: *L. B. Krasin, sovetskii diplomat* (Moscow, 1962), p. 205; K. G. Lyashenko and Z. I. Perechudova, “Leonid B. Krasin (K 95-letiu so dnya rozhdeniya),” *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (1965): no. 7, pp. 97–101; B. L. Mogilevsky: *Nikitich (1870–1926)* (Moscow, 1963); G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, “L. B. Krasin,” *Izbrannoe proizvedeniya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 522–530; L. Khinchuk: “Poslednie dni Krasina”; Trotsky wrote very interesting notes on Krasin which are still unpublished: cf. Trotsky Archives, bMs. Russ 13, “Krasin,” vol. 3490 a, b.
- ⁶² Dispatch from R. Hodgson (Moscow) to Lord Curzon: No. 38, II September 1921, N 10612/216/38, F.O. 371/9355.
- ⁶³ Minute of 14 March 1923 by J. D. Gregory on the memorandum: “Reception of Mr. Krasin at Foreign Office,” N. 2512/550/38, F.O. 371/9355.
- ⁶⁴ Letter from Chicherin (Lausanne) to Litvinov (Moscow), N 12, 17 December 1922, *D.V.P.* vol. VI, p. 89.
- ⁶⁵ TS. G.A.O.R. S.S.S.R., f. 413, ed. khr. 337, 1.41: “Pismo–Krasina v Narkomindel,” 25 January 1923, quoted in Karpova, *L. B. Krasin–sovetskii diplomat*, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
- ⁶⁶ Letter n. 1878 from R. Hodgson to Lord Curzon: 20 February 1923, F.O. 371/9355.
- ⁶⁷ Letter No. 172 from R. Hodgson to Lord Curzon: 8 March 1923, in *ibid.*
- ⁶⁸ Commentary by Section I of the SIS on the question of Vorovski’s appointment in London, N 4331/550/38, 11 May 1923, F.O. 371/9355.
- ⁶⁹ Private letter from L. B. Krasin to his wife, 4 March 1923 (in Krasin Archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam).
- ⁷⁰ After the bolshevik revolution, Litvinov was appointed Soviet representative in London (3 January 1918), but was expelled at

the beginning of the intervention (mid-summer 1918). If one is to believe the *Daily Telegraph* of 28 June 1923, "Litvinov's ambition had always been to return to London as Soviet envoy." Cf., also, A. Litvinova: "Vstrechi i razluki" [iz vospominanii o M. M. Litvinove] *Novyi mir*, no. 7, pp. 235-250; and Litvinov's forgotten article "Oktyabr'skie dni v Londone iz vospominanii tov. Litvinova] *Izvestiya*, 6 November 1918, p. 7.

⁷¹ Gregory's note N. 3128, 15 March 1923, F.O. 371/9355.

⁷² Curzon's minute on memorandum N. 3128/550/38, 16 March 1923, in *ibid.*

⁷³ Gregory's minute No. 3128, *loc. cit.*

⁷⁴ W. Strang's minute, No. 3494, 17 April 1923, *loc. cit.*

⁷⁵ Letter communicated by Section I of the SIS to the Foreign Office on 11 May 1923: Letter from Litvinov to Vorovski (copies to Trotsky and Kamenev), F.O. 371/9355. On Vorovski, see the unpublished notes by Trotsky: "V. V. Vorovski," bMS. Russ 13, vol. 3492 (*Trotsky Archives*); also B. S. Chlenov: *Rech' po delu ob ubiistve V. V. Vorovskogo* (Moscow, 1923), and his pamphlet *Ubiistvo V. V. Vorovskogo i burzhuaznoe pravosudie* (Karkov, 1924), p. 50; Rakovski: *Angliya i Rossiya*, *loc. cit.*; "Pamyati Vorovskogo," *Izvestiya*, 22 May 1923; V. Nevski: "Pamyati V. V. Vorovskogo," *Pechat' i revoliutsiya* (1923): kn. 4, pp. 5-12; V. D. Bonch-Burevich, "Na slavnom postu. Pamyati V. V. Vorovskogo" (po lichnym vospominaniyam), *Sputnik kommunista* (1923): no. 22, pp. 5-29; Ya. Ganetski, *V. V. Vorovski. Biograficheskii ocherk* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925), p. 103; V. Kalashnikova, *V. V. Vorovski* (Moscow, 1927), p. 56; V. D. Bonch-Burevich, "Nekotorye svedeniya o V. V. Vorovsko," *Zvezda*, no. 9-10, pp. 233-246 and no. II, pp. 164-185 (also his: *Na slavnom postu [V. V. Vorovsku]. Vospominaniya starovo bol'shevika* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), p. 40; "My ne zabyli," *Pravda*, 10 May 1923; and, more recently, I. P. Verkhovtsev: *Na sluzbe u proletariata (o V. V. Vorovskom)* (Moscow, 1960), p. 39; I. Sabadyrov: "V. V. Vorovski (k 90-letiu so dnya rozhdeniya)," *Instrul* (Kishinev, 1961): no. 10, pp. 144-147; O. V. Semenovskii, *V. Vorovski v Odesse* (Odessa, 1962), p. 118; N. F. Piyashev: *V. Vorovski (1871-1923). Revoliutsionner, kritik, diplomat* (Moscow, 1962), p. 31; D. Kh. Ostryanin, *V. V. Vorovski* (Kiev, 1963), p. 84; R. G. Vaichuk: *Esteticheskie vzglyady V. V. Vorovskogo* (kand. dissertatsiya Moscow, 1964); N. F. Piyashev: "Maloizvestnye stat'i i fel'etony V. V. Vorovskogo," *Novoe i zabytoe (Sbornik statei)* (Leningrad, 1966: pp. 50-110.

⁷⁶ Minute by J. D. Gregory N 6671/550/38 on telegram from Peters

- (Moscow) N 174, 2 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁷⁷ D'Abernon: *An Ambassador of Peace*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 81–82.
- ⁷⁸ Minute by J. D. Gregory N 6767, 11 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356; Ronald C. Lindsay was of the same mind when he wrote: "The truth is that not one the Bolsheviks could send to London would be *persona grata* to us or inspire us with any confidence in his good faith," (Minute N 6669/550/38, 3 July 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁷⁹ Minute by J. D. Gregory, N 6671/550/38, *loc. cit.*
- ⁸⁰ XII S'ezd R.K.P.(b), *op. cit.*, p. 585.
- ⁸¹ Secret telegram from R. Hodgson (Moscow) to F.O., N 5706/550/38: 3 July 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁸² Report from Section I of SIS, N 6036/550/38: 3 July 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁸³ Minute by J. D. Gregory, N 6671/550/38, *loc. cit.* At the time of the British–Soviet Conference, which gathered in London in April 1924, the *Morning Post* noted: "The appointment of Rakovski, hitherto Governor of the Ukraine. . . . really marks the fall from power of a vigorous personality now becoming troublesome to the Moscow government" (22 March 1924).
- ⁸⁴ Krasin's letter to his wife, 3 July 1923 (Krasin Archives, *loc. cit.*).
- ⁸⁵ Trotsky, *Stalin. An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence*, *op. cit.*, p. 384.
- ⁸⁶ Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ⁸⁷ *Pyatnadtsatyi S'ezd V.K.P.(b)*, *Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1962 ed.), vol. II, p. 1012.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 186.
- ⁸⁹ "Beseda s tov. Rakovskim," *Izvestiya*, 1 August 1923.
- ⁹⁰ Report N 6426/550/38 from Peters (Moscow), 16 July 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁹¹ *Morning Post*, 7 July 1923.
- ⁹² Parliamentary question by Captain Erskine–Bolst to R. McNeill: 21 July 1923 (quoted in F.O. 371/9356).
- ⁹³ Parliamentary question by Sir R. Richardson to R. McNeill: 25 July, *ibid.*
- ⁹⁴ The *Times*, "Mr. Rakovski's Speeches, Explanations Demanded from Moscow," Monday, 6 August 1923.
- ⁹⁵ The *Times*: "M. Rakovski's Speeches," Friday, 10 August 1923.
- ⁹⁶ Coded telegram from the Foreign Office to Peters (Moscow): N 162, N 6617/550/38, 1 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁹⁷ Minute by Sir Eyre Crowe on the report of the question asked in Parliament by Captain Erskine–Bolst on 21 July 1923, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹⁸ Minute by P. M. Roberts as a draft for the answer of R. McNeill to Captain Erskine–Bolst's question in Parliament: N 66546/550/38,

- 1 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁹⁹ Telegram from Peters (Moscow) to the Foreign Office: 2 August 1923, N 6669/550/38, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹⁰⁰ Letter from M. Peters (Moscow) to J. D. Gregory: N 7139/550/38, 10 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹⁰¹ Telegram from Peters (Moscow) to F.O.: N 174, N 6671/550/38, 2 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹⁰² Telegram N 174 from Peters (Moscow) to F.O.: 2 August 1923, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰³ Memorandum by Chicherin, 9 August 1923, N 6862/550/38, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹⁰⁴ Minute by Ronald C. Lindsay, 11 August 1923, N 6767/550/38, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹⁰⁵ Minute by J. D. Gregory, N 6669/550/38, 15 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹⁰⁶ Minute by Lord Curzon, 11 August 1923, attached to report N 6669/550/38.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁸ Telegram from Peters (Moscow) to the Foreign Office: N 6669/550/38, 2 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹⁰⁹ Minute by R. Lindsay, 30 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹¹⁰ Letter N 181823 received by the Russian Telegraph Agency (TASS) and communicated to the Foreign Office, 10 August 1923, in *ibid.*
- ¹¹¹ Minute by Sir Edmund Ovey, 22 August 1923, N 7013/550/38, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹¹² Minute by J. D. Gregory, N 6669/550/38 *loc. cit.*
- ¹¹³ Telegram N 38 to Lord D'Abernon and N 72 to M. Peters, 30 August 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹¹⁴ Cf. the interview he gave on 16 August to the Latvian newspaper *Jaunakas sinas*, as quoted in a letter from M. Sullivan (Riga) to the Foreign Office: N 7049/550/38, F.O. 371/9356.
- ¹¹⁵ Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 127; and the M. A. thesis of R. Th. Crozier, *Christian Rakovski and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1921-1923* (University of Wisconsin, 1969), p. 103. This work is only based on secondary materials and on the newspapers quoted at length by Coates. If it cannot add much to the knowledge of the problem, it represents an interesting synthesis that reads very well.

Chapter 14

¹ The *Observer*, 14 October 1923.

- ² *The Observer*, 7 October 1923.
- ³ Confidential letter from Lord Curzon to R. Hodgson (Moscow), 19 November 1923, F.O. 371/9356.
- ⁴ Minute by J. D. Gregory on the confidential enquiry the Foreign Office made on the Russian Trade Delegation, 17 September 1923, N 7652/550/38, in *ibid.*
- ⁵ Confidential letter from Lord Curzon to R. Hodgson, 19 November 1923, *loc. cit.*
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ *Labour Magazine*, January 1923, p. 393.
- ⁸ *Commons Debates*, CLIX, 1922, col. 1084–1085.
- ⁹ Letter from Arthur Henderson to the prime minister, 16 August 1923, N 7123/550/38, F.O.371/9356.
- ¹⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 4 September 1923.
- ¹¹ A. Ponsonby, preface to the pamphlet by W.P. Coates, *Export Credit Schemes and Anglo-Russian Trade*, ed., Hands Off Russia Committee, 15 November 1923.
- ¹² Rakovski, "Russia's Economic Future," *RIR*, 27 October 1923, pp. 261–262.
- ¹³ Louis Fischer's private papers; the letter is partly printed in L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 472.
- ¹⁴ W. P. Coates, *Present Position of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, November 1923, issued by Hands Off Russia Committee.
- ¹⁵ Rakovski developed this viewpoint at some length in the article he wrote on "Anglo-Soviet Trade Cooperation," *Labour Magazine* (March 1924): pp. 488–490.
- ¹⁶ *Socialist Review*, February 1922, p. 101.
- ¹⁷ *Labour Party Report of the Annual Conference*, 1922, p. 193, quoted in G. A. Ritter: *The British Labour Movement and Its Policy Towards Russia from the First Russian Revolution Until the Treaty of Locarno* (B. Litt. thesis, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1958), pp. 165–168.
- ¹⁸ *The Times*, 9 January 1924.
- ¹⁹ "Decree on Peace" passed by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, 8 November 1917, cf. Jane Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. I, 1917–1924.
- ²⁰ The Earl of Oxford and Asquith, *Memories and Reflections* (Boston, 1928), p. 249, quoted in the useful article of H. Wish: "Anglo-Soviet Relations During Labour's First Ministry" (1924), *Slavonic Review*, 1938–39, vol. XVIII, p. 390. For Lloyd George's views on Labour and the Bolsheviks, see, more particularly, his article

on "The Collapse of Frost-Bitten Diplomacy," *Daily Chronicle*, 16 February 1924.

- ²¹ Private papers of Ramsay MacDonald, Foreign Office 800/219, letter from Chicherin to MacDonald, beginning of February 1924.
- ²² Private letter from MacDonald to Chicherin, N 980/10/38, 1 February 1924, F.O. 371/10465.
- ²³ Private and confidential letter from Rakovski to MacDonald, N 7948/7948/85, 11 January 1924, private papers of R. MacDonald, F.O. 800/219.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.* For Rakovski's official views on recognition, see his article in the *New Leader*, 8 February 1924: "Russia's Greeting. What Recognition Means"; also, his statements in *Izvestiya*, 28 February, and *RIR*, 15 March 1924.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ The letter was transmitted to Rakovski, who sent it to Moscow: cf. *Arkhivy vneshnei politiki SSSR*, quoted in *Istoriya vneshnei politiki SSSR, 1917-1945*, (Izd. Nauka: Moscow, 1966), vol. I, p. 183. When Grenfell showed this letter to Rakovski, the latter immediately asked information from his government. He argued that, "to parry the offensive which is expected from political opponents," he would like "to have in reserve a document with favorable answers" to MacDonald's questions (quoted in *ibid.*). For the memorandum of the Narkomindel and for Rakovski's correspondence with Moscow, cf. *D.V.P.* vol. VII, pp. 27-34.
- ²⁷ "Text of Hodgson Note," *RIR*, 1 April 1924. See, also, A. Norman, "Russian Recognition," *New Leader* (8 February 1924): p. 8; and, for the Soviet viewpoint, Zinoviev, *Priznanie Rossii i politika kominterna* (Izd. Priboi: Leningrad, 1924); M. Pavlovich: "Angliya i priznanie SSSR," *Krasnaya nov'*, no. 19 (March 1924): pp. 185-200; in the Soviet daily press: Radek's articles, *Pravda*, 3 February 1924, and *Gudok* (same day); Steklov's comments, *Izvestiya*, 3 February; Lozovski, "Report on the International Situation," *Trud*, 12 February.
- ²⁸ Cabinet Papers, Foreign Office, CAB 9 (24) 1.46, 4 February 1923, 3 p.m.
- ²⁹ Letter from R. MacDonald to R. Poincaré, 26 February 1924, F.O. 800/218.
- ³⁰ Letter from R. Poincaré to R. MacDonald, 28 February, in *ibid.*
- ³¹ For a detailed analysis of the reactions of the French press on this occasion, see Report N 908/10/38 from E. Phipps (Paris) to the Foreign Office, 3 February 1924, F.O. 371/10465.
- ³² Memorandum (hour after hour) from R. Hodgson (Moscow) to R. MacDonald, N 1398/10/38, 8 February 1924, F.O. 371/10465.

- ³³ Private letter from R. MacDonald to C. Rakovski, 12 January 1924, F.O. 371/10588; for Rakovski's reply (16 January 1924), see F.O. 371/10518 (this is a private and confidential letter). For Rakovski's telegram of congratulations to the Narkomindel after the British recognition of the USSR, see *Izvestiya*, 3 February 1924. Two days later, a full-size portrait of Rakovski was printed on the front page of *Izvestiya*. For Rakovski's first interview when he returned to Moscow, see "Angliya i Rossiya. Beseda s zamnarkomindelom i poverennym v delakh SSSR v Londone tov. Kh. G. Rakovskim," *Izvestiya*, 29 February 1924.
- ³⁴ G. F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (New York, 1960), p. 233.
- ³⁵ Private letter from MacDonald to Chicherin, N 980/10/38/, 1 February 1924, *loc. cit.*
- ³⁶ L. Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-475.
- ³⁷ *The Times*, 21 July 1924.
- ³⁸ Cf. Lord Stamfordham's letter to Lt. Colonel Waterhouse, 22 July 1924, MacDonald's private papers, 800/219.
- ³⁹ Letter from the prime minister to Rakovski, 26 July 1924, in *ibid.*
- ⁴⁰ MacDonald first thought of appointing O'Grady to this post, see *Morning Post*, 8 March 1924.
- ⁴¹ See A. Bott, "Anglo-Russian Negotiations," *The World Today*, July 1924; for Soviet analyses: A. Ioffe: "Anglo-Soviet Treaties and the Loan," *Labour Magazine*, October 1924, pp. 246-249, and his "Sovetsko-britanskii dogovor," *Bol'shevik*, no. 14 (1924): pp. 68-77; also: "Londonskaya konferentsiya," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 4-5 (1924): no. 1, pp. 24-38, and no. 2, pp. 8-48; and Marbor, "Sovetsko-angliiskii dogovor 1924 g.," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 11 (1929): pp. 63-76. For the diary of a Soviet member of the conference, see I. I. Kutuzov, *B strane "ego velichestva."* *Pis'ma i zametki ob Anglii russkogo rabochego diplomata* (Izd. TS.K. Soiuza tekstil'shchikov: Moscow, 1924), p. 86.
- ⁴² On the British side, J. D. Gregory was the main delegate to the political committee, while Sir Sydney Chapman, of the Board of Trade, was in charge of the economic committee. On the Soviet side, Rakovski was mainly helped by A. Scheinmann and N. M. Lyubimov for the technical aspect of things.
- ⁴³ Letter from the prime minister to Rakovski (circulated to the cabinet), N 1093/10/38, 11 February 1924, F.O. 371/10465.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ *The Times*: 15 April 1924; see, also, *Izvestiya*, 16 April 1924. For a general analysis of the conference see Rakovski's report in *Izvestiya*, 12 August 1924: "Posle podpisaniya anglo-sovetskogo

dogovora. Tov. Kh. G. Rakovski o dogovore s Anglii."

- ⁴⁶ Minute by V. A. Wellesley on report N 2030/2030/85, 10 March 1924, F.O. 371/10503.
- ⁴⁷ Minute by Wellesley, 15 July 1924, F.O. 371/10509.
- ⁴⁸ For a full text of the bankers' memorandum, cf. special file in F.O. 371/10512.
- ⁴⁹ For detailed analyses of the Soviet ideas on this topic, cf. R. Fedorov: 'Proval Makdonal'da,' *Bol'shevik*, no. 14 (1924): pp. 58-68; "Sovetsko-angliiskie peregovory v 1924 g.," *Mezhdunarodnaya letopis'*, (1925): pp. 24-38; and "Sovetsko-angliiskie dogovory 1924 g.," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 11 (1929): pp. 63-76. For the opinion of the Narkomindel, see *Arkhivy vneshnei politiki SSSR*, F. 69, op. 12, d. 59, p. 36: "Stenograficheskii otchet" (Moscow, 1958), p. 30. See, also, E. F. Wise: "Scrambling for the Russian Market. Need Britain Stand Aside?" *New Leader* (3 July 1925): p. 3.
- ⁵⁰ *The Times*: 26 April 1924, p. 9; and *Izvestiya*, 30 April 1924, p. 1.
- ⁵¹ A. Ponsonby was the first to offer Rakovski his "compliments and congratulations on the resumption of full diplomatic relations" between Great Britain and the Soviet Union (see their letters of 1 and 2 February 1924, CR/890, F.O. 371/10465).
- ⁵² Letter from Rakovski to Ponsonby, 29 May 1924, N 4691/1822/85, F.O. 371/10509.
- ⁵³ Report by H. Hodgson, N 2971/1528/85, 28 March 1924, in *ibid.*
- ⁵⁴ Minute by O'Malley, 7 May 1924, on report N 3895/1506/85 of 5 May 1924, in F.O. 371/10503.
- ⁵⁵ Comrade Zinoviev's report at the Congress of Engineers in Lenin-grad, in *Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta*, 7 March 1924. Rakovski's more "diplomatic" arguments came, of course, to the same conclusion; cf. the general survey he gave of the conference: "Beseda s predsedatelem sovetskoï delegatsii v Londone tov. Kh. G. Rakovski," *Izvestiya*, 31 July 1924.
- ⁵⁶ Secret memorandum circulated to the cabinet: "Anglo-Soviet Conference. Memorandum on the Anglo-Soviet Draft Treaty," BnD. 24, CAB Papers 23/48, 28 July 1924. For the official details, see F.O. 371/10513. For the point of view of the bondholders, cf. *Russia's Debts. The Case of British Holders of Russian Debts*, published by the Anglo-Russian Press for and on behalf of the British Union of Russian Bondholders, 1924. For the Soviet viewpoint, see W. P. Coates' pamphlet: *Russia's Counter-Claims*, London, March 1924.

- ⁵⁷ Confidential conversation between Rakovski and Ponsonby, 2 June 1924, N 4789/3028/85, F.O. 371/10512.
- ⁵⁸ Confidential conversation between Rakovski and Ponsonby, 2 June 1924, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁹ Secret memorandum on the British–Soviet Conference. CAB Papers, *loc. cit.*
- ⁶⁰ For details of the orders the Soviet government intended to make in Britain if they succeeded in raising a loan, see the long letter Rakovski sent to Ponsonby on 11 June 1924. The main orders were classified under the following headings: orders for shipbuilding works; orders for engineering works; orders to agricultural machinery works; and orders to electrical engineering works: N 4934/3028/85, F.O.371/10512.
- ⁶¹ Minute by O'Malley, 7 May 1924, N 3757/1506/85, *loc. cit.*
- ⁶² A. Ponsonby: "The Anglo–Soviet Treaties of 1924. Recital of Events Which Led to Their Final Conclusion," *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (May 1926): pp. 151–154; see, also, C. G. Rakovski: "The Present Position of the London Negotiations," *RIR* (10 May 1924): pp. 293–294.
- ⁶³ Rakovski was asked to come to the Executive Committee of the Labour party to state what precisely was the point of view of the Soviet government. Lansbury, Purcell, Morell, and others then went over to Ponsonby's rooms in the House of Commons, and the negotiations were renewed: cf. *Trotsky Archives*, "Rakovskiy v Anglii," *loc. cit.*; also, M. Tanin, *Desyat' let vneshnei politiki SSSR* (Moscow, 1927), pp. 136–137.
See also the articles by H. N. Brailsford: "Towards a Russian Settlement," *New Leader* (6 June 1924): p. 8; and mainly "The Russian Settlement. Victory Snatched from Defeat," *New Leader* (8 August 1924): p. 7; one of the most interesting articles on this topic is by E. D. Morel: "Anglo–Soviet Treaties," *Foreign Affairs* (August–September 1924).
- ⁶⁴ See text of Draft Treaty (Article 13) as it stood when negotiations were suspended (Russia, no. 3, 1924). *Cmd.* 2253).
- ⁶⁵ See draft of proposed General Treaty, Article 2 (Russia no. 1, 1924, *Cmd.* 2215).
- ⁶⁶ Ponsonby's note on the Chancellor of the Exchequer's memorandum, 29 July 1924, N 626y/6035/85, F.O. 371/10517.
- ⁶⁷ Private letter from M. Ponsonby to M. Rakovski, 30 July 1924, N 6267/6267/85, in *ibid.*
- ⁶⁸ Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv oktyabr'skoi revoliutsii SSSR, f. 413, op. 17, ed. kr. 431, a.317. Pis'mo Krasina v Narkomindel, 27 June 1924, quoted in R. F. Karpova: *Diplomaticheskaya*

deyatel'nost' L. B. Krasina (Leningrad, 1962), p. 270 (this is an extremely biased book, which systematically portrays Rakovski as a Trotskyist traitor).

⁶⁹ Private letter from Krasin (Moscow) to his wife, 24 July 1924 (Krasin Archives, Amsterdam, *loc. cit.*).

⁷⁰ "Posle podpisaniya anglo-sovetskogo dogovora. Tov. Kh. G. Rakovsky o dogovore s Angliei," *Izvestiya*, 12 August 1924.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² "Rakovski-diplomat," *Izvestiya*, *loc. cit.*

⁷³ For the Soviet point of view, see I. V. Shuvalov, *Sovetsko-frantsuzskie otnosheniya (1917-1924 gg.)* (kandidatskaya dissertatsiya, Moscow, 1952); and Iu. V. Borisov: *Sovetsko-frantsuzskie otnosheniya (1924-1945 gg.)* (Moscow, 1964); (his article on: 'Ustanovlenie diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii mezhdyy Frantsiei i Sovetskim Soiuzom' was published in *Frantsuzskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow, 1963): pp. 289-331; see, also, A. C. E. Quainton, *French Policy and the Russian Revolution (1917-1924)* (B. Litt. thesis, Oxford, 1959); and S. Horowitz, *The Soviet Union and the French Left Bloc*, Certificate of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, June 1953 (p. 140). For a good work in French, cf. Ch. Harris: *La presse française et la politique européenne de l'URSS* (thèse de 3^o cycle, Paris, 1966), p. 356.

⁷⁴ *The Observer*, 14 October 1923.

⁷⁵ The actual result of the Lyons Fair, so far as Russia was concerned, was the sale of various products to a total value of £50,000 including 65,700 pelts of a value of £22,250, also timber, medical herbs, horsehair, flax, etc. (*RIR*, 28 April 1923, p. 459.)

⁷⁶ E. Herriot: *La Russie nouvelle* (Paris, 1922), p. 74. For Herriot's trip to Soviet Russia, cf. "Poezdka Errio v Rossii," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 131, (28 September 1922): pp. 36-37; for a study of his relations with Russia until 1922, cf. Y. A. Bodry, "Herriot et la Russie," *La Vie des peuples* (10 November 1922); no. 31, vol. VIII, pp. 842-848.

⁷⁷ *RIR*, 23 June 1923.

⁷⁸ Cf. Poincaré's telegram of 10 May 1923, *D.V.P.* vol. VI, p. 303, and Chicherin's reply on 11 May, in *ibid.*

⁷⁹ This article was translated and published in *Izvestiya*, 5 January 1924.

⁸⁰ "Beseda s korrespondentom *Izvestiya* o russko-frantsuzskikh otnosheniakh," January 1924, reprinted in G. V. Chicherin, *Stat'i i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 267-271.

⁸¹ French courts of commerce continued to adhere to the juridic

- norms and treaties of tsarist Russia. On 2 December 1923, a French judge ordered that Soviet merchandise purchased by a French firm from the Soviet trade delegation in Paris be transferred to Bunatian, who claimed the goods as his property. Thus, at the beginning of 1924, France found herself at the same stage as Britain was before the signing of the British–Soviet trade agreement of March 1921. The Bunatian case was reminiscent of the Sagor case, which had been tried in London in February 1921: cf. P. Miliukov: *La politique extérieure des Soviets* (Paris, 1934), p. 190; and *RIR*, 23 February 1924, p. 118.
- ⁸² *Izvestiya*, 20 January 1924.
- ⁸³ “Soobshchenie predstavatelya SSSR v Chekhoslovakii o besede s ministrom inostrannykh del Chekhoslovakii Beneshem,” 3 January 1924, *D.V.P.* vol VII, pp. 11–13.
- ⁸⁴ “Telegramma zamestitelya narodnogo kommissara inostrannykh del SSSR predstaviteliu SSSR v Chekhoslovaskii K. K. Iurenevu, *D.V.P.* vol. VII, p. 19.
- ⁸⁵ This was perfectly true, in his telegram of 11 January 1923, Litvinov had written to Iurenev, “Transmit to Beneš for Poincaré that we agree to discuss these questions in direct conversations with the representatives of the French government,” *D.V.P.* vol VII, p. 19; see, also, *Auswärtiges Amt*, L 648/ii/206226, as quoted by E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, vol. III, i, p. 35, note 2.
- ⁸⁶ *RIR*, “Franco–Soviet relations,” 8 March 1924.
- ⁸⁷ For the texts of the telegrams, see *Europe nouvelle*, 26 July 1924.
- ⁸⁸ “The Franco–Soviet Rupture, Interview with M. Skobelev,” *RIR*, 23 February 1924, p. 118.
- ⁸⁹ Interview given to *Humanité*, 4 May 1924 (reproduced in *Izvestiya*, 6 May 1924: “Tov. Rakovski o sovetsko–frantsuzskikh otnosheniakh”).
- ⁹⁰ A. de Monzie: *Du Kremlin au Luxembourg* (Paris, 1924), pp. 254–257: de Monzie’s interpellation and Poincaré’s reply are rendered in full.
- ⁹¹ “Rov. Rakovski o sovetsko–frantsuzskikh otnosheniyakh,” *Izvestiya*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹² E. H. Carr: *Socialism in One Country*, vol. III, i, p. 35, note 4.
- ⁹³ Cf. Kh. G. Rakovski, “Priznanie SSSR Frantsiei,” *Pravda*, 20 October 1924, and E. Herriot: “La reconnaissance des Soviets,” *Jadis*, vol. II, *D’Une guerre à l’autre* (Paris, 1952), pp. 195–198; see, also, A. Gauvain: “La reconnaissance des Soviets,” *Journal des débats*, 31 October 1924; A. Prud’homme: “La reconnaissance en France du gouvernement des Soviets et ses conséquences juridiques,” *Journal du droit international* (December 1924); X.X.X.

"La reconnaissance du gouvernement des Soviets," *Revue politique et parlementaire* (November 1924): pp. 246-254; and E. Lagarde: *La reconnaissance du gouvernement des Soviets* (Payot, Paris, 1924). For a Soviet view, cf. Iu. Steklov, "The French Recognition of the USSR," *Imprekorr*, 29 October 1924; for the views of the head of the Third International on the recognition of the USSR by the bourgeois states of Western Europe, see G. Zinoviev: *Priznanie Rossii i politika kominterna* (Izd. Priboi: Leningrad, 1924). For an analysis of the beginning of Franco-Soviet relations and a sketch of Rakovski's diplomatic rapprochement franco-soviétique," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* (January-March 1960 and July-December 1960).

⁹⁴ E. Herriot: "The Programme of Liberal France," *Foreign Affairs* (15 June 1924): pp. 558-570.

⁹⁵ Ts.G.A.O.R. f. 413, op. 17, ed. khr, 523, 1.324: Pis'mo Rakovskogo Litvinovu, 31 May 1924 (quoted in Karpova, *op. cit.* p. 295).

⁹⁶ This fleet numbered twelve warships, one battleship, one cruiser, six destroyers, four submarines (41,158 tons altogether), cf. Ts.G.A.O.R. SSSR, f. 413, op. 17, ed. khr. 719, 1.80, quoted in Karpova: *op. cit.* p. 295.

⁹⁷ Ts. G.A.O.R. SSSR, f. 413, op. 17, ed. khr, 525, 1.46: Pis'mo Rakovskogo Chicherinu, chlenam politiburo ot 22 iunya 1924 g. (quoted in Karpova: *loc. cit.*)

⁹⁸ *Pravda*, 28 June 1924.

⁹⁹ The telegrams are in *Russian Review* (Washington), 1 September 1924, p. 93, quoted in Carr: *Socialism in One Country*, *op. cit.* p. 39, note 1.

¹⁰⁰ Private letter from Albert Thomas to R. MacDonald, 8 February 1924, in MacDonald's private papers, F.O. 800/218.

¹⁰¹ P. Renaudel, "Recognition of the Soviet Republic. The Point of View of French Socialism," *Labour Magazine*, vol. III, no.9, (January 1925): pp. 400-402; for his speech to the Chamber on the same topic, see *Journal officiel de la république française*, Débats parlementaires, série II, 28 January 1925, pp. 380-385; cf., also, *Pravda*, article of 20 July 1924.

¹⁰² For a Soviet view, see Trotsky's book: *Zwischen Imperialismus und Revolution* (Hamburg, 1922).

¹⁰³ "Franko-russkie otnosheniya. Interviu s tov. Rakovskim," *Izvestiya*, 2 August 1924 (the interview was given in London on 24 July, two days after Herriot's visit).

¹⁰⁴ Lunacharski, *Revolutionary Silouettes*, *op. cit.*, pp.107-108.

¹⁰⁵ Balabanoff, *My Life as a Rebel*, *op. cit.* pp. 250-251; on this question of obedience of the bolshevik leaders, see, also, Boris I. Niko-

- laevski, *Power and the Soviet Elite* (New York, London, 1965) and French translation: *Les dirigeants soviétiques et la lutte pour le pouvoir* (Paris, 1969), pp. 77 et seq.
- ¹⁰⁶ As E. H. Carr notes, this interview provoked a protest from the German ambassador in Moscow, Brockdorff-Rantzau; see *Auswärtiges Amt*, L. 648/II/206476; quoted in *Socialism in One Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 39, note 2.
- ¹⁰⁷ A. de Monzie: "Christian Rakovski ou comment on se retrouve," in *Destins hors serie* (Paris, 1927), p. 23.
- ¹⁰⁸ M. Pavlovich, *Sovetskaya Rossiya i Frantsiya* (Moscow, 1924), p. 35; and de Monzie, *Retour de Russie* (Paris, 1923); and *Petit manuel de la Russie nouvelle* (Paris, 1931) (translated into English as *New Russia*).
- ¹⁰⁹ See his article "La reconnaissance *de facto* du gouvernement des Soviets," *Revue hebdomadaire*, no. 23 (December 1922), pp. 480-492; and also his study of Lenin, "Après les funérailles de Lénine," *Revue hebdomadaire* (February 1924): pp. 473-480.
- ¹¹⁰ De Monzie: *Du Kremlin au Luxembourg*, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-50.
- ¹¹¹ S. Horowitz: *The Soviet Union and the French Left Bloc*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- ¹¹² Rakovski: "Franko-russkie otnosheniya," *Izvestiya*, *loc. cit.*; and K. Radek, "Frantsiya i SSSR," *Pravda*, 26 October 1924.
- ¹¹³ Private letter from A. de Monzie to Rakovski, in Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ¹¹⁴ Private letter from de Monzie to Rakovski, 25 October 1924, in Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ¹¹⁵ Rakovski, "The Recognition by France," *Pravda*, 20 October 1924; and *RIR*, 1 November 1924. See, also, Ts. G.A.O.R. SSSR, f. 413, op. 17 ed. khr 547: Pis'mo Rakovskogo Litvinovu iz Londona, 20 October 1924, quoted in Karpova, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
- ¹¹⁶ Private letter to Rakovski from (unknown), Paris, 16 October 1924, in Louis Fischer's private papers.
- ¹¹⁷ Comte de Sainte-Aulaire: *Confession d'un vieux diplomate* (Paris, 1953), p.745.
- ¹¹⁸ *Auswärtiges Amt*, 2860/5/554491-2; and 9101/4/225752-5, as quoted in Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 41, note 1.

Chapter 15

- ¹ See the well-informed comments by L. Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs*, vol. II, pp. 493-498. For a pro-Soviet view: *Anti-Soviet Forgeries* (Workers' Publications: London, 1927). A recent article seems particularly inconclusive: see N. Grant, "The Zinoviev Letter Case," *Soviet Studies*, vol. XIX (October 1967): pp. 264-277. For a book that makes too much of previously familiar material, see L. Chester, S. Fay, H. Young, *The Zinoviev Letter. A Political Intrigue* (London, 1967).
- ² Quoted by N. Grant, *loc. cit.*
- ³ *The Communist Party on Trial: J. R. Campbell's Defense* (London, 1925), edited by the Communist party of Great Britain, p. 27.
- ⁴ Sir Frederick Maurice, *Haldane, 1915-1928: The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan, K.T., O.M.* (London, 1939), p. 168.
- ⁵ *Kommunisticheskii internatsional v dokumentakh* (Moscow, 1933), p. 411.
- ⁶ The letter is quoted in full in *Anti-Soviet Forgeries, op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.
- ⁷ The London correspondent wired his papers these significant words: "There is a report here to which much credence is attached that before next polling day comes, a bombshell will burst and it will be connected with Zinoviev."
- ⁸ *Manchester Guardian*, 28 October 1924.
- ⁹ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, 19 March 1928, col. 77-78.
- ¹⁰ *A Selection of Papers Dealing with the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, 1921-1927*, Cmd. 2895 (London, 1927), pp. 28-32.
- ¹¹ *Hansard*, House of Commons debates, 9 December 1924, col. 65-67.
- ¹² Telegramma poverennogo v delakh SSSR v Velikobritanii narodnomu kommissariatu inostrannykh del SSSR, 3 November 1924, *D.V.P.* vol. VII, p. 530. For Rakovski's public comments, see his interview in *L'Europe nouvelle*, 8 November 1924, in which he tries to reassure French public opinion and Herriot's government, which had just recognized the Bolsheviks.
- ¹³ *A Selection of Papers . . .*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁴ Louis Fischer's private papers. See, also, private letter from Sir Charles Mendl to Sir W. Tyrell, 1 November 1924 (F.O. 800/220) where we read: "Referring to the Zinoviev letter which he seemed to think had a great effect on the elections, M. Painlevé observed:

it appears to me to be obviously a forgery.”

- ¹⁵ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, 19 March 1928, col. 63.
- ¹⁶ *A Selection of Papers . . .*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁷ I. M. Maisky: “Iz londonskikh vospomonanii (1925–1927),” *Novyi mir*, no. 4 (April 1968), pp. 195–216, and no. 5, pp. 153–167. Maisky worked under Rakovski in London, to begin with as a press attaché.
- ¹⁸ C. Mowat, *Britain between the Wars, 1918–1940* (London, 1968), p. 671.
- ¹⁹ Private and confidential letter from W. S. Churchill to A. Chamberlain, 14 November 1924 (the same letter was sent to the prime minister), in Sir Austen Chamberlain’s private papers, F.O. 800/256.
- ²⁰ Private letter from A. Chamberlain to W. S. Churchill, 17 November 1924, F.O. 800/256.
- ²¹ Private letter from A. Chamberlain to W. S. Churchill, 5 November 1925, F.O. 800/258.
- ²² Cf. memorandum by W. Strang, 5 June 1925, N 3604/3604/38, F.O. 371/11028 and H. A. Gwynne’s letter (of the *Morning Post*) to Austen Chamberlain, 8 October 1925, F.O. 800/258.
- ²³ Minute by J. D. Gregory on the confidential enquiry the F.O. made on the trade delegation, 17 September 1923, N 7652/550/38, F.O. 371/9356.
- ²⁴ This memorandum is quoted in a private and personal letter from Max Muller (Warsaw), 25 August 1925, to Austen Chamberlain, F.O. 371/258.
- ²⁵ Conversation between Austen Chamberlain and Rakovski, Foreign Office, 21 November 1924: for the British account, see *A Selection of Papers . . .*, *op cit.*, No. 9, p. 34; for the Soviet account, cf. *Neue Freie Presse*, 15 and 16 October 1927, which was reproduced as an article by Rakovski: “Moi besedy s Chamberlenom,” *Molodaya gvardiya* (November 1927): no. 11, pp. 205–212.
- ²⁶ Cf. “Kh. G. Rakovski o mezhdunarodnom polozhenii,” *Izvestiya*, 7 July 1925.
- ²⁷ Conversation between Chamberlain and Rakovski, Foreign Office, 1 April 1925, in *A Selection of Papers . . .*, *op. cit.*, N. 11, p. 38.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ Conversation between Chamberlain and Rakovski, 6 January 1925, in *A Selection of Papers . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
- ³⁰ “Anglo–Soviet Relations. A Speech by C. G. Rakovski,” *RIR*, 3 January 1925, pp. 5–7.

- ³¹ "The 'Mystery' of Anglo-Soviet Trade," *RIR*, 3 January 1925, p. 7.
- ³² "Anglo-Soviet Relations. A Speech by C. G. Rakovski," *loc. cit.*
- ³³ Minute by P. M. Roberts, N 39/39/38, 2 January 1924, F.O. 371/10463.
- ³⁴ Private notes by Krasin on the monopoly of foreign trade, (Krasin's Archives, Amsterdam, n.d.). See, also, his interesting article: "Lenin and Foreign Trade," *RIR*, 9 February 1924. For a more detailed analysis, cf. his book: *Monopolyia vneshnei trgovli i N.E.P.* (Izd. Proletarii: Karkov, 1926), pp. 11-20; cf., also, M. I. Frumkin, "L. B. Krasin i monopoliya vneshnei trgovli," *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, no. 12 (December 1926), pp. 14-24. For an official study of the monopoly of Foreign Trade, see *RIR*: 5 April 1924, pp. 215-216.
- ³⁵ Private notes by Krasin: *loc. cit.*
- ³⁶ "Anglo-Soviet Relations. A Speech by C. G. Rakovski," *loc. cit.*
- ³⁷ Report from Lord D'Abernon (Berlin), 25 January 1924, N 792/81/38, F.O. 371/10473.
- ³⁸ Copy of a letter dated 30 January 1924 addressed to Messrs. Vickers Ltd., London, by their Russian correspondent and communicated to the Board of Trade, 11 February 1924, N 1207/813338, F.O. 371/10473.
- ³⁹ Minute on the letter from B.S.A. Guns Ltd., 22 February 1924, in *ibid.*
- ⁴⁰ Minute of Maxse (Northern Department, F.O.), initialled by MacDonald, 7 March 1924, N 2028/81/38, in *ibid.*
- ⁴¹ Letter from Rakovski to Ponsonby, 5 July 1924, N 5668/81/38, F.O. 371/10475.
- ⁴² Minute by O'Malley (Northern Department F.O.) on letter from Sir V. Caillard (Vickers Ltd.), 27 September 1924, N 7468/81/38, in *ibid.*
- ⁴³ Report N 9357/81/38, in F.O. 371/10473.
- ⁴⁴ Quoted in Report N 9357/81/38, in F.O. 371/10473.
- ⁴⁵ Conversation between Chamberlain and Rakovski, 1 April 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.* Matters of psychology were, of course, extremely important where Soviet Russia was concerned. Thus, while the Labour government negotiated with the Soviets and despite the celebrated "Bankers' Memorandum," Arcos had been granted credits by English banks to a total of £16,859,631, *RIR*, 6 December 1924.
- ⁴⁷ Conversation between Chamberlain and Rakovski, 1 April 1925, *loc. cit.*

- ⁴⁸ Secret report from Home Office 411534/97 sent to F.O., 19 May 1924, in file N 4296/81/38: "Purchase of War Material by the Soviet Union," F.O. 371/10473.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁰ Conversation between Chamberlain and Rakovski, 1 April 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵¹ Confidential letter from Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell, Geneva, 8 June 1925, C 7862/459/18 (N 3412/29/38 in the Northern Department), F.O. 371/11016.
- ⁵² Stalin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, *op. cit.* vol. V, p. 237.
- ⁵³ Rakovski, "Lokarno i Blizhnii vostok," *Novyi vostok*, no. 10-11 (1925): pp. xii-xv: this article is the preface Rakovski wrote to M. Rafail's book, *Blizhnyi vostok* (Moscow, 1925), *Izd. Gosizda*; cf., also, the speech by Rykov on 1 December 1924, as quoted in M. Pavlovich: "Anglo-Sovetskie otnosheniya," *Krasnaya nov'*, no. 25 (January 1925): pp. 245-255.
- ⁵⁴ Secret memorandum by A. Chamberlain to the prime minister, 24 July 1925, in A. Chamberlain's private papers, F.O. 800/258.
- ⁵⁵ Secret memorandum by A. Chamberlain to the prime minister, 24 July 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁶ Confidential report by M. Peters (Moscow) to A. Chamberlain, 30 January 1925, N 710/710/38, on the "Speech by C. Rakovski, Chicherin's senior deputy, at the Teachers' Congress"; see, also, the interview Rakovski gave to the correspondent of *Rabochaya Moskva* (14 January 1925) in the train that brought him back to Moscow for a few days.
- ⁵⁷ Speech by Rakovski at the Teachers' Congress in Moscow, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁹ Speech by Rakovski at the Teachers' Congress in Moscow, *loc. cit.*
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁶¹ Memorandum by W. Strang (Northern Department) on Soviet Russia, 10 February 1925, N 838/838/38, F.O. 371/11022.
- ⁶² "Rakovski on Anglo-Soviet Relations," *New Leader*, vol. XII, no. 3, 17 July 1925, p. 1.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁴ Private letter from Chamberlain to Tyrrell, 12 June 1925, F.O. 800/258.
- ⁶⁵ Conversation between Chamberlain and Rakovski, 1 April 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁶⁶ Rakovski, "Lokarnskii dogovor i ego posledstviya," *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

- ⁶⁷ For British analyses of the Locarno Conference, cf. C. Glasgow: *From Dawes to Locarno (1924-25)* (London, 1925); Wickham Steed: "Locarno and the British Interests," *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, vol. IV, no. 6 (November 1925): pp. 286-303; and W. G., "Locarno," *Labour Magazine* (November 1925): pp. 319-322. For the French point of view, see: A. Fabre-Luce: *Locarno sans rêve* (Paris, Grasset, 1927); and L. Dumont-Wilden, "Les accords de Locarno et la nouvelle orientation politique," *Revue bleue* (1925): pp. 708 ff.; also, his: "L'Allemagne et la Russie devant le pacte de Locarno," *Revue bleue* (1926): pp. 49 ff. For the German side, see: G. Streseman, *Six années de politique allemande. Les papiers de Streseman* (T 11, *Locarno et Genève, 1925-1926* (Paris, Plon, 1932); Thälmann: *Locarno, der neue Kriegspakt* (Berlin, 1925); W. Freiherr von Reinbaben, "Deutsche Ostpolitik in Locarno," *Aussen Politik. Zeitschrift für Internationale Fragen* (Stuttgart), vol. IV, no. 1, January 1953. For the Soviet side, cf. the series of documents *Lokarnskaya konferentsiya, 1925, Dokumenty* (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1959), p. 512 and "Lokarnskaya Konferentsiya 1925 g.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (1956): no. 4-5, pp. 130-147; for studies by various bolshevik leaders, cf. Rakovski, "The Guarantee Pact," *Communist International* (July 1925): pp. 11-34; also, his "Lokarnskii dogovor i ego posledstviya," *Mirovoe khozyaistvo i morovaya politika*, no. 1 (1926): pp. 33-50; L. B. Krasin: "Lokarno i SSSR," *Kommunist*, no. 240 (1925); K. Radek: "Garantinyi pakt," *Izvestiya*, 22 October 1925, p. 1; see, also, Odi: "Lokarnskaya konferentsiya," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 4-5 (1925): pp. 3-22; L. Ivanov: "Lokarno v svete anglo-frantsuzskikh protivorechi," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, no. 3 (1926): pp. 27-48; Postscript, "Zheneva. Vpechatleniya konferentsii v Lokarno," *ibid.*, no. 4 (1926): pp. 62-65; for more recent Soviet analyses, cf. V. M. Turok, "Ot plana Dauesa k garantiinomu paktu," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1948): pp. 22-42; and his book: *Lokarno* (Izd. AN.SSSR) (Moscow, 1949).
- ⁶⁸ Rakovski, "Lokarnskii dogovor i ego posledstviya," *op. cit.* p. 33.
- ⁶⁹ Rakovski, "The Guarantee Pact," *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- ⁷⁰ Cf. Private letter from H. A. Gwynne (*Morning Post*) to Chamberlain, 8 October 1925, F.O. 800/258.
- ⁷¹ Cf. E. H. Carr: *International Relations between the Two World Wars (1919-39)* (London, 1965), pp. 93-97; and M. Baumont: *La faillite de la paix*, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-323.
- ⁷² Private letter from A. Chamberlain to L. S. Amery, 6 August

- 1925, F.O. 800/258.
- ⁷³ Rakovski, "The Guarantee Pact," *op. cit.*, p. 17.
- ⁷⁴ Rakovski, "The Guarantee Pact," *op. cit.*, p. 24.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁶ Rakovski, "Lokarnskii dogovor i ego posledstviya," *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.
- ⁷⁷ Rakovski, "The Guarantee Pact," *op. cit.*, p. 28.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁹ Private and confidential letter from A. Chamberlain to L. S. Amery, 19 June 1925, F.O. 800/258.
- ⁸⁰ Confidential report from Lord D'Abernon to A. Chamberlain, 17 October 1925, N 5905/710/38, F.O. 371/11022.
- ⁸¹ E. H. Carr: *Socialism in One Country*, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, i, p. 441.
- ⁸² Private letter from Chamberlain to Tyrrell, 4 October 1925 (Locarno), F.O. 371/11022.
- ⁸³ Confidential report from Lord D'Abernon to A. Chamberlain, 17 October 1925, N 5907/710/38, *loc. cit.*
- ⁸⁴ Cf. the interesting article by C. Loutre, "M. Tchitcherine, le partenaire inattendu," *Europe nouvelle* (10 October 1925): pp. 1343-1344.
- ⁸⁵ Briand admitted to Chamberlain in Locarno that he was "a little preoccupied by Chicherin's activities," as he had heard of another scheme of his: "to form a Russo-German-Polish combination, to include also Italy and extending to Turkey and China." Briand was the more worried by this fantastic plan because Mussolini had been lending some countenance to the idea. See letter from A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell, 4 October 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁸⁶ Confidential report from Lord D'Abernon to A. Chamberlain, 17 October 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁸⁷ Private and confidential report from Lord D'Abernon to A. Chamberlain (sent as a page of his diary), 28 December 1924, F.O. 800/257.
- ⁸⁸ *Brockdorff-Rantzau Nachlass*, 9101/227160, as quoted by E. H. Carr, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-276, note 2. See, also, M. Skobelev, "Sovetsko-germanskie torgovye otnosheniya i Lokarno," *Planovoe khozyaistvo* (1926), no. 2, pp. 236-242.
- ⁸⁹ Letter from H. A. Gwynne (*Morning Post*) to A. Chamberlain, 8 October 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹⁰ Already in June 1925, Chamberlain wrote to L. S. Amery: "Russia is putting the strongest pressure on Germany to prevent her from coming to an arrangement with France and Great Britain and no less to prevent her from entering into the League, and fear of

Russia plays a great part in German policy," private letter, 19 June 1925, F.O. 800/258.

- ⁹¹ Private and personal letter from A. Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 18 March 1925, F.O. 800/257.
- ⁹² Private letter from A. Chamberlain to L. S. Amery, 6 August 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹³ Private and personal letter from A. Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 18 March 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹⁴ For a detailed analysis of this point, and for a study of the reasons which the Soviet Union had at that time chosen not to enter the League of Nations, cf. Rakovski, "Liga natsii i SSSR," *Mezhdunarodnaya letopis'* (1925): no. 12, pp. 3-20.
- ⁹⁵ Rakovski, "The Guarantee Pact," *op. cit.* p. 33.

Chapter 16

- ¹ Quoted in L. Fischer, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 614. During Rakovski's farewell visit to Chamberlain on 5 November 1925, the latter took the opportunity of telling the Soviet representative that he was "far too intelligent a person and far too well informed to suppose that such a policy could have any chance of success. Rakovski replied that such a policy would indeed be "idiotic." (*A Selection of Papers, op. cit.*, p. 41.)
- ² *Izvestiya*, 14 January 1926; *Le Temps*, 14 January 1926 (quoted by Carr: *op. cit.*, p. 423.)
- ³ Rakovski, "The Decline of the World's Shop," *Communist International*, no. 6 (43), June 1925, pp. 85-96.
- ⁴ Rakovski, "The Decline of the World's Shop," *op. cit.*, p. 96.
- ⁵ It has been suggested that de Monzie and Rakovski went as far as inspiring an article published in *Poslednie novosti* (24 December 1924), according to which Franco-Soviet negotiations would only progress if Rakovski was in Paris, for he was the man to "establish good personal relations" with his interlocutors (quoted in S. Schram: "Christian Rakovski et le premier rapprochement franco-soviétique," *op. cit.*, p. 226.)
- ⁶ Private letter from L. B. Krasin to his wife, 23 October 1925 (Krasin's private archives, *loc. cit.*).
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ Confidential report from the Marquess of Crewe to A. Chamberlain, 1 February 1926, F.O. Western/11838.
- ⁹ Confidential letter from the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to A. Chamberlain, 25 November 1925, F.O. 800/258.

- ¹⁰ "La visite de M. Tchitcherine à Paris," *Europe nouvelle* (5 December 1925): pp. 1626–1627; cf. also *D.V.P.*: T VIII, doc. no. 398, pp. 690–692.
- ¹¹ E. H. Carr: *Socialism in One Country*, *op. cit.*, p. 421.
- ¹² Cf. Berthelot's article in *Le Journal*, 14 December 1925; and *D.V.P.* T VIII, pp. 731 and 812; cf., also, *Le Temps*, 19 February 1926.
- ¹³ Rakovski, "La politique extérieure de l'URSS et les négociations franco-soviétiques," *Europe nouvelle*, (19 June 1926): pp. 838–843.
- ¹⁴ Much has been written on the problem of Bessarabia: for a pro-Romanian view, cf. C. Clark, *Bessarabia, Russia and Rumania on the Black Sea* (New York, 1927); A. Boldur, *La Bessarabie et les relations franco-roumaines* (Paris, 1927); A. Popovici, *The Political Status of Bessarabia* (publ. for "School of Foreign Service," Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1931); for a pro-Soviet view, see L. N. Aleksandri, *Bessarabiya i bessarabskii vopros* (Moscow, 1924); "Bessarabskii vopros v franko-rumynskom dogovore," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (1926): no. 9, pp. 72–74; B. Dembo, *Sovetskaya Moldaviya i bessarabskii vopros* (Moscow, 1925); A. N. Kroupensky, *The Rumanian Occupation in Bessarabia* (Paris, 1920); M. Pavlovich, "Rumyniya v mirovoi voine i bessarabskii vopros," *Molodaya gvardiya* (1926), no. 6, pp. 100–115; Kh. Rakovski, "Aide-Memoire on the Subject of Bessarabia at the Vienna Conference of March 1924," *RIR*, (23 August 1924); cf. also P. N. Miliukov: *The Case for Bessarabia: A Collection of Documents on the Rumanian Occupation* (London): Russian Liberation Committee Publication, No. 8, (1919); A. Babel: *La Bessarabie* (Paris, 1926); J. Okhotnikov et Bashinskii, *La Bessarabie et la paix européenne* (Paris, 1927); I. G. Pelivan, *La Bessarabie sous le régime russe* (Paris, 1919); C. L. G. Uhlig, *Die Besssarabische Frage* (Breslau, 1926); A. Mandelstam, "La Bessarabie," *Le Monde slave* (August 1925).
- ¹⁵ Rakovski's interview in *Izvestiya*, 2 February 1926.
- ¹⁶ A. Dolgov and M. Kaufman, "Le commerce extérieur de l'URSS et la France," *Europe nouvelle* (19 June 1926): pp. 856–860.
- ¹⁷ "Franco-Soviet Trade Relations," *RIR*, 8 November 1924.
- ¹⁸ Cf. "Russian Oil and France," F.O. Memorandum, 16 February 1926, F.O. 371/11787.
- ¹⁹ For analyses of the most complicated question of the "oil war," cf. A. C. Bedford, "The World Oil Situation," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 3 (15 March 1923); W. P. Coates: *The Burning Question of Russian Oil* (London, 1927); F. Delaisi, "A Truce in

the Petrol War," *New Leader* (30 May 1924): p. 4; L. Denny: *We Fight for Oil* (New York, 1926); L. Fischer: *Oil Imperialism. The International struggle for Petroleum* (New York, 1926); K. Gofman, *Neftyanaya politika i anglo-saksonskii imperalism* (Moscow, 1930); *Justice or Plunder: Soviet Oil Scandal: The Facts About Soviet Confiscation and Dishonesty*, Association of British Creditors of Russia, (1925); P. Kitaigorodskii, "Na volnakh nefti," *Kommunisticheskaya revoliutsiya*, no. 1 (40) (January 1923)): pp. 71-75; E. F. Wise, "Oil and Democracy," *New Leader* (27 March 1925): p. 17.

²⁰ *Journal officiel de la république française*, 8 February 1926. For Rakovski's contacts with Standard Oil, see *D.V.P.*, T X, pp. 230 and 636.

²¹ "French Banks and Russian Oil," F.O. Memorandum, 20 February 1926, F.O. 371/11787; cf., also, the *Times*, same day.

²² During his trial in 1937, Rakovski mentioned Emile Buré in particular, who was "an old close friend of [his] in France," and the "director of one of the largest and most influential French newspapers, *L'Ordre*; (cf. *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of Anti-Soviet Block of Rights and Trotskyites* (Moscow, 1938), p.297). As we know, Emile Buré was *chef de cabinet* to Briand for many years, but turned against him in 1924 and began writing for *L'Eclair*. He had formed friendships "with all sorts and conditions of politicians that had never been broken" and was "extremely well up in parliamentary gossip." (Cf. the confidential letters of C. Mendl, Paris, to W. Tyrrell of 1 August and 15 October 1924, F.O. 800/220.)

²³ The *Times*, "Soviet Propaganda and Credit Rumors," 12 April 1926.

²⁴ The *Times*, 9 April 1926.

²⁵ *Le Temps* and the *Times*, 9 April 1926.

²⁶ The *Times*, 12 April 1926.

²⁷ The newspaper Rakovski used most was *Paris-Soir*, which regularly printed so-called interviews. These were, in fact, articles Rakovski wrote himself, and were published at the propitious moment. Rakovski was thus much more effective than Krasin. The latter had offered 500,000 francs, and then 750,000 to *Le Temps* to send a correspondent to Moscow; the latter was supposed to print dispassionate and increasingly favorable reports, to refrain from adverse editorial comment on Soviet affairs, and to support "a line favorable to the USSR in foreign relations." At this point, the matter was referred to the Politburo, which refused to go higher, so that the transaction fell through (cf. *Trotsky's*

- Diary in Exile*), 1958, pp. 30–31, as quoted in E. H. Carr: *op. cit.*, p. 419.)
- ²⁸ *Le Nord industriel*, 25 August 1926; cf., also, memorandum by the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to F.O., 31 August 1926, N 4011/418/38, F.O. 371/111788.
- ²⁹ *Le Nord industriel*, 25 August 1926.
- ³⁰ Cf. Rakovski's revealing letter to Litvinov, 7 May 1927, *D.V.P.* T X, document no. 114, pp. 188–191.
- ³¹ L. Perlin, "Les concessions en URSS," *Europe nouvelle* (19 June 1926): pp. 851–853.
- ³² See memorandum attached to the letter of Eric Phipps (Paris) to V. Wellesley, 31 August 1925, F.O. 800/258; cf., also, *D.V.P.* T VIII, note 31, p. 771; and T X, pp. 32–33 (note by Rakovski of his conversation with Poincaré, 27 January 1927: Poincaré was then president of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance).
- ³³ Memorandum attached to Eric Phipps' letter to V. Wellesley, 31 August 1925, *loc. cit.*
- ³⁴ On the "Georgian Mission" and its activities, cf. *D.V.P.* T VII, doc. no. 246, pp. 514–515; T IX, doc. no. 55, pp. 81–82; doc. 184, pp. 310–312; doc. no. 213, pp. 350; doc. no. 303, pp. 508–509; vol. X, doc. 19, pp. 32–34.
- ³⁵ "Nota polnomochnogo predstavatelya SSSR vo Frantsii—predsedateliu soveta ministrov i ministru inostrannykh del Frantsii Brianu," doc. no. 184, *D.V.P.* T IX, pp. 310–312.
- ³⁶ "Zapis' besedy polnomochnogo predstavatelya SSSR vo Frantsii s predsedatelem soveta ministrov i ministrom finansov Frantsii Puankare," 27 January 1927, doc. N. 19, *D.V.P.* T X, pp. 32–34.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ For analyses of the Franco–Soviet Conference, cf. S. Schram, "Christian Rakovski et le premier rapprochement franco–soviétique," *loc. cit.*; L. Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 614–622 and 709–716; Iu. V. Borisov: *Sovetsko–frantsuzskie otnosheniya*, *loc. cit.*
- ³⁹ Rakovski's interview in *Izvestiya*, 2 February 1926.
- ⁴⁰ *Izvestiya*, 30 January 1926.
- ⁴¹ Rakovski, "La politique extérieure de l'URSS et les négociations franco–soviétiques," *Europe nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴² A. Viollis, "Une conversation avec M. Christian Rakovski, ambassadeur de l'URSS à Paris," *Europe nouvelle*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁴³ Confidential report by M. Wigram (Paris) to F.O., N 460/418/38, 29 January 1926, F.O. 371/111787.

- ⁴⁴ Minute initialled H.K.H., 28 January 1926, in *ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ *Pravda*, 17 January 1926, and *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, no. 19, 26 January 1926, pp. 263-264 (as quoted in E. H. Carr: *op. cit.*, p. 423).
- ⁴⁶ The conversations Krasin had with the president of the French Commission, Dalbiez, in 1925 resulted in an offer to pay a milliard gold rubles of the public debts, or about twenty-five centimes in the franc. At the end of August 1925, these negotiations were said to be "on the point of conclusion, the only question being whether a little further waiting would not bring better terms." The general secretary of the Quai d'Orsay, Berthelot, was then said to be "against immediate acceptance," Dalbiez in favor, for the reason that, if the negotiations were not concluded, Krasin would be replaced by Rakovski, and therefore himself by de Monzie, which finally happened (memorandum by a M. Poliakov attached to the letter of 31 August 1925 from Eric Phipps to V. Wellesley, *loc. cit.*)
- ⁴⁷ The Soviets always proclaimed that the British-Soviet Conference had failed in part because of French influence, and they believed (or seemed to believe) that London played a decisive part in the failure of the Franco-Soviet negotiations.
- ⁴⁸ Confidential memorandum attached to the confidential letter of 18 February 1926 from Leslie Urquhart to J. D. Gregory, N 833/418/38, F.O. 371/111787.
- ⁴⁹ Quoted in the confidential memorandum attached to Urquhart's letter to J. D. Gregory, 18 February 1926, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁰ We saw that, when he was in London, Rakovski persuaded Moscow that he practically had command of the Labour party, and through the Labour party the Labour government. If there certainly was some truth in this belief, it was evidently out of proportion with reality.
- ⁵¹ Quoted in *ibid.*
- ⁵² Rakovski's interview, 2 February 1926; cf., also, Hodgson's report to F.O., N 797/418/38, 10 February 1926, F.O. 371/117/87.
- ⁵³ Many details which we shall not repeat can be found in the well-informed analyses of Louis Fischer, *loc. cit.*, and of Stuart Schram who, as the author, had access to de Monzie's private papers now kept at the Institut d'études politiques (Paris).
- ⁵⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 9 January 1922.
- ⁵⁶ *Izvestiya* and *Le Temps*, 26 February 1926.
- ⁵⁷ *Le Temps*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁵⁸ Quoted in the conversation M. Fleuriau (from the French Embassy in London) had with J. D. Gregory at the Foreign Office,

- 27 March 1926, N 1460/418/38, F.O. 371/111787.
- ⁵⁹ *Rakovski's Private Diary*: notes on his conversations with Cail-
laux, Briand, Berthelot, and de Monzie, 15 July 1926. This is
an extract of Rakovski's private diary, which was published in
1964 in Moscow. It shows a partial rehabilitation of the leading
Soviet diplomat of the 1920s, as Ivan Maiski declared to the au-
thor during their conversation of December 1967. (*D.V.P. T IX*,
pp. 363–366). Cf., also, the obviously inspired article in *Sans fil*,
“M. Rakovski a fait part à M. Briand des déceptions de Moscou
au sujet des pourparlers franco-russe,” which was published on
15 July 1926, i.e., just after Rakovski left Briand.
- ⁶⁰ Cf. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, *op. cit.*, vol. II,
p. 617.
- ⁶¹ *Rakovski's Private Diary*: *loc. cit.*
- ⁶² *Rakovski's Private Diary*: *loc. cit.* In April 1926, Rakovski had
proposed “many ingenious solutions” to the problem of the debts,
such as the institution of some system analogous to the Repa-
rations Recovery Act of 1921, which, as he described it, would
provide France with a method of “auto-rémunération.” Duties
would be levied on goods exported from one country to the other.
This was to be accompanied by the payment of a fixed sum an-
nually by the Soviets up to 25 percent of the gold value of the
Russian debt coupons falling due. (Cf. the statements by de
Monzie and Rakovski on the debt negotiations, *Oeuvre*, 25 April
1926; and confidential memorandum by Lord Crewe to F.O. N
1927/418/38, 27 April 1926, F.O. 371/111787).
- ⁶³ Cf. J. Chastenet: *Histoire de la troisième république*, vol. V,
Les années d'illusion, 1918–1931, (Paris, 1960), pp. 149–150.
- ⁶⁴ Louis Fischer: *loc. cit.* Within two years, Rakovski had grad-
ually raised the offer made by Krasin to the point of proposing
recognition of prewar debts up to about 65 percent of their pa-
per value. (Cf. the convenient *Memorandum sovetskoi delegatsii
na sovetsko-frantsuzskoi konferentsii v Parizhe*, 25 March 1927,
which sums up all the proposals of both delegations from the
beginning of the negotiations, *D.V.P. T X*, pp. 122–124.)
- ⁶⁵ On 8 April 1926, D'Abernon made it clear to Austen Cham-
berlain that “the main cause of Germany's decision finally to
yield to the advances of Russia and sign a new agreement with
her [was] to be attributed to fear of Poland—to alarm lest some
alliance might be established between Russia and Poland or be-
tween Russia and France,” N 1617/718/38, doc. N. 407, *Doc-
uments on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, Series 1a, vol. I
(October 1925–June 1926) (London, 1966), p. 584; see, also,

- D'Abernon's letter to the same, 23 April, doc. no. 454, in *ibid.*, p. 657.
- ⁶⁶ Cf. letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. Ingram (Berlin), 16 April 1926, N 1704/718/38, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy (D.B.F.P.)*, N 434, p. 625.
- ⁶⁷ The 300,000,000 gold marks were to be guaranteed: 35 percent by the German government, 25 percent by the German banks and 40 percent by the German manufacturers who were interested in supplying machinery to Russia. The money was supposed to be spent "mainly on the resuscitation of coal mines, textile industries, and a certain portion devoted to the oil industry." It was further suggested that 25 percent of the money would be spent on the electrical industry. The leaders who had pushed forward the loan for the Deutsche Bank, the great electrical company, A.E.G., and the well-known firm of Otto Wolff (cf. Leslie Urquhart's letter of 18 February 1926 to J. D. Gregory, *loc. cit.*
- ⁶⁸ Rakovski, "Le traité germano-soviétique," *Le Temps*, 26 April 1926.
- ⁶⁹ Quoted in D'Abernon's letter to Sir A. Chamberlain, 25 April 1926, N 1892/718/38, *D.B.F.P.* N 460, p. 667.
- ⁷⁰ Very urgent telegram from Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Prague), N 1600/718/38, 13 April 1926, doc. N 418, *D.B.F.P.*, *op. cit.*, p. 603.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷² Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. Ingram (Berlin), 16 April 1926, *loc. cit.*
- ⁷³ Letter from Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain, 25 April 1926, *loc. cit.*
- ⁷⁴ Minute by Sir W. Tyrrell on the private letter that G. Locker-Lampson sent him on 26 February 1926, in G. Locker-Lampson's private papers, F.O. 800/227; the letter was also read by A. Chamberlain who noted "I agree" after Sir William's minute.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁶ Letter from Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow) to Sir A. Chamberlain N 2241/387/38, 6 May 1926, doc. no. 504, *D.B.F.P.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 724-730.
- ⁷⁷ Letter from Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow) to Sir A. Chamberlain, N 2241/387/38, 6 May 1926, doc. no. 504, *D.B.F.P.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 724-730.
- ⁷⁸ The secretary of the Miners' Federation declared in February 1927 that the British miners had received more than £100,000 "unconditionally from Russia" in answer to their appeal for help, *Daily Herald*, 3 February 1927.

- ⁷⁹ Rakovski, "Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie," *Mirovoe khozyaistvo i mirovaya politika* (1926): no. 2, pp. 3–15.
- ⁸⁰ For a general view of the events, cf. C. Brandt: *Stalin's Failure in China (1924–1927)* (Harvard U.P., 1958), p. 226, which gives a most interesting analysis of the opposition between Stalin and Trotsky on the Chinese issue; see, also, H. Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927* (Geneva, 1966); G. Mazzolini, *L'Antagonismo anglo-russo dans Asia* (Pavia, 1927); for a more precise study, cf. Z. Iman: *Soviet Russia's Policy Towards India and Its Effect on Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1928* (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1965); for Soviet analyses, see G. Voitnitsky, "British Imperialism in China," *Communist International*, (November 1924) no. 6, pp. 17–27; K. Radek, "New Imperialist Attack in the East," *Communist International*, (March 1925), no. 9, pp. 17–27; for diverse views in Anglo-Saxon periodicals, cf. "The Red Menace in Asia," *The New Statesman*, 25 September 1926, pp. 666–667; N. Roosevelt, "Great Britain and Russian in China," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1926): pp. 80–91; or C. Sforza, "Imperialistic Russia in China," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 1, (October 1927): pp. 67–75.
- ⁸¹ Private letter from Sir C. Mendl (Paris) to W. Tyrrell, 4 December 1926, in Mendl's private papers, F.O. 800/330.
- ⁸² Confidential memorandum by J. D. Gregory, N 5670/387/38, 10 December 1926, F.O. 371/11787.
- ⁸³ Confidential memorandum by J. D. Gregory, N 5670/387/38, 10 December 1926, F.O. 371/11787.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ *Hansard*, 16 May 1927, cols. 915, 916.
- ⁸⁶ *The Times*: 28 May 1927.
- ⁸⁷ Confidential letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to the Home Secretary (Sir W. Joynson-Hicks), 5 May 1925, F.O. 371/11010. If the raid on Arcos did not produce any important document (see Baldwin's speech to Commons on May 24), the Foreign Office possessed many incriminating documents. We may take only one significant example by referring to a document that was intercepted in June 1925; this, as a Foreign Office official wrote good-humoredly, was an "elaborate and ably written treatise on the gentle art of strike-organization as a means of civil war" in Great Britain. It was apparently written in mid-1924 and prepared in connection with the discussions of the Third Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions, which gathered in July 1924, cf. file "Strike Strategy in Britain," F.O. 371/11028.
- ⁸⁸ Quoted in Mendl's private letter to Sir W. Tyrrell, 7 June 1926,

F.O. 800/330.

- ⁸⁹ See Mendl's private letter to Lord Crewe, 1 September 1926, F.O. 800/300.
- ⁹⁰ Cf. letter from M. Phipps (Paris) to M. Lampson, C 5503/5139/18, 8 May 1926, in *D.B.F.P.*, *op. cit.*, doc. no. 511, p. 738.
- ⁹¹ The letter is partly quoted in L. Fischer: *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 709. For the full text, see de Monzie's private archives, Institut d'études politiques, (Paris).
- ⁹² *Ibid.*
- ⁹³ Louis Fischer's private archives: *loc. cit.*
- ⁹⁴ Rakovski was expelled at the same time as Trotsky (27 September 1927) from the Executive of the Comintern: see I. Deutscher: *The Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky 1921-1927*, vol. II, pp. 359-361 (Vintage Russian Library: New York, 1965); and Trotsky's letter to Rakovski, 30 September 1927, *Trotsky Archives*, vol. 1018, BMS. Russ. 13.
- ⁹⁵ Rakovski, *SSSR: novyi etap v sovetskom soiuznom stroitel'stve*, *loc. cit.*
- ⁹⁶ Rakovski's speech to the Karkov Town Council during the official session consecrated to the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution, 5 November 1927. Kaganovich referred to these words in the attack he pronounced against Rakovski at the Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union C.P.(b), 4 December 1927, morning session, *Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1961), vol. I, p. 152; vol. II, p. 1631, note 115.
- ⁹⁷ Cf. Rakovski, *Oppozitsiya i tret'ya sila* (Ne skazannaya rech' tov. Rakovskogo na ob'edinennom plenum Ts.K. i Ts.K.K.) end of October 1927, *Trotsky Archives*, T 1042, BMS. Russ. 13. (This speech was in fact pronounced by Rakovski a month later at the Sixteenth Moscow Provincial Conference; for an answer to this speech, cf. Karakhan's and Rosengolts' attacks on Rakovski, *Izvestiya*, 25 November 1927.)
- ⁹⁸ The full text was first published in Paris in *L'Europe nouvelle* 8 October 1927; for a translation in English, cf. A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (London (R.I.I.A.) and Oxford, 1927) p. 289.
- ⁹⁹ *Rakovski's Speech to the Fifteenth Congress of the A-U.K.P.(b)*, 5th session (morning) 5 December 1927, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 209.
- ¹⁰² Rakovski, *Oppozitsiya i tret'ya sila*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰³ Stalin's words are quoted by Trotsky in his letter of warning to Rakovski, 30 September 1927, *loc. cit.*

- ¹⁰⁴ Stalin's words are quoted by Trotsky in his letter of warning to Rakovski, 30 September 1927, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰⁵ Trotsky and Rakovski were expelled from the CEC at that very session.
- ¹⁰⁶ Rakovski, *Oppozitsiya i tret'ya sila*, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰⁷ Trotsky's letter to Rakovski, 30 September 1927, *loc. cit.*
- ¹⁰⁸ The text of the letter as quoted by Chicherin is L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 712.
- ¹⁰⁹ Cf. *L'Oeuvre*, and *Le Petit parisien*, and *L'Humanité*, 10 April 1927.
- ¹¹⁰ For more details on this point, see L. Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 712-713.
- ¹¹¹ The reading of Coty's pamphlet: *Contre le communisme* (Grasset, Paris, 1927) is most revealing. It states in some detail all the attacks that were then made against communism, in general, and against Rakovski, in particular.

Chapter 17

- ¹ *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites"* (Moscow, 1938), pp. 152, 312.
- ² See Deutscher: *The Prophet Unarmed*, pp. 271 ff.
- ³ *Report of Court Proceedings . . .*, p. 153.
- ⁴ *Supra*, note 2.
- ⁵ Deutscher: *The Soviet Trade Unions. Their Place in Soviet Labour Policy* (London, 1950), pp. 42 ff.
- ⁶ Deutscher: *The Prophet Unarmed*, p. 284.
- ⁷ Broué: *op. cit.*, p. 235.
- ⁸ Rakovski: "Oppozitsiya i tret'yaya sila," *loc. cit.*
- ⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰ Deutscher: *The Prophet Unarmed*, pp. 357-359.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² Trotsky: *Ma Vie* (Gallimard, Paris, 1930), vol. III, p. 258.
- ¹³ See Victor Serge: *Le Tournant Obscur* (Paris, 1951).
- ¹⁴ Pierre Naville: *Trotsky vivant* (Julliard edition, Dossiers des "Lettres Nouvelles," 1962, pp. 34-35.

- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- ¹⁶ Deutscher: *The Prophet Unarmed*, p. 373.
- ¹⁷ Louis Fischer Papers, conversation with Rakovski, Saratov, April 1929.
- ¹⁸ *Pyatnadsatyi S'ezd V.K.P. (b)*, December 1927, (Moscow edition, 1961), conversation with Mikhailovski (Moscow), vol. 1, p. 186.
- ¹⁹ Author's conversation with Boris Souvarine, Paris, May 1972.
- ²⁰ *Pyatnadstatyi S'ezd V. K. P.(b)*, Novitchenko's speech (Zaparoje) vol. II, p. 1012.
- ²¹ *Pyatnadtsatyi S'ezd V. K. P.(b)*, *op. cit.* Lazar Kaganovitch's speech, vol. I, p. 152.
- ²² *Proletarii* (Karkov), No. 256, 10 November 1927.
- ²³ *Pyatnadstatyi S'ezd*, vol. I, p. 152.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, Pr:metchaniya, vol. II, p. 1632.
- ²⁵ *Proletarii* (Karkov), No. 258, 12 November 1927.
- ²⁶ *Supra*, note 21, p. 153.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ See Broué: *op. cit.*, p. 249.
- ²⁹ Deutscher: *The Prophet Unarmed*, p. 381.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 387.
- ³¹ See Naville: *Trotsky vivant*, pp. 26-29; Deutscher: *The Prophet Unarmed*, *loc. cit.*; Fischer: *Men and Politics*, pp. 82-94.
- ³² *Pyatnadtsatyi S'ezd V. K. P. (b)*, Rakovski's speech, vol. I, p. 208.
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 214.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 212.
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